



STALIN

Transcripts From the Soviet Archives

Compiled from
Selected Transcripts 1903 -1951
Politburo and Church
Transcripts from the Soviet Archives
Selected Secret Documents From Soviet FP

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TRANSCRIPTS
FROM THE
SOVIET ARCHIVES

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Transcripts are compiled from the Draft Books (as of January 2021);

Selected Transcripts 1903 - 1951 from Soviet Archives, Vol I, thru, III

Transcripts from the Soviet Archives, Vol I thru XIV

Politburo and the Church 1922 – 1924

Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Most transcripts are uncorrected, directly from the stenograph, that is why redundancy, incomplete sentences (due to noise or other reasons section of speech is not heard to be recorded in full), expressions and words that is kind of “You had to be there to understand” etc., will inevitably be noticed. Translation was done as it is, in some cases explanations are added in italic.

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Report of the Minister of Justice on the Tiflis Social Democratic Organization - 1903

Asource: RGIA. F. 1405. Op. 521 D. 455.L. 482-486.

Archive: RGIA. F. 1405. Op. 521 D. 455.L. 482-486.

Approved July 9, 1903

At the beginning of 1902, anti-government appeals began to circulate among the employees of the Transcaucasian railways in a significant number of copies.

The resulting formal inquiry established that in October 1901 a secret community was formed in Tiflis, which, having appropriated the name "Tiflis Circle of the Social Democratic Workers' Party," set its immediate task to incite discontent in the working class with the existing state and economic system. types of achieving political freedom. The organization was headed by the "Central Committee", whose members, having entered into relations with the artisans, invited the latter to gatherings, where they introduced them to the works of underground literature and conducted socialist conversations, convincing those present to unite into unions and enter into an open struggle with the capitalists and the government by arranging strikes and street demonstrations. Besides,

Prominent positions in the community were held by:

- 1) Vasily Zakharov Tsabadze (30 years old, from a peasant, Orthodox, married, graduated from a vocational school course, counting official of the control of the Transcaucasian Railways),
- 2) Georgy Artemiev Karadzhev (39 years old, tradesman, of Armenian-Gregorian origin, married, has 2 children, graduated from the University of Geneva, correspondent of the Tiflis Commercial Bank),
- 3) Zakhary Iosifov Chobrishvili (35 years old, tradesman, Orthodox, single, literate, machinist),
- 4) Georgy Ivanov Chkheidze (25 years old, peasant, Orthodox, married, has 2 children, literate, painter),

5) Callistrat Gigoev Gogua (27 years old, peasant, Orthodox, single, graduated from the course of a technical railway school, has no specific occupations),

6) Joseph Vissarionov Dzhugashvili (23 years old, peasant, Orthodox, single, did not graduate from the seminary course, does not have certain occupations),

7) Arakel Grigoriev Okuashvili (37 years old, tradesman, Armenian-Gregorian confession, married, has 3 children, literate, machinist),

8) Mikhail Zosimov Gureshidze (21 years old, peasant, Orthodox, single, graduated from a vocational school, turner), Polikarp Nikolaevich Macharadze (24 years old, peasant, Orthodox, single, literate, painter),

10) Severian Moiseev Dzhugeli (24 years old, son of a priest, Orthodox, married, has a daughter, did not complete the course of the seminary, clerk),

11) Yason Efimov Megrelidze (27 years old, son of a priest, Orthodox, single, did not finish the course of theological seminary, clerk) .- L. 482 rev. - 483

The aforementioned persons, joining the "central committee", of which Tsabadze was elected chairman, formed several workers' circles, made anti-government speeches at the craftsmen's visits, convincing listeners not only to improve their financial situation, but also to strive to overthrow the autocratic power, and also disseminated a large number of illegal publications. Along with this, Tsabadze and Karadzhev were the "controllers" of the above "cash desk", and Chodrishvili and Chkheidze were in charge of its operations. The same Karadzhev and Chkheidze prepared criminal appeals and supplied the artisans with them, in addition, Karadzhev was an intermediary in the relations of the "committee" with underground organizations from other cities, Gogua led the meetings of "advanced" workers, Dzhugashvili was sent, for propaganda purposes, to the city of Batum, Chodrishvili and Okuashvili provided the apartment they occupied for the "committee" meeting and kept the printing accessories purchased by the circle, such

as: a metal board, a frame and a steel printing roller; Macharadze was in charge of the secret library and took part in the affairs of the "cash desk"; as for Gureshidze, Dzhugeli and Megrelidze, they vigorously disseminated community publications.

A search in Karadzhev's belongings found 6 works in French that were not allowed to circulate; in addition to the above items, Chodrishvili's memorable book was taken, with his own handwritten notes on the number of banned publications produced and distributed by the "committee", 8 sheets with information on the movement of community funds, 2 issues of the underground newspaper "Iskra" and 3 poems of criminal content, a revolutionary brochure and a poem were taken from Gureshidze's property, while Macharadze had a report from the "cash desk". (L. 483v. - 484)

During interrogation, the accused rejected the fairness of the facts ascertained in relation to their circumstances.

The closest collaborators of the aforementioned agitators were:

12) Yakov Averyanov Kochetkov (23 years old, tradesman, Orthodox, married, has a son, literate, worker),

13) Georgy Zakharov Lelashvili (20 years old, tradesman, Orthodox, single, literate, locksmith),

14) Leonty Alekseev Zolotarev (22 years old, peasant, Orthodox, single, graduated from the city school, locksmith),

15) Nikolay Stepanov Erikov (33 years old, tradesman, Catholic, single, literate, locksmith),

16) Anna Yakovleva Krasnova (28 years old, daughter of a priest, Orthodox, unmarried, completed the course of the diocesan women's school, passed the test for the title of midwife),

17) Hovhannes Gevorkov Unanov, aka Unanyants (34 years old peasant, Armenian-Gregorian faith, married, literate, locksmith),

18) Kirill Alekseev Kakhelidze (33 years old, son of a deacon, Orthodox, single, illiterate, locksmith),

19) Vladimir Iosifov Iashvili (28 years old, nobleman, Orthodox, single, did not complete the course of the teachers' seminary, clerk),

20) Georgy Gavrilov Arabelidze (22 years old, peasant, Orthodox, single, graduated from a medical assistant school, served as a supervisor of a city shelter for the mentally ill in Tiflis),

21) Vaclav Ivanov Pulavsky (28 years old, tradesman, Catholic, married, has a son, literate, painter).

Of these, Kochetkov, Lelashvili, Zolotarev, Erikov and Krasnova, being at the head of separate circles, organized conspiratorial meetings at which they explained to artisans the essence of socialist doctrines, read illegal works and discussed ways of fighting the capitalists and the government. The same Kochetkov, Erikov and Zolotarev distributed forbidden works to artisans, Unanov, Kakhetelidze and Iashvili collected monetary contributions for the needs of agitation, Arabelidze had a warehouse of underground literature, Pulavsky, in conversations with his comrades, promoted anti-government ideas and supplied his acquaintances with revolutionary publications, Iashvili conceded for "business" meetings of the leaders of the organization with each other and with the workers, and also had a close relationship with the secret "cash desk". (L. 484 rev.)

Among the things of Iashvili, a report on the movement of the money of the "circle", written by him in his own hand, was found, and a copy of this document, reproduced by Iashvili, ended up with Chodrishvili; in Lelashvili's apartment, about 12 appeals in Russian, Georgian and Armenian, issued by the "committee," and 5 pounds of typographic type were selected.

The named persons did not plead guilty to the criminal acts attributed to them.

Community members also included:

22) Kosma Dianozov Dolidze (19 years old, peasant, Orthodox, single, literate, locksmith),

23) Irakli Dmitriev Tsuladze (30 years old, peasant, Orthodox, single, illiterate, turner),

24) Alexey Petrov Zakomolkin (21 years old, tradesman, Orthodox, single, graduated from the city school course, turner),

25) Georgy Antonov Ninua, aka Ninuashvili (27 years old, peasant, Orthodox, single, literate, foundry worker), who, participating in workers' gatherings, got acquainted with the works of the underground press and entered into discussion of issues related to agitation.

During interrogation, the listed accused denied being involved in the anti-government movement.

Finally, the investigation involved:

26) Luarsab Georgiev Janelidze (28 years old, peasant, Orthodox, single, illiterate, locksmith),

27) Solomon Sakvarelov Dolidze (21 years old, peasant, Orthodox, single, literate, boiler operator),

28) Davil Mikhailov Kapanadze (29 years old, tradesman, Orthodox, single, graduated from a vocational school course, clerk),

29) Dmitry Grigoriev Bilanov, aka Bilanoshvili (38 years old, nobleman, Orthodox, single, graduated from the cadet corps, managing a private estate), who kept a small number of prohibited works.

Janelidze, Solomon, Dolidze, Kapanadze, and Bilanov provided evasive explanations.

Gogua, Chodrishvili and Okuashvili have been kept under guard since February 16, and Dzhugashvili since July 8, 1902.

In pre-trial detention there were: Karadzhev - more than 1 year and 2 months, Tsadadze and Severian Dzhugeli - more than 7 ½ months, Megrelidze - about 6 months, Chkheidze and Gureshidze - more than 5 ½ months, Kochetkov - 5 ½ months, Arabelidze - 5 months, Tsuladze and Kapanadze - over 4 ½ months, Iashvili, Anna Krasnova and Macharadze - over 4 months, Erikov - 4 months, Ninua, Unanov and

Kakhnelidze - over 3 months, Bilanov - 3 months and Lelashvili - 3 weeks.

As a consequence, I agree with the opinion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I would consider authorizing this inquiry by an administrative procedure in order to:

Deport under the public surveillance of the police for three years: a) to Eastern Siberia Vasily Tsabadze, Georgy Karadzhev, Zakharia Chodrishvili, Georgy Chkheidze, Kallistrat Gogua, Joseph Dzhugashvili, Arakel Okuashvili, Mikhail Gureshidze, Polikarp and Yan Dzharadze v. Arkhangelsk province of Yakov Kochetkov, Georgy Lelashvili, Leonty Zolotarev, Nikolai Yerikov, Ovanes Unanov, he is Unanyants, Kirill Kakhnelidze, Vladimir Iashvili, Georgy Arabelidze and Vaclav Pulavsky, c) to the Vologda province Anna Krasnovsky.

Subordinate Kosma Dolidze and Irakli Tsuladze to public surveillance in the places of residence for three years, Alexey Zakomolkin for two years, and Giorgi Ninua, aka Ninuashvili for one year.

Put Luarsab Janelidze and Solomon Dolidze under police arrest for one month.

To charge David Kapanadze and Dmitry Bilanov, aka Bilanoshvili, with preliminary detention in this case.

To carry out such proposals, I most fully ask your highest imperial majesty's permission.

State Secretary Muravyov.

Transcripts of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) -VKP (b) - March 1926

A source: Transcripts of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) -VKP (b) 1923-1938. Moscow. ROSSPEN. 2007. Volume 1 1923-1926. P. 655-692

Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 681. L. 1-96 (uncorrected transcript); D. 682. L. 1-118 (transcript with copyright correction); L. 119-127 (proof-proof proofs of GE Zinoviev's speech); L. 129-140 (verbatim report).

March 18, 1926

Comrade Rykov presides * (* The question was stenographed at the suggestion of Comrade Evdokimov (document note)).

Evdokimov. Is this a resolution of the Leningrad Provincial Committee or just the Bureau?

Voroshilov. This is the fourth paragraph of the resolution of the plenum of the provincial committee on February 22 2 .

Rykov. The question was raised by virtue of the resolution of the plenum of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee. Who wants the word?

Stalin * . (* Hereinafter, in copies of the transcript, uncorrected and with the copyright correction, there are notes by the stenographer: "Speeches are almost inaudible"). [... He protested, suggested that this question be postponed for a week and a half or a week.] About a week and a half ago, when the Leningraders demanded that the Central Committee approve the nomination of Comrade Komarov for the post of chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, Comrade Zinoviev called me, suggesting that this a question of 10 days when the extended Executive Committee will disperse 3...

He said that by that time he would submit a letter of resignation, about resignation from the post of the Pre-Soviet of Leningrad, and the matter would be resolved in this way in a form more favorable to Comrade Zinoviev. I agreed with this and having talked with the secretaries of the Central Committee, asked the Leningraders to temporarily postpone the question of what they reluctantly agreed with. But now

this term has already ended. The Leningradians have been waiting for a response from the Central Committee for about a month.

Zinoviev. Comrade Stalin did not accurately convey the conversation. On one of the "pleasant" days during the Executive Committee of the Comintern, I resolutely came to the conclusion that I could not work as chairman of the Comintern. The Bureau of the CPSU (b), I [said this] made this application 4, and here on the same day ... * (* There is litter stenographer.. "I cannot hear") I said Comrade Stalin, that withdrawal. (the appointment was in St. Petersburg) at the height of the Comintern testifies to me that I cannot work as chairman of the Comintern either. I also made the argument on this score that, if necessary, they could have discussed with me first.

Stalin. [He asked, while the extended plenum of the Executive Committee did not disperse, not to do it. I spoke with ... and Molotov, they agreed to postpone it. As for the essence of the matter, you need to do this operation. Clearly, comrade. Zinoviev did not get into the committee.] My conversation with Comrade Zinoviev took place over the telephone, it is not recorded anywhere. But this does not mean that Comrade Zinoviev will be able to refute the facts. I assert that he asked to postpone the question until the end of the extended plenum, so as not to compromise it in the eyes of the members of the plenum. Otherwise, why did we postpone the question then? I affirm that he then announced his desire to resign. It is possible that in demanding deposition, he pursued a different purpose. Now I can see what his goal was: he wanted to use this incident for today's transcript. As for the essence of the matter, it boils down to approving or rejecting the decision of the plenum of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee to remove comrade Zinoviev and replace him with comrade Komarov.

Kamenev. I do not know of these negotiations and believe that the matter must be resolved on the merits, independently of the negotiations of the members of the Central Committee. [And I think that] Now the removal of Comrade. Zinoviev from the Leningrad Soviet takes on a political character, no one can doubt this. You have confirmed the main complication and you are keeping him in the post of chairman of the Comintern, and at the same time [this is inevitable,

this is a resolution of the Congress] you tell every party member that he was mistaken on the basic question of interpreting Leninism. This is a difficult and complicated situation, to keep at the head of the Comintern [man] a comrade, about whom it is necessary to simultaneously inform each member of the Party that he is mistaken in the fundamental questions of Leninism. This is a difficult position. [Now I will dwell on something else.] Comrade. Zinoviev has held the post of chairman of the Leningrad Soviet until now, not because he correctly solved the issues of sewage, but because the Leningrad Soviet is such an organization headed by a political person. [What will this withdrawal revive or not?] Well, the removal of Comrade Zinoviev from this political post will weaken or exacerbate the difficult situation in the Party? Undoubtedly, it will further exacerbate [the gap between the political post, which is entrusted to Comrade. Zinoviev]. Every comrade, every worker, every Leningrad citizen will be faced with the following: they are kept at the head of the Executive Committee and are not allowed to stand at the head of the Leningrad organization. If this was done for business reasons, if it were possible to convince someone that there are purely business considerations, outside politics, outside the congress, discussion, then it would have to be done before the congress. [The matter is hushed up, smoothed over, but ...] To do this now means to aggravate difficulties both from the point of view of the internal party situation and from the point of view of the political situation within the country and in the Comintern. [No need to rush.] Why do this now?

Voroshilov. I think Comrade Kamenev was a little late with his proposal. After all, the question of the mistakes of Comrade. Zinoviev has not been understood since today - he gained very, very wide popularity at the XIV Party Congress 5 . The arena from which everything was disclosed was opened not only for our party, but for the whole world. Your speech, comrade Zinoviev, with a co-report at the party congress, was literally interested in the whole world, not only the communist one, and now to say that the act of removing you from the post of chairman of the Leningrad Council will bring something new is to break into an open door. Everything that could and should have been done has been done. The Leningrad organization is currently in a very

ambiguous position with the existing relations that have been created. Comrade Zinoviev was not taken to the provincial committee⁶, com. Zinoviev remains a political figure who heads the Leningrad organization, as comrade. Kamenev. How can you combine things that are completely incompatible? If Comrade. Zinoviev is a really political figure for Leningrad, then it was necessary to hold him in the provincial committee, but it was impossible to hold him in the province committee after what happened, if you follow the democratic principles in our party, begin to implement them, and not forget about [what we they themselves spoke of the democratic principles of our Party's practice] them, not to neglect the will of the entire Leningrad organization. It seems to me that the proposal that is being submitted must be accepted, especially since it will be the implementation of those proposals that long ago [outlined]I suggested. People who do not work, who lead the organization only for "politics", which, by the way, in the present conditions they cannot implement, should be removed. You should not create exaggerated posts that, apart from harm, can do nothing.

Evdokimov. I will not talk about the mistakes of Comrade Zinoviev, those mistakes which the congress, by its resolution, comrade. Zinoviev ascribes those attributed to him and to the entire opposition as a whole after the congress. There is not enough time for this now. I want to talk about how the withdrawal of Comrade Zinoviev on the position of the Leningrad organization. Removing Comrade Zinoviev from Leningrad in any situation would be a big blow to Leningrad as a major political and industrial center. In this situation, the force of this blow is aggravated many times over. We, Leningraders, are considered and criticized as separatists, self-styled, etc. I will not say how fair these accusations are in general.

But I believe that in this case, defending the interests of the Leningrad organization, the interests of Leningrad, we are defending the vital interests of the party. Any blow to Leningrad is a blow to the whole party. Of course, this can be said about any organization, and everyone understands that the strengthening or weakening of such organizations as the Leningrad one is of particular interest to the entire party as a

whole. Recently, owing to "organizational conclusions" from the post-congress discussion [to a certain extent], one-sided discussion, Leningrad was hit so many times, and these blows were of such a number and such degree that it is possible to speak of the defeat of the entire organization. Almost the entire asset that has developed over the past several years has been removed.

Voroshilov. [And your organization filmed five times .] In other organizations, the asset changed five times over a number of years.

Evdokimov. The size of this withdrawal is characterized at least by the fact that until the last days there are up to 1200 unemployed communards on the district committees' register, not counting those sent to the labor exchange. The best part of the Komsomol asset has been removed. A number of the most responsible professional workers have been removed, and a number of the best party military workers have been removed. The best female workers have been removed, business executives of the same scale as Comrade Balls 7 .

Dzerzhinsky. [And who replaced him? Markitakhin, I know.] He was replaced by a worker of no less scale - Markitakhin.

Evdokimov. How could this affect the mood of the organization? By your position, you must be familiar with the position of people in the organization. I am familiar at least for such facts as the last day of the worker passed with us 8; it took place in the face of tremendous passivity on the part of the working women, with small meetings. It is here, in Leningrad, where female workers have always shown tremendous activity, where there was a huge attendance of public meetings! Now the attendance of public meetings among the party activists has dropped, the party education cannot be established, the mood among the lower ranks of the party is depressed, the mood among the workers is also unimportant. Despite the campaign that was developed in the press against the so-called opposition in general and against Comrade Zinoviev in particular, I dare to assure you that Zinoviev's authority neither among the Leningrad party masses, nor among the non-party workers of Leningrad has not been shaken in the slightest degree. Yes. You can check it in any way. And with this state

of affairs in the largest proletarian organization, the removal of Comrade. Zinoviev, will this aggravate the negative sentiments that exist? This is the question to be asked. Of course, it will. There is no need for it, there is no need for it. They say that practical work suffers. After all, you can get out of this situation in this way. Without raising the question of the chairman, raise the question of the deputy chairman and appoint comrade Komarov as deputy chairman. Withdrawal at the moment comrade. Zinoviev, will this serve to strengthen the authority of the Central Committee? No, it won't! They say that Comrade Zinoviev was not elected to the province committee. What to tell us about why and how they were not chosen in the sponge. Still, you know how the district conferences were held, how the gubernia conference was held After all, you can get out of this situation in this way. Without raising the question of the chairman, raise the question of the deputy chairman and appoint comrade Komarov as deputy chairman. Withdrawal of comrade Zinoviev at the moment , will this serve to strengthen the authority of the Central Committee? No, it won't! Yet we know that it was much easier to pass it than not to. Great efforts were made to this.

Dzerzhinsky. [I'm not involved in this.] I didn't notice.

Evdokimov. So, there is not even the slightest need to cite documents that would indicate that it is necessary to hurry to remove Comrade Zinoviev. I said when I asked Comrade. Rykov to shorthand this question, which I consider very important, I will add; what I consider important and having not only enormous importance as a general party question, but a general political, not only our internal, but international issue. I cannot say all that I wanted to say on this issue, so I reserve the right to enter on the subject with a special written application to the address of all the members of the CC and CCC 10. What else to add to what I said?

Voice. Come up with.

Evdokimov. There is nothing to invent here. I am quite understandably worried, comrades, when I speak. A person of temperament, I must say,

I do not always maintain the proper clarity of thought and composure when required.

Stalin. It is dangerous to health.

Evdokimov. To improve my health, you gave me leave 11 . I hope that I will really improve my health. In conclusion, I add once again: the removal of Comrade. Zinoviev from the Leningrad organization, from work in Leningrad, will be a new additional blow to Leningrad, which will have a very, very negative meaning, which will be negatively assessed not only by the entire party mass, with few exceptions, but also by all non-party workers and women workers of Leningrad. When you make a decision on this issue, I think this fact should be the main one, based on which it is necessary to make this or that decision on this issue.

Molotov. The discussion that was at the congress cannot be erased by any speeches of people who are worried or not worried, who have improved their health during the last three months of rest, or are thinking of improving it.

Evdokimov. This is not argumentation. If we begin to defecate in wit, so can I.

(The presiding judge stops Comrade Evdokimov.)

Evdokimov. I apologize for "defecating."

Molotov. I say, this discussion cannot be deleted, and to say that after this discussion everything should remain in the same places, that everything should remain as before - this is still to demand the impossible. Comrade Kamenev says that the replacement of Comrade Zinoviev in the Leningrad Soviet has political significance. Of course, it has political significance. But does this mean that replacing Zinoviev as chairman of the Leningrad Soviet is a political change for which the party is not prepared or which it considers an unsuitable change under the given conditions? There are enough facts to judge this. Based on the facts that we have about Leningrad; one can judge this. This question did not raise any doubts at any party meeting, at least judging by the district party conferences of all regions and the general provincial

conference of Leningrad. And therefore, to say that the nomination of a new chairman of the Leningrad Soviet is a political fact that would now be unacceptable to the Leningrad working masses or the party as a whole is to say completely unconvincing things. Comrade Evdokimov tries to argue that this is a "blow to Leningrad." I think that this is also wrong. If we consider that a blow to Leningrad is the replacement of Zinoviev as chairman of the council,[nomination of a new chairman] then in general it must be considered that the opinion of the Leningrad organization, which is now expressed in a huge number of meetings, in the work of all district conferences and the provincial conference itself, does not matter to us. And this would be a real blow in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of organizations, against those sentiments that are clearly expressed by the Leningrad organization. Comrade Evdokimov's claims to express here the opinion of Leningrad, and at the same time to oppose Leningrad to the Central Committee, to oppose the interests of Leningrad to the interests of the Party and the interests of the Central Committee, is a harmful claim, and, moreover, completely unfounded. Comrade Evdokimov has no authority to speak on behalf of Leningrad.

Evdokimov. Did I really say that I speak on behalf of Leningrad?

Molotov. You said that "we, Leningraders", that "we" have defended and will defend Leningrad. It turns out that there are people sitting here who are far from the interests of Leningrad, who do not understand the interests of Leningrad. Meanwhile, we perfectly understand the real interests of Leningrad, and we think that they do not contradict the interests of the Party and the interests of the Central Committee of the Party. To say now that only the former group of the Leningrad organization are the "defenders" of Leningrad, or that only Comrade Zinoviev can "defend" Leningrad, it means [to develop] repeat the very things that some tried to spread in the party circles in the post-Congress discussion [individual comrades] Leningrad 12... But this did not receive sympathy from the Leningrad organization, or even from any significant part of the organization.

We must nevertheless reckon with the facts: there were regional party conferences, which were convened on the basis of complete

democracy [as it can be], after a very long discussion of all the main issues of interest to the party, and after many comrades from the former opposition tried to continue the discussion at party meetings [and enterprises] of Leningrad, but to no avail. We now have the voice of the regional party conferences, we have the voice of the provincial party conference, and there are decisions of the provincial committee of the new convocation. Is it possible after all this to be recognized as expedient or consistent with party experience so that a comrade who was not elected to the gubernia committee, and whose name was not named by a single comrade in the gubernia committee [and not at a regional party conference and at a provincial party conference], it would be advisable and possible to keep the post of chairman of the Leningrad Soviet? It seems to me that this is completely inappropriate and that it clearly contradicts [the facts] the will of the vast majority of the Leningrad organization. Comrade Zinoviev was not included in the Leningrad Provincial Committee, and none of the members of the Provincial Party Conference proposed Comrade Zinoviev to be a member of the Provincial Committee. After that, say that it is necessary to leave Comrade. Zinoviev as chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, in my opinion, is unfounded. Comrade Zinoviev remains chairman of the Comintern and a member of the Politburo [his authority is not lost.] This requires tremendous strength. And what position do we have with regard to the Leningrad Soviet at the present time? In fact, we have such a situation that the actual chairman of the Leningrad Soviet and before [this time] the last party events was Comrade. Komarov, who was aware of Soviet work, who actually supervised this work. Comrade Komarov has been a member of the Central Committee for at least three convocations; he is a Leningrad worker. He is a prominent worker in Leningrad, who really knows practical work and enjoys great prestige in the Leningrad organization. It seems to me that now the only correct conclusion will be [such a conclusion that instead of having a sign, it is necessary to put up] to approve this comrade [so that he would openly work as] the chairman of the Leningrad Soviet [work under the name that he fully deserves], i.e., to name the actual chairman of the council by his real name. If Comrade. Komarov, not being listed as the chairman of the Leningrad Council, actually performed this work,

especially the work of the chairman of the Leningrad Executive Committee, but now, it seems to me, the time is when it is necessary to formalize this provision, which is exactly what the Leningrad Gubernia Committee unanimously proposes. It is wrong to speak in such a way as Comrade Evdokimov that as a result of the political campaign that took place after the congress in Leningrad, the Leningrad organization is exhausted, that the Leningrad proletariat is [discouraged] in a passive state, and so on. [Demoralization in the Leningrad organization remained enormous.] Demoralization in the Leningrad organization was introduced. The responsibility for this lies with the Leningrad opposition. [Not talking] The mere fact that the organization was forced to change the composition of the lower-level elected party organs, to re-elect the bureau of collectives, this, of course, introduced a tremendous shock to the organization. At the same time, this has brought forward a new cadre of workers who still need to learn how to work, who need to be guided in all their work. But to say that this latter demoralized the organization is absolutely wrong. The demoralization introduced by the opposition is already underway. To say that the mood of the Leningrad workers is passive, that they have a negative attitude to all the latest events in the Leningrad organization, is not at all to reflect what actually exists. There is every reason to expect that the Leningrad organization will now increase the pace of all its work. Everything speaks for the fact that the decision of the provincial party conference and the provincial committee of the Central Committee should not be broken or redone [this is a decision of individual comrades. I think that]. With this decision, you need to agree to [and the need to approve it].

Rykov * . (* There is a note from the stenographer: "Comrade Rykov was almost not heard.") ... At the suggestion of Comrade. Evdokimov's debate in the Politburo about the chairman of the Leningrad Council is being stenographed. Comrade Evdokimov, obviously, proceeds from the premise that our debate should be known to a wider circle of party members than the composition of the Politburo.

Statement by Comrade Evdokimov about his vacation can be interpreted by the party in such a way that we are letting him go on

purpose [since he didn't say anything about this, he just said that he was going on vacation to get medical treatment] in order to get rid of him. He stressed that we gave him a vacation again. Statement by Comrade Evdokimov was recorded, it is necessary that my words were also recorded. I definitely declare that Comrade Evdokimov goes on vacation against our wishes and our insistence. I recently spoke with Comrade Kosior, and Kosior complained to me that it is very difficult for the Secretariat to cope with the work. Outwardly, a somewhat strange situation really turns out: while Evdokimov was not in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party 13, then he could work in the Leningrad organization, but now he cannot work anywhere. The position of the Secretariat, thanks to the departure of Comrade Evdokimov [maybe he is necessary], puts the work of the Secretariat in unusually difficult conditions. We are comrade Evdokimov was included in the Central Committee Secretariat in order for him to work there. We insisted in every possible way that it work. The situation, thanks to his leave, creates an unusually difficult one. In any case, the party should know that he is leaving against our wishes [and demands. This should be perfectly clear].

Second question. I was recently in Leningrad at a meeting of the Leningrad Council. A faction was appointed there to discuss the question of the chairman of the Leningrad Soviet. By telegram from here, this [history] meeting was postponed. Several comrades from the council came up to me and pointed out the incorrectness of the situation when Zinoviev was not a member of the provincial committee and nevertheless remained the chairman of the Leningrad Soviet. In Leningrad, a large political campaign was carried out, in which all the members of the Leningrad organization were involved, without exception, it was not our fault. As a result of this campaign, the Leningrad organization unanimously sided with the majority of the Fourteenth Congress and condemned the behavior of the Leningrad opposition. This situation has its own logic.

Comrade Zinoviev said that he would not resign. This means that contrary to the opinion of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee and the faction of the Leningrad Soviet, he wants us to leave him chairman of

the Leningrad Soviet by a resolution of the Politburo. Can this be done now? You can't. It was necessary to think about this earlier, comrade. Evdokimov. Now you speak here at the meeting and say: "You have weakened the organization" [because it did not agree with the majority of the congress] ... * (* There is a note from the stenographer: "not heard.") How did you weaken it? After all, the main thing that happened in the Leningrad organization is that it sided with the XIV Congress, with the overwhelming majority of the party. This is not a weakening, but a strengthening of both the Leningrad organization and the party as a whole.

[This] Your demand is a desire to continue [the line that was before] the struggle. [This cannot be done now under any circumstances. It was a one-sided discussion on the part of the Leningrad leaders for years, not months. Evdokimov and Zinoviev do not consider the discussion. The discussion was prepared against the XIV Congress. After that, no one shut your mouth, so ...] Comrade Evdokimov said that there was a one-sided discussion in Leningrad. If we can talk about a one-sided discussion, then only in the sense that we did not discuss one-sided against you, but quite the opposite. Both before the XIV Congress and during the XIV Congress, you led a discussion against the majority of the party, not only without giving the floor to the supporters of the majority. but sometimes they carried out their work against the party majority, in secret from it.

After the congress, we discussed together with you in front of the entire Leningrad Party mass. Every Leningrad worker, of course, had the opportunity to familiarize himself with Comrade Evdokimov's worldview. For this, [an infinitely long] much longer time was given and. understandably, there is more opportunity than for acquainting the Leningrad workers with our point of view. [In any case, in order not to understand from the transcript that there was a one-sided discussion on our part, I am talking about this fact:] So, there was a "one-sided discussion" on your part before the congress and during the congress, and after the congress we discussed with you. We won only because of the correctness of our position, and the Leningrad workers were wholly on the side of the Fourteenth Congress. Is it

possible now to accept Comrade Zinoviev's proposal, contrary to the opinion of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee and the faction of the Leningrad Soviet, which stayed with us and spoke out against Comrade Zinoviev? The Politburo has no way of doing this now [for business reasons. The last plenum of the Comintern proved that Comrade. Zinoviev must now concentrate much more attention on the work of the Comintern]. In addition, business considerations require that Comrade. Zinoviev concentrated his work in the Comintern.

The last plenum of the Comintern showed that if there are three or four such workers as Comrade Zinoviev, this will not be enough for the Comintern. [There is no need to talk about this now, because three or four workers, such as Zinoviev, are not enough now for the Comintern, and then they are unlikely to cope with the work of the Comintern .]

The leadership by the Comintern of the grown Communist Parties now requires much more strength and attention than it used to be: otherwise, the communist movement will encounter difficulties that, with more careful leadership, can be avoided.

In order to have less difficulties in the field of the international communist movement, comrade. Zinoviev to concentrate all his attention on the work of the Comintern.

Zinoviev. I want to say a couple of words on the issue of the leave of comrade. Evdokimova. There has been very little suitable approach to this issue here. What's the matter, comrades? Comrade Evdokimov showed me the doctors' certificate and showed it to you all. The leave was given on the basis of the testimony of doctors, who, unfortunately, do not leave even half a percent in doubt that Comrade. Evdokimov cannot work at the moment. [He made comradely here] How can you make such statements here on this score, unfriendly, to say the least. He received leave [on all grounds of the party charter], how all sick comrades get. There is a definite conclusion of the doctors that he cannot work perfectly at this moment. What is the point in the fact that if a member of the Central Committee makes such a statement as he did [not accept such a statement], to remind him of his health? Has this [possibly] ever happened to us?

Now I turn to the question of the chairman of the Leningrad Soviet. Here Comrade Rykov spoke of "Zinoviev's proposal." There is no such proposal, here the same speaker said that Comrade Zinoviev "wants to be left behind," wants the Politburo to appoint him Chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, contrary to the decision of the Leningrad Provincial Committee. After all, I know very well that it was the majority of the Politburo who prepared my dismissal. It scarcely needs proof here that it is not a question of fighting for a post or the like. All this, I hope, understands. What does Zinoviev "want"? He only wants political clarity. If you send several thousand St. Petersburg communal workers to the labor exchange, work yourself and remove Zinoviev. Comrade Molotov said that the entire organization agreed with the removal of Zinoviev. But he also said that all the collective bureaus in St. Petersburg had been removed. If all collectives were forced to "change" the collective bureaus - what does this mean? There are about 800 or even 1000 collectives in Leningrad, in each collective of the Bureau there are 5-7 people, multiply all this, you will see how many [new] workers [were brought into the Leningrad organization] had to be "changed" and how many were removed. Add a few hundred dismissed workers of a larger scale who have passed through the Central Committee, remember the numbers that Comrade Evdokimov, then you will get [violation of the party] idea of the "democracy" that Voroshilov mentioned. We all sinned against internal party democracy, and our excuse was that the economic, general political and international situation for a long time forced us to maintain [almost] military discipline in the party, sometimes forced us to overdo it. But we were already during the discussion in 1923.¹⁴ They said, referring to a well-known passage from the speech of V <Ladimir> I <Lich> at the 10th Congress, that in another year or two economic upsurge and we would get more support and initiative from the workers and would be able to improve in practice the internal party democracy, we would put things in motion. This rise has now come. If the Central Committee considers the recent events in Leningrad as an example of a "democratic" regime, it seems to me that this would be a gross mistake. I recently sent you a small piece of paper, I think you have already received it. A member of the Central Control Commission,

Comrade Peterson, a worker at the Leningrad factory, a comrade whom almost all the female section of the Leningrad proletariat knows. This comrade is elected a member of the Central Control Commission at the XIV Congress. After that, just because she shared the views of the Leningrad delegation at the XIV Congress, she was dismissed from her job and sent to the labor exchange. What it is, comrades? We never had such things in the Bolshevik Party, never had anything like it!

About the discussion and my "mistakes". Everyone knows how they were explained during the "study" of the decisions of the congress. There is a resolution of the XIV Congress, in which there is not even a hundredth part of what was later "explained" about it when the resolutions of the XIV Congress were "worked out". Everyone knows that the "study" of the decisions of the XIV Congress is carried out not so much according to the resolutions of the XIV Congress, as according to a cheat sheet distributed secretly at the XIV Congress itself, a cheat sheet that was delivered to me from the provinces and which I officially handed over to the Central Committee. The discussion was not one-sided, says Comrade. Rykov! But, comrades, you all know that we were forbidden to speak [at the Leningrad conference].

Voroshilov. All spoke, only members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission were prohibited.

Zinoviev. In other words, to our most qualified comrades. I will remind you of the St. Petersburg worker comrade. Kostritsky.

Uglanov. His letter is sent to factories.

Zinoviev. I don't know, but I know that he has already been removed from party work for two years. An example of the last days: take the Priboi publishing house 15 - a small publishing house, and in this one cell there are 19 people. removed from party work. And what is "Surf" in St. Petersburg - a grain of sand! You can judge from this the size of the defeat. Have we ever applied such measures [to restore] discipline in the Party? If my "mistakes" that are outlined here in [this lousy]illegal cheat sheet, are correctly stated, if you really believe in them, then, of course, I have to work at some other job, and not at general political. The fact of the matter is that hardly anyone seriously

believes the instructions that are in this cheat sheet. You put the question this way: did you "hit" the sponge or did not hit the sponge. Everyone understands the price of this argument.

Molotov. You have a very good attitude to the party.

Zinoviev. I treat the party no worse than you. I repeat that I "did not hit" the sponge, so what? It happened (not so long ago) that Comrade. Rykov, for example, did not get into the Central Committee of the party under Ilyich 16 . There are no irreplaceable ones, but political clarity must be created. And if a member of the Central Control Commission, elected at the XIV Congress, Comrade Peterson, is sent to the labor exchange, then this is unacceptable.

Stalin *. (* Initially, the phrase was attributed to M.F.Shkiryatov.) It seems that she is no longer a member of the Central Control Commission 17 .

Zinoviev. As far as I know, the people elected at the XIV Party Congress cannot be re-elected by anyone. That the party is "prepared" for the removal of Zinoviev, as comrade Molotov, this, of course, is known [Comrade Molotov, formally prepared]. In some layers, it is prepared by your efforts.

Stalin. Comrade Evdokimov portrays the matter in such a way that not by a sponge, but by the Politburo, Comrade. Zinoviev from the post of chairman of the council [which does not correspond to the interests of the Leningrad industry, the Leningrad organization] . This is not true. This is not true. This is a falsification of what is taking place now in Leningrad. [The falsification is complete .] Voting at the Leningrad conference, which did not elect Comrade. Zinoviev in the provincial committee, in the absence of a protest against such a vote, [not available in the Leningrad archive, what does this mean, anything? Does it matter?] is a fact. This fact prejudices the removal of Comrade Zinoviev from the post of chairman of the Leningrad Soviet. Does not Comrade Evdokimov, that this had already predetermined the question of removing comrade. Zinoviev from the post of chairman of the council of Leningrad? And the second fact is the direct vote of the Leningrad Provincial Committee to remove Comrade. Zinoviev and replace him

with a metalworker, comrade. Komarov, against which there are no protests either. You cannot dodge these facts. What about comrade Zinoviev cannot understand that these two votes are decisive? And what about the opinion of the lower ranks of the party, who voted against the opposition, for the decisions of the XIV Congress? Can we go against these facts? No, we cannot. Formally, the question is not about removing Comrade Zinoviev from his post, but about canceling or approving the decision of the Leningrad organization. Should we cancel the vote of the Leningrad organization or should we not? I think that we must approve the decision of the Leningrad organization. [This is the question. And no matter how much Comrade. Zinoviev, all the same he will not prove and will not show, there will not be a single person ...] Finally, Comrade. Zinoviev must understand that after all that has happened, he cannot remain chairman of the council. If we now imposed comrade. Zinoviev to Leningraders, his position there would be unbearable.

They depict here the decision of the Leningrad organization to remove Comrade. Zinoviev as a blow to Leningrad. Comrade Evdokimov managed to portray the case just like that. One out of two. Either the Leningrad organization itself strikes itself a blow, which is absurd, or Comrade. Evdokimov is more of a Leningrad than the Leningrad organization, which is also absurd. Comrade Evdokimov [you] forgets that now he has less right to talk about the Leningrad organization than the Leningrad organization itself, admit that Comrade Evdokimov.

Evdokimov. I admit.

Stalin. We have two main votes of the Leningrad organization, which express the opinion and interests of the Leningrad organization. To portray oneself as a representative of the Leningrad organization, regardless of these facts, is too risky a thing, Comrade Evdokimov. If Leningrad organization freed from opposition mistakes, if she was able to [make out] to dissociate himself from Comrade errors. Zinoviev and [Evdokimov] others, then this is not a blow to the Leningrad organization, but a blow to those who want to strike a blow at our party.

What do you think, can our party lead, having in the rear the Leningrad organization, which [is going to strike, cannot? We had two leading centers.] In the face of its top, did it strike the party blow after blow? What was the question? Besides, we actually had two Central Committees in the Party, two centers. One Central Committee, which was called Moscow, the other in [Petersburg] Leningrad. Can a party in power [for a month, two or three] lead the country, the economy, the proletariat, having two centers? No, he cannot. Ultimately, the organizational basis of the discussion [boiled down to this at the congress, can we have two centers in the party or should there be one center.

And Priboy, I read the Priboi edition, from which directives were given on an all-Russian scale, leading anthologies were written, which were published besides the Central Committee, without the Central Committee. It was a new center. You had one main center, the organ of Leningradskaya Pravda, which was a wing of the congress, you know that well. And you think that the Party can tolerate having such an organization as the Leningrad one in its rear. Either the Soviet government or the party ... (inaudible) or one center. If we talk about the blow that came from the Leningrad organization against the party, from which the congress liberated the party and without which we could not lead the country. They could not lead, having the Leningrad organization in their rear. Either they must surrender, or they must bring the Leningrad organization into line with the decisions of the party. This is how they achieved the blow that Comrade Evdokimov. He says that this blow is assuming a different form, that it is directed against the party, the blow was deflected by the congress, now we have a party center, both the party and the proletariat will benefit from this. Now turning the wheel back and returning to the position where there are two centers is to kill the party. A blow to the industry .] was to destroy the two-center in the party, to create one center, to create a united front with Leningrad. This was done mainly at the XIV Congress. Take your old Surf, for example. It was an all-Union organization, not a Leningrad one, which published leading textbooks and political textbooks for the entire Union, in parallel with the publishing house of the Central Committee. And what about

Leningradskaya Pravda? Didn't it claim to be the de facto central organ of the party? In short, you were building a new Central Committee in Leningrad in parallel with the existing Central Committee of the Party. You have been pursuing a double center. You and now stand on the point of view of a two-center, proposing to impose Comrade. Zinoviev to Leningrad. Well, but the party wants to have one center, the center that was elected at the XIV Congress. And Leningrad also wants now to have one center at the head of the party, and not two centers. That is why the removal of the so-called. Zinoviev is not striking a blow to Leningrad, but to the pernicious double-center and its supporters. Now turn the wheel back and return to the position where [there are] there were two centers, which means ruining the party.

They say that Comrade Zinoviev is a blow to the Leningrad industry. [In the picture of the case it appears] It turns out that only Evdokimov and Zinoviev can defend the industry of Leningrad.

Evdokimov. I did not say that.

Stalin. You said that while Zinoviev was there, industry was secured, and now it is not known what will happen. [I don't understand that .] This is fundamentally wrong.

Evdokimov. I did not say that.

Stalin. If you [in this form did not speak] refuse now, then very many of your circle are talking about it. This, I repeat, is fundamentally wrong. [I think that you do not have any opportunity to support Leningrad industry, against the will of the Central Committee. Everything that you do is done with the permission of the Central Committee according to its directives, and no one thinks that Leningrad industry will be placed in worse conditions. On the contrary, I think she will be in better conditions. Our business is improving, and it will continue to improve, this improvement should extend to Leningrad industry.]

Leningrad industry was supported not because Zinoviev liked it, but because the Central Committee considered it necessary to support it. The Central Committee will continue to support it, for this is required

by the interests of the Party and the proletariat. And the sooner we get out of the difficulties from which we are already getting out, the more thoroughly the support of Leningrad industry should be, anyway, Comrade will be there. Zinoviev, or not.

Finally, the last question about the Comintern. Kamenev said that Zinoviev [hinted, but hinted not so clearly - how] he could not lead the Comintern without having a majority in the [party] of the Central Committee. [I do not think that it is impossible for such a person to lead the Comintern who does not agree with us.] This is not true, in my opinion. He can lead if he is loyal to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). We have a precedent. Remember well III Congress 18 . The Central Committee was then against Zinoviev. If I am not mistaken, then Lenin blocked with Trotsky on the question of the ultra-Lefts and the Central Committee supported this bloc against Zinoviev. Zinoviev remained in the minority [at the III Congress] in the Central Committee. Of course, after the III Congress there was the V Congress, but it does not follow from this that the III Congress should be forgotten. Zinoviev was then in the minority. However, no one raised the question of removing him from the Comintern. Moreover, I do not know of a single party in the Comintern that would raise the question of removing Zinoviev. [He was not in the majority, but he was the chairman of the Comintern. So, my proposal is not to object to the decision of the plenum of the provincial committee to remove comrade. Zinoviev from the post of chairman of the Leningrad Soviet and on the appointment of Comrade Komarov.] Therefore, Comrade Zinoviev can remain chairman of the ECCI, and he can continue this business with loyalty to the Central Committee. The chairmanship in Leningrad is another matter, the organization of which, the regional committee of which spoke in favor of replacing Zinoviev with Komarov.

Evdokimov. I would like to say a few words in connection with my vacation. I understand the difficulty of the situation in which the Secretariat finds itself, for I have spoken with comrades on this issue. I said that the situation is being created very difficult, that Kosior is overloaded. In my opinion, this situation cannot last. By the way, when I returned, I was talking to Comrade. Molotov, and he asked me a

question: why such questions? What practical suggestions do you have? I said: there is only one practical proposal: at the next plenum of the Central Committee, elect another Central Committee secretary instead of me. And where are you going? - asks Molotov. And after my vacation I will go to any job, go to a cooperative or trade union job. We had such a conversation. I said that I myself understand the difficulty of the situation in which the Secretariat finds itself. But I see no other way out¹⁹ .

Rudzutak *. (* In the transcript with the author's corrections on the text of speeches YE Rudzutak litter: "Such nonsense, I never told ya Rudzutak." And followed by handwritten text of the statement.) Since there was raised the issue of easing [or introducing confusion into the ranks of] Leningrad organization in connection with the removal of Comrade. Zinoviev, we must first of all decide the question of whether the weakening of the Leningrad organization is the elimination of pre-Congress and post-Congress sentiments in it, the elimination of the opposition to the Leningrad organization of the Central Committee. I think that the elimination of these phenomena will undoubtedly lead to the strengthening of the Leningrad organization. [We have the opinion of the Leningrad organization. This suggests that the pre-Congress and post-Congress sentiments that were in the Leningrad organization are being eliminated. This testifies towards the Leningrad organization, and therefore I think that further work should proceed along this line.] If Comrade. Evdokimov, that in the Leningrad organization there is a lowered activity, apathy, this, undoubtedly, is the result of the work of the opposition, and all measures aimed at the soonest elimination of pre-Congress moods lead to the strengthening of the Leningrad organization. [As for leaving Comrade Zinoviev as chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, it seems to me that Comrade Voroshilov pointed out correctly. I think that the Leningrad organization has said its word here and that any elimination of their pre-Congress sentiments is a strengthening, not a weakening of the organization. And from this point of view, there is no reason to cancel the decision of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee.] Regarding fears that this would weaken the authority of Comrade. Zinoviev, - Comrade is right. Voroshilov that this authority was most of all undermined by the discussion at the

congress. In order to establish a normal situation in the work of the Leningrad organization and to strengthen it, there is no reason to cancel the decision of the Leningrad organization on the question of the chairman of the Leningrad Soviet.

Solts. I absolutely do not understand why this question is posed. What does it mean to strike at the Leningrad organization? Comrade Rudzutak said quite rightly. Of course, [to a certain extent] when the Leningrad organization drew [these] its organizational conclusions, it was painfully experienced to some extent, because all the governing bodies of the Leningrad organization were re-elected on the basis of clarifying the issues dealt with at the congress. [It is somewhat painful, maybe they are put on, but it can be survived.] Moreover, there were, perhaps, hobbies. Comrade Zinoviev pointed to a member of the Central Control Commission, Comrade. Peterson, who was sent to the labor exchange, that this is wrong, that this should be changed. This is true, but, in any case, this does not apply to Comrade. Zinoviev.

Stalin. It is necessary [before] to ask the Leningrad Province Committee what he will say.

Solts. This is the case of the Central Control Commission, and we decided to interrogate the Leningrad organization how such a misunderstanding happened 20 . Hobbies are being made at the same time, perhaps, but what does this have to do with the question of Comrade Zinoviev? On the contrary, Comrade Zinoviev is not an ordinary worker. Why was Zinoviev not elected as a member of the provincial committee? It's clear why. Because Zinoviev, being elected, should be the leader there, and not just a member of the provincial committee. And after the whole organization spoke out against the line that Zinoviev supported, it is strange for him to be [one of the 50 members of the provincial committee] the head. I think the situation is the same in the Leningrad Soviet. If he remains on the council, he needs to be a leader there, but in the position that has turned out, can he be a leader there? No. Why is there a false position? Comrade Zinoviev cannot occupy a false position in that organization which now entirely adheres to a different point of view. It really comes down to just that there will be a firm, a formal post. Here is the chairman of the Leningrad

Soviet, and the entire council with the provincial committee has a different point of view. Therefore, for business reasons, this is not necessary. Why raise the question again, really in order to have an extra document, to once again emphasize the issues that have already been resolved? I think that this question did not need to be raised and there is nothing to analyze.

Kamenev. Stalin said that formally the question stands in such a way that we must reverse the decision of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee. I agree that this is how the question stands formally, but this is only formally, because no party charter rejects the case when the Central Committee finds this or that decision of the provincial committee inappropriate and enters into relations with one or another organization. Why issue such an ultimatum that we must violate the opinion of the Leningrad organization and cancel its decisions? There are other ways. The Central Committee can judge whether this decision is rational or expedient. The Central Committee has never refused this. And nobody understands democracy in such a way that since there is a decision of the provincial committee, nothing can be done. Comrade Molotov [, we need to understand democracy in a different way] says that this violates the principles of democracy. A strange understanding of democracy! So, if we want to discuss the matter on the merits, then we can tell the spokesman, even the Leningrad one, that the opinion of the Central Committee is this and that. Sponge can take note of this, can enter into negotiations. So, Comrade is right. Stalin, that formally the question is so, but in essence it is not so.

Molotov. And the resolution of the conference that Zinoviev was not elected.

Kamenev. So, in essence, I took the floor in order to dwell on the words of Voroshilov, Molotov and Rykov, because I think that here you only need to speak directly, that you need to make ends meet or you shouldn't say at all.

Voroshilov believes that the removal of Zinoviev is one of the inevitable organizational conclusions from the discussion, and therefore, they say, there is nothing to talk about.

Voroshilov. I said this before the discussion.

Kamenev. Here is a transcript, the transcript says: Voroshilov considers organizational conclusions inevitably connected with the discussion; and there is nothing to talk. He does not allow [himself the possibility of such a conclusion] thoughts that regardless of how the discussion ended, it is possible to dispute the organizational conclusions that were made not by the congress, but by the collegium of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee. The Central Committee may, without violating the decisions of the congress, challenge such organizational conclusions. I believe that these organizational conclusions are disastrous. In order to draw such a conclusion, additional data are still required, additional data are needed to say: since the person remained in the minority at the congress, he must be removed from his post. What, can't he work? All this requires proof, and you don't have it. Voroshilov says that the Leningrad organization is in an ambiguous position. Yes, that's right. [We] You have put in an ambiguous position not only the Leningrad organization, but also the Comintern. You forget about it. Of course, if Zinoviev's resignation was accepted at the first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee 21 and they said that he really could not remain the Chairman of the Comintern, then there would be no ambiguous position either in the Comintern or in Leningrad. This was not done. And now the situation is so ambiguous that Comrade. Zinoviev may remain Chairman of the Comintern, but he cannot remain the leader of the Leningrad organization. We still have to make ends meet. They say that Zinoviev was not elected to the provincial committee, but why was he elected Chairman of the Comintern? The whole Party and the Comintern are in an ambiguous position. After all, now every member of the Party and member of the Comintern can say that at the head of the Comintern there is a man who departed from Leninism and sunk to Sukhanov. How can you cover such a statement? Nothing. General Secretary of the CPSU (b) proved that Zinoviev retreated from Leninism and slipped to Sukhanov²² . And this man is left as Chairman of the Comintern. Understand that only by deviating from simple political sincerity can one prove the absolute intolerance of Comrade. Zinoviev remained chairman of the Leningrad Soviet for at least one day. After all, even earlier, even under

Lenin, there were differences. It was such a case that with most Zinoviev dispersed on CC III Congress 23 . It was a discrepancy on a particular specific issue. But Lenin took a different point of view regarding the organizational conclusions. He never took such a point of view as to prove, after a divergence, in brochures, speeches, resolutions, etc., that Zinoviev had abandoned the line of Leninism and slipped into Sukhanov.

Lenin did not draw the organizational conclusions that you are making now. Under Lenin, such organizational conclusions regarding Leningrad and Zinoviev would not have been possible. That's the whole difference. So, the reminder of the discrepancies at the III Congress sounds unfounded in your lips. People continued to work in their posts without any "organizational conclusions." Then there was no such theory that in order to correct certain mistakes, a comrade should be discredited. I studied Lenin very carefully and nowhere did I find this theory of discrediting.

Stalin. He says it is necessary to exclude such individuals.

Kamenev. In each specific case, he proposed certain specific measures. And now the theory is put forward that whoever made a mistake must be discredited in order to correct the mistake. This has not happened before. It is very surprising that this policy is literally processed and a theory is formed. I believe that Lenin never went to this theory of discrediting.

Voroshilov. And after Lenin, one must think whether you are the creator of this theory?

Kamenev. If, comrade Voroshilov, we did this together in the case of Comrade Trotsky, this does not mean that we will always follow you when you continue this policy. If you think that because we beat Trotsky together, that therefore we are deprived of the right and opportunity to defend ourselves, [when this theory passes to another ,] if you think so, you are deeply mistaken. You won't shut our mouths, we will speak.

Kuibyshev. This is not convincing.

Kamenev *. (* Both copies of the transcript contain the note of the stenographer: "Comrades Trotsky and Kamenev spoke at the same time.") I know, Comrade. Kuibyshev, that your beliefs are not in your head.

Finally, the third conclusion of Comrade. Voroshilov: people who do not work should be removed. This is an absolutely correct conclusion. But here the question must be whether they do not work because they really stopped being able to work, or because they cannot work at all. This is exactly how the question should be put in relation to Comrade. Zinoviev. [Should I shoot Zinoviev?] What, it may or may not work? If not, where is it proven?

Voroshilov. And where is it proven that he worked?

Kamenev. Zinoviev, apart from his official reports, did nothing. And this each of us can do. Why, then, each of us cannot be the chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, everyone can do this, everyone can make such a report? Then I must say that Zinoviev should have been removed three years ago.

Voroshilov. I spoke about this before, though not three years ago.

Kamenev. They are filming not because Zinoviev is not efficient, but because this is an organizational conclusion from the discussion. This is what needs to be said directly. Molotov says that this is the opinion of the Leningrad organization. Well, you know, Comrade Molotov says that this opinion was made on the basis of the absolute most democratic foundations, but you forgot to add at the same time: on the basis of democracy and additionally some administrative measures and on a scale unheard of in party practice until then. [Or] One of two things is needed: either to stand [on the Stalinist theory ,] on the Stalinist point of view or [not]talk about democracy. The Leningrad organization is a rebel who must be brought to its knees, Stalin says. So, you say it. But why cite speeches about the fact that complete democracy was carried out and that Zinoviev is overthrowing the Leningrad proletariat? Nobody will believe it. Absolute democracy in Leningrad is to make people laugh. Better, comrade. Molotov, [take a stand] stop talking about democracy and stand up to the end with the point of view that

Stalin developed. Stalin's point of view is quite logical. He definitely says: Leningrad wanted to strike us from the rear, we will strike it ourselves. This statement is logical. We will strike a blow and then one can judge whether this blow can be justified by political considerations and the interests of the party or not. After all, your theory is that since Trotsky and I did this, we must do the same in this case.

[Voroshilov . Minin, Safarov, etc. spoke.]

Kamenev. But the question about Comrade Trotsky today is a special item on the agenda, isn't it, Comrade Trotsky (24) ?

Trotsky. I accept it.

Kamenev. Therefore, I believe that if you do not speak here cute phrases about democracy, about freedom of discussion, but say what we have, then we must say: since Leningrad must be conquered, then not for business reasons, but for other reasons, for reasons, violating all logic, Zinoviev must be removed. But I repeat, every member of the Leningrad Council and every member of the Comintern can ask you: "How then do you leave the chairman of the Comintern a person who is not suitable for the work of chairman of the Leningrad Council?"

Zinoviev. Comrade Stalin spoke very [lightly] here ... * (* There is a note from the stenographer: "I can't hear it.") About what an awkward position I would find myself in if I didn't resign myself. It is clear that he is full of the best feelings for me and, as the secretary of our party, he always protects the interests of every member of the party and must take care of me too. [as a party member.] It's very touching of him. Imagine, it also occurred to me more than once: to resign. I consulted my friends about this. The same happened with the Leningrad Gubernia Committee, when it was deprived of fire and water, the newspaper was taken away, and several dozen of its members were dispersed. Sponge also first thought about resignation. But nevertheless, they came to a different conclusion, decided that no, it was not necessary to resign, let them make "organizational conclusions." Let them shoot openly. This will be a good lesson for the [others] party. So, this also applies to me.

About two centers and one-centeredness. It goes without saying that this is the ABC of [communism] of Bolshevism * (* The correction was introduced by the editor in a copy of the copyrighted transcript.) : One center is needed. Right. But you have no right to say that Leningrad was "in the rear" of the party. You are now trying to create a situation in which not a single delegate at any of the congresses will dare to say the word "no", he will always say "yes." The defeat of the Leningrad organization leads to this. Since when did Leningrad come to the rear of the party? Was it at the [XII] XIII Party Congress? No, as if it weren't. How the case went after [XII] XIII Congress? Everyone knows that it would take us too far. Leningrad was not "in the rear" of the party, but of some of your mistakes — that is true. But to say that he was in the rear of the party cannot be said. Let me tell you, it is not a secret that Leningrad remains against your mistakes even now.

Stalin. Leningrad?

Molotov. Are you speaking on behalf of the Leningrad organization?

Zinoviev. No, not on behalf of the [Leningrad workers] of the current Leningrad organization, but I know the mood of the Leningrad workers, I know the attitude of the Leningrad workers to the main problems, and I think that if the questions come up again, the Leningrad communists will have the same opinion as they had and have now. Because the one-sided "discussion" took place in an environment that made it impossible for them to say what they were thinking. [Regarding the "rear". Nothing has been proven that Leningrad was in the "rear".] It is said that Priboy was a new Central Committee, published anthologies, etc. First, as far as I know, all anthologies were approved by the Central Committee; secondly, that we should create a situation in which it would be impossible to publish a book without the permission of the Central Committee and from this to conclude that we have two centers - I do not understand such a formulation of the question. Employees of all editions were approved by the Central Committee, including the Priboi. In Leningrad there were no less skilled workers than Broido, and on the basis of the general decisions of the Central Committee, they could figure out whether it was necessary to print this or that book. It seems to me that the example

given here in this part was completely unfortunate. According to the charter, each sponge may have its own organ, each sponge may have its own organ.

Stalin. But this body opposed itself to the [body] of the Central Committee.

Zinoviev. I don't think so. When the Central Committee announced a discussion before the congress [we wrote letters] and invited: please, guys, speak up 25 (laughter), Leningradskaya Pravda had the right to take advantage of this proposal of the Central Committee. Yes, comrades, "speaking out" is called when people really say exactly what they think, and not just "do it". It was before the congress, [public opinion was being prepared before the congress] when the Central Committee called for free expression. As you know, the organ was taken away from the provincial committee during the 26... This is an unheard-of thing. If I were to offer you, Comrade. Uglanov, imagine for a minute that if your entire Bureau of Collectives were "changed", your newspaper was closed, all the leaders were removed, and in this position they would tell you: win Moscow.

Uglanov. I don't know, I've never been in this position.

Zinoviev. I think you would hardly have won. It would be difficult. Yes, one-of-a-kind is necessary. But it does not follow from this that the big proletarian center could not make its own proposal to the party before the congress, not even a proposal that would not please the majority of the Central Committee. Before the congress he had every right to do this; after the congress it was a completely different matter. Submission to the decisions of the congress was fully ensured. This was correct before the Congress.

I would like to say two more words about the "precedent" with the Third Congress of the Comintern. This is not devoid of relevance. Comrade Stalin here said that no foreign party demands the removal of Zinoviev from the Comintern. With proper "preparation", some parties may, perhaps, demand this, Comrade Stalin. And I know that such "preparation" is underway. It is impossible, says Stalin, to proceed from one Fifth Congress 27, but one must recall the Third Congress. Right.

This is what I did at the plenum of the ECCL. [At the III Congress it was clear that it was a question of power, when it was necessary to conquer the workers. Further, it is not true that it is me.] The Third Congress was of tremendous importance. I do not remember whether Comrade Stalin participated directly then, or whether he was not then in Moscow.

Stalin * . (* There is no replica in the uncorrected transcript; it was entered by I.V. Stalin during editing.) I was on vacation then.

Zinoviev. There were no "fears" then, there were no such fears that I would defend the ultra-left. [You point out that] The dispute then remained in a tight circle and was not moved outside this circle. There was not a single Politburo resolution on this score. You know that Vladimir Ilyich himself wrote a year later about Levi, 28 that he was wrong in this respect, that he later admitted his mistake. I did not remain in any minority at this third congress.

Regarding the question of Comrade Trotsky, I think he has the right to raise this question. Yes, we, together with the majority of the Politburo [did not understand that it was time to move to the implementation of internal party democracy and, in particular,] overdid it in relation to Comrade Trotsky. I took an extreme position in this regard. I spoke about this at the XIV Congress. That all comrades from the former groupings should be given the opportunity to work (of course, under the control of the Central Committee, this must be admitted, I admitted this, and I admit it, and I admitted it at the Congress and is ready to admit it, anywhere. You must understand that new times have come, that the moment has come when we give (and should give) more rights to the workers and peasants, more democracy to the Soviets and unions, and, therefore, it is impossible not to change the regime in relation to our own party. This time has come. The more the Politburo will drag out practical conclusions of this, the worse.

Voice. Since when did it come?

Zinoviev. It came from the beginning of our economic upsurge, when the situation in this respect was determined. By the Fourteenth Party Congress, instead of realizing this, you yourself tried to create a

culminating point in relation to the clampdown. This culmination was expressed in the defeat of Peter: the sooner it is fixed, the better it will be.

Stalin *. (* In the transcript with the author's revision, the text of the speech was subjected by I.V. Stalin to significant semantic and stylistic corrections and in this form was published in the verbatim record. An uncorrected copy of the transcript of his speech, see Appendix 3.) I took the floor because with the statements of Comrade. Zinoviev and Kamenev cannot agree. Comrade Kamenev says that I am posing the question formally, while the Politburo must decide the question on its merits, from the point of view of expediency. T. Kamenev is wrong. I pose the question not only formally, but also on the merits. I have already said why it is inappropriate to leave Zinoviev as the pre-council in Leningrad, having declared that the system of two centers in the party, pursued by the opposition, is disastrous. Everyone understands that if Comrade Zinoviev will remain at the head of the council, he will again try to turn the entire Leningrad organization or part of it into a ram for a strike against the Central Committee. Why did I talk about two centers? Because there was a two-center and it was carried out by Zinoviev and Kamenev. There were two centers, two press organs, two organizations - the Leningrad and the Central Committee, and the sharpest clash of these two competing centers was formally expressed at the congress. The Leningrad organization then found itself in the rear of the majority, thanks to the opposition of Kamenev and Zinoviev. I affirm that such a situation in our party in power can create a mortal danger. A party which, by the grace of the former leaders of the Leningrad organization, has such a serious organization as the Leningrad organization cannot govern the country and the proletariat. From this point of view, I am considering the question of the advisability of removing Comrade. Zinoviev.

Kamenev. With my withdrawal, I will have to change the argument.

Stalin. Why? The question of your withdrawal can only be resolved by the Moscow organization. Leave Comrade Zinoviev there, at the head of the Leningrad organization, this means either splitting the Leningrad organization and rebuilding part of it against the Central Committee,

or throwing the entire organization into confusion, gradually turning it against the Party and the Central Committee. Now neither the Leningrad Communards nor the Party will agree to this. And that you opposed the Leningrad organization of the Party and its Central Committee, this is indicated by the co-report at the XIV Congress, your anti-Party declarations at the Congress. As a matter of fact, you were heading towards a split, for the two-center is preparation for a split. We now want to protect ourselves from such dangers. We want to affirm the unity of the center in the Party, this organizational basis of Bolshevism. Together with the Leningrad Communards, we want to secure the Party against the danger of a split.

Now about Lenin's organizational method. Kamenev asserts that Lenin never proposed drastic measures in the party. Kamenev is wrong, comrades. Speaking of the past, let me remind you that in the October days, in the period of the mistakes of Kamenev and Zinoviev, Lenin proposed seven times to expel both of these comrades from the Party. Who stood against it then? I, Sverdlov, I think, Trotsky and some others. We several times then made a decision to the Central Committee that Comrade Lenin should not insist on his demand for expulsion. Some documents in this regard have been preserved in the party. There is even a special appeal to Lenin's Bolshevik Party in this respect 29 . So, Lenin sometimes acted much sharper and more decisively.

Voice. And the exclusion of Shlyapnikov 30 , and the question of Tomsk 31 ?

Stalin. About democracy comrade Kamenev and Zinoviev. He, this democracy, is such that it is worth laughing at him. How did our first serious confrontation begin? From the fact that the Leningrad Gubernia Committee, based on Zinoviev's report, passed a decision on the need to expel Trotsky from the party, and we went against such a decision and achieved that the exclusion clause was deleted from the resolution. Try to refute this fact. In retaliation for this, Zinoviev then began to write articles on the "half-Trotskyism" of the majority of the Central Committee. This is called the "soft" method and democratism com. Kamenev and Zinoviev!

Zinoviev's statement that we allegedly did not have freedom of discussion is completely wrong. The history of our party does not know such a discussion that took place before the XIV Congress and at the Congress. Maybe the discussion was not as sharp as it was, for example, on the issue of the Brest Peace ³²when the party faced the direct danger of a split. But the history of our party does not know such a full discussion as was at the XIV Congress. Take the minutes of the congress, containing 1000 pages, of which more than half are devoted to discussion. They say that after the congress the discussion was far from complete. It's right. It couldn't be otherwise. Our party is not a discussion club. The members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, who are called upon to carry out the decisions of the congress, must not be allowed to open a discussion against the decisions of the congress the day after the closing of the congress. It would not be a militant party of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but a discussion club of empty talkers.

The most ridiculous thing about the democracy of Kamenev and Zinoviev is the fact that they still cannot understand the truly democratic background of the turn of the Leningrad organization towards the decisions of the 14th Congress, towards the Central Committee. They do not understand why it was so easy to raise the Leningrad organization against the old opposition elite. You think, apparently, that the Leningrad Communards turned so easily against the opposition, thanks only to the speeches of Kalinin and Molotov, Tomsy and Voroshilov (Comrade Zinoviev's remark is not heard.) I ask you to refrain from hints, for all these comrades have done colossal work in Leningrad. Why was it possible to isolate the opposition so easily in Leningrad? But because our congress campaign coincided with the pressure of democracy in the lower ranks of Leningrad, which was gradually accumulating and which finally broke through in the form of re-election of collective bureaus. The congress campaign of our Central Committee members in Leningrad was an appeal to the party masses. Over 70 thousand party members were set in motion during the congress campaign. The party masses understood the matter in such a way that it means that they, the party collectives, can express their opinion, say their weighty word. And the first thing they said was

to get rid of the old secretaries and organizers, forbidding collectives to gather and playing the role of "party" district police. That is where the basis of the genuine democracy of the successful congress campaign in Leningrad lies. Our "democrats" cannot or do not want to understand this, comrades. Zinoviev and Kamenev.

As for the Third Congress of the Comintern, I was then on vacation, but I know about the disagreements between Lenin and Zinoviev at the Third Congress from Lenin's words and from data from the Central Committee archive. Zinoviev cannot deny that these differences were that they were of cardinal significance, that Zinoviev remained in the Central Committee at that time in a minority, that, despite this, he retained the post of chairman of the Comintern.

As for the fact that someone is allegedly carrying out work in the Comintern against Zinoviev, then Zinoviev is bringing down from a sore head to a healthy one. It is proved on the basis of the documents that the next employee and agent Zinoviev t. Highlander conducted illegal work in the Comintern against the Communist Party and in favor of the opposition immediately after the closing of the XIV Congress 34 . A special commission from Pyatnitsky, Lozovsky and Manuilsky established this fact. If we adopted a soft resolution on this matter and spared Zinoviev, then this speaks in favor of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, and not in favor of Comrade. Zinoviev.

Kalinin. Could you close the list of speakers?

Rykov. The Politburo can do whatever it wants. Enrolled: Zhukov, Trotsky, Molotov. They are also recording: Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin.

May I close the list of speakers? (Accepted.) [Maybe revise the agenda and postpone some issues?

(Agenda items are being revised, a number of issues are postponed .)]

Zhukov. Of course, you can say whatever you want, the Politburo has the right to decide anything in party practice. If the Politburo proposes a decision of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee to change, or rather

orders to change this decision, then we will, of course, do it. We have this issue and on the Bureau of the Provincial Committee and the North-West Bureau 35 was decided, and the Secretariat, and everywhere it was decided unanimously in all three instances of the same. And before these instances, at the regional party conferences, at the collectives and at the gubernial party conference, there was not a single vote where this candidate was nominated.

Why did this happen? Kamenev is amazed here and says that Zinoviev has become unfit for work in Leningrad. This is not the question. This happened for the simple reason that they spoke about during the discussion, they spoke here too, and which, it seems to me, is not worth dwelling on. As for the passions that were portrayed here, that if Zinoviev is removed, then everything will perish, so this is nonsense. None of this will happen. Of course, there are difficulties, of course, this is a great difficulty. But what is to be done? If this was done, it was necessary to think about it not now, but earlier. It was necessary not to arrange the opposition, it was necessary not to do the things that the opposition did, especially towards the end of the discussion.

We had such a situation that if a party comrade wanted to speak not only at the factory meeting, but in the collective bureau, he was physically beaten [and beaten in the face]. That's what it came down to. If in this way you want to further define inner-party democracy, this can be done, but this method is unlikely to go far. And there were many such cases. That is why in Leningrad this issue was decided so unanimously. I cannot say what happened in the last faction of the Leningrad Soviet, because I was absent at that time, but before that instance there was not a voice, not a single sound. Of course, if you order to override, we can and must override, but it seems to me that it will hardly be expedient.

As for the two centers and two directions, this is indisputable. Who can deny? Not a single St. Petersburg commuuard can deny that serious attempts, expressed in a number of specific measures, were made to establish a center in St. Petersburg.

As for Zinoviev's statement that, excuse me, the St. Petersburg organization does not say that - I doubt it very much, I doubt it very much. Of course, no one can be a prophet, we do not believe in prophecy, but I doubt that the St. Petersburg organization, after all that it has experienced now, would agree to such a thing. I don't think there is even the slightest reason. It is unlikely that in the St. Petersburg organization there will be an idea that Safarov should be their leader when he was doing such things. We lived in such a situation: any St. Petersburg communist, regardless of party experience and position, who had been in the party for at least ten years, had no right to say a single word against the opposition. Such a party member was not allowed to speak, even when he tried to speak out against Safarov at a closed meeting of the collective bureau.

And so, it turned out that with all the most energetic pressure from the leading opposition group, despite all their speeches at party meetings - and I spoke at very many meetings after the congress and I know about it - with the most desperate pressure and pressure, they could not do anything to do, they did not receive a single vote, not a single candidate, either at the regional party conferences or at the gubernial party conferences. Comrade Evdokimov said here: we know how to carry out democracy. I have no doubt that you know you have a lot of experience, especially the 22nd Gubernia Conference 36 proved this to us.

I must declare that the will of the St. Petersburg organization has already been revealed; it will be difficult to reconsider this decision. This business will be very difficult for any St. Petersburg organization. Because now go to the lower ranks, to the collectives of the Leningrad organization, to any party member and prove to him the opposite, to prove what is impossible to prove, to prove in the name of various considerations, it seems to me that such things should not be done. I must say: this is not our expression that 90% of the St. Petersburg communards will name and call the previous situation the state of feudal estates. There is a feudal prince, he does what he wants. If you want to continue like this, continue. This is the opinion of the St. Petersburg communards. We, of course, do not join this, but this is what the St. Petersburg Communards say. When making a decision, one

must reckon with the organization. The organization decided in all instances,

Trotsky * . (* In the transcript with the author's revision, the text of Leonid Trotsky's speech is given in two copies (the first version is with the author's revision, the second is a reprint with a new revision).) I would prefer to talk about these issues without a transcript, because , even with the most conscientious desire to be clear, comrades may have legitimate suspicions that you are speaking specifically for the transcript. [This is] And we are examining a question about which it is better to speak within the Central Committee, because then you will express yourself more freely. But there is nothing to do. However, before moving on to the question under discussion , I want to dwell on one [small] side question, [small, of course, relatively, this question] raised by comrade. Stalin: although this question has little to do with the matter, in itself it is of great importance for the history of the party. It seems to me Comrade Zinoviev is wrong when he says about the Third Congress of the Comintern that at that time the disagreements were of a limited nature, touching only on a specific question. No, the question of tactics then stood in full. At that time there was a danger that the policy of the Comintern would follow the line of the March events in Germany, 37 that is, * (* In the uncorrected transcript there is a note: "Inaudible.") along the line of attempts to artificially create a revolutionary situation and "electrify" the proletariat, as one of the German comrades put it. This mood was then dominant at the Congress, and Vladimir Ilyich came to the conclusion that, acting in this way, the International would surely break its own skull [it was].I wrote to Comrade Radek a letter about my impressions of the March events, which Vladimir Ilyich did not know about. In view of the delicate situation, not knowing the opinion of Vladimir Ilyich and knowing that Zinoviev, Bukharin and Radek were in general for the German Left, I, of course, did not speak openly, but wrote a letter (in the form of theses) to Comrade Radek, so that he gave his thoughts. With comrade We did not agree with Radek. Vladimir Ilyich found out about this, summoned me, and he characterized the situation in the Comintern as such, which is associated with the greatest dangers. In assessing the situation and tasks, we had complete solidarity.

After this meeting, Vladimir Ilyich summoned Comrade. Kamenev to ensure a majority in the Politburo. There were 5 people in the Politburo at that time, [and Comrade Kamenev supported this group] with comrade. There were three of us by Kamenev, hence the majority. And in our delegation, on the one hand, there were comrades. Zinoviev, Bukharin and Radek, on the other hand, - Vladimir Ilyich, myself, and Comrade Kamenev, and we had formal meetings in groupings. Vladimir Ilyich said then: "We are creating a new faction." In further negotiations on the text of the resolution, I was a representative of the faction of Vladimir Ilyich, Radek was a representative of the faction of Comrade Zinoviev.

Zinoviev. Now things have changed.

Trotsky. Yes, it has changed. Moreover, Comrade Zinoviev [very] rather decisively than comrade Radek is that he "betrayed" his faction in these negotiations; seemed to have made too great concessions. The struggle was great on the front of all the parties of the Comintern, and Vladimir Ilyich conferred with me about what to do if the Congress spoke out against us: will we obey the Congress, whose decisions could be disastrous, or will we not obey? An echo of this meeting can be found in the transcript of my speech. I said then - by agreement with Ilyich - that if you, the Congress, make a decision against us, then I think that you will leave us a certain framework so that we can defend our point of view in the future. The meaning of this warning was clear enough. However, I must say that relations within our delegation were maintained at that time, thanks to the leadership of Vladimir Ilyich, completely comradely. Still, it should be noted that Comrade Zinoviev already at that time showed a certain disloyalty to me at this congress. He portrayed the matter in such a way that I represent a separate position from Vladimir Ilyich. At the same time, rumors were spread about Trotsky's "Menshevism". Vladimir Ilyich then summoned me to his place and talked to me about this in the sense of how best for us to demonstrate our solidarity with him. In the minutes one can find the corresponding statements of Lenin. This is how it was. As far as the party history and the name of Vladimir Ilyich have been touched upon

here, I would like to more accurately illuminate the whole matter and my participation in it.

Now for today's question. I think that given the current situation in Leningrad, the removal of Comrade Zinoviev is an inevitable conclusion - not in the sense of the policy of "organizational conclusions", which I do not sympathize with, but simply because of the specific situation. After the gubernia conference and the election of a new gubernia committee, the removal of Comrade Zinoviev from the council is inevitable, not in the least, in essence, without changing the situation in one direction or the other. The question now, comrades, is not at all that. I must say that I have already said to the Politburo, when the question of Leningrad was considered in past times 38... Comrade Zinoviev is now saying that we (in Leningrad) were "overdoing it" in some ways. I am forced to repeat once again that the negative features of our party regime, the regime that has been established over the past two or three years, that these features in Leningrad manifested themselves more sharply than anywhere else. I once expressed myself at a private meeting of the Politburo, I remember, in the fall of 1923, in such a way that the Petersburg organization was "mutilated". This expression of mine was later repeated a lot against me. I think that the party regime, which is based on an excess of bureaucracy, in Leningrad had to inevitably receive a particularly sharp expression, in view of the high activity and intelligence of the Leningrad proletariat. The hardware results that can be achieved in remote corners by relatively "normal" means, in St. Petersburg require special funds. This is not only the individual fault of Comrade Zinoviev, but also the "fault" of the situation in which the regime was applied. That is why I have always said that the Leningrad regime was only the harshest expression of the general party regime. The struggle against this Leningrad regime, which is difficult for the party members, was waged not because the mass of members of the Leningrad organization said aloud that they did not want this regime, but because Comrade Zinoviev, disagreements with the majority of the Central Committee appeared. Here is the crux of the question. You can't close your eyes to this. You can't close your eyes to this. This considerable circumstance testifies to the fact that [that there is some wrongness in Leningrad, because if there

is a certain pressure, but all] how difficult it is for the mass of party members to influence the party regime. Everyone is now talking about the extreme pressure that reigned in Leningrad, but I ask: why did the mass of the Party, at least in Leningrad, not speak about this, were silent, tolerated? And the "statements" started only when sharp disagreements arose at the top [this is a known incorrectness]. This must be answered. That I cannot be a defender of the regime that was in Leningrad - this, I think, is completely clear to everyone without further words. But at the plenum during the XIV Congress, I warned against the measures that were taken to accelerate the overthrow of this regime. I talked about the danger of knocking out a wedge with a wedge. Comrade Stalin was absolutely right in that part of his speech when he said that victory over the Leningrad opposition was ensured not only by pressure from the central apparatus, but also thanks to the desire of the Leningrad party members to free themselves from the excessive clamping of the local apparatus. Right! But what if it turns out that they fell out of the fire and into the fire? Does the current regime in Moscow allow one to think that the new regime in Leningrad will be "softer"? And so, depressed mood] a very difficult condition in the Leningrad party organization. I have spoken about this, and those who say in the Moscow districts that I do not speak out on sensitive issues of party life, they are lying to the Moscow organization. I have never hidden my views. But I remain with my views within the Central Committee, [I spoke about mine] since it is a matter of differences with the majority of the Central Committee. I considered it and I do not have the right to do my fundamental differences outside the Politburo. This is not "hiding" their views from the party, but the observance of collegial discipline. If the Politburo says that I should go to the districts and talk about it there, I will, of course, do it, but this means a discussion, and I think that the discussion will be useful only in one case out of a hundred. Therefore, I repeat: those are lying, they are deceiving the Party, who tell it that I do not speak out, that I "hide" my views. There is not a single significant issue on which I would not express myself in the Politburo.

I absolutely cannot accept the theory of "compromising the leaders," which Comrade Stalin formulated and now again supports. Under

Vladimir Ilyich, this theory did not exist and there was no need for it. That Lenin sometimes proposed decisive and harsh measures, even against members of the Central Committee, is correct, but he proposed them within a narrow circle of comrades and in 9 cases out of 10 in order to achieve a certain "pressure" on the one against whom these measures were directed. Vladimir Ilyich did his best to avoid compromising. But then she was not so dangerous, because then there was Lenin. He could believe that if he temporarily removed one or the other from work, then there would be no great danger - such a right was given to him by history. He had such a consciousness of himself and the same consciousness we had in relation to him that the party, if one or the other is removed, since there is Lenin, will not shake. I think that none of us who have remained have such a right now, and we cannot think so of ourselves. The development of the theory and especially the practice of compromising now, without Lenin, is downright disastrous. After all, this is a matter of mutual compromise and self-compromise. He who does not see this is blind. In any case, if we assume that the members of the Central Committee have such a "right" to compromise, there is such a share, then I personally have never used this share and am never going to use it. In a case that is completely wrong, absolutely falsely contacted me in the case of Eastman's book he is blind. I also did not carry out this theory of compromise, on the contrary, I supported the reputation of the members of the Politburo. Comrade Zinoviev, in the midst of your struggle against me, when a young communist, who considered himself in solidarity with me, allowed himself to call you by your first name, and even a diminutive name in conversation with me, I abruptly stopped him.

[**Kamenev.** You talked a lot about this * (* In the uncorrected transcript the remark was attributed to LB Kamenev. In the copy with the copyright correction there is Kamenev's note: "I did not say that. LK")]

Zinoviev. This has already been discussed in the literature *. (* There is no replica in the uncorrected transcript. In the copy with the copyright correction, it was entered by G.E. Zinoviev.)

Trotsky. I didn't take any steps to get it told, but it was. I protected the reputation of the leading comrades not out of any special cleanliness,

not according to any moral rules, but for political and very real reasons. I proceeded from the premise that the party can be supported by the mutual trust of its members and trust in the leadership.

It is impossible, of course, to do without refuting certain mistakes of the leading comrades, but it is unacceptable to complicate the issue with side points, to involve extraneous circumstances, personal insinuations, etc. with the aim of compromising. It is impossible to violate the proportions in the struggle, pursuing the task of compromising. This inevitably leads to humiliation and narrowing of the ideological elite. And what does this narrowing mean? It means the inevitable strengthening of hardware methods. Why? Because the lack of the power of persuasion has to be compensated for by coercion. If we agreed within the Politburo, at least through some internal "fight" based on a conscientious attitude towards each other, then in most cases we could ideologically defend our decisions before the party. If we go further along the line of this mutual compromise, then, undoubtedly, it will be necessary to strengthen the clamping methods. The ever-greater weakening of the ideological authority of the leading group will inevitably have to be compensated for by the apparatus method, which within certain limits can replace ideological influence, but only within certain limits. It's funny when they attribute to me childish thoughts about the uselessness or unimportance of the apparatus, discipline, etc. and, I dare to think, I learned a thing or two from Vladimir Ilyich. [We agreed there, agreed on all issues. We inevitably solved all this without ideological narrowing.] I understand the significance of a powerful centralized apparatus just as well as others. But I also understand that the apparatus is not omnipotent. And when the apparatus begins to replace ideological authorities, to destroy authorities, to create authorities, it is thereby going towards the greatest dangers. That is why I cannot accept the theory of compromise; I strongly reject it. What do you need now? It is necessary to create conditions for collective work in the Politburo, for real collective work, i.e., when you come to the Politburo, you do not come across a ready-made decision and do not think about [what you will say and what it will be said] how to present this or that business proposal, and whether it will be carried behind your back in all districts. [I am approaching to the point, for example,

on the question of Japan. This question came to my mind, the question of the war came to me. I thought that if I introduce this question, I will bring it in boldly and it will not be interpreted in any other way. I would calmly introduce this question in order to find out in which direction and how they react, how they sympathize or not.] Well, what is better, a fresh example, take at least my today's proposals concerning China and Japan 40... This is a very serious question, and to a certain extent the fate of our revolution is connected with it. While working through the material we have on this matter, I thought not only about the question of substance, but also about how I would bring this question, whether I would come across a ready-made solution, whether there would be complications instead of benefits, whether my initiative would be interpreted according to -other. And now, instead of calmly introducing this question on the merits, I introduced it "in the direction" in order to probe whether it is possible to take the second step. I have never had this kind of fear before, but now, when the system of compromise is used, I have these fears, because every time you risk drowning the question. I think this is deeply abnormal, and I think it would be better [that these fears should not exist] for the party if we eliminate it. [I think there was not a single question in the Politburo that could be informed. If anyone wants to inform the decision, let him write a note. But if you have to argue not only depending on what you want to say on this issue, but if it is interpreted as a step and you do not know how your yesterday's conversation will be interpreted and so on. and when all is skewed, I believe - this is a bad way]. When pieces of our debate are sent through the apparatus to the districts, then this is not information, but disinformation, for with such a transfer the matter inevitably gets distorted, and you are deprived of the opportunity even to correct and clarify. I think that we should draw the main conclusion from the party upheavals of these last years of the policy of compromise and say: this is not the right way. It seems to me that it is possible and should, through efforts of goodwill, to restore in the Politburo the possibility of truly conscientious, collective work without repression, without compromise. This will have a beneficial effect on the entire party regime.

Molotov *. (* The text of VM Molotov's speech in the transcript with copyright revision was significantly revised stylistically, it was not possible to fully restore it.) Comrade. Kamenev said [about the formal decision, if he made a decision to the sponges, he was generally right, this formal fact must be reckoned with] that formally the decision of the gubernia committee was correct, but the Leningrad gubernia committee could be persuaded of the need to change this decision. I think we must reckon not only with [the Leningrad Gubernia Committee itself] the decision of the Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee, but also with the decision of the Party conference. And this solution already exists.

[**Voice**. Has anyone consulted?]

Molotov. [There were, were present,] A number of members of the Central Committee were in Leningrad, and they observed what was the attitude there towards [Leningrad] the issue that we are discussing not only at the provincial conference, but in all collectives. [What we understand well,] We, who traveled to Leningrad, reported this in a written report. Of course, if it were necessary, you can convince with a sponge. The Leningrad Province Committee is located near Moscow. But the fact is that the Party conference [reflected] expressed itself on the merits of this issue and made its decision on the question of the composition of the provincial committee unanimously. [The committee was formed later, no one suggested changing,] When he was elected as a provincial committee, no one proposed the introduction of Comrades. Zinoviev and Evdokimov did not. Nobody! It goes without saying that this is a reflection of the opinion of the [rather] broad party [groups] of the masses. We can say that not everyone in Leningrad thinks that there are those who think that the withdrawal was wrong. Probably, there are such comrades, I have no doubt about it, but, on the other hand, we must reckon with the main results of the reporting campaign on the congress, and it lasted for a month. [A proposal was made to seriously discuss at a number of collectives, the discussion continued not at one meeting, but at several meetings.] The members of the Central Committee sent to explain the decisions of the congress [actively participated] played an important role in it, but it must be borne in

mind that the opposition also actively participated in this campaign. It is wrong to say that there was a one-sided discussion in Leningrad. Safarov, Glebov-Avilov, Minin and others, all prominent opposition workers, performed at [some] collectives. In a number of cases, they managed to keep the mood for some time, especially in such collectives whereby a number of organizational measures the workers were protected from access to the enterprises of those who could defend the congress line. We know this especially on the example of the Putilov plant. [But the fact is that what happened in the Leningrad organization is in no way, it cannot be named with any party position, it was the stripping of collective bureaus, it was not a disagreement, it was re-election.] But we also know the results of the reporting campaign. What happened in the Leningrad organization can in no way be called the defeat of the collectives, it was the re-election of the collective bureaus, which was done at the request of the overwhelming majority of these collectives. Not always unanimously, but in most cases the overwhelming majority of the collectives spoke in favor of the congress line, and after that they changed the composition of the collective's bureau, especially getting rid of those who had tried to impose a different point of view, the point of view of the opposition. I note that only in those cases when a clear majority in favor of the congress was envisaged in the collective, the party masses, without any pressure from above, changed the composition of the collective bureau and elected people who were more faithful to stick to the general party line. [This was the opinion of the party masses.] To say that after the congress the bureaus of collectives were dispersed in the Leningrad organization, it means completely distorting the picture, portraying things differently from what they really were. Comrade Zinoviev said: [a lot] we know how [the Leningraders carried their line, how it was unanimously adopted, in particular, in the composition of the provincial committee and the district committee] the decisions of district and provincial conferences are unanimously adopted. This is also a bad attempt to portray the matter in such a way that even in the very organization on behalf of which they are trying to appeal here, on behalf of which they tried to defend their position, that [there can be no conflict of opinions,] and here there is not and has not been a really

correct discussion of the basic questions of party policy. This reflects the bleak views of the party. In fact, just on the example of the discussion of the results of the XIV Congress, we have a careful discussion of the main issues of our policy among the party masses and a very active participation of the masses in this discussion. [Precisely] The Party masses [and many of the Party] throughout the organization gathered in collectives in a more normal manner than was usually the case before the Party Congress. [Who can defend the fact that the Leningrad organization came to the party congress with a unanimous delegation, that this took place without real pressure and without an explicit regime, which was the opposition to the Leningrad organization, no one can believe this. After the congress period, of course, the regime also changed, and the fact that we, the members of the Central Committee who worked in Leningrad during this period, resolutely advocated a change in the regime, resolutely supported the opinion, began to work not in the party active, but in the party masses. It was a reflection of the views of the party masses.] And yet who can defend that the appearance at the party congress of the Leningrad delegation, consisting exclusively of oppositionists, that this could have happened without increased pressure and without creating a regime in the organization, which, having been opened, hit the opposition itself in the Leningrad organization. After the congress, one of the most important tasks in the Leningrad organization was to change this unacceptable internal party situation. We, the members of the Central Committee who worked in Leningrad during this period, strongly supported the need for this change. We began our work is not so, as we have suggested the former leaders of Leningrad, not with party activists and the party from the masses wanting to immediately approach the genuine sentiments of organization 41... And the results of our work, we think, reflect the opinion of the party masses much more than they did before the party congress.

I do not want to say that in our party regime, in the party as a whole, or in the Leningrad organization, everything is now all right. This I do not assert and cannot assert. It was not for nothing that we accepted, and not on the initiative of Comrade. Zinoviev, before the congress, an appeal to the party on the implementation of internal party democracy

42 . Comrade Zinoviev, although he was on the editorial commission on this appeal of the Central Committee, inserted only a few words into it. It is clear that this appeal was adopted in order to correct the regime, soften and improve the methods of leadership. In many cases, the pressure on the party line oversteps normal boundaries, and corrections are needed here. But it is one thing when the freedom of all groups, everyone, even former groups and movements, etc. is being defended. This proposal was not accepted at the party congress. And another is a proposal [for the change] aimed at improving the regime, for a more consistent implementation of inner-party democracy, the latter is a necessary measure.

Stalin. So that the party does not turn into a discussion club.

Molotov. This is what I am approaching. Take the line led by Comrade Zinoviev before the Congress and now. Now he repents, he says today: I repent, I made mistakes against democracy, but we know that during the year before the party congress many had to fight against the excessive suppression of Zinoviev's policies. This also affected the question of Comrade. Trotsky. Everyone knew that. Despite the fact that the economic turnaround has not been outlined since the XIV Congress, Comrade. Zinoviev, only finding himself in the minority, started talking about democracy. [I believe that what we did against Trotsky was necessary, I believe that my articles, perhaps weak, were nevertheless caused by a certain necessity.] I think, if we talk about the party regime, then not Comrade. Zinoviev to talk about it. With regard to the party regime, he was the most extreme, the most tight-lipped, and from January 1925 the Central Committee had to stop exactly Comrade Zinoviev on this part. Comrade Until recently, Zinoviev understood less than others the need for intraparty democracy and most of all argued the need for one hundred percent "monolithism" [which was recommended by Comrade Lenin and which was developed by Comrade. Zinoviev] whose meaning is in the interpretation of Comrade. Zinoviev is famous.

Now about Comrade Trotsky. If Comrade Trotsky is trying to prove that he is pursuing an absolutely correct line, that he is not hiding any of his views, that he says what he thinks, then, I must confess, I have

doubts on this score. Nowhere about the XIV Congress of Comrade Trotsky did not speak. Meanwhile, no one forbade him to defend the decisions of the XIV Congress. Comrade Trotsky, in many of his political speeches, never tried to do this.

Trotsky. And what about textile workers?

Voice. You have very little there about the XIV Congress.

Molotov. You have topics like "Europe and America", maybe some of your favorite topics, but not about the XIV Congress [its directives] and not about general party decisions. Speaking of speeches, we must strive to make all members of the Central Committee feel responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress and for the decisions of the Central Committee. [They believe that they have the right to talk about anything, that they are free in their choice of topic, this is not the case.] Our party is so strong that it is striving for unity of action, unity of speech on basic questions.

I will end with a question, why did Evdokimov, Zinoviev and Kamenev need the transcript of this meeting? How can this be explained? I did not expect that Comrade Zinoviev will insist that the session be recorded in shorthand. This comrade. Zinoviev apparently wants to emphasize that he continues to occupy a special line in our Party. There is a decision of the congress - this is one thing, but some have a special line, and they are trying to inflate it [individual facts, individual mistakes of the party, individual examples] emphasize in front of the whole party. To this end, they turn to fierce criticism of the party regime, and again conduct polemics with congress decisions. What is it for? This is an open continuation of the erroneous position taken at the XIV Congress. It would be much better if, in spite of the disagreements that existed before the Fourteenth Congress and at the Congress itself, you were to achieve unity in the actions of the entire Central Committee.

Zinoviev * . (* The uncorrected transcript contains the note of the stenographer: "Speech is almost inaudible.") As for Comrade Molotov's last words about the need for more united joint work, everyone understands that this depends on the majority of the Politburo. We

agree to this. About the III Congress; here the III Congress is remembered. If the comrades wish, you can install the picture with documents in hand. At our conferences with Comrade Lenin, they spoke of the "factions", of course, only in jest.

Trotsky. Right*. (* In the transcript with the author's revision, L.D.Trotsky's remark was inscribed by G.E.Zinoviev.)

Zinoviev. Then, when some of the Germans, led by Comrade Thalheimer, talked about the "electrification of minds", it goes without saying that Bukharin and I were against this. They argued about the tactics of "open writing," a line that had just been outlined at that time. I did have some erroneous doubts about the open letters. They argued about the March uprising. Argued over Levy, who was expelled by the left 43 . They argued about Clara Zetkin, who left the Central Committee with Levy. And, in the end, at the congress, they spoke with a general opinion. [This may, of course, be related to the part that was agreed upon and which allowed our common decision .]

All this was under Lenin. And he knew how to get his comrades to convince. He did not create a "theory" of compromising comrades who were mistaken in anything (even when there really was a mistake). And he knew how to admit his own mistakes: an example is the Levy case, about which we also argued with V.I. during the III Congress.

Comrade Stalin raised here the question of [the controversy over] our October mistake. He knows perfectly well what he is doing. It is absolutely true that Vladimir Ilyich proposed very sharp measures against me, Rykov, Kamenev, and others.

Stalin. As regards Rykov [and others], he did not propose an exception. There is nothing to entangle Rykov here. This was before the uprising.

Zinoviev. [I admit it. Quite right.] Rykov and I then made the same mistake. Everyone knows that. I talked about this in print in detail in my article "Bolshevism or Trotskyism" 44 and in a number of other, earlier speeches. I believe that if our differences continued along this line, we, of course, could not be in the same party. But they did not last, they were episodic, for a couple of weeks. And Vladimir Ilyich then in

a very short time [spoke to me, he] stated that the discrepancy was episodic. He called me and asked: do you see that you were wrong? I see! - The end? The end! Here's how it went. As you know, Vladimir Ilyich wrote in the press two years later that one should not return to this mistake, for it was corrected.

On Lenin's initiative, a couple of weeks after October 25, 1917, I was appointed to the post of chairman of the St. Petersburg Council of 45 - the post from which you are removing me today.

On Lenin's initiative, I was elected chairman of the Comintern. For 6 years after this mistake of mine, as well as for 14 years before that, we worked with V.I. hand in hand without a single discrepancy. That is why Lenin wrote that there is no need to return to this mistake.

Trotsky. He said something else, he said that there was no need to remind of Trotsky's past Bolshevism.

Zinoviev. Right. In addition, in his will, he said that it was necessary to consider measures to replace comrade Stalin in the post of general secretary, and he motivated not only by the rudeness of comrade Stalin, but by the fact that he (Stalin) would not always be able to correctly use the enormous power concentrated in the hands of the secretary general 46 . But it is absolutely true that I and others thought about Comrade Stalin that this was not so. And at the Thirteenth Congress, in comradely conversations and in delegations, we fought against this opinion. It is very possible that we made a mistake exactly where it was necessary to do otherwise.

Molotov. There was no one to fight, by the way.

Zinoviev. So, if you remember what Vladimir Ilyich proposed against us, then we must admit that he refused this, and after a short time, when the mistake was acknowledged by us (which was stated by me dozens of times in the press), Vladimir Ilyich considered this mistake exhausted and took the initiative to place us in the most responsible positions. Meanwhile, as his proposed decision regarding the removal of Comrade. He never took Stalin back. [Anyway, it exists. If we talk about this story, then we must remember this too .]

Finally, about the history of our quarrels. Comrade Stalin said that our disagreements began with the question of Trotsky. There is very great interest in this in the party, and I would like to say what the reasons really were and what the dimensions of this disagreement were. In January 1925, before the decision was made regarding Comrade Trotsky, 47The preliminary meeting of the Central Committee members-Leninists adopted a decision that is well known to the participants in this preliminary meeting. The decision was made as a result of an exchange of opinions: comrade. Trotsky should not be removed from the Politburo at once; the congress should be committed to this, as Stalin said. It was decided not to elect Trotsky to the Central Committee in the future, i.e., XIV Congress. Moreover, I and others, we demanded immediate removal from the Politburo, because we believed that having told the country and the party what we said about Trotsky, he should not be left in the Politburo. The decision not to elect Trotsky to the Central Committee was taken by a majority, with two abstaining, all the rest were in favor (45 people). It was decided at the congress itself to lead the matter towards the non-election of Trotsky to the Central Committee. It was in January 1925, but not only that, a couple of days before the opening of the XIV Congress at private meetings, about which they spoke at the congress itself, when certain attempts were made to dissuade us from openly speaking at the 14 at least to the removal of Trotsky from the Politburo. Comrade Stalin two days before the opening of the XIV Congress. So, we had common mistakes here. Of course, there was particular fervor especially on my part, which I admit. I thought that since we said that Comrade Trotsky could lead the party away from Bolshevism — and we thought it necessary to say this to the whole country and the party — then we should not leave the Politburo. But in order for our genuine differences with Stalin and others to be precisely on this point, the one who knows our relationship will confirm that this is not so.48 - Stalin says. But he knows that we are together with him, i.e., Comrade Stalin, they took a secret decision-instruction that if some part of the provincial committees spoke in favor of harsher measures against Trotsky, it would be good.

Trotsky. Kremnitsky demanded an expulsion from Chita.

Kosior. There was another one.

Trotsky. Was Kubyak the same? * (* In the copyright transcript, the text of the remark was probably included by the editor.)

Kosior. Kubyak was.

Zinoviev. So that's how it was.

A few more words about the Comintern. It said that "my agents," as comrade. Stalin, they were doing some unacceptable work, and he, Stalin, acted gently towards them. I declare that this is a completely incorrect statement. If there are any "agents" who have done any work, you need to find them and draw all the conclusions. As for Comrade. Gural'sky, then in the special commission, which was appointed not by me, but by the majority, it was not established in a single word that these were my "agents". In general, they only established that Comrade. this one strove to prevent foreign parties from passing resolutions in the West, which the Central Committee also recognized as necessary. Therefore, it seems to me that this very statement of Stalin confirms only what I said about "working" against me in the Comintern, and clearly shows the situation in which work in the Comintern has to be conducted.

Why, says Stalin, was it so "easy" to achieve "success" in St. Petersburg? Because the speech of the majority of the Central Committee coincided with an impulse towards democracy. Is this "impulse" really only in Leningrad, and in Moscow, for example, not? Comrade Zhukov is now the only real Leningrader here, because we [are fake]"Former" Leningraders, since we live here under the command of Comrade. Uglanova. What does Zhukov say? Zhukov says that the "scrapping" of the Leningrad organization was a difficult thing, of course. If you like the "raid" more than the defeat, I can agree with this. When Stalin says "okolotokh", then everything would be fine if there were 10, 100, 500, 1000 of these "okolotokh" people. And you have a lot of "near" ones. How so? 7000 filmed! All bureaus of collectives in an organization of 90 thousand people were dismantled.

Molotov. The vast majority of them refused, as is well known.

Zinoviev. So, there are too many of these "okolotokh". And if you find the "push for democracy" to be a good thing, can't you say the same to other organizations? You are referring to the letter from the Central Committee, to the appeal before the party congress about the need for democracy. I was also for this letter. But if, two weeks after this letter, the Leningrad organization is taken away from the Leningrad organization for expressing a different opinion and they are looting or "scamming" it, [if you will], then it is clear that the effect of this letter [on which it was expected, it] is destroyed, [or at least eliminated] is neutralized.

Now there is no joke around [this] question of democracy in the party. It is necessary to understand that something really needs to be done in this respect. That it is really necessary [to introduce new content] to bring democracy to the party, to stop clamping down. In 1926, when both along the Soviet and professional lines we are pursuing democracy, expanding the rights of peasants, etc., it is necessary to do this also in relation to the [Leningrad organization] of the party.

As for the statement about the need for collective work, I fully subscribe to this. But I repeat that this matter depends on the majority of the Politburo, on the majority of the Central Committee. Each of us will work wherever the Central Committee puts him. Each of us uses to defend his views within the Party everything that is permitted to him by the Rules of our Party, decisions of Party congresses and decisions of the last congress.

Kamenev. Here Comrade. Trotsky made a speech about how good it would be to develop a collective opinion in the Politburo. I think that each of us will join this opinion that it would really be good to develop a collective opinion at the Politburo. But I ask why Stalin now, when working out a collective opinion, found it possible to recall that Ilyich proposed to exclude such and such persons? Why did he do it?

Stalin. Because you began to remember the old.

Kamenev. We said that after the Third Congress Ilyich did not propose to expel anyone. This was actually the case. You are now proposing something quite different; you are proposing a method from

which we deliberately refrained at the Congress. When I said at the congress the phrase that Stalin could not unite the Bolshevik headquarters around his name, and when the congress loudly protested against this and gave Stalin an ovation, I could cut this ovation if I said that I was only repeating Ilyich's words and nothing else.

Stalin. Why didn't you say?

Kamenev. Because I don't want to resort to such methods. I think about the interests of the party. Comrade Stalin proposes, considers it necessary to repeat in the transcript that Ilyich proposed to expel us. He does this to put pressure on the consciousness of the party. I am ready to remember everything, because you remember what has long been covered by Vladimir Ilyich himself. This proposal was made before the October uprising, and during the uprising no one other than Ilyich appointed me Chairman of the Second Congress of Soviets, which was conducting the uprising. And then he himself, despite the fact that I was in prison at that time in Finland 49, was not at the 7th Party Congress 50 and was not introduced to the Central Committee, he himself introduced me to the Central Committee, and during all subsequent elections to the Central Committee and the Bureau of the Bureau, he himself always exhibited me and opposed everyone who, referring to old mistakes, tried to oppose me. Finally, before his death, Vladimir Ilyich himself entrusted me with editing his works and his archive 51. I value this as the highest confidence of my great teacher, and I see in this that Ilyich believed that I made up for my mistakes with my work. This consciousness cannot be wrested from me by any attacks of Stalin.

What are the conclusions from this? Ilyich never created or set the task of discrediting this or that worker. He was ready to destroy this or that worker politically at the moment, but no one would ever say this about Ilyich so that Ilyich would ever set the task of discrediting certain groups of workers and go systematically towards this goal. Our disagreements did not come from Trotsky, but from the speech of Comrade Stalin in the newspaper Pravda against me and Zinoviev in August 1924 52, and did it not meet with resistance from those who stood close to the leadership, and was it not the beginning of work on

the deliberately set task of discrediting a number of comrades, and then was this task not carried out for a year and a half with great efforts? It was all like that. After this, it cannot be said that we were moving towards disagreements on the question of Trotsky. The case began when Stalin published [that Kamenev was not engaged in theoretical work, and Zinoviev wanted the dictatorship of the party.] In the newspapers a direct attack on Zinoviev and Kamenev, regardless of any disagreements with Trotsky. All this was a definite political goal, which was brought to the end and with great success at the congress.

On the question of behavior in connection with Trotsky, a lot of wrong has also been said. When it was necessary to draw conclusions from the discussion, did you say: no; we are resolutely against any organizational conclusions. No, then you said that we would not elect Trotsky to the Central Committee at the next congress. And we said ... *. (* The uncorrected transcript contains a note from the stenographer: "Voroshilov says something, but you can't hear it.") Everyone here wants to rehabilitate himself *. (* The uncorrected transcript contains the note of the stenographer: "Rykov - not heard.") You and Bukharin were against it. It should be noted that Rykov abstained on this question.

I'm asking about the political meaning of this. Was it really so that the whole history of the XIV Congress can be explained by this?

Voroshilov. Who are you counting on? On people who have not been for a year and a half at those squabbles and fights that we had? Those who were, openly laugh in your eyes. Do you think these are naive people? In vain.

Kamenev. I hope Comrade Voroshilov, what can you tell us how it all happened. But it was so, in my opinion, that you all said and declared that you would be against Trotsky being a member of the Central Committee, while we said that until the Congress, Trotsky could not be a member of the Politburo. We immediately removed him from the post of Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council 53. [You] We were then engaged in polemics with Trotsky not along the Soviet line, but along the party line, and you drew conclusions from the party dispute

along the Soviet line, towards his removal from the Soviet post. We thought it was wrong. Maybe we were wrong. [I said that]We underestimated the mood of the party, but it is downright untrue to portray the matter in such a way that some wanted to keep Trotsky and others did not. There was nothing of the kind.

Molotov. [It was] It has been proven time and again that this will affect the entire party regime.

Kamenev. I saw how this affected the party regime and how it was reflected in Leningrad. So, in the event of disagreements, Trotsky was not at all the point. You know this very well.

Stalin. [Maybe in the "cave is it?] Maybe you will remember "Cave?" 54

Kamenev. I have not been in the cave and I cannot say anything about it. Our first disagreement did not begin with Trotsky. You came up with an article against me and Zinoviev because of Trotsky?

Stalin. No.

Kamenev. That's it. Therefore, I think that we can now follow two paths, we can proceed to further complicate the internal party situation, and I admit that on this path logic is on Voroshilov's side. Voroshilov is the most logical person among us, and at the same time he embraces all the problems. He says: there was a discussion, organizational conclusions must be made, everyone must be removed. Right. But it seems to me that you yourself cannot do this and do not want to do this, since you are leaving Zinoviev in the Comintern. Then do not complicate matters and do not refer to democracy when you decide to remove Zinoviev from his post. The Leningrad organization, of course, will willingly obey the Central Committee if the Central Committee says that it is not necessary to do this now out of the interests of the party, out of the interests of unity, out of the interests of eliminating squabbles. What do you think you can't get through? You yourself do not believe this.

Stalin * . (* In the transcript with the author's revision, the text of Stalin's speech was subjected to significant semantic and stylistic revisions and, as such, was published in the verbatim report. An

uncorrected copy of the transcript of his speech, see Appendix 4.) I will start with where I ended. Kamenev. If the Central Committee had been convinced that Comrade Zinoviev was ready to lay down arms, ready to submit to the Party, the question would not have taken on such an acute form. The fact of the matter is that we have no confidence in this, there are no grounds for this confidence. On the contrary, everyone sees that you are holding a stone in your bosom and accumulating live ammunition in order to then shoot at the party, and some of you say that "in two months everything will change", others say that "we will see."

Voroshilov. 14 1 / 2- way exit.

Stalin. And still others are trying to restore the double-center in the party before our very eyes. You yourself are to blame for the fact that the Party does not have the same trust in you.

For the first time I hear that Lenin entrusted Comrade Kamenev with the publication of his works without the knowledge and consent of the Party, as Kamenev assures us of this. This is the first time I hear that Lenin "appointed" Zinoviev as chairman of the Leningrad Soviet without the consent of the party. Don't you think that Lenin handed out life positions? Don't you think that Lenin did not take into account the opinion of the Party?

About the mistakes of Kamenev and Zinoviev in October, Kamenev is offended that I remembered these mistakes. I remembered them because Kamenev had incorrectly characterized Lenin's organizational method.

Kamenev. Why didn't they talk about it for 8 years?

Stalin. Because there was no need for it, and now it has appeared.

Kamenev. Did you remember this at the III Congress?

Stalin. Now not the third congress. I take facts. And the facts show that Lenin demanded the expulsion of Kamenev and Zinoviev. Why is it possible to speak about Bukharin's mistake during the Brest period everywhere and everywhere, but it is impossible to talk about the

mistakes of Kamenev and Zinoviev in the Party? Where does this privilege come from? Do we have the right to falsify the history of the party? Of course, we don't. But does it not follow from this that we must teach the Party, in no case hiding from the Party the mistakes of these or those leaders? So, what's the deal?

They remembered about Lenin's letter. So, let's remember.

It is known to the Thirteenth Congress 55 . What does it say?

About Bolshevism and Trotsky's mistakes.

Voroshilov. Which were no coincidence.

Stalin. About the mistakes of Bukharin and Pyatakov, about the mistakes of Zinoviev and Kamenev in October, which are also called not accidental, and then, about Stalin's rudeness, and it is recommended, if possible, to find another secretary, since rudeness is not a good quality. I am the only one there whose mistakes are not mentioned in the letter by a single word. This is the content of the letter. And that I am not a soft and rude person, you all know that. Twice I asked the Central Committee plenum to release me from the duties of Secretary of the Central Committee but each time turned down the request 56. It is not my fault here if the Central Committee does not find it necessary to replace me with someone else. What can be added to these facts by com. Zinoviev and Kamenev?

On the theory of compromise. There is no theory of compromise and has never happened in our party. Trotsky and Kamenev are wrong in speaking of such a theory. Compromising certain leaders is not a theory, but an inevitable result of the internal party struggle. When the opposition is waging a struggle against the Central Committee, this cannot but result in a certain compromise of the Central Committee. And vice versa, when the Central Committee is fighting the opposition, this also cannot fail to result in a certain compromise of the leaders of the opposition. Most of all, those who are defeated as a result of the internal party struggle are compromised. This is the law of struggle to which we are all subject. Think back to the recent past. Is the theory of the "degeneration" of the leaders of our party a compromise of the

Central Committee or not? Who was the first to raise the question of the degeneration of the leaders of our Party? Comrade Trotsky. Who was the first to talk about this? Comrade Trotsky.

Trotsky. You read, Comrade Stalin, what I actually wrote, you distorted me so much that you yourself have already believed it.

Stalin. How can I distort when everyone read your article in Pravda in 1923 about the rebirth of our leaders, which draws an analogy with the German opportunists 57?

Trotsky. This letter was specially printed to be used as a pretext for an attack against me. After all, the letter was sent to the editorial office of Pravda, why did no one ask me if it was possible to understand my words this way? Why wasn't I called and asked?

Stalin. I do not accuse you; I only note the fact that the first serious step in our Party on the question of compromising the Central Committee was taken by none other than Comrade Trotsky.

Trotsky. This is not so, because at that time there was already a "troika" 58 and the theory of Trotsky's depopulation in the country. Comrade Rykov told his friends and acquaintances about this, told that now it was necessary to depopulate Trotsky. I'm telling the truth, comrade. Rykov?

Rykov. I do not remember.

Stalin. I ask, comrade Trotsky, don't get excited, I'm only talking about facts. We read your article. You say that you sent the article to Pravda, but at the same time you sent it to the districts. After all, you wrote it, and not someone else. The workers knew about this, and the Central Committee could not put itself in an awkward position by not publishing an article so that you could not later say that your mouth was closed. And then you sent an article to Pravda, demanding that it be published. How could you not print it under such conditions? And all this is explained by the fact that Trotsky was then waging a struggle against the Central Committee. The article on degeneration was a weapon in the struggle against the Central Committee. But from this

article came a certain compromise of the Central Committee on the part of Trotsky. This is the law of the internal party struggle.

I'm not even talking about Zinoviev and Kamenev, who later took up the theory of the Central Committee's degeneration and supplemented it with the Leningrad theory of Thermidor, 59 which could not but lead to a certain compromise of the Central Committee.

These are the facts.

Therefore, the attempts of some comrades to portray themselves as clean are in vain. You can't get away from facts.

Comrade Zinoviev spoke here about the appeal of the plenum of the Central Committee before the XIV Congress about internal party democracy as a trifling piece of paper. How to combine such a trick with Zinoviev's "democracy"? If the plenum of the Central Committee addresses all organizations before the congress with a demand that internal party democracy be carried out, and if this appeal meets with general sympathy in the party, then how can such a party document be called an empty piece of paper? What exactly do the comrades want, and what kind of democracy are they trying to achieve? If they want complete democracy, then there is hardly any need to prove that complete democracy is impossible under a dictatorship. If they want to turn the party into a discussion club, then we cannot agree to this, for our party is a militant party of the revolutionary struggle and socialist construction, and not a circle of discussionists. If they talk about bureaucratic vestiges or outgrowths in the party, then they are and will still be, for the party is often infected by the state apparatus by narrowly administrative methods. This must be fought, and we will fight tirelessly by expanding and introducing intra-party democracy. But it must be remembered that this expansion cannot be unlimited, that it will and must have a certain framework necessary to ensure the unity of the Party and its proletarian discipline. Without this, the existence of a centralized party is unthinkable. that it will and must have a certain framework necessary to ensure the unity of the Party and its proletarian discipline. Without this, the existence of a centralized party is unthinkable. that it will and must have a certain framework necessary

to ensure the unity of the Party and its proletarian discipline. Without this, the existence of a centralized party is unthinkable.

Voice. Democracy is transitional, there are several stages.

Stalin. As for the present regime, what exactly does Comrade Trotsky demand? For everyone to perform as they please.

Voice. No.

Stalin. To give everyone the right to speak and defend their point of view at any time?

Voice. No.

Stalin. After all, we do not even know the position of Comrade Trotsky, what does he stand for, for the decisions of the XIV Congress or against them?

Trotsky * . (* In the transcript with the copyright correction, the text of Leonid Trotsky's speech is given in two copies (the first version is copyrighted, the second is a reprint, in which new revision).) I'll give you an example, if I may interrupt, to clarify what kind of democracy we are talking about. At one working cell in Moscow, the secretary of the cell said something like that Trotsky sells his articles and signatures to the bourgeoisie, reads reports for money, though, they say, he has a big family, he doesn't read to the workers, makes money, takes 60 percent in his favor ., secondly, says the same secretary, Jews are raging in the Politburo ... And now a group of Bolshevik workers of this cell consulted on how to submit an application on this matter, but, on reflection, was afraid, decided that it was impossible to submit, - "we", they say they are family people, they will throw us out into the street. This fact means something. I spoke about this with Bukharin at the Politburo: what to do? Maybe this is an exaggeration? I myself am ready to believe that this is an exaggeration, and suggested Bukharin to go with me to the cell, to conduct an investigation. But the question is: is it possible that the party worker is afraid to inform the party about how the secretary of his cell launches propaganda about the sale of the signature of the bourgeoisie and about the Jewish dominance? I asked Comrade Bukharin and myself: how is this possible? Unfortunately, we

all have to tell ourselves that this is possible. The Bolshevik workers tried to file a complaint about the secretary's Black Hundred agitation - they tried, but they got scared. Such a fact was previously impossible, but now it has become possible. Another fact: the Komsomol member wrote a letter on this topic and walks with his head down, believing that he could be thrown out of the party for this. This is a fact, comrades, and party democracy is a regime in which such facts are impossible.

Uglanov. Is it really impossible to inform the Party committee of this, whatever it is, Comrade Trotsky?

Trotsky. Yes, this is not the point, but the fact that the party workers are afraid that they will be kicked out of the factory.

Uglanov. Do you really think that there is no anti-Semitism in collectives?

Trotsky. You do not understand me: not manifestations of anti-Semitism are terrible, but that a Bolshevik may be afraid to tell his PC about them.

Stalin. It is possible that there were such cases. These are exceptions. [There is not only anti-Semitism, but they will also say that the Politburo sells signatures to the bourgeoisie.] I will not say that such things cannot occur in the party.

Molotov. We have the means to fight this.

Stalin. Yes, such cases [exist, we must fight] are possible. The proletariat [not so cultured] is not cultured enough, we attract people to the party indiscriminately, and there can always be people who can do such an outrage *. (* There is a note from the stenographer: "Inaudible.") [I must say, since we are in power, since we are ruling the country, since our responsible workers from day to day ... (inaudible), since we will always have the strongest vestiges of bureaucracy within the party and a strong need to fight, but we cannot turn the party into a discussion club, we are surrounded by enemies and we cannot completely dissolve the reins, we cannot go for it. As for the party democracy within the limits, the frameworks outlined by the party and against those decisions - no one objects, I do not know a single

person who would consider it impossible to do so within the framework outlined by the Central Committee at the XIV Congress. It's a difficult matter, we can't get over it right away.] This must be checked. For such cases, there is a purge, CKK.

Now about the collegial work of the Politburo. Collegial work is a good thing if it is done. [There are party decisions, they must be carried out. There are decisions in the Politburo, there is a struggle over the decisions of the Politburo, after these decisions have been made. There are also attempts to bombard these decisions, to discredit them. Tell me: there are no such facts.] But how to carry out collegial work? It can only be carried out on the basis of decisions of the party and its organs. Willingness to comply with party decisions is the basis of collegial work. But if party decisions are under fire, how can collegiality be established? Here is at least today's fact. Why was transcribing required today? For collegiality?

Kamenev *. (* In the transcript with the author's revision, the replica was originally attributed to L.D. Trotsky, the correction was introduced by I.V. Stalin.) The questions that you raise, these questions are transcribed. Stenography was introduced when you wanted to remove me from the service station.

Stalin. Not I, but the Central Committee removed you 61. Transcription is carried out in two years, the Politburo 62, [with a special approach, which aims to accumulate the material against the CC, it is felt. Here it is difficult to collectively lead so that the minority obey the majority, when this subordination is not there, and there is no unconditional implementation, there are attempts to accumulate material in order to sharpen it on the basis of the material. Who is fired upon? Nobody. Democracy is very difficult here] The stenography is carried out at someone's request. Today you demanded stenography not for collegiality, but for struggle. This is how the question of collegial work in the Politburo stands. The Politburo is not to blame if you seek and create material for the struggle.

Rykov. The proposal of the Leningrad Provincial Committee on the candidacy of Comrade Komarov for the chairperson of the Leningrad

Council is being voted on. A proposal has been made - not to object to the proposal of the Leningrad Provincial Committee. Who is behind this proposal?

Kamenev. I ask you to raise the question that the letters, those supposedly "seven" letters from Comrade Lenin, about which Comrade Stalin, about our expulsion were transferred to the Lenin Institute for publication in the corresponding volume of Lenin's works.

Stalin. [Available] Only one letter has survived, the rest [I tore up], unfortunately, destroyed.

Rykov. Comrade Tovstukha says that there is one letter that is in the Lenin Institute.

Kamenev. Then I ask you to order that it be published in the corresponding volume of Lenin's works.

Stalin. [I believe that there is no need for publication.] I did not demand it and do not demand it.

Voice. Before deciding, you need to familiarize yourself with the content.

Rykov. You need to read it.

Kamenev. I don't mind if anyone knows you can read it.

Attachment 1

Extract from minutes No. 16 of the Politburo meeting dated March 18, 1926.

JV Stalin's speech on collective farm development.

JV Stalin's speech at the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on collective farm development. May 22, 1939

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 5. 1937-1939. Book 2. 1938 - 1939. Moscow ROSSPEN 2006. Pp. 416-424

Archive: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.D. 1123. L. 1-30. uncorrected transcript.

No. 206

Stalin's speech at the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on collective farm development 110

I wanted, comrades, to shed light on a few issues.

A number of very serious issues are noted in the draft resolution, but they are not deepened, because from the point of view of practice, this is not necessary. However, I would like to take these questions more seriously at the root, so that the comrades in their work are guided by these practical needs. We mean perspectives. To lead, you need to look, see and notice a little further than your nose. To lead, one must foresee. And if we are dragging along the events as we have been dragging until now, we do something, and then it turns out the other way around - what a guide! To lead, one must foresee, look beyond one's own nose. And in order to foresee, one must know in a Marxist way what is taking place in the environment. Take, for example, the question of estates and collective farms, of manor land and public collective farmland. When we in the Central Committee were deciding the question of in order to recognize that the artel is the predominant basic form of the collective-farm movement, we, of course, knew that the struggle between the beginning of the artel and the beginning of the personal economy would take place. There is a social collective farm form as the basis of collective farm production, and there is a personal field estate as the basis for personal production. We proceeded and proceeded from the premise that it is personal, contrary to the public, nevertheless, it should be combined, consistent with the public for the first time. There are no other ways to transfer the individual peasant economy to the collective path. There is no other way for this. But we knew that the struggle of these two paths, dull, not stopping for an hour, would take place. Apparently, the comrades forgot about this.

Yesterday's peasant will strive to round up this business in his personal household, because this is an uncontrolled business, no one encroaches on him, no one cares, this is mine, it is eternal, attention should be focused on this. But even on the collective farms there were forged cadres who, on the contrary, wanted to focus on the public field as stimulating and representing the main sources for the life of both the collective farmer and the collective farm as a whole.

This struggle between them must take place. What has it led to, this struggle between the beginning of the personal economy, the basis of which is the estate field, and the beginning of the social economy, the basis of which is the collective farm field? What did this lead to? You tell about this quite colorfully that the second clause of the charter has been violated, the field of personal economy has been expanded in spite of the requirements of the charter and, most importantly, in spite of the requirements of our Bolshevik Leninist policy, and the expansion of the private individual field was due to the public collective farm field. All of you have stated this fact that the public collective farm field is shrinking, since we are not pursuing an absolute expansion of arable land in favor of the personal farming of collective farmers, which can no longer be reconciled with the requirements of our Bolshevik policy.

Where did we want to start? From the artel, then go to the commune. What do you do? We started with an artel in order to step back to the individual farm. Here's what you get in practice. I am far from scaring you or exaggerating what we have, but I am sure that if we take the specific weight of the personal plot and compare it with the specific weight of the collective farm field, it is insignificant, and the basis of our entire collective economy is a public field, but we must take things not in the form as they are now, but it is necessary to take into account the tendency of development, this slope of development, which has emerged, and the slope is that the private field increases due to the public field, and if this continues for 30-40 years, therefore that families are dividing, many families are dividing plots, if in practice you have outlined the allocation of household plots at the expense of the public field, if the allocation of estates takes place at the expense of a public field, therefore, the size of the public collective farm field in your

country will decrease from year to year, and the total fund of farmstead land will increase progressively, and it is necessary to drag along the events for another 30-40 years, and not lead them as the Bolsheviks should, and we did not behave like the Bolsheviks in this matter, but dragged along the events. If we continue to drag along the events, and not lead, then in 30-40 years we will get such a picture that collective farms will disintegrate, instead of collective farms, farms will be formed, new individual farms included in collective farms, which either have no social field at all. or there is very little left, no tractors are needed, because on small fields there is nothing for tractors to do, a lot of threshers, combines, social labor are not required, for he himself sits as king on his personal plot and returns to individual peasant farming, semi-natural farming or completely natural farming. The commodity output will be 3-4 times less than it is now, then industry must be closed, liquidated and returned back to individual farming, eliminating the fleet of tractors and combines. Here, in 30-40 years, what could have happened to the collective farm economy, if we also dragged behind the events, and did not lead, as we are now dragging.

We are magnificent communists, Leninists, Bolsheviks, we write a report, we swear by the name of Lenin, Marx, but we turn out to be fools, opportunists, Mensheviks in practice. This is Menshevism, when leaders think of themselves as leaders and do not direct events, but drag themselves, as if on a ramp, behind events, in the tail of them. What did Lenin accuse the Mensheviks of? In tailism. What can you be accused of? In tailism. This was Menshevism in our practice. This is what the development of our agriculture would lead to if there were no people among us who want to turn events in the other direction, who want to help the Bolsheviks, i.e., to lead the business, and not to be dragged behind the events. Theoretically, this picture is quite admissible, this is exactly what happened - collective farms would disintegrate into farms, farms, estates, small farms, the tractor fleet and combines should be eliminated, because in small plots who need combines would return to individual peasant farming with its semi-natural character, with its low marketable output, but what is a small marketable output of grain farming? This means there would not be enough grain for the cities and the army, which means that our industry must be cut 3-4 times, and our

industry is 4-5 times more than the peasant economy. Is it possible, if the marketable output of grain was small, our marketable output of grain is 2 times more than in previous years, and maybe 3 times? On this we are going, on this we have built a new large industry, on this is based our army and our entire new culture. Try to take this thing away, you have nothing from modern industry, big industry will not remain and there will be no more of mechanized agriculture, because small farms do not need mechanization, and you are well aware of the laws of individual farming. Theoretically, I repeat, this picture would be inevitable, well, of course, practically in 5-8 years our district communists, comrades, no matter how they forget, no matter how blind, they still noticed that we are going in the wrong direction. How is it that we want to strengthen the collective farm, but it turns out on the contrary, that we are turning in the other direction. A fight is needed here. we want to strengthen the collective farm, but it turns out on the contrary, that we are turning in the other direction.

And in order to prevent this and to correct the situation in time, it is wrong to refer, as you do, to the peasant. The peasant has nothing to do with it, he does what suits him. You are to blame, the Central Committee, and especially you, who sit in the localities, see the matter and do not signal.

Of course, in 5-10 years our blind-minded comrades will notice that they have gone wrong and that we need to turn, and our task is not to wait until the last people notice that we have turned in the wrong direction, but to foresee and correct the situation in advance ...

This is what the basis for the fact that we have raised this question for discussion at the plenum of the Central Committee comes down to. If you want to turn to individual, peasant, farmstead farming without mechanization and without our large-scale industry - just say so, then you can drag along behind the events. If you do not want this, then if you please, turn towards expanding the collective farm fields, towards introducing individual peasant farming into the framework.

They talk about workdays. Some have painted a gloomy picture here that, they say, the collective farmer is directly floating in wealth, and

the collective farm is disappearing, as one could understand from some speeches. How people love to scourge themselves! Yesterday we were still writing a report on collective farms, our newspapers shouted hoarsely that collective farm labor is the greatest thing, collective farms are millionaires and so on. and so on, just look at Pravda. And as soon as the question was raised - where are you taking, comrades (it is you who are carried by the elements, and not you who lead it, here are the Bolsheviks in quotation marks!), As soon as this question was raised, everyone immediately began to scourge themselves. There was talk that the collective farm labor was worth nothing, that workdays were not workdays, but that the whole thing was concentrated on the collective farm field, from there income and expenses, and so on. This is nothing but the other extreme from too much praise to the collective farms there is a transition to too indiscriminate criticism of collective farms, collective farm labor. This is also useless. It means that people do not have an anchor, they are carried like a splinter: now in one end, then in the other. That doesn't work either.

If we summarize the materials that we have, say, on the participation of collective farm members in collective farms, on the question of which groups generate how many workdays, etc., this is quite interesting material, one can come to the following conclusions. It turns out, for example, that in 1936 12.8% of able-bodied collective farmers did not give a single workday. In the USSR, 12.8% of able-bodied collective farmers did not give a single workday. In 1937 this category was reduced by 2.4%. In 1937, there were 10.4% of such collective farmers instead of 12.8%. This category is not growing but shrinking. This is a good sign. Who are these collective farmers?

Who are these collective farmers? These are registered, formal collective farmers. These are mostly city people, partly employees. There is hardly a real collective farmer who lives in the village in full view of everyone, so that he does not have a single workday. Maybe there are such people, but there are few of them, maybe they are disabled, and I take people who are able to work, not disabled.

So, this category of collective farmers, people called collective farmers, represented 12.8% in 1936, and now, in 1937, one year later, it represents 10.4%. Category that is declining.

The second group of able-bodied people on the collective farms of the USSR. If we take people who have from 1 to 50 workdays a year, then there were 22.3% of them in 1936, from one to 50 workdays a year. There were them in 1937, a year later, 21.2%. This means less, which means that this group of collective farmers is also a group that has undergone a reduction, not growing, but declining. Over the year - from 1936 to 1937 - decreased.

Take the third group of collective farmers who work from 51 to 100 workdays a year. Such was in 1936 18.3% of all able-bodied collective farmers. There were 15.6% of such people in 1937, less by 2.7%. This means, again, this is a group of collective farmers that is not growing but shrinking.

The next group is collective farmers who work out from one hundred to two hundred workdays during the year. There were 26.5% of them in 1936. The largest group. Became 25% in 1937. Again, this is the group that is not growing but shrinking. In one year, it managed to decrease by 1.5%.

The next group of able-bodied collective farmers working out up to three hundred workdays. There were 17.4% of them in 1936, this group became 18.4%. This means that this is the first group that grows, a group that produces up to three hundred workdays a year. This means that this is a group with a future; it has grown by one percent in a year.

The next group, producing from 301 to 400 workdays per year. There were 9.8% of such collective farmers in 1936, while in 1937 it was 11.3%. This means that this group, which also has a future, is growing; it has grown by almost 4% in one year. "Collective farms in 1937" - it's published, you can get it, there is interesting material there.

The next group of collective farmers, giving from 400 workdays per year and more - 500 - 600 - 700 - 800 workdays. There were 5.7% of such

in 1936, and in 1937 it was 8.5%. This is also a group that has a future and is growing.

What happens if we outline a general tendency in the development of collective farm labor and the importance of various groups, despite all our mistakes, despite the fact that we are not so much leading as dragging along the events?

It turns out that groups are less valuable, for example, groups that do not have a single workday, or groups that have from 1 to 50 workdays, or groups that have from 50 to 100 workdays, groups that have from 100 to 200 workdays, that is, less valuable groups, these groups do not grow, on the contrary, their share is declining. But the more valuable groups, the groups that have worked out from 200 to 700 workdays, these groups are growing.

This is the basis of our work on collective farms. How viable are collective farms, how progressive they are, and how unsuitable we are as leaders! With such a great base, where the best groups grow and the laggards fall, we cannot do anything with this base. We are fake leaders, comrades, fake!

So, the situation is not as bad as the comrades painted here.

How do you explain that groups with more than 200 workdays are growing? In general, it turns out that 60% of able-bodied collective farmers give over 200 workdays, and about 40% - less, of which only 10% give nothing. These are registered people, not real collective farmers. And only 21% gives from 1 to 50 workdays. If we combine this group with another group that gives up to 100 workdays, a total of 37% of collective farmers come out who give less than 200 workdays. And the remaining 63% minus 10% of the unemployed, that is, 53%, give more than 200 workdays.

You see what a healthy soil the collective farms provide.

I repeat, the situation is not as bad as they said here, they relished: how is it that collective farmers take income after income from their microscopic plot, and how collective farms, having mechanization and

tractors, disappear straight away. Correspondents know how to draw, castigate themselves. This is not a merit.

The situation is not as bad as some comrades think.

That, therefore, is how matters stand, comrades. It means that we have two roads before us, if you like: one road - so that we will not bother with this matter any longer and in order to put an end to the dull, but tireless struggle between personal farming, estates and collective farms, collective farms, perhaps to go over to communes? Is the time for this or not? The time has not come for this. In order to switch to communes, you need to have the richest farms on the collective farms, you need the collective farmers to see that instead of having a cow and even fiddling with it, it is better to go and get milk from the farm, the same with other products. This is not yet the case. The material conditions - you are well aware of this - are not sufficient for the transition from artel to commune. Therefore, for now, this road is closed for us. Therefore, we remain in conditions where the struggle between personal economy,¹ * Here, in this struggle, we must manipulate. People go to the other extreme. Since this is the case, we, they say, missed, did not notice, and the peasant walked around us, give him a tail and a mane.

To reduce, to bring to a minimum the backyard fields - it will not work. As long as you allow both private and collective-farm fields, it must be honestly said that the household field must be such that it gives the collective farmer something, otherwise there will be no sense. There must be a collective farm field, and a household plot, and a household plot in no case can be expanded at the expense of the collective farm field. It is clear that the total funds of household plots will grow as soon as reproduction takes place, people multiply, families divide. Since we are in the framework of combining a private economy with a collective farm, personal plots must be given without fail, honestly, we must give them, you cannot deceive here. We must tell the peasant: now we do not have the conditions for the transition to a commune. This means that the estate farm remains, the collective farm remains, just keep in mind, dear comrade, that our collective farm field will be at the forefront, we will not allow it to be reduced, on the contrary, it must be expanded. As for your site, what to do with it, by the fall we will

convene a collective farm congress and there we will make proposals, we will reduce it a little to the size that is necessary in order to satisfy some personal, family everyday needs, so as not to do something from the site that wants to undermine the foundations of collective farm economy. The basis of the collective farm system is the collective farm, not the manor. We will say this directly to the peasants at the collective farm congress. At the collective farm congress, we will try to arrange matters so that the peasants have their own all-Union organ, something like their own All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Please let the All-Union Administration of Collective Farms be elected and let the All-Union Administration - it also solves some issues of collective farm development, with our participation and with our help. It will be very good. It is inconvenient and wrong for us to give orders to collective farms from the depths of the People's Commissariat for Land, this is non-state. They need to create their own All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, let them have one, and we'll see who will work better, the peasant All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions or Shvernikov's (general laughter).

Shvernik. Yes, there will be competition.

Stalin. Such a congress will go to reduce the norms of personal land. You see, 60% of collective farmers have over 200 workdays a year. Here is our support. Here are the majority. Any tidying up, any limitation of the estate economy will meet with delight on the part of these 60% of real collective farmers, who give more than 200 workdays a year, and many 800, 600, 400. And these groups are growing from year to year. Here is our support. Here we will find full response and full understanding. And as for the assigned 10%, who are on the collective farm and don't give anything to the collective farm, they themselves will shake themselves out of the collective farm with joy. As for the people who sit on the collective farm and give from 1 to 50 workdays, they will also be shaken out with pleasure, and we will welcome. As for the next group, which gives from 100 workdays, they will be accepted, they will say: no, work like a human,

So, if the congress of collective farmers decides to amend the collective farm regulations, which are outdated - all laws are getting old, the best

laws are getting old, it is necessary that the laws adapt to life, to its development - and, therefore, the regulations are outdated, the collective farm congress will adopt amendments, will reduce, I have no doubt about it, I repeat, 60% of the best collective farmers will be on our side. In the meantime, we must dance from the charter. Let the plenum of the Central Committee, the communists get together and write a law for the collective farmers. It's necessary.

Here, in our decisions, we must proceed from the charter for the time being, not from reducing personal plots, but not violating clause 2 of the charter, which indicates the norms for personal plots that must be implemented. This guy will understand. He will understand that the Bolsheviks do not want to change anything in the charter without his consent, but there will be a congress, will make a decision, then we will reduce it.

So, for now, until the convocation of the congress of collective farmers, we will dance, as they say, from the charter, and we will demand that all the levads and melons that are interspersed in the collective farm fields, all these "orders" (or rather, disorder), when the collective farm the field is not taken into account and is considered a reserve for expanding the personal economy of the collective farmer, all these "orders" were eliminated immediately. Household plots must be measured, levad. Any dissemination of individual pieces into collective farm fields must be eliminated. If the plenum comes to the conclusion that less land is given for a plot, we will give it for the time being according to the charter, while there is no congress.

This is the first question on which I wanted to draw your attention in order to reveal the prospects of where it is taking us, and what we, the Bolsheviks, who consider themselves leaders, need to look - whether we are leading, or some element is leading us and carries somewhere, in order to turn your attention towards the Bolshevik path, where people should lead, and not drag along the events, for this I touched on this issue.

If we drag out, the collapse of the collective farms will continue, the transition to their destruction, I repeat. Reducing our entire industry by a factor of four is like that.

If you do not want this, and you do not want this, then you need to turn away from the elements, to the Bolshevik leadership, and set yourself the task of leading, and not dragging in the tail, and then you will see that we can straighten out this matter in one year and set it to the proper height, because 60% of us generate more than 200 workdays, this is already a living force, this is a revolutionary force, on which one must be able to rely.

The second question is about resettlement or about regulation, if you will, of the labor force. When we plan this, what do we rely on? That we can distribute the entire fund. Of course, any plan, a five-year or two-year plan, is worth nothing - it is a piece of paper if there are no funds and funds to implement it correctly.

We have everything in order to realize our plans, in order for them to be real, there are funds, funds are available, sometimes there is not enough, but, in any case, if we want to distribute money, we are the masters in organizing the distribution. We are more or less the owners of funds, but we are not the owners of the distribution of labor power, and without this, plans cannot be realized. If we want to build as many factories as we want and if there is not enough manpower, nothing will come of it.

We have money - this is the first factor, funds are - the second factor, labor is the third factor, but in this third part we are weak, not the owners.

How could this happen? Very simple. We are a country where there is no unemployment. We have eliminated unemployment on our own heads (laughter in the audience), and now there is nowhere to get workers. It is one thing when there is unemployment, when there is a reserve of workers, when you can get it, workers work better, being afraid to get out of the factory gates and, moreover, when there is an opportunity in industry to maneuver, to attract people to go to work. We do not have such an opportunity; we do not have a single extra

worker in the market. For the capitalists, this is facilitated by the fact that they can distribute labor power, some have a million in reserves, some with two million, and some with three million, and we do not have a reserve of one hundred thousand.

In this area we need to become masters, we need to take control of the distribution of labor. Do we have an unemployed workforce? There is, of course. Where's she? On collective farms. Here we have a group of 10.4% of collective farmers who do not have a single workday on the collective farms. I believe that this figure has not been deciphered, I understand that here most of the urban and semi-urban people, there are collective farmers, today they go to the station to be hired, and tomorrow they live on their homestead land, etc., there are collective farmers, people who call themselves collective farmers, not working on a collective farm, but living on a collective farm, these are real parasites for collective farms.

The second group, 21% of collective farmers giving up to 50 workdays. These are also real parasites, they need to be shaken out, the collective farm does not need them, but they need the collective farm in order to have the authority of the collective farmer, to have collective farm benefits, these are people who use the collective farm firm, the collective farm banner for their own purposes, they need the collective farm, and the collective farm does not need them. This requires a minimum of workdays. We are making an offer - 50 workdays. We know very well that this figure is inapplicable for all areas, but we wanted to name some figure so that you, the practitioners, would say what minimum workdays to have, in which zone. I think that in the South and East, where there is grain farming, where industrial crops are labor-intensive, profitable crops, there, of course, at least 50 workdays, it will be funny there. In some, as they said before, consuming areas, where there is a holiday, there, maybe 50 workdays is even a lot. You, practitioners, must tell you in which zones what labor minimum, what minimum workdays, and without this minimum you cannot free collective farms from an unnecessary and parasitic group. There are collective farms that are not provided with land. Yesterday you were told that there are collective farms where 1 hectare per yard

is 2 hectares, 4 hectares. It would be nice to have these parasites "collective farmers" who are not needed by this collective farm, but who need a collective farm, it would be good to relocate them. You don't have a workday norm, you are violating this, if you please move to another place, you are in vain settling our personal plot, move to another place, there you will be given a plot. and without this minimum you will not be able to free the collective farms from an unnecessary and parasitic group.

Touch this group as well, because people multiply, families will share, there are three generations in large families, but we will not deal with this, this is not our business, but families will share, young people, finished work 2* do not want to be under guardianship, they will have to give a plot. As long as we have plots, we will give. I must say that there will be collective farms, whole areas where funds for plots will not be found, as soon as we pass a law that the collective farm field cannot in any case be reduced, where can we get funds for personal plots? We must honestly give personal plots; we must not cheat here. A leader who cheats, no matter how Marxist he is, will be driven to hell. We must give sites honestly. There are areas where there are no such funds for plots, all the land has been used, public plots cannot be occupied, and funds for household plots have been exhausted. New families need to be relocated to new areas, more multi-land, where there is a personal plot for them. There are two motives.

Firstly, parasites, people who have stuck to the collective farm, but do not give any benefit - they need to be shaken out. Some of them will go to industry, others will try to move to another place. There will be people among them who will not want to part with agriculture, there are such patriots, they will want to move to other regions: Omsk, Krasnoyarsk, Volga region, there are many lands, to Kazakhstan, the Far East, and so on.

This is the basis on which we are creating opportunities to regulate the workforce. If we do not create such opportunities, in the absence of unemployment we will be completely helpless in the implementation of the economic plan, because we will not have that need to dispose of things, we need to dispose of things, but we also need to dispose of

people, if you want the plan not to remain on paper. You feel it, decisions are made, but there are not enough workers. Today they are recruiting several thousand, and in two weeks they leave, again it is necessary to recruit.

Here is an atmosphere of absence of unemployment.

This means that the second question is not just about giving household plots to some farms that do not have enough land, but this is a big, serious question. In our theses, this issue is touched upon from the point of view of pure practice, but if we theoretically look more deeply at the issue of labor force regulation in a state where a planned economy is conducted, and in order to run a planned economy, I repeat, one must be the master in the distribution of money, funds and people. In the matter of distributing money, you are full masters, in the matter of distributing funds, we are more or less masters, but not completely, in the matter of distributing people we are not masters. It is necessary to become the owner, and for this it is necessary to free the collective farms from surplus labor. Mechanization is taking place on collective farms, but look, 30% of people are sitting for nothing. Here's your labor. And for this, it is necessary to create an appropriate body - the resettlement administration under the Council of People's Commissars, a large resettlement administration, which would have its own local bodies, in the republics, so that people can be disposed of not only within the USSR, but within individual republics, within the regions. There are inhabited areas and there are unpopulated areas. This must be done with. A planned economy cannot afford this matter to the elements. A planned economy, if it is a planned socialist economy, must manage not only money, not only funds, but also labor force. This is the second remark. So, you look at things more from this point of view. It is necessary to shake out the worst, to refresh and improve the health of the collective farm, because if one generates 600 workdays, and the other 50, the other has benefits and the other has no benefits, by this we offend the best people. To support the best collective farmers, the worst must be shaken out. This is the second remark.

1 * Hereinafter, an outline of the document.

2 * So in the text.

110The main issue discussed by the plenum (it worked on May 21-24, 27) was formulated as follows: "On measures to protect public lands of collective farms from squandering." Preparations for discussing this issue began almost a month before the opening of the plenum. In the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee under the leadership of A.A. Andreev, three special meetings were held on this issue. Andreev, who oversees agricultural issues in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), made a report at the plenum. Stalin spoke shortly after Andreev. Stalin's speech, which was of fundamental importance, was not only not published, but even removed from the typewritten transcript of the plenum; it was not found in the typographic proofs of the set prepared for publication. The compilers of the next volume of Stalin's Works used the text extracted from his personal collection. Such a detail is curious. During the report, Andreev, relying on the opinion of a number of secretaries of regional and regional party committees, members of the Politburo who participated in the preparatory meetings, he raised the question of the need for a significant reduction in the personal lands of collective farmers, since "the 1935 charter is outdated." Stalin interrupted him with a remark: "So far the charter has not been canceled," pointing out that the question must be decided by the collective farmers themselves at the III Congress: "The congress must take a decision to change the charter, which is outdated." And before that, "let the plenum of the Central Committee, the communists get together and write a law for the collective farmers. It's necessary". In a speech at the plenum, Stalin gave the following reasoning: "A man in a private household will always strive to round up this matter." "A step back to individual farming has been taken." "If we continue to drag along the events, and not lead, then ... we will get such a picture that the collective farms will disintegrate, instead of collective farms, farmsteads are formed, new individual farms ... then industry must be closed, the fleet of tractors and combines must be liquidated, there will be no more grain for the cities and the army. " "It is necessary to turn in advance from the elements to the Bolshevik leadership ... Lead, not be in the tail."

In essence, it was a question of revising the norms of individual land use, enshrined in the collective farm charter of 1935. Stalin demanded a thorough measurement of the farmsteads of collective farmers, withdrawing from personal use levada, vegetable gardens, melons and annex them to the public lands of collective farms. Collective farmers who produce few or no workdays, he called "real parasites", "parasites", "imaginary collective farmers" who must be sent to industry or relocated to other areas where there is a lot of land (Siberia, the Volga region, Kazakhstan, the Far East). "Collective farms must be freed from surplus labor." Stalin, without any irony, complained that "we have eliminated unemployment on our own heads, and now there is nowhere to get workers," although "there is certainly an unemployed labor force on the collective farms."

By the decision of the plenum, on the basis of Stalin's instructions, in the collective farms, a mandatory minimum of workdays per year was established for each able-bodied collective farmer and collective farmer (from 60 to 100), in case of failure to fulfill which the violators were considered to have left the collective farm and lost the rights of the collective farmer.

Measurements of household land, seizure and transfer of "surplus" to collective farms were decided on the basis of a resolution of the plenum. Special commissions were created with the participation of rural activists, and their decisions were approved by the district party committees. The measurements were completed by the beginning of October 1939. The total area of the withdrawn land was 1189.1 thousand hectares. In accordance with Stalin's instructions, the Migration Administration and its local bodies were formed under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to "manage the resettlement of the surplus part of collective farmers to multi-land areas." The resettlement of collective farm families to the East began. This was argued by the fact that "collective farm public lands cannot be reduced, and in small-land collective farms the reserves for providing collective farmers with personal plots according to statutory norms have already been exhausted."

Having lost their homestead land and part of the livestock, the families of such collective farmers were forced to leave their homes and leave for Siberia, the Far East, Kazakhstan. They had to urgently, for a pittance, sell their livestock and poultry, or hand over the animals to the offices of the Zagotskot in exchange for personal receipts giving the settlers the right to receive livestock at the places of settlement. However, this condition, as a rule, was not met. Great difficulties arose due to the lack of housing. Many settlers were forced to return back to their old places. According to the data of the Resettlement Administration, as of October 1, 1940, about 6 thousand peasant families returned back (History of the Soviet Peasantry. Vol. 3. P. 30-31) (note by IE Zelenin).

Source; "Transcripts from the Soviet Archives", 14 Volume, Svitlana M, Erdogan A

From the speeches of J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov at a joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b). November 27, 1932

Asource: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 3. End of 1930 - 1933. Moscow ROSSPEN 2000. Pp. 557-561

Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 1011. L. 9v.-15. Verbatim record. Typographical copy.

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Top secret.

... Stalin. Comrades! I will not touch upon the organizational aspect of this matter. A lot has been said about this here. It is clear to me that there existed and exists something like an unformed factional group fighting the party. It is clear to me that this group is not limited to Smirnov, Eismont and others, but such comrades as Tomsy and Rykov are also included. This is my belief.

I will also not touch upon individual testimonies of former or current comrades who, in one way or another, sympathize with this unformed group. The analysis of these indications given here by the comrades; I believe to be correct. It is clear to me that the goals of this group are the same as those pursued not so long ago by the right-wing elements of our party. True, Smirnov and others, as can be seen from the testimony, sharpened the question on one person, on Stalin, portraying the matter in such a way that Stalin was to blame for everything, and not the political line of the party. But this is a ruse on their part, it is not sincere. In fact, they are fighting not against Stalin, but against the party, against the party line which they consider disastrous. This is the point, not individual members of the Politburo. Stalin can be "removed" or not "removed", but you cannot "take away" the party, it will remain under all conditions, just as its political line will remain under all conditions.

I would like to pose another, more important and decisive question. I would like to raise a political question, a question about the substance, about the political content of the platform of this unformed group. I think this question is more important than all other questions. Of course, the members and inspirers of this group "recognize" the general line of the party. Now every dog recognizes the general line of the party, apparently believing that this very line does not bind to anything. Therefore, it is necessary to raise the question of the practical everyday policy of the Party and its Central Committee. And now, if we approach the matter from this side, then it is clear to me that this group has fundamental disagreements with the practical policy of our party.

What do these disagreements boil down to? They boil down to the same thing as the disagreements between the Rights and our Party. These people stand against our policy of industrialization, against our policy of collectivization, against our policy of planting and developing state farms. This is the point, comrades.

... The root is that they do not believe in the correct position of the party on the basic questions of industrialization and collectivization. The root is that they think the party's policy on industrialization and collectivization has failed. They believe that the party's policy has not passed the test either in the field of industry or in the field of agriculture. And precisely because they think so, they have returned to their broken positions.

This is the essence of the platform of this new, but essentially old, right-wing grouping.

... Let us now turn to the question of collectivization policy, to the question of agriculture. Is the party's collectivization policy correct? Has it failed, this very policy, or has it won?

What are the goals of collectivization? What has the Party been and is striving for by pursuing a policy of collectivization? What has she achieved in practice as a result of the work of the last 2 - 3 years?

... Has she passed the exam or failed?

The party has achieved that in the course of some three years it has managed to organize more than 200 thousand collective farms and about 5 thousand state farms of grain and livestock production. The Party has achieved that collective farms now unite over 60% of peasant farms, covering over 70% of all peasant land. The party has achieved that instead of 500 - 600 million poods. marketable grain procured during the period of predominance of individual peasant farming, she now has the ability to procure 1200 - 1400 million poods. grains. It scarcely needs proof that without this leap forward we would have had a famine in the country, we would not be able to maintain our industry, we would not be able to feed the workers and the Red Army. Finally, the party has achieved that the kulaks as a class have been defeated, although they have not yet been finished off.

These are the results of the collectivization policy.

Where would we be now without collectivization, without these results of the policy of collectivization? What would happen to us if the politics of the right deviators, politics without collectivization, politics without state farms, triumphed? We would be sitting at a broken trough. We would not have had a sufficient amount of grain, there would not have been a sufficient amount of raw materials, industry would have been undermined, the peasantry would continue to be poor, and the kulak would triumph.

... We are told that grain procurements are proceeding this year with great difficulties, that these difficulties are allegedly connected with the existence of collective and state farms. It is, of course, true that grain procurements are proceeding with great difficulties this year. But, firstly, grain procurement took place with the predominance of individual peasant farming with even greater difficulties. Secondly, the difficulties of the current year do not at all stem from the nature of collective farms and state farms. On the contrary, without the collective and state farms we would have had incomparably more serious difficulties. This is evidenced by the fact that the most difficult section of grain procurement this year is the section of an individual peasant farm.

What explains the difficulties of this year in the field of grain procurement? They are explained by two circumstances: a) the penetration of anti-Soviet elements into collective farms and state farms and the organization of recking and sabotage there, and b) the wrong, non-Marxist approach of a significant part of our village communists to collective and state farms.

... Our rural and regional communists idealize collective farms too much. They often think that as long as the collective farm is a socialist form of economy, then everything is given by this, and there can be nothing anti-Soviet or sabotage on the collective farms, and if there are facts of sabotage and anti-Soviet phenomena, then these facts must be ignored, because in relation to collective farms it is possible to act only through persuasion, and methods of coercion against individual collective farms and collective farmers are not applicable. Needless to say, this view of the collective farms has nothing in common with Leninism. Leninists should never idealize collective farms and collective farmers. They must look at things soberly and concretely, without any fetishism in relation to collective farms and collective farmers.

... What is the collective farm peasantry? The collective farm peasantry is an ally of the working class. The overwhelming majority of these peasants are the mainstay of Soviet power in the countryside. But this does not mean that there can be no separate detachments among the collective farmers and collective farms, marching against the Soviet power, supporting the wreckers, supporting the sabotage of grain procurements. It would be stupid if the Communists, proceeding from the fact that collective farms are a socialist form of economy, did not respond to the blow of these individual collective farmers and collective farms with a crushing blow.

These are the circumstances that determined the difficulties of grain procurement this year.

You see that these difficulties do not and cannot follow from the nature of the collective and state farms. You see that these difficulties are explained by the weakness of our rural and regional communists in the

difficult conditions of the organizational period in the development of collective and state farms.

But this weakness of the communists is a temporary phenomenon, and it will undoubtedly be eliminated in the near future. I think that sabotage on collective farms and sabotage of grain procurements will ultimately play the same beneficial role in organizing new Bolshevik cadres in collective and state farms, which the "Shakhty process" played in the field of industry. The "Shakhty process" served as a turning point in strengthening the revolutionary vigilance of the communists and organizing red specialists in the field of industry. There is no reason to doubt that the phenomena of recking and sabotage on collective and state farms, which have manifested themselves this year, will serve as a turning point in the development of the revolutionary vigilance of our rural and district communists and the organization of new Bolshevik cadres in collective and state farms.

... Molotov.... The collective farms in the countryside won, taking the dominant position in agriculture. But still far from all collective farms we can consider our, Soviet, socialist collective farms. 200,000 collective farms have been created, but we have not already taken possession of all these collective farms in a Bolshevik manner. It is precisely this task, the task of the Bolshevik mastery of collective-farm development, that is now being solved in our struggle for grain, in our struggle for the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan. There can be no doubt that the overwhelming mass of collective farmers stands for the Bolsheviks, for Soviet power, for the collective farms. But the strength of the influence of anti-Soviet elements in the countryside is still so great that in many collective farms they have taken positions that facilitate their kulak-demoralizing anti-Soviet work among the collective farm masses. The lack of a sufficient cadre of persistent Bolshevik workers in the countryside and, above all, in the collective farms themselves, is now reflected at every step. This situation facilitates the direct seizure of leadership in individual collective farms by anti-Soviet elements, which disruptively affects the politically unstable part of collective farmers, not only in these collective farms. But such a situation only raises before the party with all its urgency the question of strengthening

work among the collective farm masses, of strengthening the Bolshevik leadership of collective farms, of educating new, significant and truly politically forged leaders - fighters for our Soviet, socialist collective farms.

The sooner and better we understand the meaning of this new task, the faster we will solve it. Not to retreat in the face of difficulties, but to go confidently forward, fulfilling the grain procurement plan and strengthening the leadership of the collective farms in a Bolshevik manner - with this we will solve the most difficult and, at the same time, the most urgent of the immediate tasks of the victorious offensive of socialism.

At the same time, we must not forget that there are now many elements in our party organizations that are in panic before the kulak sabotage of grain procurements in the part of collective farms, which are ready to break the pace of industrialization and almost beg for mercy from the kulaks. The presence of this kind of rotten political sentiment cannot be underestimated now. They make themselves felt not only in the village.

... We have 200 thousand collective farms that have emerged in the last 2 - 3 years. Basically, the Bolshevik leadership of the collective farm movement is certainly assured. However, hundreds and thousands of collective farms do not yet have Bolshevik leaders and are under the direct or indirect influence of kulak and other anti-Soviet elements. Is it not clear that the collective farms, where the leadership fell into the hands of elements hostile to Soviet power, not only cannot grow economically and get stronger politically, but that the presence of such collective farms has a destructive effect on other collective farms, where the level of political leaders, party and non-party, low, where the experience of social socialist work is still lacking? It is not difficult to understand that under these conditions the anti-Soviet forces can find for their work many such gaps and holes in collective farms (as well as in state farms), which cannot be seen from above, but,

... While working on grain procurements in Ukraine, I had to meet more than once in the villages with such leaders who not only did not grow up to Bolshevism, but in fact completely dissolved in the petty-

bourgeois element and are trailing behind the kulaks and anti-Soviet elements.

You come, for example, to an area rich in grain, but failing the grain procurement plan and, as a rule, you meet here with the leaders calmly and judiciously outwardly proving that everything is more or less well with them, which could not be otherwise. These people are ready to "regret" the disruption of grain procurements, "admit" their guilt and, in general, engage in "self-criticism" and, portraying themselves as "guides" of the general line, in fact cover up all and any facts of degeneration in the party organization, theft and sabotage of grain procurements on collective farms, indulgence of the kulak and other anti-Soviet bastards on the part of local Soviet and party bodies. In organizations with such leaders, you have to look especially carefully for people.

1 * The meeting considered the question of the "Smirnov-Eismont-Tolmachev group." A verbatim report was sent to the participants in the January joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1933.

188 In May-June 1928 in Moscow, under the chairmanship of A.Ya. Vyshinsky, a trial was held, based on accusations inspired by the party and Soviet leadership against the technical specialists of Donbass. Of the 53 people brought to trial, 5 were shot, the majority received various terms of imprisonment (see: Kislitsyn SA Shakhtinskoe case. Rostov-on-Don, 1993).

Source

"Transcripts from the Soviet Archives", 14 Volumes, Svitlana M, Erdogan A

Stalin's speech to consider the draft Model Charter of the Agricultural Artel

JV Stalin's speech at a meeting of the commission of the II All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers-Shock Workers to consider the draft Model Charter of the Agricultural Artel. February 16, 1935

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 4. 1934 - 1936. Moscow ROSSPEN p. 390-402

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No. 146

Stalin's speech at a meeting of the commission of the II All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers-Shock Workers for consideration of the draft Model Charter of the Agricultural Artel 111

Comrade Stalin. First of all, comrades, I think that we must take into account the remark of one of the delegates of the Voronezh Region that where it is said about land as the property of the people, we mean only collective farmland, and meanwhile, there are other lands, state farms, this is also people's land. This remark is correct, one can say this: "land occupied by an artel", but in parentheses say: "like any other land in the USSR is the state property of the whole people." And where it says: "assigned to the artel for perpetual use," add: "that is, forever." It's clear. Cannot be bought, sold or rented out. And then comes the allocation of land. I propose to formulate this point in the following way: where it says: "from the socialized land plots are allocated for the personal use of collective farm households," I propose to say: "Allocated for the personal use of each collective farm household." This means that there should not be a single yard that does not have household land. I must say "do not stand out", but "stand out"1 * and not "small plots for the personal use of collective farm households", but it must be said: "allocated for the personal use of each collective farm household on a small plot in the form of household land", and not "household lands." If so to speak, it may create confusion because there are courtyards in the south, where there are several lands. This means one yard, one

household land. This means that this clause must be formulated as follows: "Of the socialized land plots, each collective farmyard is allocated for the personal use of a small estate plot in the form of a backyard land (a vegetable garden and a garden)."

Further on the item on which the debate unfolded most of all. I do not agree with his comrades, who are the bravest and say, 1 / 10, 1 / 12 part. This is not true, firstly, we must make a reservation that the land under the buildings is also called household land. Comrade Kosheleva, like other comrades, believes that household land is all land, both under residential buildings and under crops. We believe that the part of the household land on which there are residential buildings should not be counted.

I believe that the conditions in our country are very diverse. If you take the cotton districts, and even irrigated land, cotton, this very intense culture, it gives a lot on a small plot of land, and I understand Uzbek, who says that more than 12 / 100 1 * should not be given. If we subtract the land under residential buildings, it is necessary, in my opinion, to about 1 / 4ha. After all, there will be every bird, every grain is needed - the collective farm does not give them. If you take a tobacco region and give 1 hectare, then it can live happily ever after. If you take the suburban land here, in the Moscow region, if you also give 1 hectare, then it is no longer necessary because you have sown a vegetable garden or brought berries to the city - and you live happily ever after. But there are areas where livestock will be abundant. If we take the areas of livestock or semi-livestock, then, of course, 0.5 hectares will not be enough for them. We want to give such districts 50 sheep to each collective farm. There are areas of nomadic animal husbandry, in Kazakhstan we give 100 sheep for personal use, what can be done with 0.5 hectares? You can't do anything. Therefore, the conditions are diverse, and the solution must take this into account. You can't cut everyone under one parenthesis, especially what should you mean? You are brave here and you speak extreme speeches, but you must consider what is now in practice. Take the North Caucasus and a number of regions - the Azov-Black Sea region, Kabarda, some regions of Ukraine are large, some regions of the Voronezh and Kursk regions,

there are one and a half hectares, and you will immediately cut it off from the peasant. It will not work, there will be great discontent. The more the collective farm economy encompasses collective farm households, and the more the collective farm system is introduced into life, the less will the collective farm household strive to expand its personal economy. We must take this into account. We began to plant collective farms on a massive scale for only three years. The old society took hundreds of years to build, and if you think that the new society can be built in three years, you are wrong. You cannot build a new society in three years. More years are needed to strengthen the collective farm system properly, and in order not to drive the collective farmers away from themselves and not to generate unnecessary and completely unnecessary discontent, one must reckon with their opinion. You are progressive people, I understand you that you care very much about the collective farm system, about the collective farm economy. But are all collective farmers like you? You are a minority; the majority thinks differently. Should we reckon with this, or not? It is necessary. Therefore, I believe that you must make a decision by virtue of which the size of the personal land of the collective farm could fluctuate depending on local conditions. There should not be less than a quarter of a hectare, up to 0.5 hectares, and in some areas up to 1 hectare. I am afraid that this is too bold, what I am saying may even need to be raised. that you care very much about the collective farm system, about the collective farm economy. But are all collective farmers like you? You are a minority; the majority thinks differently. Should we reckon with this, or not? It is necessary. Therefore, I believe that you must make a decision by virtue of which the size of the personal land of the collective farm could

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Kalinin. Comrade Stalin, we don't have enough land.

Stalin. In any case, for the time being, what I am proposing will be enough not to cause discontent among the majority of collective farmers, who now have more than 0.5 hectares.

Voroshilov. These are still a minority.

Stalin. I would not say that. In Kabarda, not a minority, in Maikop, too, not a minority, take the Southern Don - also not a minority. Take some areas of Ukraine. There is nothing to hide here, I must say frankly, and a Bolshevik means a person who is not afraid of the truth, no matter how bad it looks, and he tells it all to the end. There are yards with 4 hectares each. I saw it myself. Here's to the extreme of not to strike and to you as a progressive people, have taken into account the mood of the army, which you are doing, and she had several other moods, it is necessary to take the average, and the average will be such - from 1 / 4 to 1 / 2ha. For example, we will give Koshelevoy a hectare, the eastern part of Siberia has special farms, where 3-4 cows can be used for personal use, otherwise it is impossible. In Kazakhstan, where there is animal husbandry, 8 hectares are given for personal use. There is no agriculture, agriculture does not play any role there; all people live by animal husbandry only.

How do you want to disregard this? It must be considered. Different conditions, different people. We are writing the law. And the charter is the highest law, the basic law of building a new society.

If you want to write a law not for one collective farm, but for the whole country, everything must be taken into account, all the variety of conditions.

I therefore propose to formulate this controversial point as follows: "The size of the household land that is in the personal use of the collective farmyard (not counting the land under residential buildings)", not counting Comrade Koshelev. You see, I am making a concession - "these sizes can fluctuate from 0.25 hectares (these are suburban areas, obviously, tobacco, cotton and others) to 0.50 hectares, and in some areas - up to 1 hectare (voices: Correct), depending on the regional and district conditions, determined by the People's Commissars of the Union Republics on the basis of the instructions of the USSR People's Commissars. " The People's Commissariat for Land determines in which areas how to maneuver. If you accept this thing, I think it will come out better.

It should be said: "draft animals are socialized, all agricultural implements", and put in brackets: "plow, harrow, and the rest of the small implements are not socialized."

Chernov. And the thresher?

Stalin. You can put in brackets - plow, harrow, thresher. The parentheses will open after the word "inventory". The rest of the paragraph remains unchanged.

Voice. Then it is better to say: "all agricultural instruments of production."

Stalin. A shovel is also an agricultural tool.

Kaganovich. The thresher can be recorded.

Kalinin. "Plow and harrow" - that says it all.

Stalin. "Plow, harrow, thresher, mower."

Kalinin. The mower and thresher are socialized even now.

Stalin. In all other respects, we will leave the item unchanged.

Next paragraph. The draft says: "they do not socialize and remain in the personal use of a member of the artel" ... 2 * I must say instead of "member of the artel" - "collective farmyard." These are residential buildings. Here we are dealing with a collective farmyard, and therefore instead of a "member of the artel" we must say "collective farmyard".

At the end of this paragraph, it says: "outbuildings necessary for the maintenance of livestock, which is in the personal use of the collective farmer." Instead of the word "collective farmer" it is necessary to say, "collective farmyard".

I have no amendments to the next point.

Then we are talking about the allocation of livestock for personal use. It says here: "From the socialized draft animals, the board of the artel, if necessary, allocates several horses to serve the personal needs of the members of the artels." After the words: "for service," you must say: "for a fee," and the board decides, in kind or in money. Here you can admit a monetary payment, why not?

"The artel organizes livestock farms." Better to say: "The artel organizes a commercial livestock farm, and in the case of a large number of livestock, several commercial farms." If you have 5 - 10 pigs, you do not need to create a separate farm. You don't need to create a specialization to the point of insanity. Management should be one, and the cattle will be in different premises, and having several departments is unnecessary.

Kaganovich. "Mixed farms can be arranged."

[Stalin:] You can say: "Organizes a mixed commercial livestock farm, and if there is a large number of livestock, several specialized commercial farms."

So, this point should be formulated as follows: "The artel organizes a mixed livestock commercial farm or, in the case of a large number of livestock, several specialized livestock commercial farms."

A controversial issue will follow. As for the grain, cotton, beet, flax, hemp, potato, tea and tobacco regions, a collective farmyard can have a cow and up to three young animals for personal use. Apparently, most of the delegates are inclined to put one cow in the yard and up to two young heads, and not up to three heads. It will be possible to say so, as it says here: "One cow and up to two young heads."

As for the sows, there is discord, some stand for one sow, others for two.

Kalinin. It says up to two, so you can have one.

[Stalin:] If it is said up to two, then they will have two. It must be said: "One sow or, if the collective farm board finds it necessary, two sows."

[Stalin:] If the board finds that it is not dangerous for the collective farm, then it will say keep two sows, and if it finds it dangerous, it will say keep one sow.

Voices from the field. It is right.

[Stalin:] It speaks of a collective farmyard. This means that this clause must be formulated as follows: "Each collective farm in grain, cotton, beet, linseed, hemp, potato, tea and tobacco regions can have a cow for personal use, up to two young cattle, one sow, or, if the board finds necessary, two sows, up to 20 hives. "

Voice. Up to 20, up to 20.

[Stalin:] An unlimited number of birds and rabbits and up to twenty hives, so that the men do not get offended.

The next note is the most controversial case. In the note, only two groups of farms are indicated: one group of farms is non-nomadic animal husbandry, and the other group is nomadic animal husbandry.

I propose, in addition to two groups, to add a third: semi-livestock farming. There are such farms. I propose to formulate this very significant note as follows:

"Exceptions are allowed, firstly, for semi-livestock regions (like the Far East, like Eastern Siberia, like the western part of Buryat-Mongolia, like some regions of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, maybe include such regions as the old regions of highly developed dairy farms - Vologda, Cherepovets and, perhaps, some areas of the Northern Territory, to the north of Vologda)".

Kaganovich. And maybe some areas of Polesie and Ukraine.

Stalin. Maybe. Let it be determined by the USSR People's Commissariat of Agriculture together with the People's Commissars of the Union republics.

Voice from the place. About the deer.

Stalin. Of course, this can also be taken into account.

This means that the first group - an exception is made for areas of a semi-livestock nature, where it is allowed to have in the personal use of a collective farmyard from 2 to 3 heads of cattle, from 20 to 25 sheep and goats together, from 2 to 3 sows.

Chernov (chairman). Comrade Stalin, just say not up to three heads of cattle, but up to three cows.

Stalin. Obviously, cows. If a bull starts up, what can you do with it? What about a cow without a bull?

Chernov. Young animals are still considered there.

Stalin. Except for the young.

Secondly, for areas of non-nomadic livestock raising, where agriculture plays an insignificant role, for example, I take the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus, Dagestan, Karachay, where people do not live by farming, where agriculture plays a completely subordinate role. I mean the mountainous regions of Tajikistan, then the mountainous regions of Azerbaijan and Karabakh, regions of Georgia. There you can be allowed to have in the personal use of the collective farmyard from 4 to 5 heads of cattle with offspring, from 30 to 40 sheep and goats together, from 2 to 3 sows with offspring.

And thirdly, an exception should be allowed for areas of nomadic animal husbandry. I mean a number of regions of Kazakhstan, where they have no idea about agriculture, livestock roam, none of your 30-40 hectares will be enough for them. They need thousands of hectares because they wander. I mean the part of Buryat-Mongolia, where people also roam along with cattle and there is no agriculture. They always buy bread, down to the last pound. I mean the Nogais in the North Caucasus, people who also roam with livestock.

Yakovlev. And the Kalmyks.

Stalin. Partly Kalmyks, where nomadic animal husbandry also predominates. There you can be allowed to have in the personal use of the collective farmyard from 8 to 10 heads of cattle, from 100 to 150 sheep and goats, from 2 to 3 sows. They probably won't have pigs.

Mikoyan. You can feed acorns.

Stalin. Maybe there will be some waste, acorns, oak trees. Don't talk about sows in the third section. Here's the first note.

Kaganovich. Instead of a note, a paragraph would be better, Comrade Stalin.

Budyonny. Cattle or cattle?

Stalin. There you have to make a reservation about horses. They must put up to 10 heads 1 *, camels must be put from 5 to 8 heads. It is impossible to live there without it, keep in mind.

Our country is big, the conditions are very different. If this is not taken into account by the charter of the artel, which covers all regions of the vast country, the charter will cost them nothing. There are semi-livestock farms, for which a special rate is needed. There are semi-nomadic livestock farms, for which an increased rate is needed. And there are livestock breeding, purely nomadic farms, for which a higher rate will be required.

Here comrades suggest, maybe not to stipulate in a note, but as a separate paragraph.

Kaganovich. Of course, this is not a note, but a whole program.

Stalin. It is possible as a separate item. Then the charter will have an all-union character. And each district almost recognizes itself, realizes that its interests were taken into account.

If this is accepted, it can be formulated as a separate clause, entrusted to a group of comrades, they will do it, or I will do it myself.

A few words about the comments of the commune representative.
Dzerzhinsky Chelyabinsk region

You see, I propose not to make any special reservations about such communes, firstly, because we are writing the charter of the artel for the artel, and not for the commune. Secondly, because they have a special position. If all our artels were in such a position as the commune is rich, well-organized, well-organized people, good personnel, a lot of cattle, God has given equipment, as much inventory is available ...

Kaganovich. Milk is received ...

Stalin. ... I would like all the artels to achieve these conditions, but the fact is that there are only a few such communes in our country.

It is not worth writing down a law for them now that they must give out livestock for personal use. Let's not destroy this commune. Let's see how long she lives like this. Where is this comrade from the commune? (Turning to Comrade Praporshchikov.) I personally doubt, I am not entirely sure that you will be able to hold out to the end of this matter.

Voice. This already exists in a number of other areas.

[Stalin:] Units. There were many of them. After the artels began to develop and enter into force, the communes became few. They began to rearm, rebuild, so that the collective farmyard had something at its disposal, so that it would not be deprived of its last livestock. Is there a bird too?

Ensigns. And we have a lot of birds. We distributed poultry and pigs to communards, but no cows.

Stalin. I don't think that your esteemed commune could hold out to the end of this matter, because you must understand, what is the artel and, in general, our entire collective farm movement based on? On the fact that we proceed not from denying the personal interests of the collective farmer, but from combining his personal interests with public interests and, if you like, adapting personal interests to public interests. Man is man. He wants to have something for himself. He wants to have some livestock. He doesn't want to get milk from the common boiler. And he wants to have his own cow. There is nothing criminal in this. And the personal interests of the collective farmyard, which consists of family members, which, in addition to common interests, have their own private interests, is not understood by everyone. And this must be understood.

If you want to strengthen the artel, if you want a collective-farm mass movement, a massive collective-farm movement that should embrace millions of households, and not just a few or hundreds, if you want to achieve this, under current conditions you must take into account, in addition to the general interests of collective farmers, their personal interests. The collective farmer wants to have pocket money. Required. He has guests. He wants to have milk, meat and anything, a little. He himself visits, and, of course, it is unpleasant for him if the person to whom he came to visit has nothing, if he has to take from the common barn. All this is unpleasant. And this must be considered. This is a vital necessity that will take its toll.

Brace yourself as long as you can, but how there is later - I no longer know. I believe that your Communards will soon demand a cow from you.

Ensigns. Comrade Stalin, we do not have such collective farmers.

Stalin. Well, as long as you have a lot of products, it may not be required. We'll see. In any case, the fact that the comrades have a commune would be wrong for the vast majority of the peasants. Wrong and unacceptable. It will take a long time to develop artels, to rework human psychology for a long time, to re-educate this mood so that

people understand that everything must be taken from the common pot.

To take everything according to your needs from a common boiler, you need to have a lot of products. There are a lot of products. Well, in one commune there is a lot of food, but in the artel there is no. I know the history of the collective farm movement in the Chelyabinsk region. At one time there were only communes, three years ago. Right?

Voice. Right.

[Stalin:] There were too many communes. We were amazed. Our artels are difficult to organize throughout the country, but they have many communes. They began to figure out what was the matter. The peasant reasoned like this: if the commune, then the seeds can be eaten, the state will give. When it was explained to him that they would not give you seeds for nothing, that you need to work and work skillfully, the communes collapsed then.

Ensigns. Since 1930, thanks to the government, we have provided 24 tractors 1 * .

Stalin. In the Urals then, out of all the collective farms, you had several cooperatives for joint processing, about 60 - 70% of the communes and about 25% of the cooperatives. That was the case. Then the communards thought that we would give land for free, meat would be given for free, bread for free and whatever. By the way, everyone swore: with mugs in their hands, they stood and waited until they were given milk. Then the further, the more communes became. How many communes do you have now?

From place. The only one. (Laughter.)

[Stalin:] So let's not touch it. Let him lead his commune as long as he has enough strength, and if later it becomes necessary to rebuild the artel from the commune, there is no harm in this.

And for all the other members of this meeting, I must say that you do not at all take into account the personal interests of the collective farmers when you say that one tenth of a hectare of private land should

be given to the collective farmer. Some think that the cow should not be given, others think that the sow should not be given. In general, you want to squeeze the collective farmer. This case will not work. When clamped, they give a return. It is necessary to raise the level of people as the consciousness of collective farmers develops, as they re-educate them and as products accumulate in the artel. And if you have little food in your artel and you cannot give individual collective farmers, their yards, everything they need, you cannot take upon yourself in order to satisfy both the socialized and the personal. Then it is better to arrange some division: such and such an area of work is public, and such and such is personal. Better to admit directly, openly and honestly, that the collective farm household should have its own private household, small but personal. It is better to proceed from the fact that there is an artel economy, public, large, large, serious for the satisfaction of social needs, and there is a personal economy. As long as there is a family, children, personal needs and tastes, then this cannot be ignored. And do not overly pinch the personal interests of the collective farmers. Not too much. And don't over-tighten the string. It won't do. Consider the personal interests of the collective farmers. Adapt these interests to the public but reckon with them. In addition, consider that the country is very large, the conditions are different: there are grain areas, there are non-grain areas, there are nomadic, there are livestock, there are semi-nomadic, there is a purely agricultural economy, there is a semi-agricultural, etc. All this must be taken into account ...

From the Dnepropetrovsk region. ... 1 * He has grapes, milk, and poultry, you go, start to prove that you need to work, that the collective farm suffers, that I will be fined from the board, that you need to work, but he does not go, does not pay attention collective farm. If we all went about our individual business, our collective farm public goods would suffer. But there are also conscious ones who have a lot of their own good but go to work.

Stalin. Such people are punished.

Voice from the place. How to punish?

Stalin. Here it is said in the charter: "For mismanagement and negligence towards public property, for absenteeism without good reason to work, for poor quality work and other violations of labor discipline and the charter, the board imposes penalties on the guilty, in accordance with the internal regulations, for example: redo substandard work no accrual of workdays, warning, reprimand, censure at a general meeting, entry on the black board, a fine of up to 5 workdays, transfer to a lower job, temporary suspension from work.

In cases where all measures of education and punishment taken by the artel are invalid, the board puts before the general meeting the question of exclusion from the artel with regard to incorrigible members of the artel. "

Here you have the means of influence. After all, it happens when one incorrigible bummer cannot be corrected in any way, but you still have to try all the means of influence. And there are people who are unconscious. Where to throw them away? It is necessary to make them conscious, to instill in them, to try to correct them, and then, if it doesn't work, move on to measures of punishment, penalties, and then exclude them.

Why, because of one or two idlers, should the other honest workers be deprived of the right to have their own private household? This is wrong. It is necessary to punish and correct. This is stated in the charter.

Voice. Here the woman raised a very important issue. I work and my wife works on the collective farm. I work at a good job, I earn 300 - 400 workdays, but my wife does not want to work, to earn money for me. How to be in such a time?

Kaganovich. Do you want to give an example, or do you want to say that your wife does not want to work?

The same voice. No, just an example.

Kaganovich. Then it's embarrassing to put your wife to shame at such a meeting. (Laughter.)

Chernov (chairman). We will no longer have a debate. Allow me to vote on Comrade Stalin's proposal. It is clear to everyone. I vote ... Who is for? .. Who is against? ..

Chernov. Comrade Stalin has the floor.

Stalin. Comrades, this is not a charter, this is an approximate charter 112, this is a general charter for all districts. Based on these exemplary bylaws, which you will approve, if you approve, the different areas are to develop their present bylaws. Because, if you look at grain-growing regions, why talk about nomadic animal husbandry in the charter of these regions? They don't have nomadic animal husbandry. Why talk about him? Why talk about cotton production if they don't have it?

This is a rough charter. Here are the general provisions, the foundation. On this foundation, you yourself must build in the region your charter for the collective farm in your native language. This approximate charter will be printed in all languages that exist in the USSR. You can already add all sorts of little things to your charter. And here we have worked out the general foundations, and therefore we must abandon all minor amendments, we must take the bull by the horns, take the basis. This is a general clarification so that people know that this is not a charter, but only an approximate charter, i.e., the canvas on which you will embroider your charters in the field. Livestock breeding areas, nomadic, will have their own charter based on local conditions. Grain crops have their own charter, and there will be no word about nomadic farming. Linen districts will have their own charter, why talk about hilling cotton in it?

We will probably adopt a general resolution at the congress of collective farmers, if the congress approves an approximate charter, which, on the basis of this approximate charter, oblige regional organizations to assist collective farmers in developing their specific regulations in relation to specific conditions.

Voice. Right, right.

Stalin. In livestock regions, more must be said about livestock, in grain crops - about grain and nothing about nomadic animal husbandry. This is a general comment.

Now about the amendments. Here you have a clause on manure. What, this manure will be taken only from the farm or from the collective farmyard?

Chernov. And from the collective farmyard.

Stalin. Then it is necessary to say: "the introduction of manure into the land both from the farm and from the collective farmyard", put a comma, and after that: "the introduction of mineral fertilizers." Then it will be clear. Don't you take from the collective farmyard? Take it. Take as much as you can take. This amendment must be made.

Voice from the place. We sat all evening yesterday and went through one sheet. Are we going to look at one sheet today? Today comrades are speaking and talking about manure. Here you need to act specifically, introduce something new. And then, if today there is one leaf, tomorrow there is one leaf, then how many days you will sit here, and we did not come here to visit. Yesterday a leaf, today a leaf, what in the end?

Chernov. Enough. We believe that the item "a" is finished. We pass to point "b".

Voices from the field. No add-ons.

Stalin. The comrades want the position of the collective farms in the plan to be taken into account. Indeed, in our regional organizations there are people who rework plans. Perhaps it could be said so: "the artel accepts to exact execution in terms of sowing, raising fallow, inter-row cultivation, harvesting, threshing and autumn plowing, taking into account the situation of collective farms and especially the collective farm, as well as the state plan for the development of animal husbandry." But it is necessary to introduce: "taking into account the state and peculiarities of the collective farm," it must be said both about the peculiarities and the state of the collective farms, for they are not the same thing.

Chernov. What are the amendments to paragraph "d"?

Voice . It is necessary to make such an addition. The charter says: "to fully use, on a voluntary basis, all available draft power, all implements, agricultural tools, seeds and other means of production belonging to the artel." Here we must add about the draft force. Her in the Odessa region. lacks. Here you need a tractor.

Stalin. It is said: "he pours seeds for sowing and fodder for feeding livestock in the amount of 10-15%." It should be added: "for the entire annual need." Further: "as well as for insurance against crop failure and so on in the amount of 10-15%", in a word, "for the entire annual need."

Chernov. We pass to point 14.

Stalin. As for making the work of pregnant and lactating women easier, one or two lines should be included about the release of pregnant women for 1 month. before childbirth and for a month after childbirth with the maintenance of half the amount.

Delegate from her seat. It depends on how the woman worked, good or bad.

Chernov. Then she earned little, and the average earnings will be less.

Stalin. Maybe add this: with regard to pregnant and lactating women, it is necessary to facilitate the work with the release of pregnant and lactating women for 1 month. before delivery and 1 month. after childbirth with maintenance at half their average earnings.

Chernov. We pass to point 14. We will read out paragraph by paragraph. (Reads out the seventh paragraph.)

Voice from the place. It says here: "To charge 10-15% to the shock workers, and to the foreman up to 20%." Where to get these workdays from?

Voice from the place. We must take from the team that worked worse, otherwise we have nowhere to take workdays.

Stalin. And if one brigade works well, five brigades work excellently, and one brigade works poorly, then those brigades do not have enough workdays. This means that there must be as many excellent brigades, as many bad ones.

Kalinin. It is clear that the total number of workdays needs to be increased.

Chernov. This means that he receives 10% more than what is credited to him. Let's better vote this paragraph as amended by Comrade Yakovlev. Accepted.

Stalin. I must also say about those teams that do not perform tasks.

Chernov. There is a proposal to make an addition to this point in relation to teams that work unscrupulously and give low yields, poor wool yields, poor milk yield, poor maintenance of young animals, they should be given a discount of up to 10%.

Stalin. Teams working poorly or not working hard?

Chernov. Who is in favor of accepting Comrade Stalin's amendment? The amendment was accepted ...

Stalin. A deputy is necessary, even if the collective farm is not very large. It must be said that small collective farms, which are very tiny in the north, will probably turn into large ones, because it is more difficult for small collective farms to exist.

A deputy is needed in every collective farm. If there is no deputy, then the chairman will have to sit in the office and write papers, he cannot go anywhere, cannot send anyone to the brigade for checking, etc. Finally, the chairman can get sick. Who will replace him? The collective farm must have a permanent deputy chairman who is obliged to study the case, replace the chairman, improve his qualifications, etc.

Delegate's voice. You just need to make a reservation that he is not released.

Stalin. It does not say that he is being released.

Delegate's voice. It must be said that he is not released.

Chernov. On large collective farms, he can be released.

Stalin. If there is a large collective farm, it is necessary to release a deputy in it, if it is a small one, it should not. Therefore, we are silent on these issues, we leave it to the artel itself to decide where it will be released and where it will not.

Voice, I have such an addition: it is not enough to collect a meeting 2 times a month, you need 3 times a month.

Yakovlev. The charter says: "At least twice a month."

Voice. Our troikas meet every day, but general meetings rarely meet, and, in my opinion, 2 times a month is not enough.

Yakovlev. That is the trouble with us, it turns out that the board, the troika get together almost every day in order not to gather a general meeting later. Here in the charter, it says: "collect at least twice a month." This does not mean that you cannot collect three or four times. It is necessary that the board does not replace the general meeting. And we have a special point about the general meeting.

Ksenofontov. One more addition. Since there will be no further item on the chairpersons, I propose to speak here about the payment procedure for the chairman. We have the following proposal: the collective farm chairman receives both in-kind and monetary income in the artel for all his workdays [for] a very big job. And the whole good organization of work on a collective farm depends on what kind of chairman is, and the pay is equal to that of an ordinary collective farmer. Can't a collective farm chairman be a good drummer? - of course it can, but not every drummer can be a good chairman. The value of the labor of a collective farm chairman is paid low, and collective farm chairmen, especially on large collective farms, are offended when the work is done well 1*, it's a shame that his work is paid low. Why shouldn't the chairmen be paid both in kind and in money, depending on the performance of their work: a job is done well - get it, poorly done - we won't pay. Here are my considerations to consider.

Stalin. I think that with regard to the chairmen of collective farms, their deputies, if they have not been released, then in relation to the heads of livestock farms, and perhaps also in relation to bookkeepers and accountants, this issue will have to be worked on. In relation to these people, who make up permanent management cadres and are of great value for the artel, it may be possible to give additional cash income in addition to the usual calculations for workdays. Let's just say, if the collective farm has no more than 500 hectares, depending on the size of the collective farm, give the chairman 50 rubles each. I say approximately. If more than 500 hectares - up to 1 thousand hectares - 75 or 100 rubles, if 2 thousand hectares - up to 125 rubles. Take a scale in accordance with the size of the sown area of the collective farm and depending on the responsibility that the chairman of the collective farm bears.

The same is true for other categories, say, farm managers, accountants, bookkeepers, because you cannot satisfy them by nature alone. Now our monetary economy will develop. There will be a lot of goods. Money is such a thing that makes it possible to better maneuver. Maybe a person wants to buy something, and not get bread. In my opinion, it is necessary to establish the principle of additional monetary payment for workdays.

Chernov. How will we include it in the charter, or will we issue it as a separate resolution?

Stalin. It is possible by a separate decree; it can be included in the charter in the section "Remuneration". There you can enter such a heading. It is possible and limited to a special resolution of the congress, if the commission makes such a proposal.

Kalinin. Such payment is still allowed.

Voice. We have a combined economy and small plots of land.

Stalin. We say: up to 500 hectares. This means that this includes 50, 100, and 200 hectares. And there will be one payment for this. And if the collective farm has from 500 to 1 thousand hectares, a different amount of payment, more than 1 thousand to 1.5 thousand, or 2 thousand there

- the third. We also have very large collective farms. It is necessary to establish the amount of cash payment in connection with the amount of land on the collective farm.

If this principle is approved, then you can instruct someone to formulate it and submit it on behalf of the commission to a meeting of the collective farm congress so that it be adopted in the form of a separate binding resolution. And if you like, you can add it to the model charter.

Voice. Add to the charter.

Kalinin. They still receive additional payments.

Yakovlev. His workdays are equated to the development of a drummer, and here he gets it in kind.

From the place. In our collective farm, the chairman receives a lot of workdays, and even payment in kind, and we have more than one chairman, but there is also his deputy, the foreman, the assistant to the foreman and the entire board, and they take one and a half workdays, and the chairman two workdays, while a good collective farmer- the drummer, who has calluses on his hands, receives 300 workdays, and the chairman received 500 workdays from us and took payment in kind for them: bread, and potatoes, and that's all. As soon as they arrive from the area, they will press it first. It is not right.

Stalin. Not everything is clear to me, maybe she is right. I want to ask, how is your collective farm chairman, does he receive all the workdays or a part?

From the place. Everything, and I received everything in kind.

Stalin. Does the chairman get as many workdays as the best drummer can do?

From the place. No, he writes two workdays in a row, and a field grower one and a half.

Stalin. But tell me, how does the chairman get all his workdays: in kind or partly? 1 *

Voice. Not all, part.

From the place. So, I get 0.75 daily and 100 rubles. money. I get 22 workdays a month. I earn 220 workdays a year, and this is how the average collective farmer earns. Along with him, I get workdays.

Stalin. This means that not for all the workdays in kind, but as much as the best drummer can work out.

The question is very difficult. Let's put it aside in order to earn some money. The chairman is responsible for everything, he has many worries. If the farm does not work well, the chairman is responsible, not you (referring to the Collective Farm , which spoke with Comrade Stalin in Ukrainian). The chairman should receive more.

Since the question is complex and there are large differences, I propose to postpone this question. Let's not write anything into the charter for now, but we will discuss this issue separately with the collective farmers.

Obviously, it is necessary to gather representatives of large collective farms, medium and small collective farms and discuss this. It is necessary to properly suck this question, and now this question is postponed.

It is necessary to decide who will enter with a proposal to the II Congress of Collective Farmers about the fact that the model charter is considered the basis for drawing up the artel regulations, so that the approximate charter is immediately translated into all languages of the USSR and so that there is somebody that monitors behind this 3 *, Narkomzem, for example. Who will enter with this proposal?

Chernov. It will be necessary to decide.

Stalin. Commission. Until now, there was an approximate charter, and this approximate charter was considered a charter for each artel. The specific features of each artel were not taken into account for each district and region, and the approximate charter turned into a charter. It just doesn't sound good.

This means that we must now adopt a draft resolution: the commission submits for approval to the Second Congress of Collective Farmers the question of what, in addition to the approximate charter, are approved, say, or better: on the basis of this approximate charter, the artels should have their own charters, taking into account the specific features of each artel, each region and area. This is one sentence.

Now the second sentence. Molotov and I were just talking, and he suggested an idea. Perhaps the commission should enter with a proposal to the Second Congress of Collective Farmers about organizing an agricultural exhibition in two years' time. Several years ago, we had an agricultural exhibition, where individual farms of all regions were presented. Now we have many collective farms, farms are more organized. It would be nice to create an All-Union agricultural exhibition in two years, so that later the square and the well-known premises of this exhibition can be turned into the All-Union collective farmer's house. This is the second sentence. Then we will put all the gifts there and put the samovar there. A large samovar, we don't know where to give it (laughter).

Chernov. There is a proposal to enter on behalf of the commission with a proposal to the Second Congress of Collective Farmers-Shock Workers that the main charter that will be adopted is only the basis on which the charters of the artel are developed, taking into account the specific situation. Who is in favor of entering our congress with this proposal, please raise your hands? Please omit.

1 * So in the text.

2 * Hereinafter, outlines of document.

3 * For the resolutions of the II All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers-Shock Workers, see: The Second All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers-Shock Workers: Verbatim Report. S. 237, 246.

111 Commission for consideration of the draft Model Charter of the agricultural artel in the amount of 167 people. was elected at the II congress of collective farmers-shock workers on February 14, 1935. The commission included I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, L.M. Kaganovich, K.E.

Voroshilov, M.I. Kalinin, P.P. . Petrovsky and others, as well as representatives of the territories and regions of the USSR (Pravda. 1935, February 15). The chairman of the commission is M.A. Chernov. The commission began work on February 15. The results of the work were summed up in the report of MA Chernov "On the work of the commission on the Model Charter of the agricultural artel" on February 17, 1935 (II All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers-Shock Workers: Verbatim Report. M., 1935, pp. 225 - 232) ...

112Work on the Model Charter of the Agricultural Artel began at the end of 1929. The first version, which was recognized as unsatisfactory by the board of the People's Commissariat for Land, was presented on December 28. The draft revised by the Kolkhoz Center, after discussion and revision, was published on February 6, 1930. It was a declarative document that did not solve the main issues of the collective farm movement, which contributed to the desire of local leaders to socialize as much as possible, i.e., the actual creation of communes. In this regard, already on March 2, 1930, the amended Model Charter of the Agricultural Artel was published, which brought great clarity to the problems of the degree of socialization of property, streamlined membership and wages in collective farms (see: Ivnitky N.A. Collectivization and dispossession (the beginning of the 30s). M., 1996, pp. 78-80). However, the 1930 charter did not specifically formulate the principles of organization,

Record of the conversation of Stalin with Lord W. Beaverbrook and A. Garriman - 1941

Record of the conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR Stalin with the heads of the delegations of the Great Britain Lord W. Beaverbrook and the USA, A. Garriman at the Moscow conference of the representatives of three "

September 29, 1941

highly secret

Beaverbrook: I will allow myself to submit for your consideration the invitation to speak at the conference on Thursday to report on progress and to celebrate the role of the united states of America. Such a performance would create an atmosphere of triumph, strengthen the common front and make a strong impression on England, the USA and even France. I am trying to get the best out of the meeting for the benefit of all three countries.

Stalin: I do not see the need for this. Plus, I'm **very busy**. I don't even have time to sleep. I think that comrade **Molotov's speech will be quite sufficient.**

On Beaverbrook's proposal to bring the conference delegates to the kremlin, comrade Stalin again points to his busyness. Beaverbrook states that he will return to this issue.

Beaverbrook: with America's help, we can deliver 500 tanks, of which no more than 50% are light tanks and the rest are heavy.

Stalin: what is the weight of the light tanks and the caliber of the guns?

Beaverbrook: 7-8 and 13 tons, and caliber - from 37 to 40 mm.

Stalin: we agree if small tanks are no less than 7 tons and guns are no less than 37 mm. But is it possible to increase the number?

Beaverbrook: now we are talking about procurement over the next 8 months. Then we can give more. In our proposal we have reached the

limit of possibilities. Of course, it will be necessary to keep the Arkhangelsk port open.

Harriman: where would you like the American tanks to be sent - to Arkhangelsk, Vladivostok or via Iran? This issue, of course, can be resolved in the commission, if we cannot make a decision now.

Stalin: to Arkhangelsk, closer to the front.

Beaverbrook: there are very few cranes there, to my knowledge.

Stalin: the number of cranes can be increased.

Beaverbrook: let's move on to aviation now. We will be sending out 200 fighters per month from the UK for 8 months and more thereafter. If we do not agree to make any changes to the types of fighters, we intend to send hurri-cannons, spitfires or other types. We'll have to send them by sea to Arkhangelsk (it is impossible to send them by air), of course, disassembled.

Stalin: can't Lord Beaverbrook say what the weight of the hurricanes and spitfires is.

Beaverbrook: I can't say now.

Stalin: what motors?

Beaverbrook: 800 horsepower Merlin, Rolls Royce motors. These fighters saved the UK.

Stalin: as far as I know from the literature, the power should be 1000 horsepower.

Beaverbrook: quite possibly. Tomorrow I can tell you more precisely.

Stalin: will the oil (*other necessary items*) be supplied with weapons?

Beaverbrook: yes, guns and ammunition.

Stalin: it is advisable to have ammunition for each aircraft for 20 sorties. "tomahawks" had ammunition only for 4-5 sorties, which our pilots consider very insufficient.

Beaverbrook: we sent ammunition for the tomahawks from England for 1,100,000 rounds, 3,150,000 were sent from America. On October 10, 500,000 will arrive, of which 200,000 are armor-piercing and 100,000 are tracer. I think that this will be enough for now, and if not, we will send it. We are not interested in keeping planes inactive.

Stalin: our planes take with them 600 rounds for small-caliber machine guns, 300 for large-caliber machine guns and 150 for 20-mm cannons. These numbers must be multiplied by 20. The plane lives with us for a month and five days, which is equivalent to 20 sorties. If you do not have the specified amount of ammunition, the aircraft may remain inactive for some time.

Beaverbrook: this calculation is correct if on each departure the plane will use up all the taken supplies each time. In any case, we are interested in the maximum benefit from the aircraft, and we will take care of the sufficient supply of ammunition to the fighters.

Harriman: I am surprised by the numbers given.

Stalin: our machine gun fires 2400 rounds per minute, the large-caliber one - 1100-1200, the 20-mm cannon - 800, and the 23-mm - 580. Each plane takes 500-600. This is 15 sec.

Beaverbrook: that's right. I will share with you the results of the British experience in this regard.

Stalin: we don't take tracer bullets. Experience has shown them to be useless. We need incendiary bullets.

Beaverbrook: incendiary can also be sent. Do you need armor-piercing?

Stalin: yes, we do. Is it not possible to receive planes of the same type: either the hurricanes or the spitfires, so that it would be easier for our pilots to master?

Beaverbrook: I understood you yesterday in the sense that you want to have spitfires as well, and I telegraphed an order today, which I can of course cancel?

Stalin: I said yesterday that we would prefer to have only spitfires. If it is not possible, then we are ready to take only "hurricanes".

They say that there are three-ton machine-gun tankettes. Could you supply us with them?

Beaverbrook: we'll get to that point a little more.

I persuaded Harriman to send 1,800 aircraft from the united states within 9 months, of which about 100 will be sent in October, 150 in November, 200 in December, 200 in January, and the remainder over the next 5 months. Agreement between Great Britain and the united states. Half of each monthly dispatch will be bombers. Fighters will be of the tomahawk type in small numbers, and the rest of the Katigavk type. This is an improved tomahawk type, and pilots familiar with this type will not have to re-master the Katigavk. According to your wishes, the radius will be from 600 to 700 kilometers, and the bombs will be one ton on average, some will be larger, others smaller.

Stalin: twin-engine?

Beaverbrook: all twin-engine. Some of this number will be sent from England.

Stalin: yesterday we expressed a desire to receive more bombers than fighters, namely, in a proportion of 75-25%.

Beaverbrook (throwing up his hands): it's absolutely impossible.

Stalin: we have a special type of Sturmovik bomber. It has armor of 5-7 mm, and in some places even 13 mm. He hits tank columns and manpower. Armed with cannons and bombs. The motor is not high-altitude, it flies at an altitude of 50-150 meters. Foggy weather doesn't matter to him if the fogs are not very low. It has a great effect in combat. It has 23 mm guns, but soon we will put 37 mm guns. The speed at the ground is 380-400 kilometers. Russian motor, m-38. Single engine. The team consists of one person. Power 1250 horsepower. The Germans really don't like him. Your military saw him.

Beaverbrook: it would be interesting to see it.

We can give other things as well: field guns, heavy Bren-class aircraft. I would like to discuss each subject one by one and come to definite solutions here. We intend to come again in 8-9 months with a supply proposal on a larger scale. After we come to certain decisions here, the rest of the items can be transferred to the supply committees in London and Washington. If this plan is approved, then I will start listing further types of supplies.

Do you need 25-pound cannons?

Stalin: we can do without them. Can't you get anti-aircraft guns?

Beaverbrook: we don't have them.

Harriman: unfortunately, we are very lagging behind in the production of anti-aircraft guns, we have 90mm zeits, which we are just starting to produce. We value them very much, but I am authorized to offer 152 guns from them within 9 months, and u1-mm - 756 within 6 months. These are the only two types that we produce, about 150 per month.

Beaverbrook: anti-aircraft guns don't shoot down planes. That is why we prefer fighters.

Stalin: during massive air raids, anti-aircraft guns frighten, do not allow hitting the target and make them throw bombs in disorder.

Beaverbrook: from the anti-tank guns, we could get some 2-pounders with armor-piercing rounds. We now only make armor-piercing guns. Within the next 9 months we will be able to deliver 2750. They penetrate 50 mm armor. They are all on trailers.

We can provide machine guns with a caliber of over 6.72 mm used in tomahawks. The magazine contains 97 and 37 rounds.

We can offer three-inch mortars used in the infantry. They shoot 1,500 yards.

Stalin: no, they will not be needed. We are replacing them with mortars.

Beaverbrook: it has anti-tank mines that we can give you 60 thousand a month.

Stalin: yes, we do.

Beaverbrook: hand grenades?

Stalin: we have.

Beaverbrook: we can give you some anti-tank rifles, and later we can give more. I can tell you the caliber tomorrow.

Stalin: yes, good.

Beaverbrook: do you need wedges for a team of 2-3 people?

Stalin: yes, we do.

Beaverbrook: there are Thomson-type stenautomatic rifles, 8-9 rounds in the magazine.

Stalin: no, they are not needed. We have a 10-round magazine.

Beaverbrook: you ordered them, and we've already sent 20 thousand.

Stalin: no, we don't need it.

Harriman: we have small four-wheeled vehicles built specifically for the army, especially for communications, like the jeep. We have 5 thousand of them.

Stalin: okay, let's take it.

Beaverbrook: I'll ask if we can give them a lot.

Stalin: what about barbed wire?

Harriman: you can.

Stalin: how much? Harriman: I'll have to ask.

The conversation ended there, and the continuation is scheduled for 6:00. The evening of the next day.

Publ. : Soviet-English relations ... - t. 1. - s. 132-136.

Recording of the conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR J. V. Stalin with the heads of delegations of the Great Britain Lord W. Beaverbrook

September 30, 1941 highly secret

Harriman delivers a note in English concluding the responses of the British and American delegations to the individual items on our list of applications, after reading this note.

Stalin: we could take 8-10 thousand 3-ton trucks a month. If it is impossible, then they would agree to take part 17, and 2-t.

Harriman: I can't talk about the numbers right now. But we will do our best to satisfy you as much as possible.

Stalin: 4 thousand m(eter) of barbed wire a month is not enough for us. We would like to receive 10-15 thousand tons at once. Can't you get now a 2-month supply of 8 thousand m in one month?

Harriman: I can't promise now.

Beaverbrook: in addition to toluene, we will send you 10,000 m, but I don't know what month. It is an explosive substance containing toluene.

Harriman hands over a list of goods that it is desirable to receive from the USSR.

Beaverbrook: I would suggest ending the conference so that we can return to the UK and the us and there to discuss your maritime application with our governments. I want the UK to go far, very far, to have a sense of real cooperation.

Stalin: how many tankettes can you give?

Beaverbrook: 200 a month now and more then. Everything that we produce and that is not included in your applications, we will give you. You only need to tell us what you want. I am making this proposal on behalf of my government. Do you need quarter-ton bombs?

Stalin: we would prefer half-ton bombs.

Beaverbrook: we can offer you oxygen cylinders for 75 and 750 liters, as well as various rockets, for example, for lighting water, smoke, etc.

Stalin: we need to study all this.

Beaverbrook: you can wire me this.

Harriman: if you don't mind, I would like to leave here a permanent representative at the embassy who would deal specifically with the supply issues and would help our ambassador in this.

Stalin: it would be very good (...]

If we have finished with this question, then I would like to say a few words about after Steinhardt. It seems to us that he is very influenced by the local foreign diplomatic missions. At the very beginning of the war, he frightened us with the fact that the Germans were supposedly plotting to send parachute troops to kidnap me and comrade Molotov. At that time, he already suggested that we evacuate the government from Moscow, as well as the embassy. He has been keeping part of his embassy in Kazan for a long time.

Harriman: I didn't know that. It seemed to me that Steinhardt was eager to help.

Stalin: are you satisfied with our ambassador Umansky?

Harriman: he talks too much. He addresses many people on the same matter, and as a result no one knows who is responsible for the execution. It would be better if he spoke with one person, who is responsible in each case.

There is a brief exchange of views on Maisky and Cripps, with lord Beaverbrook speaking highly of Maisky.

Harriman: I want to return to the issue I raised yesterday regarding the Siberian airfields. Who could our general Chaney turn to?

Stalin: to general Golikov.

How is Hess doing?

Beaverbrook: I visited him on September 8th.

Stalin: is he so hospitable?

Beaverbrook: it's in a wired house with bars on the windows. He handed over to Mia a memorandum of 40-50 pages, written with his own hand, where the thesis against Russia is being developed. He complained that he, who had come to save England, was being held behind bars and not even allowed to correspond with his family. He especially insists that he be allowed to communicate with Hitler. In my personal opinion, which Churchill does not share, Hess came with someone's knowledge; in England he hoped to decline, to cause through his supporters a movement against the British government and then fly back. But, obviously, he was not met at the agreed place or did not give the necessary signals, the fuel ran out, and Hess had to go down by parachute. Churchill thinks Hess is insane.

We would like to do something for the Turks, they treat us with sympathy.

Stalin: it would be good **so that Turkey does not go to Germany.** But she doesn't behave like an ally of England.

Beaverbrook: they didn't do anything to hurt us, no trouble. They were hurt by our actions in Iraq and Iran. Helping them boils down to delivering tools you don't need. Yesterday I spoke about a thousand 87 lei of field guns, which would mean a lot for the Turks.

Stalin: to help, you need to have guarantees that help will not be lost. Is lord Beaverbrook sure of that? There is no union between Turkey and England, but there is neutrality.

Beaverbrook: we would like to resurrect the union.

Stalin: this should have been a condition for help.

Beaverbrook: we can't complain about them. We ourselves did not fulfill some obligations.

Stalin: Turkey is afraid of Bulgaria and its alliance with Germany.

Does the blockade extend to Finland?

Beaverbrook: I think we're ready to distribute, but I'm asking you not to rely on that answer. I could give a more accurate answer to this from England.

Stalin: Finland is behaving very impudently towards Britain's ally - the USSR. At the beginning of the war, she said that she was striving to establish the old borders, and now she behaves like a vassal of Germany.

Beaverbrook: so, you want a blockade of Finland?

Stalin: this would be a continuation of the blockade of Germany. Finland has long crossed its borders.

I once asked the president of the united states of America if he could threaten Finland to break off relations. Do you know, Herr Harriman, what followed?

Harriman: I can't say, but personally I think it would be politically difficult for the president.

Stalin: I think that our agreement with Britain on cooperation against Germany and on not concluding a separate peace should be turned into an alliance treaty that would cover not only the military, and about post-war period, our government is wholly behind this.

Beaverbrook: I personally would support such a proposal and would like the issue to be raised. We have a military cabinet and a defense committee, which is responsible for the issue raised. Members of the defense committee are Churchill, Attlee, Eden, and Beaverbrook. They make certain decisions without asking the rest of the government.

Stalin: is it possible to end the conference by signing the agreement on cooperation of the three powers?

Beaverbrook: I think it would be difficult for America.

Harriman: lord Beaverbrook speaks from personal experience. You should not push the president with agreements.

Stalin: I do not press, but only ask.

Harriman: you have to understand where the president is leading his country.

Stalin: but all the same, there is a **lot of ambiguity in America's position:** on the one hand, it supports the belligerent England, and on the other hand, **it maintains diplomatic relations with Germany.**

Beaverbrook: America is doing everything it can to harm Germany. The country is very friendly towards Great Britain, but the army and navy are not so willing to part with their own supplies. Roosevelt, Hopkins and Harriman, however, are pushing through. I would like you to be as much a friend of these people as we are.

Harriman: for clarity, I will add that our fleet wants war with Germany and by all definitions of the concept of war, it is already at war, having received the order to fire on German ships. Our army is too small, but difficulties are being overcome.

Beaverbrook: from July 1, 1942, we will be delivering 375 tanks a month and 500 tanks a month from January 1, 1943. I see no reason why the us could not deliver the same quantities to you. I can promise on behalf of my government to raise the delivery of airplanes to 500 per month from July 1, and to 400 from January 1, 1943. If America gives the same quantities, then you will receive 800 per month, I repeat once again, if we produce anything in the UK that is not on your list, we are always ready to provide you with a certain percentage of products.

Stalin: we would very much like to receive trucks from America.

Do you think a press communique is necessary?

Beaverbrook and Harriman: yes.

Harriman: we are sending a military mission to China; do you have anything to say about this?

Stalin: it would be nice, but China has stopped fighting.

Harriman: are you continuing to supply china?

Stalin: no, due to our own needs we stopped supplying, but 4 months ago we sent artillery and aircraft there.

Beaverbrook: the Americans recently sent 67 bombers to china that were destined for England.

Harriman: can you say something about japan?

Stalin: when the neutrality treaty was signed, the question of aid to china was not raised at all. There is no way to tear japan away from Germany. Does America seem to be working on it? It would be nice.

Harriman: all I can say is that the UK and America have dealt with this issue a lot. We now represent a united front to make japan understand the fallacy of its relationship with the axis powers. This policy, which we have been developing since the president's meeting with Churchill, is already yielding good results.

Stalin: I have the impression that Japan is not Italy and does not want to go into slavery to Germany. Therefore, there are grounds for separating it from Germany.

A decision is made to end the conference from tomorrow and to prepare a press communique in the meantime.

Wua rf. F. 048. On. 48. P. 431. D. 10. L. 26-31.

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From

Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Svitlana M, Erdogan A

Conversation of Stalin with Cripps - 1940

From: conversation of the general secretary Stalin with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR Cripps in the Kremlin

/ July 1940 top secret

.....

Comrade Stalin turns to the question of Turkey.

What about Turkey? We have good relations with the Turks, but they, the Turks, play so much in politics and play so many unexpected tricks that it is difficult to guess what they want.

With regard to the aspirations of Italy and Germany to the middle east, comrade Stalin considers such aspirations not excluded, but here a lot depends on the position of Turkey which jumps and where she will make it, is very difficult to guess.

Cripps replies that, of course, the Turks will jump if there is a danger to Istanbul or to further revise the status quo on the Bosphorus or the Black Sea. If there is an opportunity for England to do something in the direction of resolving this issue, then England will gladly do everything possible.

Comrade Stalin turns to the question of the Balkans.

Comrade Stalin says that this question must be studied. I think, says comrade. Stalin, that it makes no sense for Germany to withdraw troops from the western front and transfer them to the Balkans. There is a lot of talk in Romania that because of the war in the Mediterranean, the Romanians have nowhere to send their oil. Romanians will sell oil to Germany and Italy. Therefore, there is hardly any reason to divert forces to the Balkans.

As for Turkey, Istanbul and the straits. What kind of danger could be for Turkey in this matter? Maybe this is a fictional danger of Turkey, on which the latter is going to play and throw out a new focus. If we talk not about imaginary, but about real dangers, then the speech of comrade Molotov must calm down the Turks. We have good relations

with them insofar as we are not going to attack each other. With regard to the recent negotiations, it must be said frankly that we did not come to an agreement with the Turks and we parted, dissatisfied with each other.

During his last visit, says comrade Stalin, Saracoglu did not even want to talk about the straits, and I think that our relations need to be improved. If the UK intends to make an effort to improve relations, then we will not object.

....

S. A. Lozovsky

Avp rf, f. 0144, on. 20, p. 105, d. 3, l. 1-3.

From

Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941 , Svitlana M, Erdogan A

Conversation of Stalin with the ambassador of GB in the USSR S. Cripps - 1941

From; recording of the conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR J. V. Stalin with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR S. Cripps

July 10, 1941, top secret

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While agreeing with the new version of the first paragraph, Cripps, however, said that since the text he proposed mentions the rendering of "each other assistance of all kinds," **he does not see a great need for the addition proposed by comrade Stalin.** Cripps also stated that as a lawyer, he often encountered agreements in England and always used general terms. The British, Cripps explained, have a strange way of conveying the meaning of the document, and he finds that if you make a reservation, then in England there will be people who will think that the assistance stipulated in the agreement is limited. Cripps considers the question raised by comrade Stalin to **be purely technical.** However, he personally must warn that London might make the same remarks that Cripps himself made.

Comrade Stalin asked Cripps if he would mind if comrade Molotov was present at the conversation.

Cripps fully agreed with comrade Stalin's proposal, after which comrade Molotov took part in the conversation.

After comrade Molotov got acquainted with Churchill's message and the Cripps proposals, comrade **Stalin read the Anglo-French-Turkish treaty** and agreed that this treaty does indeed say: "if Turkey is involved in hostilities with a European power the aggression committed by this power against Turkey, France and the United Kingdom will effectively cooperate with Turkey and will render her every assistance and support within the limits of their forces. "

Cripps jokingly stated that he hoped that the agreement, which Britain and the USSR were going to conclude, **would not suffer the fate of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty.**

Cripps stated that he had received Churchill's personal message to comrade Stalin, which was a response to the proposals made by comrade Stalin in his conversation on July 8 .

After reading out loud and handing comrade Stalin the Russian text of Churchill's message, Cripps noted the difficulties encountered in translating into Russian that part of Churchill's message which refers to the "declared agreement expressed in the statement." Cripps further stated that in order to expedite the signing of the agreement, he, on his own initiative and under his own responsibility, drafted a draft agreement that, in his opinion, reflected the views of the British government.

The draft agreement presented by Cripps read:

"his majesty's government in the United Kingdom and the government of the union of Soviet socialist republics have agreed and declare as follows:

A) both governments mutually undertake to render each other assistance of every kind in the present war against Germany.

B) they further pledge that during this war they will not negotiate peace and **will not conclude an armistice** without mutual consent. "

Answering comrade Stalin's question why not call the proposed draft document an agreement, Cripps said that in drawing up the draft he had to be guided by Churchill's message, where the latter calls the document an "agreed declaration". Wishing to start discussing the agreement as soon as possible, Cripps decided to draw up the draft in the simplest, in his opinion, form, and he, Cripps, would have nothing against introducing any amendments and proposals into the text of his draft.

Comrade Stalin noted that no one could and cannot say that the Soviet Union did not fulfill its obligations under the treaties it concluded.

Referring to the wording of the first paragraph of the draft agreement, comrade Stalin proposed the following **option**:

1) both governments undertake to provide each other with all kinds of assistance and support ...

If, said comrade Stalin, this option is acceptable, then **he no longer has any objections**.

Taking note of comrade Stalin's remark, Cripps asked if he could send a telegram to London with the text of the draft agreement as approved by the Soviet government.

Answering in the affirmative, comrade Stalin asked Cripps whether the validity of this agreement was determined by **any time limit or not**.

Cripps stated that the duration of the agreement was determined by **the duration of the war** against Germany. As soon as the war is over, the treaty will disappear by itself. The war will not end until both countries, as indicated in the agreement, do not conclude peace by mutual agreement.

Comrade Stalin said in a joking tone: "isn't England afraid that **the Russians themselves will defeat Germany** and say to England: we don't want to have anything to do with you, they say."

Cripps, also laughing, replied that **this was not possible**, since the parties to the agreement were not allowed to do anything like that.

Further, comrade Stalin asked Cripps what the name of the draft document proposed by the ambassador would be.

Cripps said it would be a declaration agreement. This declaration will say that both contracting parties have concluded an agreement, which they "declare" about.

In response to comrade Stalin's proposal to call the document **not a declaration, but an agreement**, as Britain and Turkey did, Cripps said that the agreement is much more complicated in its content, has various additions, appendices, etc.

Perhaps, Cripps said, we could work out such a treaty later.

Disagreeing with comrade Stalin's remark that a declaration is less binding than an agreement, Cripps proposed to call the document either the "agreed declaration" or "declared agreement".

According to Cripps, the new form of agreement is better than the usual one as it will yield results soon. If both sides discuss separate points of the document, then months will pass.

Comrade Stalin told Cripps that it would be better for months to pass but let both sides work out a real document defining their cooperation.

In response to Cripps' proposal to call the document a declaration "on an agreement on joint actions by the government of his majesty and the government of the USSR," comrade Stalin said that **there are better forms of defining cooperation**. The experience of Munich has already made the whole world convinced that **declarations are worthless**, and no one is fulfilling them.

Cripps began to assure comrade Stalin that England would abide by and observe the present agreement and that the title would not change the meaning and content of the document.

Comrade Stalin noted that the title of the document proposed by the ambassador would provide ample material for critics. It may appear that **both parties lack confidence in each other**.

Agreeing with comrade Stalin's remark about the critics, Cripps said that France would be afraid to criticize the agreement. Cripps, however, proposed to name the document "agreement between Britain and the USSR on joint actions against Germany" or "agreement on mutual assistance and consultation between the USSR and England."

Comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov noted that the addition of the word "**consultation**" **weakens the meaning of the document**.

Cripps then proposed the following title of the document: "agreement on joint actions of his majesty's government in the United Kingdom and the government of the union of Soviet socialist republics in the war against Germany."

Comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov agreed with Cripps' proposal.

Further, comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov and Cripps came to a final decision on the text of the agreement itself, adopting the following wording:

"the government of his majesty in the United Kingdom and the government of the union of Soviet socialist republics have concluded this agreement and declare the following:

1. Both governments mutually undertake to render each other assistance and support of every kind in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.
2. They further undertake that during this war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or peace treaty, **except by mutual consent.** "

Cripps stated that he would like to send both the English text of the draft and the Russian to London.

Comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov approved Cripps' desire and handed the Russian text of the draft agreement to the ambassador.

Cripps said that if he received his government's consent to signing in the form as it is now worked out, he, Cripps, would ask London to authorize him to sign this agreement.

At the end of the conversation, comrade Molotov asked Cripps if he had received an answer from London regarding proposals to take joint measures in Iran and Afghanistan.

Cripps stated that he had telegraphed to London and asked to **consider the question raised by comrade Stalin immediately.** Cripps also pointed out to London that it was necessary to get in touch with Maisky to find out if a joint deMarche could be made.

Having promised to consult with the British envoy in Tehran, Cripps suggested that the military might have to support diplomatic measures.

Comrade Stalin agreed with Cripps' last remark.

Adding that he pointed out to London the need for swift action **on the issue of the Germans in Iran**, Cripps said that he would communicate with the British envoy in Kabul and find out the state of affairs. If necessary, he will coordinate with his government the question of joint actions by the British and Soviet governments.

Comrade Stalin told Cripps that Soviet intelligence learned about a month ago about the proposals that the Germans had made to the Iranians. The Germans offered Iran to sell them oil three times more than the British.

The Germans also promised the Naans that they would help seize the oil fields of Baku.

Cripps stated that he had similar reports of the former. As for the promises of the **Germans to provide assistance in the capture of Baku**, he hears this for the first time. Cripps added that the only way to deal with the Germans is to take joint action.

Saying goodbye to Cripps, comrade Stalin said that he personally asked both Cripps and Churchill himself to quickly resolve the issue with the signing of an agreement in order to clarify both in the USSR itself and throughout Europe.

Cripps assured comrade Stalin that there would be no delay either on his part or on Churchill's side, and that the question would only be behind the dominions.

The conversation lasted 1 hour and 10 minutes.

The conversation was recorded by Potrubach.

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From

Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941, Svitlana M, Erdogan A

Record of the conversation Stalin, Molotov and Saracoglu - 1939

October 1939

Top secret

Comrade Molotov explained in a few words the reason for the delay in the negotiations.

Saracoglu — when I saw the results of the work of the Soviet government in recent days, I understood the reasons for the delay in negotiations. At the same time, I acknowledge the honor that has befallen my lot to continue the negotiations in the presence of comrade Stalin.

Comrade Molotov- now let's get down to business. We got acquainted with the draft Anglo-French-Turkish mutual assistance pact. We also carefully tried to study the articles of this treaty and came to the conclusion that the purpose of the entire document as a whole is not entirely clear to us, that is, **against whom** exactly the pact of mutual assistance concluded by Turkey with England and France will be directed. **We would like to know to what extent** Turkey is bound by the need to conduct these negotiations with both British and the French, how far Turkey has gone in these negotiations. We would also like to know to what extent the Turkish government **considers it obligatory** for itself to conclude this pact with the British and French, and whether it would not be better not to conclude this pact. The present situation and conditions are different from the situation and conditions that took place in the spring when negotiations began (about this pact). All of this interests us **for the following reason**: is it possible that a moment may come when **Turkey finds itself in a position unfriendly towards the USSR**, especially since (we) have symptoms of such anxiety.

Saracoglu - I will gladly answer your questions. However, won't comrade Molotov be able to tell me something about the Soviet-Turkish mutual assistance pact?

Comrade Molotov - We respond to this question dependent on your answer to my question; Will there be confirmation of the existing pact

or will there be something else, like a consultation? In addition, before answering Saracoglu's question about the pact of mutual assistance between the USSR and Turkey, we want to get clarification from the minister of foreign affairs; **against whom can this pact be concluded?** We are interested in this if only because there are no signs now that would speak of Italy's intention to oppose Turkey. Hence, only Bulgaria remains. So, **who will our mutual assistance pact be directed against?** We are interested in these questions.

Saracoglu - Now I will try to answer the questions posed by comrade Molotov. The draft pact that we have handed ** is clear enough and, in any case, it is in the interests of the Turkish government to make it clear. Against whom are the Turkish-English and Turkish-French mutual assistance pacts directed, which have already been initialed and will be signed, against whom are these pacts directed? **The text of the documents explicitly states** that they are not directed against anyone in particular, but at the same time directed **against any aggressor**, with the provision that **these pacts cannot be used against the USSR**. We have already reached the signing of the pacts. Of course, many changes have taken place on earth during this time. However, as far as Turkey's security is concerned, no change has occurred in this matter. In any case, the obligations assumed by Turkey, England and France were taken into account **in the event** that a war broke out in the Mediterranean Sea or in the Balkans. I don't think that it would be possible for Turkey not to sign pacts with Britain and France. As for the possibility of non-signing the pacts with Britain and France in the event that these pacts have already been initialed, I personally cannot say anything definite. However, if these pacts are signed, then we can hardly refuse them.

If you don't mind, then I would like to tell you the history of the negotiations. When the German ultimatum was presented to Romania, the British asked the Turkish government what the latter thought to do if the ultimatum turned into aggression. After two days, talk about the ultimatum was dropped, and it was no longer talked about. Later, the Albanian question arose, and then the threat of Corfu. In this connection the British asked us again what we intend to do. **We**

informed the Soviet government of the British inquiries and instructed our representative in Moscow to ask what the USSR was thinking of doing. 3-4 days later, England made us an official offer. We replied that our position would depend on a number of circumstances, but along the way, we set the following as mandatory conditions:

- 1) **participation of the Soviet Union in the pact;**
- 2) limited area of the pact;
- 3) economic assistance to Turkey from England.

In the latter case, we had in mind our close economic ties with Germany, which would naturally reduce its purchases from Turkey.

England agreed to our terms. We also noted with satisfaction that the Soviet Union, concluding a non-aggression pact, **puts Turkey's participation in this pact as the main condition.** At this time, comrade Potemkin paid a visit to Ankara, where they talked about various eventualities. Turkey planned to conclude a pact with Britain and France, if at the same time the Soviet Union also concludes an agreement with the British and French. It meant that [that] if England and France did not come to an agreement with the USSR, they would begin negotiations on the possibility of concluding a black sea pact. If it was not possible to carry out this too, **then Turkey was ready to conclude a bilateral agreement with the USSR.**

Then Saracoglu recalled our first negotiations with Turkey on a mutual assistance pact, about the issues that were raised by the plenipotentiary envoy Terentyev, and Turkish answers to these questions, and reproduced briefly the last statement of Terentyev, made in accordance with the directive of comrade Molotov regarding the common language.

“after all this, we have proposed to you the well-known draft of a mutual assistance pact containing three articles. Then came an invitation from the Soviet government to come to Moscow as a minister of foreign affairs in order to agree here on everything related to the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance. Coming here from Ankara, I

retained the conviction that the Soviet government was ready to conclude such a pact with Turkey.

Comrade Molotov - we answered you: "come to Moscow, and here the question of the mutual assistance pact will be settled."

Saracoglu - that's right. I have finished with the history of our negotiations with the British.

In my opinion, the Soviet-Turkish pact interests not only us, but also our friends, that is, the USSR. Even taking into account the 4th article of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, I still think that there is no obstacle to the signing of the treaty between the USSR and Turkey. I think that the Soviet-Turkish mutual assistance pact meets the interests of both sides as a peace pact. The pact will be an instrument of peace also **because there is a pro-Soviet clause in our agreement with the British**, and a similar clause, apparently, will be recorded in the Soviet-Turkish mutual assistance pact.

I would not like to develop in front of you the thesis about the benefits of a pact between our countries, because you are better than anyone and, in any case, know the international situation better than me.

Comrade Molotov - against whom will this Soviet-Turkish pact be directed? We cannot conclude a pact against Germany, against Italy — she is an ally of Germany, against Bulgaria, but the eye does not threaten Turkey!

Saracoglu - I will answer with a question. If Germany or Italy comes to the doors of Turkey, what position will the Soviet Union take in relation to Turkey? We think that this will not be indifferent to the USSR.

Comrade Molotov - it is true that it is not indifferent. But in reality, aggression against Turkey is **out of the question**. Italy not only does not threaten Turkey, but, on the contrary, withdraws its troops from the Dodecanese.

Saracoglu - this is true.

Comrade Molotov - Bulgaria is not capable of threatening Turkey.

Saracoglu - if Germany is such a country as you portray it, or if Italy will not do anything bad to Turkey, then why are you asking - to conclude a pact between the USSR and Turkey?

We, however, have doubts about the sincerity of Germany and Italy.

Why, finally, not allow such a possibility: the desire of England and France to attack Turkey, if not today, then tomorrow? Our pact, not being directed against any country, will at the same time have a general character, and then **Turkey and the Soviet Union can be guaranteed against a common eventuality.**

Comrade Molotov - we think that the Turkish-English and Turkish-French pacts impose many obligations on Turkey, which should bear responsibility even for Romania and Greece, but especially for Romania. All these issues should be resolved only by Turkey, and if the Turkish government does not consider it possible for itself to retreat from the Anglo-Turkish pact, then we should agree in the form Saracoglu explained to the Plenipotentiary in Ankara: **we are talking about the "Soviet reservation" in Anglo -Franco-Turkish pact**, which should fix that Turkey's obligations under the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish pacts lose their force immediately **if Britain and France oppose the USSR.**

Comrade Stalin — the **Turks did not ask me**, but if they asked me, **I would not advise them to agree** to the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish pacts. **Of course, Turkey needs** both England and France as states with a large fleet. Turkey is considered a Mediterranean power. What England and France should have given the Turks in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas (**in particular, the return of the islands**), the USSR could not give Turkey now. Therefore, **I fully understand the intentions of the Turks** to use the contradictions between England and France, on the one hand, and Italy, on the other, in order to get what Turkey needs in the Mediterranean for this and to protect their interests in the Dodecanese. **It is right.** And only in this way can you get the islands. Up to this point, Turkey is the winner. **Next comes the complication.** As for the Balkans, Greece and Romania were attached to Turkey. Here Turkey can give more to the

British and French, but not vice versa. I think, as if , because of these burdens which Turkey took upon itself in the Balkans, **the Turks and I did not have a misunderstanding**, especially because of Bulgaria. The help with funds and loans given by the British, in my opinion, is worth less than the troops sent by Turkey. The situation in which Turkey finds itself unleashes everything on the continent: whether Bulgaria moved, whether the Hungarians attacked the Romanians, whether Italy attacked Greece - **the Turks must get involved in the war**. Or there was a complication between the USSR and Romania because of Bessarabia - we do not think to attack the Romanians, but we will not give Bessarabia as a gift - **again a conflict**. In my opinion, Romania is like Poland: as she grabbed a lot of land, so did Romania. Whoever contacts Romania with mutual assistance must keep a sword at the ready: Hungary is here, and maybe someone else is not profitable for Turkey.

This is **one group of questions that confuses us**. And that is why we believe that these points, that is, the first and second points of your pact with the British, would not have been better.

There is also a group of questions that puts us in a difficult position. Events have their own logic: we say one thing, but events go the other way. We divided Poland with Germany, England and France did not declare war on us, but it may be. We have no pact of mutual assistance with the Germans, but if the British and French declare war on us, we will have to fight them. **What will this contract look like?** This is what is new, this is where the logic of events is felt.

Mr. Saracoglu can reply that we have a reservation of the order that Turkish commitments will expire or **that Turkey will be neutral**. Then we will have to make a reservation that **if Turkey gets involved in the conflict**, then our pact will lose its force. We will not oppose Germany. **What then remains of the pact? Nothing**. Do we want to conclude a pact with the Turks? **We want. Are we friends of Turkey? Yes**. But there are circumstances that I spoke about and which turn the pact into a piece of paper. Who is to blame for the turn of affairs unfavorable for concluding a pact with Turkey? **None**. Circumstances, development of events. Polesha's action played its role. The British and French, especially the British, did not want an agreement with us,

believing that they could do without us. If there are guilty persons, then we are also guilty - we did not foresee all this.

Saracoglu - first of all, I must declare that I have a commission from Ismet Inonu: if I manage to see comrade Stalin, then convey to him that Ismet retains unforgettable feelings and the best of the impressions he got from his visit to the Soviet Union and from his meetings with comrade Stalin.

Comrade Stalin — I would like to ask you to thank the president for the good memory of us. How is Ismet's health?

Saracoglu - he feels good to your words that Turkey did not ask for your opinion ...

Comrade Stalin — (remark) —it is not necessary to ask. This is not a rebuke.

Saracoglu - can I, Saracoglu, understand the words of comrade Stalin in such a way that if the treaty between Turkey and England were drawn up as comrade Stalin advises, there would be no obstacles to the conclusion of a Soviet-Turkish pact of mutual assistance?

Comrade Stalin — certainly.

Saracoglu - but if we draw up our pact differently, without technical omissions, what to do?

Comrade Stalin - but this is **not a technical mistake**. If Saracoglu recalls, several years ago we had some correspondence with the Turkish government at the time when Turkey concluded the Balkan pact, the Turks somehow stipulated to defend Romania and Bessarabia, how did this end? But this is not a technical question.

Saracoglu — we did not take on obligations to protect the external borders of the Balkan countries, and even a special Soviet clause was made.

Comrade Stalin - but it was not, it seems, officially recorded?

Saracoglu - no, it was written down. Greece made a reservation that it would not oppose Italy, and Turkey made a Soviet reservation. The Balkan pact is a guarantee of the internal borders of the Balkan countries. If Romania had to fight against the USSR, the obligations of the Balkan pact would be invalid. Our pact with Britain, rightly, says that Turkey will defend Romania and Greece if anyone attacks these countries. But if, as a result of the conflict over Romania, Turkey should have opposed the USSR, **then Turkey will not agree to this**, which is provided for by the Soviet clause. We regard the Soviet clause as a substitute for the general conclusion of a mutual assistance pact that was supposed at one time.

Comrade Stalin - I think that the Soviet-Turkish clause follows from the 1925 pact. We are also obliged to make a corresponding reservation, and we will.

Saracoglu - we considered it our duty to introduce a reservation arising from our non-aggression pact with you. What will be Turkey's position in the event of a war between Britain and France against the USSR? When Soviet troops entered Poland, I invited the British and French ambassadors to my place and advised their governments not to push the Soviet Union into a military agreement with Germany, and also not to create such moments for Turkey in relations with England and France that would have put Saracoglu in Moscow into a difficult position. However, **if a war breaks out**, Turkey will remain neutral. I am also sure, as comrade Stalin thinks, that Britain and France did not want to conclude an agreement with the USSR. However, now, under the influence of a cruel lesson, **I am convinced that the British and French are inclined to come to terms with the Soviet Union**. The Soviet-Turkish pact can resolve all misunderstandings. It could be a harbinger of other broader agreements that are important not only for Turkey, but also for affairs of the world. We are talking about an amicable agreement with Britain and France.

Comrade Stalin - despite our doubts, does Saracoglu think that a pact can be concluded with us?

Saracoglu - yes, this is my conviction.

Comrade Stalin - is it difficult to change anything in the Turkish-English and Turkish-French pacts?

Saracoglu - if a conflict arises between the USSR and Romania, Turkey remains on the sidelines. I agree to make a reservation about this. If the Soviet government says that any action by Turkey can be regarded by our friends as an unfriendly action, then Turkey will refrain from this.

As for the reservation, if **something adequate is proposed by the USSR**, then he, Saracoglu, will accept it. This reservation is contained in the general reservation principle. The British themselves took the initiative to introduce a reservation, from which it follows that Turkey may refuse to help Romania if this latter could cause a conflict.

Comrade Stalin - when you are dealing with the French and the British, **you need to remember that these are people who fulfill their obligations only when it is beneficial to them**, and do not fulfill their obligations when it is not beneficial to them. Example: Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc.

Saracoglu - this is true.

Comrade Stalin — couldn't article 3 be transferred to the category of consultations? Turkey would have free hands.

Saracoglu - we thought that by introducing the reservation, **we obliged our partners** to reckon with every Soviet proposal. If the USSR considered something inconvenient for itself, then we would have to reckon with it.

Comrade Stalin - this is inconvenient: the obligations under article 3 automatically come into effect.

Saracoglu - why can't we achieve the goal we need by concluding a pact with you?

Comrade Stalin - we have no pacts with Bulgaria, but we feel sorry for the Bulgarians. We mean if Bulgaria itself does not go against the Turks. It would be good to write down a clause about Bulgaria and Romania in our mutual protocol. For example, if Bulgaria does not attack itself, then it should not be beaten. If the Turks manage not to fulfill

paragraph 3, then we will welcome it. But **it is best to replace it with a consultation.**

Saracoglu - as for the Romanian clause, this document already exists. However, if Italy attacks us or if Bulgaria attacks any of the Balkan countries, then we will have to fight.

Comrade Stalin - if Bulgaria opposes Turkey, **then beat her.** But why should Bulgaria be beaten in other cases? I would prefer to translate the 3rd article into an advisory one.

Saracoglu - in Romania, you can. But Greece is our vital issue.

Comrade Stalin - When was it decided to hand over the Dodecanese to Italy?

Saracoglu answers - Provides historical information.

Comrade Stalin. - so, the translation is not going to the consultation?

Saracoglu - how about Greece?

Comrade Stalin - it would be good too.

Saracoglu - impossible. The occupation of Greece is tantamount to the occupation of Turkey.

Comrade Stalin - all the same, the Turks will have to fight, and the British will help will not come to you. If the Greeks give the islands to the Turks, then help is needed.

Saracoglu — we are not asking for an island.

Comrade Stalin — the islands must be demanded. **They are located at the exit to the sea. Your situation is difficult.** We also had this situation. England guarantees, and because of Poland we are at war.

Saracoglu - Italy will not go to Greece because of Greece. Greece is a bridge to attack Turkey.

Comrade Stalin - what does Italy want from Turkey?

Saracoglu - Italy has not exactly formulated, but always talks about the roman empire. The fortification of the rocky islands is directed against Turkey.

Comrade Stalin — Italy needs Egypt.

Saracoglu - maybe, but Egypt is now in firmer hands.

Comrade Stalin - doesn't Saracoglu consider it possible to ask Ankara about Greece - for a consultation?

Saracoglu - but without adding anything, what do you give?

Comrade Stalin - well, let's say, a pact of mutual assistance in the event of an attack directly on Turkey in the straits and the black sea, without the Balkans, and consultation if something arises in the Balkans.

Saracoglu - when they talk about the Balkans, does European Turkey belong to the Balkan countries?

Comrade Stalin - yes.

Saracoglu - and if there is an attack in Thrace, **will it be covered by a guarantee of assistance?**

Comrade Stalin - yes.

Saracoglu - this is not only against Bulgaria, but against any state. We are afraid of Bulgaria if it unites with anyone.

Comrade Stalin - Bulgaria wants only Dobruja and, perhaps, Dodegach.

Saracoglu - I would ask you to formulate everything concerning the pact with you.

Comrade Molotov - the reservation must be made in the spirit of the message of the Plenipotentiary, i.e., **Turkey's obligations to Britain and France immediately lose their force** in the event of Britain and France coming out against the USSR.

Saracoglu - yes, the pact is inactive during the conflict between Britain, France, on the one hand, and the USSR, on the other.

What will happen if Germany moves towards Turkey?

Comrade Molotov – We will not support Turkey if **she opposes Germany**. But if **Germany opposes** Turkey, we will oppose.

Comrade Stalin - I understand the reservation so that if a conflict arises, Turkey will be neutral. But Turkey does not break with the British and French **but helps them in other places**.

Saracoglu - no, this is out of the question, **I accept your additions to the Soviet reservation**.

I will report to my government on two issues of principle and receive instructions in this regard from Ankara:

1) the commitment undertaken by Turkey to assist Romania and Greece is transferred to the advisory part and

2) **your additions to the Soviet clause** that for the duration of the conflict between Britain, France, on the one hand, and the USSR, on the other, Turkey's obligations are losing their force.

As soon as I receive an answer, I will immediately inform you about it in order for us to continue negotiations.,

From

Selected Secret Documents from Soviet Foreign Policy Documents Archives - 1919 to 1941

Svitlana M, Erdogan A

Stalin on the tasks of business executives: Speech at the First All-Union Conference of Socialist Industry Workers, February 4, 1931.

A source: Stalin I.V. Op. T. 13.M., 1951.S. 29-42

Comrades, the deliberations of your conference are drawing to a close. You are now about to adopt resolutions. I have no doubt that they will be adopted unanimously. In these resolutions — I am somewhat familiar with them — you approve the control figures of industry for 1931 and pledge yourselves to fulfil them.

A Bolshevik's word is his bond. Bolsheviks are in the habit of fulfilling promises made by them. But what does the pledge to fulfil the control figures for 1931 mean? It means ensuring a total increase of industrial output by 45 per cent. And that is a very big task. More than that. Such a pledge means that you not only pledge yourselves to fulfil our five-year plan in four years — that matter has already been settled, and no more resolutions on it are needed — it means that you promise to fulfil it in three years in all the basic, decisive branches of industry.

It is good that the conference gives a promise to fulfil the plan for 1931, to fulfil the five-year plan in three years. But we have been taught by "bitter experience." We know that promises are not always kept. In the beginning of 1930, too, a promise was given to fulfil the plan for the year. At that time, it was necessary to increase the output of our industries by 31 to 32 per cent. But that promise was not kept to the full. Actually, the increase in industrial output during 1930 amounted to 25 per cent. We must ask: Will not the same thing occur again this year? The managers and leading personnel of our industries now promise to increase industrial output in 1931 by 45 per cent. But what guarantee is there that this promise will be kept?

What is needed in order to fulfil the control figures, to achieve a 45 per cent increase in output, to secure the fulfilment of the five-year plan not in four, but as regards the basic and decisive branches of industry, in three years?

Two fundamental conditions are needed for this.

Firstly, real or, as we term it, "objective" possibilities.

Secondly, the willingness and ability to direct our enterprises in such a way as to realise these possibilities.

Did we have the "objective" possibilities last year for completely fulfilling the plan? Yes, we had. Incontestable facts testify to this. These facts show that in March and April of last year industry achieved an increase of 31 per cent in output compared with the previous year. Why then, it will be asked, did we fail to fulfil the plan for the whole year? What prevented it? What was lacking? The ability to make use of the existing possibilities was lacking. The ability to manage the factories, mills and mines properly was lacking.

We had the first condition: the "objective" possibilities for fulfilling the plan. But we did not have in sufficient degree the second condition: the ability to manage production. And precisely because we lacked the ability to manage the factories, the plan was not fulfilled. Instead of a 31-32 per cent increase we had one of only 25 per cent.

Of course, a 25 per cent increase is a big thing. Not a single capitalist country increased its production in 1930, or is increasing production now. In all capitalist countries without exception a sharp decline in production is taking place. Under such circumstances a 25 per cent increase is a big step forward. But we could have achieved more. We had all the necessary "objective" conditions for this.

And so, what guarantee is there that what happened last year will not be repeated this year, that the plan will be fulfilled, that we shall use the existing possibilities in the way that they should be used, that your promise will not to some extent remain a promise on paper?

In the history of states and countries, in the history of armies, there have been cases when there was every possibility for success and victory, but these possibilities were wasted because the leaders failed to notice them, did not know how to take advantage of them, and the armies suffered defeat.

Have we all the possibilities that are needed to fulfil the control figures for 1931?

Yes, we have such possibilities.

What are these possibilities? What is needed in order that these possibilities should really exist?

First of all, adequate natural resources in the country: iron ore, coal, oil, grain, cotton. Have we these resources? Yes, we have. We have them in larger quantities than any other country. Take the Urals, for example, which provide a combination of resources not to be found in any other country. Ore, coal, oil, grain — what is there not in the Urals? We have everything in our country, except, perhaps, rubber. But within a year or two we shall have our own rubber as well. As far as natural resources are concerned we are fully provided. We have even more than necessary. What else is needed?

A government desirous and capable of utilising these immense natural resources for the benefit of the people. Have we such a government? We have. True, our work in utilising natural resources does not always proceed without friction among our leading personnel. For instance, last year the Soviet Government had to conduct a certain amount of struggle over the question of creating a second coal and metallurgical base, without which we cannot develop further. But we have already overcome these obstacles and shall soon have this base.

What else is needed?

That this government should enjoy the support of the vast masses of workers and peasants. Does our government enjoy such support? Yes, it does. You will find no other government in the world that enjoys such support from the workers and peasants as does the Soviet government. There is no need for me to refer to the growth of socialist emulation, the spread of shock-brigade work, the campaign and struggle for counter-plans. All these facts, which vividly demonstrate the support that the vast masses give the Soviet Government, are well known.

What else is needed in order to fulfil and overfulfil the control figures for 1931?

A system that is free from the incurable diseases of capitalism and has great advantages over capitalism. Crises, unemployment, waste, destitution among the masses — such are the incurable diseases of

capitalism. Our system does not suffer from these diseases because power is in our hands, in the hands of the working class; because we are conducting a planned economy, systematically accumulating resources and properly distributing them among the different branches of the national economy. We are free from the incurable diseases of capitalism. That is what distinguishes us from capitalism; that is what constitutes our decisive superiority over capitalism.

Notice the way in which the capitalists are trying to escape from the economic crisis. They are reducing the workers' wages as much as possible. They are reducing the prices of raw materials as much as possible. But they do not want to reduce the prices of food and industrial commodities for mass consumption to any important extent. This means that they want to escape from the crisis at the expense of the principal consumers, at the expense of the workers and peasants, at the expense of the working people. The capitalists are cutting the ground from under their own feet. And instead of overcoming the crisis they are aggravating it; new conditions are accumulating which lead to a new, even more severe crisis.

Our superiority lies in the fact that we have no crises of overproduction, we have not and never will have millions of unemployed, we have no anarchy in production, for we are conducting a planned economy. But that is not all. We are a land of the most concentrated industry. This means that we can build our industry on the basis of the best technique and thereby secure an unprecedented productivity of labour, an unprecedented rate of accumulation. Our weakness in the past was that this industry was based upon scattered and small peasant farming. That was so in the past; it is no longer so now. Soon, perhaps within a year, we shall become the country of the largest-scale agriculture in the world. This year, the state farms and collective farms — and these are forms of large-scale farming — have already supplied half of all our marketable grain. And that means that our system, the Soviet system, affords us opportunities of rapid progress of which not a single bourgeois country can dream.

What else is needed in order to advance with giant strides?

A party sufficiently solid and united to direct the efforts of all the best members of the working class to one point, and sufficiently experienced to be unafraid of difficulties and to pursue systematically a correct, revolutionary, Bolshevik policy. Have we such a party? Yes, we have. Is its policy correct? Yes, it is, for it is yielding important successes. This is now admitted not only by the friends but also by the enemies of the working class. See how all the well-known "honourable" gentlemen, Fish in America, Churchill in Britain, Poincare in France, fume and rave against our Party. Why do they fume and rave? Because the policy of our Party is correct, because it is yielding success after success.

There, comrades, you have all those objective possibilities which assist us in realising the control figures for 1931, which help us to fulfil the five-year plan in four years, and in the key industries even in three years.

Thus, we have the first condition for fulfilment of the plan — the "objective" possibilities.

Have we the second condition, the ability to use these possibilities?

In other words, are our factories, mills and mines properly managed? Is everything in order in this respect?

Unfortunately, not everything is in order here. And, as Bolsheviks, we must say this plainly and frankly.

What does management of production mean? There are people among us who do not always have a Bolshevik approach to the question of the management of our factories. There are many people among us who think that management is synonymous with signing papers and orders. This is sad, but true. At times one cannot help recalling Shchedrin's Pompadours. Do you remember how Madame Pompadour taught the young Pompadour: "Don't bother your head with science, don't go into matters, let others do that, it is not your business — your business is to sign papers." It must be admitted to our shame that even among us Bolsheviks there are not a few who carry out management by signing papers. But as for going into matters, mastering technique, becoming master of the business — why, that is out of the question.

How is it that we Bolsheviks, who have made three revolutions, who emerged victorious from the bitter civil war, who have solved the tremendous task of building a modern industry, who have swung the peasantry on to the path of socialism — how is it that in the matter of the management of production we bow to a slip of paper?

The reason is that it is easier to sign papers than to manage production. And so, many economic executives are taking this line of least resistance. We, too, in the centre, are also to blame. About ten years ago a slogan was issued: "Since Communists do not yet properly understand the technique of production, since they have yet to learn the art of management, let the old technicians and engineers — the experts — carry on production, and you, Communists, do not interfere with the technique of the business; but, while not interfering, study technique, study the art of management tirelessly, in order later on, together with the experts who are loyal to us, to become true managers of production, true masters of the business." Such was the slogan. But what actually happened? The second part of this formula was cast aside, for it is harder to study than to sign papers; and the first part of the formula was vulgarised: non-interference was interpreted to mean refraining from studying the technique of production. The result has been nonsense, harmful and dangerous nonsense, which the sooner we discard the better.

Life itself has more than once warned us that all was not well in this field. The Shakhty affair 2 was the first grave warning. The Shakhty affair showed that the Party organisations and the trade unions lacked revolutionary vigilance. It showed that our economic executives were disgracefully backward in technical knowledge; that some of the old engineers and technicians, working without supervision, rather easily go over to wrecking activities, especially as they are constantly being besieged by "offers" from our enemies abroad.

The second warning was the "Industrial Party" trial 3.

Of course, the underlying cause of wrecking activities is the class struggle. Of course, the class enemy furiously resists the socialist

offensive. This alone, however, is not an adequate explanation for the luxuriant growth of wrecking activities.

How is it that wrecking activities assumed such wide dimensions? Who is to blame for this? We are to blame. Had we handled the business of managing production differently, had we started much earlier to learn the technique of the business, to master technique, had we more frequently and efficiently intervened in the management of production, the wreckers would not have succeeded in doing so much damage.

We must ourselves become experts, masters of the business; we must turn to technical science — such was the lesson life itself was teaching us. But neither the first warning nor even the second brought about the necessary change. It is time, high time that we turned towards technique. It is time to discard the old slogan, the obsolete slogan of non-interference in technique, and ourselves become specialists, experts, complete masters of our economic affairs.

It is frequently asked: Why have we not one-man management? We do not have it and we shall not get it until we have mastered technique. Until there are among us Bolsheviks a sufficient number of people thoroughly familiar with technique, economy and finance, we shall not have real one-man management. You can write as many resolutions as you please, take as many vows as you please, but, unless you master the technique, economy and finance of the mill, factory or mine, nothing will come of it, there will be no one-man management.

Hence, the task is for us to master technique ourselves, to become masters of the business ourselves. This is the sole guarantee that our plans will be carried out in full, and that one-man management will be established.

This, of course, is no easy matter; but it can certainly be accomplished. Science, technical experience, knowledge, are all things that can be acquired. We may not have them today, but tomorrow we shall. The main thing is to have the passionate Bolshevik desire to master technique, to master the science of production. Everything can be achieved, everything can be overcome, if there is a passionate desire for it.

It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo somewhat, to put a check on the movement. No, comrades, it is not possible! The tempo must not be reduced! On the contrary, we must increase it as much as is within our powers and possibilities. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the working class of the whole world.

To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. No, we refuse to be beaten! One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her — because of her backwardness, because of her military backwardness, cultural backwardness, political backwardness, industrial backwardness, agricultural backwardness. They beat her because it was profitable and could be done with impunity. You remember the words of the pre-revolutionary poet: "You are poor and abundant, mighty and impotent, Mother Russia." 4 Those gentlemen were quite familiar with the verses of the old poet. They beat her, saying: "You are abundant," so one can enrich oneself at your expense. They beat her, saying: "You are poor and impotent," so you can be beaten and plundered with impunity. Such is the law of the exploiters — to beat the backward and the weak. It is the jungle law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak — therefore you are wrong; hence you can be beaten and enslaved. You are mighty — therefore you are right; hence we must be wary of you.

That is why we must no longer lag behind.

In the past we had no fatherland, nor could we have had one. But now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in our hands, in the hands of the people, we have a fatherland, and we will uphold its independence. Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this, you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop a genuine

Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said on the eve of the October Revolution: "Either perish or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries."

We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall go under.

That is what our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. dictate to us.

But we have yet other, more serious and more important, obligations. They are our obligations to the world proletariat. They coincide with our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. But we place them higher. The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world working class. We achieved victory not solely through the efforts of the working class of the U.S.S.R., but also thanks to the support of the working class of the world. Without this support we would have been torn to pieces long ago. It is said that our country is the shock brigade of the proletariat of all countries. That is well said. But it imposes very serious obligations upon us. Why does the international proletariat support us? How did we merit this support? By the fact that we were the first to hurl ourselves into the battle against capitalism, we were the first to establish working-class state power, we were the first to begin building socialism. By the fact that we were engaged on a cause which, if successful, will transform the whole world and free the entire working class. But what is needed for success? The elimination of our backwardness, the development of a high Bolshevik tempo of construction. We must march forward in such a way that the working class of the whole world, looking at us, may say: There you have my advanced detachment, my shock brigade, my working-class state power, my fatherland; they are engaged on their cause, our cause, and they are working well; let us support them against the capitalists and promote the cause of the world revolution. Must we not justify the hopes of the world's working class, must we not fulfil our obligations to them? Yes, we must if we do not want to utterly disgrace ourselves.

Such are our obligations, internal and international. As you see, they dictate to us a Bolshevik tempo of development.

I will not say that we have accomplished nothing in regard to management of production during these years. In fact, we have accomplished a good deal. We have doubled our industrial output compared with the pre-war level. We have created the largest-scale agricultural production in the world. But we could have accomplished still more if we had tried during this period really to master production, the technique of production, the financial and economic side of it.

In ten years at most we must make good the distance that separates us from the advanced capitalist countries. We have all the "objective" possibilities for this. The only thing lacking is the ability to make proper use of these possibilities. And that depends on us. Only on us! It is time we learned to make use of these possibilities. It is time to put an end to the rotten line of non-interference in production. It is time to adopt a new line, one corresponding to the present period — the line of interfering in everything. If you are a factory manager — interfere in all the affairs of the factory, look into everything, let nothing escape you, learn and learn again. Bolsheviks must master technique. It is time Bolsheviks themselves became experts. In the period of reconstruction, technique decides everything. And an economic executive who does not want to study technique, who does not want to master technique, is a joke and not an executive.

It is said that it is hard to master technique. That is not true! There are no fortresses that Bolsheviks cannot capture. We have solved a number of most difficult problems. We have overthrown capitalism. We have assumed power. We have built up a huge socialist industry. We have transferred the middle peasants on to the path of socialism. We have already accomplished what is most important from the point of view of construction. What remains to be done is not so much: to study technique, to master science. And when we have done that we shall develop a tempo of which we dare not even dream at present.

And we shall do it if we really want to.

Pravda, No. 35, February 5, 1931

A Brief Record of Comrade Stalin's Instructions on Intelligence Data from May 21, 1937

A source: Petrov N., Jansen M. "Stalin's pet" - Nikolai Yezhov. M., 2008.S. 290-293

Archive: CA FSB. F. 6. He. 5.D. 25.L. 208-210. Copy.

1. It is necessary to have in reconnaissance the correct goal and setting, to determine who our enemies are. The Germans know who their enemies are, so they rushed to us to plant their net.

We have forgotten the basic rules of reconnaissance: there are direct enemies and there are possible enemies. All allies are possible enemies - and allies must also be checked. From the point of view of intelligence, we cannot have friends, we have direct enemies, there are possible enemies.

Therefore, do not give any secrets to anyone.

Cooperation with the Czechs: to provide materials that do not reveal our secrets. Otherwise, we will be captured by them. Czechs are the enemies of our enemies, nothing more.

The lesson of cooperation with the Germans must be fully taken into account. Rapallo, close relationship - created the illusion of friendship. The Germans, while remaining our enemies, climbed up to us and planted their net. The reconnaissance department overlooked with its apparatus, fell into the hands of the Germans.

The bourgeois states betray each other, and our "allies" even more so.

2. It is necessary to stage intelligence and counterintelligence propaganda.

Publish counterintelligence literature, not hide it from readers. In the west, the bourgeoisie creates a halo around its spies.

In our country, intelligence officers are little known, they are ashamed of their work and their rank, so we do not have an influx of new forces.

We need to popularize the work of intelligence and counterintelligence. Promoting intelligence means attracting young people, talented people, girls, scientists ...

The scout is a true patriot, hero, leader of his country. It is necessary to explain the importance of intelligence and the role of the intelligence officer. Write a number of good articles, brochures. Rework and publish some good intelligence books. It is necessary to study foreign intelligence experience and the rich technique of this business.

Make up proposals for the promotion of intelligence work.

3. It is necessary to draw a line at socialist and bourgeois intelligence, between socialist and bourgeois intelligence.

We need ideological intelligence, we need to define morality: intelligence, for example, duality does not suit us.

Bourgeois spies are dishonest, unprincipled, corrupt, they are recruited out of fear, on their vices, and prostitution is widely used.

Most of our failures are due to a lack of ideology. When we select our people, we must thoroughly test their ideological and loyalty.

The scout is principled, ideological, honest and loyal to his homeland.

It is necessary to conduct propaganda about the morality of our intelligence.

4. It is necessary to intensively train scouts. We need more schools; we need to increase the number of schools. The school does not provide a ready scout. It is necessary to have two types of scouts: one type - a closed scout organization consisting of experienced proven active scouts; another kind of people who are in the field of intelligence, are gradually preparing for work in intelligence, make up a large environment around intelligence, these people are sent abroad to study the country, master, improve their language skills, acquire the necessary skills, they observe, perform exclusively tasks on which cannot fail. After one or two years, these people are called back, checked, given additional training, the most capable can be sent to active intelligence work.

5. The reconnaissance network must be disbanded; it is better to disband the whole. Call people to look at them and, after careful checking, some of them can be used in a different direction, sent to other places. Better less, but proven and healthy. The central apparatus should consist only of its own people.

6. It is necessary to increase the salaries of agents in accordance with their value.

7. It is necessary to make wider use of legal opportunities, to put military intelligence officers in the corps of diplomatic couriers, all our diplomatic institutions need to be saturated with commanders. Intelligence should provide the main staff to all our diplomatic countries.

Those traveling abroad are invited to instruct and, if not suitable for use, to protect against recruiting the enemy.

8. It is necessary to conduct a significant part of our commanders through reconnaissance. It is necessary to staff the intelligence school with military-literate commanders.

9. It is necessary to have intelligence and counterintelligence in the military department. It is imperative that military men keep watch over the army. The NKVD must provide people with intelligence.

This does not exclude completely separate work in this direction by the NKVD organs, but it is necessary to have organs to coordinate all intelligence work.

10. We have major victories, we are the strongest politically, we are stronger economically, but in intelligence we were defeated. Understand, we were defeated in intelligence.

We must create our own intelligence. Good intelligence can delay wars. Strong intelligence of the enemy and our weakness is a provocation of war.

You cannot be blind; you must have eyes. So, you need to have strong intelligence and counterintelligence.

Within ten days, under the leadership of Comrade Voroshilov and Comrade Yezhov to develop a draft resolution on the organization of intelligence and counterintelligence and coordination of all intelligence work.

Develop proposals for the promotion of intelligence work.

After the approval of these proposals, develop a regulation on intelligence and counterintelligence.

* Litter on the first sheet: The material was received on December 26, 1982 from the apparatus of Comrade Tsviguna S.K.

Recording of a conversation by phone I.V. Stalin with K.V. Ostrovityanov. 7 February 1952

A source: Historical Archives 2012 No. 4 P. 29

Archive: ARAN. F. 1705. Op. 1.D. 166.L. 55-56. Autograph by hand of K. V. Ostrovityanov.

IV Stalin : Comrades, about 20 people contacted me about a textbook. I wrote 50 pages of my notes on the tutorial. It is hardly advisable to call all the participants in the discussion. Send it out to the comrades who signed the letter or to the sections? -

Konstantin Ostrovityanov : *The entire conference was divided into sections: pre-capitalist formations, capitalism, socialism, therefore, this is a lot.*

IV Stalin : Then it is better to send it to the comrades who signed the letter. This will probably be more correct.

Konstantin Ostrovityanov : *Yes, probably right. Maybe you should publish your comments?*

IV Stalin : No, this is not for publication, the publication will not be in your favor. The remarks were not approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), so as not to bind the authors' collective. It is necessary to replenish the team of authors, increasing it to 10-15 people, to include one lawyer for the accuracy of wording and one statistician.

Konstantin Ostrovityanov : *Less is better, about 10 people.*

IV Stalin : Also include some critics, so that there would be controversy. What do you think?

Konstantin Ostrovityanov : *It depends on what kind of critics.*

IV Stalin : In the textbook, you can feel that different chapters are written by different authors, the difference in style. It is necessary to create an editorial commission of 3-5 people.

Konstantin Ostrovityanov : *Better out of 3.*

IV Stalin : The processing time is 1 year. Remarks are being submitted for publication, tomorrow they will be. Keep in mind, the creation of a textbook is a great world-historical endeavor.

K.V. Ostrovityanov . *And [Osif] In [Isarionovich], I am being sent to Copenhagen in connection with an international] economic] meeting. What do i do?*

IV Stalin : Do you want to go?

K.V. Islander : *I would prefer to study a textbook.*

IV Stalin : You can send another. We'll decide tomorrow.

JV Stalin's note to members on voting by poll to approve the death sentence in the case of the Moscow clergy – May 1922.

JV Stalin's note to members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on voting by poll to approve the death sentence in the case of the Moscow clergy and believers [May 8, 1922]

A source: Kremlin archives. In 2 books. / Book. 1. Politburo and Church. 1922-1925 - M. - Novosibirsk, "Russian Political Encyclopedia" (ROSSPEN), "Siberian Chronograph", 1997, p. 213

Archive: APRF, f.

No. 24-7

HURRY. SECRET.

TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO

A Moscow court sentenced 11 people to death, most of them are priests: (8 priests, 1 wood splitter, agitator, butcher shop). Kamenev proposes to limit ourselves to the execution of two priests.

I ask you to vote "for" or "against" Comrade Kamenev's proposal. I personally vote against the cancellation of the court decision.

SECRETARY OF THE CC. Stalin

- L. 9. Typewritten copy of that time made for the office work of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). A stamp confirming that the document belongs to the proceedings of the Politburo meeting, minutes No. 6, item 18 of May 11, 1922 (No. 24-12). A handwritten litter about the same with the date "6 / V-22". Stamp of the Secret Archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) with an inventory number. Date of the document by the date of the survey (No. 24-12).

- L. 8. Typewritten copy of the later time from the copy. Made simultaneously with L. 7 (No. 24-12). Above, there is a typewritten note on the document's belonging to the proceedings of the Politburo meeting, minutes No. 6, item 18 with the date "6.V. 22 g." (No. 24-12).

Removed the formula "t." (comrade) before Kamenev's surname in the last sentence.

A source: Kremlin archives. In 2 books. / Book. 1. Politburo and Church. 1922-1925 - M. - Novosibirsk, "Russian Political Encyclopedia" (ROSSPEN), "Siberian Chronograph", 1997, p. 197

Archive: APRE, f. 3, op. 60, d.24

No. 24-1

May 2, 1922

Members of the Politburo

T.t. TOMSKY, RYKOV, MOLOTOV.

Forwarded for poll of Politburo Members.

The session of the Revolutionary Tribunal in Ivanovo-Voznesensk sentenced two priests to death 1; Comrade Kalinin proposes to cancel the decision of the Revolutionary Tribunal;

T.t. Stalin, Trotsky and Lenin, on the contrary, propose not to cancel the decision of the Revolutionary Tribunal.

Secretary of the Central Committee I. Stalin

- L. 2. Typewritten original on the letterhead of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), signature - facsimile. Date, month and last digit of the year of the date in handwritten form. Round stamp: "RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY BOLSHEVIKS", in the center with the monogram "Central Committee". The stamp confirming that the document belongs to the proceedings of the Politburo meeting, minutes No. 5, item 23 of May 4, 1922 (No. 24-5). In the upper right corner, there is a stamp of the Secret Archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) with an inventory number.

- L. 3. Handwritten draft original, autograph (?). In the lower right corner, there is a stamp indicating that the document belongs to the proceedings of the Politburo meeting, minutes No. 5, paragraph 23 of May 4, 1922 (No. 24-5). Unlike the typewritten white paper, the address

and surnames of the addressees are missing; the formula of the survey is as follows: "For the survey of PB members". Before the words "Comrade. Kalinin ", the word " Presidium "was deleted . The word "vice versa" is written above the line. At the end of the text, the words: "Please Voice."

Notes and Comments:

1 We are talking about the verdict passed on April 25, 1922 in the city of Ivanovo-Voznesensk by the visiting session of the Supreme Tribunal in the case of the events in the city of Shuya (No. P-109). The tribunal sentenced to death the priests Ivan Stepanovich Rozhdestvensky, Pavel Mikhailovich Svetozarov and the layman Pyotr Ivanovich Yazykov. See also # 24-2, 24-3, 24-5. 3, op. 60, d.24

Circular letter of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) No. 30 "on the attitude towards religious organizations." August 16, 1923

Source: Kremlin archives. In 2 books. / Book. 1. Politburo and Church. 1922-1925 - M. - Novosibirsk, "Russian Political Encyclopedia" (ROSSPEN), "Siberian Chronograph", 1997, pp. 414-418

Archive: APRE, f. 3, op. 60, d.12

No. 12-56

Strictly - Secret Copy [copy] No.

TO ALL GUBKOMS, OBKOMS, KRAYEVS TO [OMIT] THERE, NATS [IONAL] CC and BURO CC.

CIRCULAR LETTER of the Central Committee of the RCP No. 30

(About the attitude towards religious organizations).

The Central Committee invites all party organizations to pay the most serious attention to a number of serious violations committed by some organizations in the field of anti-religious propaganda and, in general, in the field of attitudes towards believers and their cults.

The party program says: "It is necessary to carefully avoid any insult to the feelings of believers, leading only to the consolidation of religious fanaticism." The resolution of the XII-th 1 * Party Congress on anti-religious agitation and propaganda confirms that "deliberately rude methods, often practiced in the center and in the localities, mockery of objects of faith and worship, instead of serious analysis and explanation, do not accelerate, but complicate the liberation of the working masses from religious prejudices. "

Meanwhile, some of our local organizations are systematically violating these clear and definite directives of the Party program and the Party Congress.

The Irkutsk Provincial Executive Committee stopped with one stroke of the pen from 26. VI p. d. the existence of all Baptist communities throughout the province and closed their houses of worship for

"political reasons." The Oryol Provincial Executive Committee closed churches and prayer rooms throughout the province for failure to comply with administrative orders, for non-registration, despite the fact that the registration period was 2 * delayed 2 *. On Klyuchinskaya glassworks Tver province and a factory "of the communist vanguard" (6 Sobinka) Vladimir gu6ernii 3 * vote at general meetings ruled churches closing, prayer rooms and these solutions were the 4* the basis for the local authorities to close churches, and in the latter cases it came to an armed clash between believing workers with communists and Komsomol members. The Mtsensk executive committee (Oryol province) rudely announced to representatives of church councils the taxation of each church from 100 to 500 rubles. gold, as a fine for non-registration, and the request for the presentation of the basis of recovery was followed by the threat of arrest, and after 5 * this 5* and arrest. Throughout Transcaucasia, especially in Georgia, dozens of churches are being closed completely illegally, in violation of the party's directives, causing ferment and discontent among the population. In Minsk (Belarus), Kharkiv (Ukraine), Poltava (Ukraine), Kremenchug (Ukraine), Loev (Rechitsa district, Gomel province), Birzula (Odessa province.Ukraine), Simferopol (Crimea) and many other cities in the south and the south-west of the USSR, Jewish prayer houses were closed by local authorities. Etc., etc.

These and numerous similar examples with sufficient vividness testify to how carelessly, not seriously, and lightly some local organizations of the Party and local authorities treat such an important issue as the issue of freedom of religious belief. These organizations and government bodies, apparently, do not understand that by their rude, tactless actions against believers who represent the vast majority of the population, they inflict incalculable harm to the Soviet regime, threaten to frustrate the Party's achievements in the field of church corruption, and risk playing into the hands of counter-revolution.

Based on the foregoing, the Central Committee decides:

- 1) prohibit the closure of churches, prayer rooms and synagogues on grounds of failure to comply with administrative registration orders, and where such closure has taken place, cancel it immediately;

2) prohibit the liquidation of prayer rooms, buildings, etc. by voting at meetings with the participation of non-believers or outsiders to the group of believers that entered into a contract for a premise or building;

3) prohibit the liquidation of prayer rooms, buildings, etc. for non-payment of taxes, since such liquidation was not admitted in strict accordance with the instruction of the NKYu 1918, item 11 53;

4) prohibit arrests of a "religious nature", since they are not connected with clearly counter-revolutionary acts of "church ministers" and believers;

5) when leasing premises to religious societies and determining rates, strictly observe the resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee dated 29 / III-23, 54;

6) explain to the party members that our success in disintegrating the church and eradicating religious prejudices does not depend on persecution of believers - persecution only strengthens religious prejudices - but on a tactful attitude towards believers with patient and thoughtful criticism of religious prejudices, with serious historical coverage 6 * ideas of God, cult and religion and 1 * pr. 1 *;

7) personally, assign the secretaries of provincial committees, regional committees, regional bureaus, national Central Committees and regional committees personally for the implementation of this directive.

At the same time, the Central Committee warns that such an attitude towards the church and believers should not, however, in any way weaken the vigilance of our organizations in the sense of careful observation that the church and religious societies do not turn religion into a weapon of counter-revolution.

Secretary of the Central Committee I. 5 * Stalin.

16 / VIII 23 y.

- L. 117-119. A typewritten copy of that time. On l. 117 in the upper left corner is a handwritten label: " (From the set) ". The secrecy formula, stamp "Copy [copy] No.", letter number, date after the signature formula are written in ink by hand. With the same ink in the document

crossed out at the beginning of " PROJECT ". and at the end - "CORRECT: KURYNDINA".

- L. 120 — rev. A printed sheet of the time made for local distribution. Handwritten editing of copy l. 117-119 included. The number "31" is stamped in the "Copy [copy] No." stamp . The letter number number "30" is also stamped. Attached to document No. 12-55.

- L. 114-116. A later certified typewritten copy. Handwritten editing of copy l. 117-119 taken into account and submitted by typewriting. In the stamp " EKZ [EMPLYAR1 No. " the typewritten number "53" is crossed out by hand. Above L. 114 handwritten note on the document's belonging to the proceedings of the Politburo meeting, minutes No. 25, item 16 of August 16, 1923 (No. 12-55).

- APRF, f. 3, op. 1, d.356, l. 30-32. Draft minutes of the Politburo meeting. Typewritten original of the original document; signature, date, secrecy formula, stamp "copy] No.", letter number "30" are missing. The handwritten text revision is fully included in copy l. 117–119 and transferred in typescript. On l. 30 in the upper left corner by the hand of the assistant secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) A. M. Nazaretyan of the litter: " Today : 1. Reprint. 2. Distribute to PB members and collect votes. A. Shazaretyan]. 14 / VIII ". In this note, all the text, except for the first word and date, is crossed out (or underlined?) In pencil. With the same pencil on the right, other notes by AM Nazaretyan: 1) "To the PB case . A. N [azaretyan] "; 2)" Project ".

- Ibid, l. 27-29. Another copy of the same typewritten bookmark as L. 117-119. The handwritten text editing was repeated. The letter number is not entered. At the end of the document there is no "CORRECT: KURYNDINA". The signature formula is handwritten, the surname is inscribed in pencil by the hand of A. Nazaretyan, Assistant Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).

Notes and Comments:

The file contains a note on the letterhead of the MK RCP (b), sent on September 8, 1923, signed by the head of the Secretariat of the MK RCP (b) D. Ivanov (?) "TO THE POLITBURO of the Central Committee"

with a request "to inform you whether you have revised the decision of the Politburo of 10 / V in the part concerning the introduction of our representative to the Church Commission under the Central Committee. By the resolution of the Bureau from 24 / V-23, prot [okol] No. 7 MK was proposed to the commission instead of Comrade Zhakov, comrade. Kastelovskaya ". The note is stamped "URGENT". Stamp of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with the date "8 / 9-23" and the incoming number. (L. 121).

1 * Inscribed on a line in ink by hand.

2 * Corrected by ink by hand from the originally printed was deferred until 27.IX.-p. g.

3 * Further crossed out in ink by hand originally printed and counted.

4 * written in ink on the hands in the line of the original printed served and again over the line.

5 * Inscribed above the line in handwritten ink.

6 * Inscribed above line in handwritten ink instead of strikethrough explanation.

53 See comm. 50 to d. 12.

54 See comm. 48 to d. 12.

From; Politburo and The Church, Svitlana M, Erdogan A

From the speech of I. V. Stalin. December 4, 1936

A source: Questions of history, 1995, № 1 Pp. 9-11

Stalin. I wanted to say a couple of words that Bukharin absolutely did not understand what was happening here. Not understood. And he does not understand in what position he found himself, and why the question was raised at the plenum. Doesn't understand this at all. He hits on sincerity, requires trust 7 . Okay, let's talk about sincerity and trust.

When Kamenev and Zinoviev declared in 1932 that they renounced their mistakes and recognized the party's position as correct, they were believed. They believed it because they assumed that an ideological struggle is characteristic of a communist - former or present - this ideological former or real communist is fighting for his idea. If a person openly said that he adheres to the party's line, then, according to the well-known traditions established in Lenin's party, the party believes - it means that the person values his ideas and he really renounced his mistakes and took the party's position. They believed - they were wrong. They were wrong, (Comrade Bukharin. Yes Yes.)

When Smirnov and Pyatakov announced that they renounced their views, openly declared this in the press, we believed them. They also proceeded from the fact that people grew up on the Marxist school, obviously, value their position, their ideas, they are not hidden, they are fighting for. They believed, the Order of Lenin was given, they moved forward and made a mistake. Is that correct, Comrade Bukharin? (Bukharin. True, true, I said the same thing.)

When Sosnovsky submitted a statement that he renounces his mistakes, substantiated it, and substantiated it well from the Marxist point of view, we believed and really told Bukharin: "You want to take him to Izvestia, good, he writes well, take it, let's see what happens. " We were wrong. Then believe in the sincerity of people! We came to a conclusion: the former oppositionists cannot be taken at their word. (Animation in the hall. Voices from the seats. Right, right!)

You cannot be naive, and Ilyich taught that being naive in politics means being a criminal. We do not want to be criminals. Therefore, we came to the conclusion: you cannot take a word from any former oppositionist.

A few facts. Pyatakov, when his wife was arrested, they wrote a telegram, he was somewhere in the south, I think, in Kislovodsk. From there he replied briefly that he could not find arguments against his wife, but since Moscow considered it necessary to arrest her, then it must be so I arrived. We all gave testimony to him to read. He said that Zinoviev, Kamenev and Mrachkovsky were slandering him in their testimony. Others, just arrested or involved in the process, said so. He came to us and said: "Well, what can I say against these people, how can I justify myself? They lie, they want to ruin me. " We tried to tell him: "Okay, but you acted as a public prosecutor against the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Act as a public prosecutor against them " 8.- "OK, with pleasure". He was preparing. But we thought it over and decided that it would not work. But this test began to convince us for a minute that, perhaps, the person was right. What does it mean to put him up as a public prosecutor? He will say one thing, the accused will object to him, they will say: "Where did you get into, the accusers. You worked with us, didn't you ?! " What would that lead to? This would turn the process into a comedy and disrupt the process.

Therefore, Pyatakov was told: "No, although we raised the question of you to go as a public prosecutor, but this case will not work. " He became sad: "How can I prove that I am right? Let me, I will personally shoot all those whom you condemn to be shot, all this dirt, all this bastard. What more proof do you need? Announce in the press after the verdict and after the verdict is executed that the execution of the verdict was carried out by comrade Pyatakov. This circumstance also should have shaken us somewhat. But, on the other hand, we have never announced who is carrying out the sentence. And they decided: to declare - no one will believe that we did not force him to do it. We said that this case will not work, it's embarrassing, no one will believe that you volunteered for this business, and not under duress. And besides, we never announced faces who carry out sentences. "What should I do,

give me a way out. Let me write an article against the Trotskyists. "-“ Okay, write. ” Wrote, defeated Trotsky and Trotskyists 9 .

And what has turned out now, you look! After that we at least interviewed 50 people. After all, they turned Pyatakov's insides inside out. He turned out to be a monstrous man! Why did he go to act as a public prosecutor? Why did he go so far as to shoot his comrades himself? It turns out that their rule is this: if your fellow Trotskyite is arrested and began to extradite people, he must be destroyed. You see what a hell of a thing it is. Then believe in the sincerity of the former oppositionists! You cannot take the word of the former oppositionists even when they undertake to shoot their friends with their own hands.

Until recently, until yesterday, Radek kept writing me letters. We delayed the case of his arrest, although there were as many slanders as we wanted from different sides. Everyone, from top to bottom, slanders Radek. We delayed the case of his arrest, and then arrested him. Yesterday and the day before yesterday I received a long letter from him, in which he writes: a terrible crime is being committed. He is a sincere man, devoted to the Party, who loves the Party, loves the Central Committee, and so on and so forth, they want to let him down. This is wrong. You can shoot or not, that's up to you. But he would like his honor not to be shamed. What did he show today? Here, Comrade Bukharin, what happens. (Bukharin. But neither today, nor tomorrow, nor the day after tomorrow I cannot admit anything. Noise in the hall.) I do not say anything personally about you. Maybe you're right, maybe you're not. But you can't speak and talk here, for you have no trust, no faith in. Bukharin's sincerity. It's all old. And the events of the last two years have clearly shown this, because it has been proven in practice that sincerity is a relative concept. As for the trust in the former oppositionists, we gave them so much trust ... (Noise in the hall. Voices from the seats. Right!)

Here is your sincerity and here is your trust! That is why we are raising this question at the plenum of the Central Committee. But because Bukharin may be offended and indignant, must we hide it? No, in order not to conceal this, the question must be raised at the plenum. Moreover, the former oppositionists took an even harder step in order

to preserve at least a grain of trust on our part and once again demonstrate their sincerity - people began to commit suicide. After all, this is also a means of influencing the party. Lominadze committed suicide, he wanted to say that he was right, in vain he was interrogated and in vain he was subjected to suspicion. What turned out to be? It turned out that he was in a block with these people. Therefore, he killed himself in order to cover his tracks.

So, this political murder is a means of former oppositionists, enemies of the party to bring down the party, to thwart its vigilance, to deceive it by suicide for the last time before dying and put it in a stupid position.

Furer, what letter he left also after the suicide, after reading it you can directly cry. (Kosior. No matter how it is.) And a person who is more or less politically experienced will understand that this is not the case here. We know Furer what he was capable of. And what happened? "He is right, he loves the party, he is pure, but at the thought that someone in the party might think that he, Furer, once merged with the Trotskyists, his nerves cannot stand it, his honor does not allow him to live ". (Kosior. They slandered him!) But what happened? It turned out - you could not imagine worse.

Tomsky, I would advise you, Comrade Bukharin, to think about why Tomsky committed suicide, and left a letter - "clean." But you can see that he was far from clean. As a matter of fact, if I am clean, I am a man, a person, and not a rag, I am not saying that I am a communist, then I will shout to the whole world that I am right. To kill me - never! And here not everything is clean. (Voices from the field. That's right!) The man went to the murder because he was afraid that everything would be revealed, he did not want to be a witness of his own universal shame. And Furer and Lominadze ... (Mikoyan. And Khanjyan.) And Khanjyan, and Skrypnik, and Tomsky. Here is one of the very last, sharpest and easiest means by which, before dying, when leaving this world, you can spit on the Party for the last time, deceive the Party. Here's to you, Comrade Bukharin, the rationale behind the latest suicides. And you, Comrade Bukharin, want so that we take your word for it? (Bukharin. No, I do not want to.) Never, in no case. (Bukharin. No, I don't want to.)

And if you don't want that, then don't be indignant that we raised this question at the plenum of the Central Committee. It is possible that you are right, it is hard for you, but after all these facts, which I told you about, and there are a lot of them, we must figure it out. We must objectively and calmly figure it out. We want nothing but the truth, we will not allow anyone to perish, to perish from anyone. We want to find out the whole truth objectively, honestly, courageously. And you can't intimidate us with tearfulness or suicide. (Voices from the seats. That's right! Prolonged applause.)

Notes:

7. Opposing this assertion of Stalin, Bukharin wrote to him on December 15 the following: "You said at the plenum:" Bukharin strikes here for sincerity. " You're wrong: I don't hit anything. I am in such a state of mind that this is already half-life ... I am dying because of scoundrels, because of human bastards, because of disgusting villains "(APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 262, l. 27) ...

8. This proposal was made to Pyatakov by Ordzhonikidze.

9. Pyatakov G. Mercilessly to destroy despicable murderers and traitors.— Pravda, 21.VIII. 1936.

From the speech of Comrade Stalin. February 27, 1937

A source: Questions of history, 1994, no. 1, pp. 12-13

[In the journal publication of the materials of the plenum it was indicated (1993, No. 7, p. 24) that the record of JV Stalin's speech on February 27 was absent. Now we have managed to find this text, as amended by Stalin, in the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (f. 45, op. 1, d. 1120, l. 23-27). It was prepared for publication by the expert-expert of the archive Yu.G. MURIN.]

Andreev (presiding). The meeting opens. The floor for the report from the commission on the first item on the agenda is given by Cde. Stalin [In the upper left corner of the text it is written: "Viewed. Art. ".].

Stalin.

Comrades! The commission of the plenum of the Central Committee instructed me to make a report on the results of its work. Let me make this message. There was no disagreement in the commission as to whether Bukharin and Rykov should be considered a measure of punishment, and, moreover, at least excluding them from the list of candidates for members of the Central Committee and from the ranks of the CPSU (b). There was not a single vote in the commission that would speak out against this proposal. There were disagreements over whether or not to prosecute them, and if not to prosecute, what to limit. Some of the members of the commission spoke in favor of bringing them to trial by the Military Tribunal and ensuring that they were shot. Another part of the commission spoke out in favor of bringing them to trial and ensuring that they were sentenced to 10 years in prison. The third part spoke in favor of to bring them to trial without prejudice to the question of what the sentence should be. And, finally, a fourth part of the commission spoke out in favor of sending the Bukharin and Rykov case to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs rather than handing over to the court. The last offer prevailed.

As a result, the commission unanimously decided to exclude them from the list of candidates for members of the Central Committee and from

the ranks of the CPSU (b) and send the case of Bukharin and Rykov to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

Commission motives. Of course, the feeling of indignation both at the anti-Party and anti-Soviet activities of Bukharin and Rykov and at their behavior here at the plenum, during the discussion of the question of them, was very strong in the commission, as well as at the plenum. But the commission believed that it could not and should not be guided by a sense of indignation.

There were votes, a fairly significant number of votes in the commission, just as here, at the plenum of the Central Committee, in favor of the fact that there is supposedly no difference between Bukharin and Rykov, on the one hand, and those Trotskyists and Zinovievites who were attracted by known lawsuits and were punished accordingly. The commission did not agree with this position and considers that it is impossible to lump Bukharin and Rykov in one heap with the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, since there is a difference between them, and this difference speaks in favor of Bukharin and Rykov.

It is one thing - the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, who were excluded once from the party, then reinstated, then expelled again, and another thing - Bukharin and Rykov, who were not excluded. It is impossible to draw an equal sign between the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, who, as you know, at one time staged an anti-Soviet demonstration in 1927, and Rykov and Bukharin, who have no such sins in the past.

The commission could not fail to take into account the fact that Bukharin and Rykov did not have such sins in the past and that until recently they did not give a reason and reason to raise the question of their exclusion from the party]. Therefore, the commission had to take into account that until recently neither Bukharin nor Rykov had serious party penalties, except for such a serious penalty that they were removed from the Politburo and, in addition, Rykov was removed from the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars [Then the phrase was crossed out: "As for the fact that they were transferred from the membership of the Central Committee to the list of candidates, this

was carried out not in the order of repression, but in the order of non-election. The commission took this difference into account so that the decision was fair and objective. ”]. As a result, the commission adopted the following draft resolution. Can I read it?

(Voices from the seats. Please.)

“The resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the case of Comrades Bukharin and Rykov, on the basis of the investigative materials of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, a confrontation ... (Reads.) ... to transfer the case of Bukharin and Rykov to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs "... **This draft was adopted by the commission unanimously.**

Andreev. Are there any people willing to speak? No. Are there any other proposals besides the one introduced by Comrade Stalin? No.

Are there any amendments to the proposal submitted by Comrade Stalin on behalf of the commission? No.

Vote as a whole? I Voice.

I must warn the comrades that besides the members of the Central Committee and besides candidates for members of the Central Committee, in accordance with the charter, members of the Party Control Commission are also voting,

Who is in favor of accepting the offer, please raise your hands? Lower it.

Who is against? No.

Who is abstaining? Two.

So, the decision was made with two abstaining - Bukharin and Rykov. At this point, the meeting is closed until tomorrow, at 12 o'clock.

Source,

"Transcripts from Soviet Archives", Svitlana M, Erdogan A.

Comrade Stalin's report, March 3, 1937 Evening session.

Source: Questions of history, 1995, No. 3, pp. 3-15

Andreev (presiding). The meeting opens. Comrade Stalin has the floor for his report [JV Stalin's speech is published according to the verbatim report (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, f. 3, No. 9457, pp. 3-10).].

Stalin.

Comrades! From the reports and debates on them, heard at the plenum, it is clear that we are dealing here with the following three main facts.

First, the sabotage and wrecking and espionage work of agents of foreign states, among whom the Trotskyists played a rather active role, touched to one degree or another all or almost all of our organizations, both economic and administrative and party.

Secondly, agents of foreign states, including Trotskyists, infiltrated not only grassroots organizations, but also some important positions.

Thirdly, some of our leading comrades, both in the center and in the field, not only failed to discern the real face of these pests, saboteurs, spies and murderers, but turned out to be so careless, complacent and naive that they themselves often contributed to the advancement of the agents. foreign states for certain positions of responsibility. These are three indisputable facts that naturally follow from the reports and the debate on them.

How can we explain that our leading comrades, who have rich experience in fighting all kinds of anti-party and anti-Soviet trends, turned out in this case to be so naive and blind that they did not manage to discern the real face of the enemies of the people, did not manage to recognize wolves in sheep's clothing, did not manage them a mask? Can it be argued that the wrecking and sabotage and espionage work of agents of foreign states operating on the territory of the USSR can be something unexpected and unprecedented for us? No, you can't say that. This is evidenced by acts of sabotage in various sectors of the

national economy over the past 10 years, starting from the Shakhty period, recorded in official documents.

Can it be argued that lately we have not had any warning signals and warning indications about the sabotage, espionage or terrorist activities of the Trotskyite-Zinoviev agents of fascism? No, you can't say that. There were such signals, and the Bolsheviks have no right to forget about them.

The villainous murder of Comrade Kirov was the first serious warning that the enemies of the people will double-deal and, by double-dealing, will disguise themselves as a Bolshevik, as a party member, in order to gain confidence and open access to our organizations.

The trial of the "Leningrad Center", as well as the trial of "Zinoviev-Kamenev", provided new justification for the lessons arising from the fact of the villainous murder of Comrade Kirov.

The trial of the "Zinoviev-Trotskyist bloc" expanded the lessons of the previous trials, showing firsthand that the Zinovievites and Trotskyists unite around themselves all hostile bourgeois elements, that they have turned into spy and sabotage and terrorist agents of the German police secret police, that double-dealing and camouflage are the only means of the Zinovievites and Trotskyists for penetration into our organizations, that vigilance and political perspicacity are the most reliable means for preventing such penetration, for eliminating the Zinoviev-Trotskyist gang.

The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) in its closed letter dated January 18, 1935 about the villainous murder of comrade Kirov, strongly warned the party organizations against political complacency and philistine rotozy. The closed letter says: "We must put an end to the opportunist complacency that stems from the erroneous assumption that as our forces grow, the enemy seems to become more and more tame and harmless. This assumption is fundamentally wrong. It is a burp of the Right deviation, which assures everyone and everything that enemies will slowly creep into socialism, that they will eventually become real socialists. It is not the business of the Bolsheviks to rest on their laurels and act out. We do not need complacency, but vigilance,

real Bolshevik revolutionary vigilance. It must be remembered that the more hopeless the position of the enemies, the more willingly they will seize on extreme means as the only means of the doomed in their struggle against Soviet power. We must remember this and be vigilant.

"

In his closed letter dated July 29, 1936 regarding the espionage and terrorist activities of the Trotskyite-Zinoviev bloc of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he again called on the party organizations to be extremely vigilant, to the ability to recognize enemies of the people, no matter how well they were disguised. The closed letter says: "Now that it has been proved that the Trotskyite-Zinoviev fiends unite in the struggle against Soviet power all the most embittered and sworn enemies of the working people of our country - spies, provocateurs, saboteurs, White Guards, kulaks, etc., when between these elements, on the one hand, and the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, on the other hand, have erased every edge - all our Party organizations, all Party members must understand that the vigilance of the Communists is necessary in any sector and in any situation.

So, there were signals and warnings. What did these signals and warnings call for? They called for eliminating the weakness of the party's organizational work and turning the party into an impregnable fortress where no double-dealing could penetrate. They called for an end to the underestimation of party-political work and a decisive turn towards strengthening such work in every possible way, towards strengthening political vigilance.

And what? The facts have shown that signals and warnings were perceived by our comrades more than poorly. The well-known facts from the field of the campaign for the verification and exchange of party documents speak volumes about this. How can you explain that these warnings and signals did not have the proper effect? How can we explain that our party comrades, despite their experience of fighting anti-Soviet elements, despite a whole series of warning signals and warning instructions, turned out to be politically short-sighted in the face of the sabotage and espionage and sabotage work of the enemies of the people?

Perhaps our party comrades have become worse than they were before, have become less conscious and disciplined? No, of course not! Maybe they began to be reborn? Again, no! This assumption is devoid of any foundation. So, what's the deal? Where does such rotozy, carelessness, complacency, blindness come from?

The fact is that our Party comrades, carried away by economic campaigns and colossal successes on the front of economic development, have simply forgotten about some very important facts about which the Bolsheviks have no right to forget. They forgot about one basic fact from the field of the USSR's international position and did not notice two very important facts directly related to the current saboteurs, spies, wreckers and murderers, hiding behind a party card and disguising themselves as a Bolshevik.

What are these facts that have been forgotten or which our party comrades have simply not noticed?

They have forgotten that Soviet power won only in one-sixth of the world, that five-sixths of the world are the possessions of the capitalist states. They forgot that the Soviet Union was surrounded by capitalism. It is customary in our country to chat about capitalist encirclement, but they do not want to ponder what kind of thing it is - capitalist encirclement. **Capitalist encirclement is not an empty phrase**, it is a very real and unpleasant phenomenon. Capitalist encirclement means that there is one country, the Soviet Union, which has established a socialist order in itself, and there are, in addition, many countries - bourgeois countries that continue to lead a capitalist way of life and which surround the Soviet Union, waiting for an opportunity to to attack it, smash it, or at least undermine its power and weaken it.

This basic fact was forgotten by our comrades. But it is he who defines the basis of the relationship between the capitalist environment and the Soviet Union.

Take, for example, bourgeois states. Naïve people may think that there are exceptionally good relations between them as between states of the same type. But only naïve people can think so. In fact, the relationship between them is more than far from good-neighborly relations. It is

proved as two times two is four that the bourgeois states send their spies, saboteurs, provocateurs, and sometimes murderers to the rear of each other, give them the task of infiltrating the institutions and enterprises of these states, creating their own network there and "if necessary" blowing them up rears to weaken them and undermine their power. This is the case at the present time. This has been the case in the past. Take, for example, the states in Europe during the time of Napoleon I. France was then swarmed with spies and saboteurs from the camp of the Russians, Germans, Austrians, and British. Conversely, England, The German states, Austria, Russia then had in their rear no less number of spies and saboteurs from the French camp. Agents of England twice attempted on Napoleon's life and several times roused the Vendée peasants in France against Napoleon's government. And what was the Napoleonic government like? A bourgeois government that strangled the French revolution and preserved only those results of the revolution that were beneficial to the big bourgeoisie. Needless to say, the Napoleonic government did not remain in debt to its neighbors and also took its sabotage measures. This was the case in the past, 130 years ago. This is the situation now, 130 years after Napoleon I. Now France and England are teeming with German spies and saboteurs and, conversely, in Germany, in turn, the Anglo-French spies and saboteurs are active. America is teeming with Japanese spies and saboteurs, and Japan with American ones. This is the law of relationships between bourgeois states.

The question arises, why should the bourgeois states treat the Soviet socialist state more gently and more neighborly than to the same type of bourgeois states? Why should they send fewer spies, provocateurs saboteurs and murderers to the rear of the Soviet Union than they send them to the rear of their kindred bourgeois states? Where did you get this from? **Wouldn't it be more correct, from the point of view of Marxism, to assume that bourgeois states should send twice and three times more wreckers, spies, saboteurs and murderers to the rear of the Soviet Union** than to the rear of any bourgeois state? Is it not clear that as long as there is a capitalist encirclement, there will be wreckers, spies, saboteurs and murderers sent to our rear by agents of foreign states?

All this was **forgotten by our party comrades, and, having forgotten about it, they were taken by surprise. That is why the espionage and sabotage work of the Trotskyist agents of the Japanese-German police secret police came as a complete surprise to some of our comrades.**

Further. **Fighting against Trotskyist agents, our party comrades did not notice, overlooked that the present Trotskyism is no longer what it was, say, 7-8 years ago, that Trotskyism and Trotskyists have undergone a serious evolution during this time that radically changed the face of Trotskyism that in view of this the fight against Trotskyism, the methods of fighting it must be radically changed. Our party comrades did not notice that Trotskyism ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that from a political trend in the working class, as it was 7-8 years ago, Trotskyism turned into a rabid and unprincipled gang of saboteurs, wreckers, spies and murderers, acting on assignments by intelligence agencies of foreign states.**

What is the political trend in the working class? A political trend in the working class is a group or party that has its own definite political physiognomy, platform, program that does not and cannot hide its views from the working class, but, on the contrary, propagates its views openly and honestly, in front of the worker, a class that is not afraid to show its political face to the working class, is not afraid to demonstrate its real goals and objectives to the working class, but on the contrary, goes with an open visor to the working class in order to convince it of the correctness of its views. Trotskyism **in the past**, 7-8 years ago, was one of such political trends in the working class, it is true, anti-Leninist and therefore deeply mistaken, but still a political trend.

Can we say that today's Trotskyism, Trotskyism, say, 1936, is a political trend in the working class? No, you can't say that. Why? Because modern Trotskyists are afraid to show the working class their real faces, they are afraid to reveal their real goals and objectives to them, they diligently hide their political faces from the working class, fearing that if the working class finds out about their real intentions, it will curse them as alien people and drive them away from him. This, in fact, explains that the main method of Trotskyist work is

now not open and honest propaganda of their views in the working class, but disguise of their views, servile and sycophantic praise of the views of their opponents, pharisaic and false trampling of their own views in the mud.

At the trial of 1936, if you remember, Kamenev and Zinoviev strongly denied that they had any political platform. They had full opportunity to deploy their political platform at the trial. However, they did not, stating that they had no political platform. There can be no doubt that both of them lied in denying that they had a platform. **Now even the blind can see that they had their own political platform.** But why did they deny that they had any political platform? Because they were afraid to reveal their true political face, they were afraid to demonstrate their real platform for the restoration of capitalism in the USSR, fearing that such a platform would arouse disgust in the working class.

At the trial in 1937, Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov took a different path. They did not deny that the Trotskyists and Zinovievites had a political platform. They admitted that they had a certain political platform, admitted and expanded it in their testimony. But it was deployed not to call on the working class, to call on the people to support the Trotskyist platform, but in order to curse and brand it as an anti-popular and anti-proletarian platform. **The restoration of capitalism, the elimination of collective and state farms, the restoration of the system of exploitation, an alliance with the fascist forces of Germany and Japan to approach the war with the Soviet Union,** the struggle for war and against the policy of peace, the territorial dismemberment of the Soviet Union with the return of Ukraine to the Germans, and Primorye to the Japanese,

It is clear that the Trotskyists could not help hiding such a platform from the people, from the working class. And **they hid it not only from the working class, but also from the Trotskyist masses, and not only from the Trotskyist masses, but even from the leading Trotskyist elite, which consisted of a small handful of people of 30-40 people.** When Radek and Pyatakov demanded from Trotsky permission to convene a small conference of Trotskyists of 30-40 people to inform them about the nature of this platform, **Trotsky forbade them**

to do so, saying that it was inappropriate to talk about the real nature of the platform even to a small handful of Trotskyists, since such an "operation" can cause a split.

"Political figures" who hide their views, their platform not only from the working class, but also from the Trotskyist masses, and not only from the Trotskyist masses, but also from the leading leadership of the Trotskyists — **such is the physiognomy of modern Trotskyism**. But it follows from this that **modern Trotskyism can no longer be called a political trend in the working class**.

Modern Trotskyism is not a political trend in the working class, but an unprincipled gang of saboteurs, wreckers, intelligence agents, spies, murderers, a gang of **sworn enemies of the working class who are employed by the intelligence agencies of foreign states**. This is the indisputable result of the evolution of Trotskyism over the past 7-8 years. This is the difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism in the present.

The mistake of our party comrades is that they did not notice this profound difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism in the present. They did not notice that the **Trotskyists had long ceased to be ideological people, that the Trotskyists had long since turned into robbers from the high road**, capable of any filth, capable of anything nasty, including espionage and outright betrayal of their homeland, just to spoil the Soviet state and Soviet power ... They did not notice this and were therefore unable to reorganize in time in order to wage the struggle against the Trotskyists in a new way, more decisively. That is why the abominations of the Trotskyists in recent years have come as a complete surprise to some of our party comrades.

Farther. Finally, our party comrades did not notice that between the current wreckers and saboteurs, among whom Trotskyist agents of fascism play a rather active role, on the one hand, and wreckers and saboteurs of the Shakhty period, on the other hand, there is a significant difference.

First of all. Shakhty and industrial party members were openly alien to us. They were mostly former owners of enterprises, former managers

under the old owners, former partners of old joint-stock companies, or simply old bourgeois specialists who were openly hostile to us politically. None of our people doubted the authenticity of the political face of these gentlemen. And the **Shakhty residents themselves did not hide their hostility towards the Soviet system.** The same cannot be said about today's wreckers and saboteurs, about the Trotskyists. **The current wreckers and saboteurs, the Trotskyists, are for the most part party people, with a party card in their pocket,** so they are not formally strangers. If the old pests went against our people, then the new pests, on the contrary, fawn on our people, praise our people, and grovel in front of them in order to get into trust. The difference, as you can see, is significant.

Secondly. The strength of the Shakhty and industrial party members consisted in the fact that they possessed, to a greater or lesser extent, the necessary technical knowledge, while our people, who did not have such knowledge, were forced to learn from them. This circumstance gave the pests of the Shakhty period a great advantage, gave them the opportunity to harm freely and without hindrance, gave them the opportunity to deceive our people technically. **Not so with the current pests, with the Trotskyists.** Today's pests have no technical advantage over our people. On the contrary, our people are technically better prepared than today's wreckers than the Trotskyists. During the period from the Shakhty period to the present day, tens of thousands of real technically savvy Bolshevik cadres have grown up in our country.

What, then, **is the strength of the modern wreckers, the Trotskyists?** Their strength lies in the party card, in the possession of the party card. Their strength lies in the fact that their party card gives them political confidence and gives them access to all our institutions and organizations. Their advantage lies in the fact that, having party cards and pretending to be friends of the Soviet regime, they deceived our people politically, abused their trust, harmed on the sly and revealed our state secrets to the enemies of the Soviet Union. "Advantage" - dubious in its political and moral value, but still "advantage". This "advantage" explains, in fact, the fact that the Trotskyist wreckers, as people with a party membership card, have

access to all places in our institutions and organizations, turned out to be a direct find for the intelligence agencies of foreign states. **The mistake of some of our party comrades is that they did not notice, did not understand all this difference between the old and new wreckers,** between the Shakhty people and the Trotskyites, and, not noticing this, did not manage to reorganize in time in order to fight against new wreckers.

These are the basic facts from the area of our international and domestic situation, which have been forgotten or which many of our party comrades have not noticed. That is why our people were caught by surprise by the events of recent years in terms of sabotage and sabotage. One may ask: but why did our people not notice all this, why did they forget about all this? Where did all this forgetfulness, blindness, carelessness, complacency come from? Is this not an organic flaw in the work of our people? No, this is not an organic vice. This is a temporary phenomenon that can be quickly eliminated with some effort on the part of our people. What is the matter then?

The fact is that in recent years our Party comrades have been completely absorbed in economic work, they have been extremely carried away by economic successes and, being carried away by all this business, they forgot about everything else, abandoned everything else. The fact is that being carried away by economic successes, they began to see in this matter the beginning and end of everything, and in such matters as the international situation of the Soviet Union, the capitalist encirclement, the strengthening of the political work of the party, the fight against sabotage, etc. they did not simply pay attention, believing that all these issues are secondary or even tertiary matters.

Successes and achievements are, of course, a great thing. Our successes in the field of socialist construction are indeed enormous. But **successes, like everything else in the world, have their shadow sides.** For people who are not very sophisticated in politics, great successes and great achievements often give rise to carelessness, complacency, complacency, excessive self-confidence, conceit, and bragging. You cannot deny that lately there have been a lot of boasters among us. It is not surprising that in this environment of great and

serious successes in the field of socialist construction, moods of boastfulness, moods of ceremonial manifestations of our successes are created, moods of underestimation of the forces of our enemies, moods of overestimating their strengths are created, and as a result of all this, political blindness appears. Here I must say a few words about the dangers.

We know the dangers associated with difficulties from experience. For several years now we have been fighting against such dangers and, I must say, not without success. The dangers associated with difficulties, in unstable people, often give rise to moods of despondency, disbelief in their strengths, moods of pessimism. And, conversely, where it is a question of overcoming the dangers arising from difficulties, people become tempered in this struggle and come out of the struggle as truly steadfast Bolsheviks. This is the nature of the dangers associated with difficulties. These are the results of overcoming difficulties.

But there are dangers of another kind, dangers associated with success, dangers associated with achievement. Yes, yes, comrades, the dangers associated with successes, with achievements. These dangers lie in the fact that for people who are not very sophisticated in politics and who have not seen a lot, the atmosphere of success - success after success, achievement after achievement, over fulfillment of plans after over fulfillment - **generates a mood of carelessness and complacency**, creates an atmosphere of ceremonial celebrations and mutual greetings, killing the sense of proportion and dulling political instincts, demagnetizes people and pushes them to rest on their laurels.

It is not surprising that in this stupefying atmosphere of arrogance and self-righteousness, the atmosphere of ceremonial demonstrations and noisy self-praise, people forget about some essential facts that are of paramount importance for the fate of our country, people begin to ignore such unpleasant facts as the capitalist environment, new forms of sabotage, danger, associated with our successes, etc. "" Capitalist encirclement? Yes, this is nonsense! What significance can any capitalist encirclement have if we fulfill and overfulfill our economic plans? New forms of sabotage, the fight against Trotskyism? All this is nonsense! What value can all these little things have when we fulfill and overfulfill

our economic plans? Party charter, election of party organizations, accountability of party leaders to the party masses? Is there a need for all this? Is it worth bothering with these trifles at all if our economy is growing, and the material situation of the workers and peasants is improving more and more? It's all nonsense! We are overfulfilling our plans, our party is not bad, the Central Committee of the party is not bad either, why the hell do we need more? Strange people are sitting there, in Moscow, in the Central Committee of the party: they invent some questions, talk about some kind of sabotage, they themselves do not sleep, they do not allow others to sleep ...""

Here is a clear example of how easily and "simply" some of our inexperienced comrades become infected with political blindness as a result of their dizzying enthusiasm for economic successes. These are the dangers associated with success, with achievement. These are the reasons why our party comrades, carried away by economic successes, forgot about the facts of an international and domestic nature, which are of significant importance for the Soviet Union, and did not notice a whole series of dangers surrounding our country. These are the roots of our carelessness, forgetfulness, complacency, political blindness. Such are the roots of the shortcomings of our economic and Party work.

How to eliminate these shortcomings in our work? What needs to be done for this?

It is necessary to carry out the following activities.

- 1) It is necessary, first of all, to turn the attention of our party comrades, who are bogged down in "current issues" along the line of this or that department, towards **major political issues of an international and domestic nature.**
- 2) It is necessary to raise the political work of our Party to the proper level, placing at the forefront the task of political education and the Bolshevik training of Party, Soviet and economic cadres.
- 3) It is necessary to explain to our party comrades that economic successes, the significance of which is undeniably very great and which we will continue to achieve, day after day, year after year, nevertheless

do not exhaust the entire work of our socialist construction. Explain that **the shadow sides associated with economic successes and expressed in complacency, carelessness, in the dulling of political instincts** can be eliminated only if economic successes are combined with the successes of party building and the extensive political work of our party. Explain that the economic successes themselves, their strength and duration entirely depend on **the successes of party organizational and party-political work, that without this condition, economic successes can be built on sand.**

4) It must be remembered and never forgotten that **the capitalist encirclement is the basic fact that determines the international position of the Soviet Union.** Remember and never forget that while there is a capitalist encirclement, there will be saboteurs, saboteurs, spies, terrorists sent to the rear of the Soviet Union by the intelligence agencies of foreign states, **remember this and wage a fight** with those comrades who underestimate the significance of the fact of the capitalist encirclement, who underestimate the power and significance of sabotage. **Explain to our party comrades that no economic successes, no matter how great, can nullify the fact of the capitalist encirclement and the results arising from this fact.** To take the necessary measures so that our comrades, Party and non-Party Bolsheviks,

5) It is necessary to explain to our party comrades that **the Trotskyists**, who represent active elements of the wrecking and sabotage and espionage work of foreign intelligence agencies, **have long ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that they have long ceased to serve any idea compatible with the interests of the working class** that they have turned into an unprincipled gang of pests, saboteurs, spies, murderers, **hired by foreign intelligence agencies.** Explain that in the fight against modern Trotskyism what is needed now are not old methods, **not methods of discussion, but new methods, methods of uprooting and routing.**

6) It is necessary to explain to our party comrades the difference **between modern pests and pests of the Shakhty period**, to explain that if the pests of the Shakhty period deceived our people in technology, using their technical backwardness, then modern pests

with a party card deceive our people on political trust in them as to party members, using the political carelessness of our people.

It is necessary to supplement the old slogan about mastering technology, corresponding to the period of Shakhty times, with a new slogan about the political education of cadres, about mastering Bolshevism and the elimination of our political credulity, a **slogan that is fully consistent with the current period we are going through.**

It may be asked: was it not possible ten years ago, during the Shakhty era, to issue both slogans at once — the first slogan about mastering technology, and the second slogan about the political education of cadres? No, it was impossible. This is not how things are done in our Bolshevik Party. **At the turning points of the revolutionary movement, one basic slogan is always put forward as the key one, in order to grab onto it and pull the whole chain through it.** Lenin taught us this: find the main link in the chain of our work, grab it and pull it out in order to pull the entire chain through it and go forward. The history of the revolutionary movement shows that these tactics are the only correct tactics. During the Shakhty period, the weakness of our people consisted in their technical backwardness. Not political and technical issues were then a weak point for us. As for our political attitudes towards the pests of that time, they were completely clear as the attitude of the Bolsheviks towards politically alien people. We eliminated this technical weakness of ours by issuing the slogan of mastering technology and educating tens and hundreds of thousands of technically savvy Bolshevik cadres in the past period.

It is a different matter now, when we already have technically savvy Bolshevik cadres and when the role of saboteurs is played not by openly alien people who, moreover, have no technical advantages in comparison with our people, but people who have a party card and enjoy all the rights of party members ... **Now the weakness of our people is not technical backwardness, but political carelessness**, blind trust in people who accidentally received a party card, the lack of verification of people not by their political declarations, but by the results of their work. Now the key issue for us is not the elimination of the technical backwardness of our cadres, for it has

already been largely eliminated, but the elimination of political carelessness and political credulity towards saboteurs who accidentally got their party membership card.

This is the fundamental difference between the key issue in the struggle for cadres during the Shakhty era and the key issue of the present period. That is why we could not and should not have issued both slogans at once, ten years ago - the slogan about mastering technology and the slogan about the political education of cadres. That is why the old slogan about mastering technology must now be supplemented with a new slogan about mastering Bolshevism, about the political education of cadres and the elimination of our political carelessness.

7) It is necessary to smash and throw away the rotten theory that with each advance we make the class struggle in our country should as if more and more fade away, that as we succeed, **the class enemy seems to become more and more tame. This is not only a rotten theory, but also a dangerous theory**, for it lulls our people, leads them into a trap, and gives the class enemy the opportunity to recover to fight the Soviet regime.

On the contrary, the more we move forward, the more successes we have, the more the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes will become embittered, the sooner they will go to more acute forms of struggle, the more they will be nasty to the Soviet state, the more they will grab onto the most desperate means of struggle as the last means of the doomed.

It must be borne in mind that the remnants of the broken classes in the USSR are not alone. **They have direct support from our enemies outside the USSR.** It would be a mistake to think that the sphere of the class struggle is limited to the borders of the USSR. If one end of the class struggle has its effect within the framework of the USSR, then its other end extends into the borders of the bourgeois states around us. The remnants of the broken classes cannot but know about this. And precisely because they know about it, they will try to continue their desperate forays. This is what history teaches us. This is how Leninism teaches us. You need to remember all this and be on the lookout.

8) **It is necessary to smash and discard another rotten theory**, which says that someone who does not always harm and who at least sometimes shows success in his work cannot be a pest. **This strange theory exposes the naivete of its authors**. No pest will harm all the time if he does not want to be exposed in the shortest possible time. On the contrary, a real pest must show success in his work from time to time, for this is the only way to preserve him as a pest, gain confidence and continue his wrecking work. I think that this question is clear and does not need further clarification.

9) **It is necessary to smash and discard the third rotten theory**, which says that the systematic implementation of economic plans supposedly nullifies wrecking and the results of wrecking. Such a theory can pursue only one goal: to tickle the departmental pride of our workers, to calm them down and weaken their fight against sabotage. What does "systematic fulfillment of our economic plans" mean?

Firstly, it has been proved that all our economic plans are understated, because they do not take into account the huge reserves and opportunities hidden in the depths of our national economy.

Second, the total fulfillment of the economic plans for the People's Commissariats as a whole **does not mean that plans are being fulfilled in some very important sectors**. On the contrary, the facts show that a number of People's Commissariats, which have fulfilled and even overfulfilled the annual economic plans, systematically fail to fulfill plans for some very important branches of the national economy.

Thirdly, there can be no doubt that **if the pests had not been exposed and thrown out**, the situation with the implementation of economic plans would have been much worse, which should be remembered by the short-sighted authors of the theory under consideration.

Fourthly, saboteurs usually time their main sabotage work not to the period of peacetime, but to the period of the eve of the war or the war itself. Let us assume that we would lull ourselves to sleep with the rotten theory of the "systematic fulfillment of economic plans" and would not touch the pests. Do the authors of this rotten theory imagine what colossal harm the wreckers would inflict on our state in the event

of a war if they were allowed to remain in the bowels of our national economy under the shadow of the rotten theory of the "systematic implementation of economic plans"? **Is it not clear that the theory of the "systematic fulfillment of economic plans" is a theory beneficial to pests?**

10) It is necessary to smash and throw away the fourth rotten theory, which says that the Stakhanov movement is supposedly the main means of eliminating sabotage. This theory was invented in order to ward off pests under the guise of chatter about the Stakhanovites and the Stakhanov movement.

In his report, Comrade Molotov demonstrated a number of facts showing how Trotskyist and non-Trotskyist wreckers in Kuzbass and Donbass, **abusing the trust of our politically careless comrades**, systematically led the Stakhanovites by the nose, put a spoke in their wheels, and artificially created a number of obstacles to their successful work and finally achieved what upset their work. What can only the Stakhanovists do if the sabotage of capital construction, say, in the Donbass, has led to a gap between the preparatory work for coal mining, which lags behind the pace, and all other work? **Is it not clear that the Stakhanov movement itself needs real help from our side against all and all the machinations of saboteurs in order to move the cause forward and fulfill its great mission?** Isn't it clear that the struggle against sabotage, the struggle for the elimination of sabotage, the curbing of sabotage is a necessary condition for the Stakhanov movement to develop to its full extent? I think that this question is also clear and does not need further clarification.

11) It is necessary to smash and discard the **fifth rotten theory, which says that the Trotskyist wreckers allegedly have no more reserves, that they are supposedly getting their last cadres**. This is not true, comrades. Such a theory could only be invented by naive people. The Trotskyist wreckers have their reserves. They consist **primarily of the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes in the USSR**. They consist of a number of groups and organizations outside the USSR that are hostile to the Soviet Union.

Take, for example, the Trotskyist counter-revolutionary **IV International, two-thirds of whom are spies and saboteurs**. Why is this not a reserve? Is it not clear that this espionage international will provide cadres for the Trotskyists' espionage and sabotage work? Or take, for example, the group of rogues Sheflo in Norway, which **sheltered the spy Trotsky** and helped him to mischief the Soviet Union. Why is this group not a reserve? Who can deny that this counter-revolutionary group will continue to provide services to Trotskyist spies and wreckers?

Or take, for example, another group of the same rogue as Sheflo - the Souvarine group in France. Why are they not a reserve? Is it possible to deny that this group of rogues will also help the Trotskyists in their espionage and sabotage work against the Soviet Union? And all these gentlemen from Germany, all sorts of Ruth Fischers, Maslovs, Urbans, who sold their soul and body to the Nazis - why are they not a reserve for Trotskyist espionage and sabotage work?

Or, for example, the **well-known horde of American writers headed by the famous swindler Eastman**, all these robbers of the pen who live by slandering the working class of the USSR - why are they not a reserve for Trotskyism?

No, we must throw away the rotten theory that the Trotskyists are supposedly recruiting the last cadres.

12) Finally, it is necessary to smash and discard **another rotten theory**, which says that since we Bolsheviks are many, but there are few pests, since we Bolsheviks are supported by tens of millions of people, and Trotskyist pests are supported by only a few and tens, then we, the Bolsheviks, **could not pay attention to some handful of pests**.

This is not true, comrades. This more than strange theory was invented in order to console some of our leading comrades who have failed at work due to their inability to deal with sabotage, and to lull their vigilance, to let them sleep peacefully.

That the Trotskyist wreckers are supported by a few, and the Bolsheviks by tens of millions of people, is, of course, true. **But it does**

not at all follow from this that wreckers cannot do the most serious harm to our cause. It doesn't take a lot of people to do something wrong and harm. To build Dneprostroy, tens of thousands of workers must be put into operation. **And in order to blow it up, it may take several dozen people,** no more. To win a battle in a war, it may take several Red Army corps. And in order to ruin this gain at the front, a few spies somewhere in the army headquarters or even in the division headquarters are enough for this, who can steal an operational plan and transfer it to the enemy. To build a great railway bridge it takes thousands of people. But to blow it up, only a few people are enough. There are tens and hundreds of such examples.

Consequently, one must not console oneself with the fact that there are many of us, and there are few of them, the Trotskyist wreckers. **We must ensure that they, the Trotskyist wreckers, are not at all in our ranks.**

That is how matters stand with the question of how to eliminate the shortcomings of our work, which are common to all our organizations, both economic and Soviet, as well as administrative and party organizations. These are the measures needed to remedy these shortcomings.

As for the specially party organizations and shortcomings in their work, the measures to eliminate these shortcomings are described in sufficient detail in the draft resolution submitted at your discretion. I think, therefore, that there is no need to dwell on this aspect of the matter here. I would only like to say a few words about the political training and improvement of our party cadres.

I think that if we could, if we could manage our party cadres, from top to bottom, to prepare ideologically and temper them politically in such a way that they could freely orient themselves in the domestic and international situation, if we were able to make them quite mature Leninists, Marxists who are able to solve the questions of the country's leadership without serious mistakes, **we would have solved nine-tenths of all our tasks.**

What is the situation with the leading personnel of our Party? In the composition of our party, if we bear in mind its leading strata, **there are about 3-4 thousand top leaders**. This, I would say, is the generals of our party. Next come **30-40 thousand middle managers**. This is our party officers. Then there are about **100-150 thousand of the lowest party commanding staff**. This is, so to speak, our party non-commissioned officers. **Raising the ideological level** and political tempering of these command cadres, infusing these cadres with fresh forces awaiting their nomination, and thus expanding the composition of the leading cadres — **that is the task**.

What is required for this? First of all, it is necessary to propose to our party leaders, from secretaries of cells to secretaries of regional and republic party organizations, to select, within a certain period, two people, two party workers, capable of being their real deputies. They may say: where to get them, two deputies for each, we do not have such people, we do not have appropriate workers. This is not true, comrades. We have tens of thousands of talented people. You just need to know them and put them forward in time so that they do not stop in their old place and do not start to rot. Seek and find.

Further. For party training and retraining of cell secretaries, it is necessary to create four-month "Party courses" in each regional center. Secretaries of all primary party organizations (cells) should be sent to these courses, and then, after completing the courses and returning to their place, their deputies and the most capable members of the primary party organizations.

Farther. For the political retraining of the first secretaries of regional organizations, it is necessary to create in the USSR, say, **in 10 most important centers, eight-month "Lenin Courses"**. The first secretaries of district and district party organizations should be sent to these courses, and then, after completing the courses and returning to their place, their deputies and the most capable members of the district and district organizations.

Farther. For the ideological retraining and political improvement of the secretaries of city organizations, it is necessary to create under the

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) **six-month "Courses on the history and politics of the party."** The first or second secretaries of city organizations should be sent to these courses, and then, after completing the course and returning to the place, the most capable members of city organizations.

Finally, it is necessary to create under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a six-month "Conference on Domestic and International Politics." It is necessary to send here the first secretaries of regional and regional organizations and central committees of national communist parties. These comrades must give not one, but several shifts that can replace the leaders of the Central Committee of our Party. This is necessary and must be done.

I am finishing, comrades. Thus, we outlined the main shortcomings of our work, both those that are common to all our organizations - economic, administrative, party, and those that are peculiar only to especially party organizations, shortcomings used by the enemies of the working class for their wrecking and sabotage and espionage and terrorist work. We have outlined, further, the main measures necessary to eliminate these shortcomings and neutralize the wrecking and sabotage and espionage and terrorist attacks of Trotskyist-fascist agents of foreign intelligence agencies. The question is, can we carry out all these measures, do we have all the necessary opportunities for this?

Of course, we can. We can, since we have at our disposal all the funds necessary to carry out these activities. **What do we lack?**

There is only **one thing missing: the willingness to liquidate one's own carelessness, one's own complacency, one's own political myopia.** This is the catch. But really we will not be able to get rid of this ridiculous and idiotic disease, we who overthrew capitalism, built mainly socialism and raised the great banner of world communism?

We have no reason to doubt that we will undoubtedly deal with her, if, of course, we want to. We will deal not simply, but in a Bolshevik way, for real. And **when we deal with this idiotic disease,** we can say with complete confidence that we are not afraid of any enemies, neither internal nor external, we are not afraid of their forays, for **we will break**

them in the future just as we break them in the present, as they were broken in the past. (Applause.).

Andreev. There is a proposal to announce a break for 10 minutes. No objections?

Source;

Transcripts from the Soviet Archives, Svitlana M, Erdogan A

From the speech of Comrade Stalin. March 5, 1937

Source: Questions of history, 1995, No. 12, pp. 11-23

Andreev. Comrade Stalin has the final word.

Stalin.

Comrades, in my report I spoke about general questions of the matter under discussion. Now let me say a few words in my closing remarks about more specific questions.

Now, apparently, everyone understood, realized that an excessive enthusiasm for economic campaigns and economic affairs, a hobby explained by the fact that these affairs give immediate results and this, so to speak, even more people are involved in this business, that this is an extraordinary passion when forgetting about other issues lead to a dead end. I think that the comrades have understood and realized this.

But from the speeches of some speakers, it is clear that they draw extreme conclusions from this clear and, I would say, axiomatic position. There were voices: "Well, now, thank God, let's get rid of economic affairs ..." (Laughter) "... now we can get down to party political work."

This, comrades, is the other extreme. You cannot jump from one extreme to the other. It is impossible to separate politics from the economy. We cannot abandon the economy in the same way that we cannot and must not abandon politics. It is only in the interests of a methodological study of the issue, for convenience, we separate politics from economics in our heads. In life, on the contrary, in practice politics and economy are not separate and inseparable. They exist together and act together. In no case should we leave the farm. In no case. The meaning of the draft resolution is not to substitute economic bodies for our party leaders, not to replace, not to transfer the headquarters of economic work - whether the question is about industry or agriculture, all the same - not to transfer them to the office of the first secretary. This is what we are talking about.

Of course, we will not be able to immediately get rid of household trifles. We're just scheduling the installation. Time is needed for the directive to free oneself from economic trifles and to strengthen party political work. It is necessary to staff the organs of agriculture, to give them the best people. Industry, it is stronger built, and its organs, perhaps, will not allow you to replace them. And this is very good. The situation is weaker with the agricultural authorities both in the center and in the localities. These bodies must be strengthened worldwide by people, and, most importantly, we must learn the method of the Bolshevik leadership of Soviet economic bodies, not replace them and not depersonalize them, but help them, strengthen them and lead through them, and not apart from them. This is where the question comes down.

The agricultural agencies have not yet been staffed, not strengthened, unfortunately, you will have to deal closely with agricultural affairs in the near future so that these matters are not abandoned altogether. So, you need to combine one with the other. This is the method of the Bolshevik leadership of the economic organs, of the economy in general, both industry and agriculture. Strengthening the organs of the economy, equipping them with the best people, - to help them from the outside, to give them guiding thoughts and to manage the economy through them, without jumping to the other extreme and without rejecting economic work. This will not work, comrades; it will go to extremes.

The next question is about saboteurs, saboteurs and all other agents of the Trotskyist and non-Trotskyist type, foreign states. I think that all the comrades understood and realized that this breed of people, no matter what flag it is masked, Trotskyist or Bukharin, we do not care, this breed of people has nothing to do with any political trend in the labor movement. This is a rabid gang of hired killers, saboteurs, spies, pests, etc., etc. This, I think, people have understood and realized. But I am afraid that in the speeches of some comrades the thought was slipping that: let's now beat right and left anyone who has ever walked along the same street with some Trotskyist or who has ever been in the same

public canteen somewhere along I dined next door to the Trotskyist. Let's hit right and left now.

It won't work, it won't do. Among the former Trotskyists, we have wonderful people, you know this, good workers who accidentally fell into the hands of the Trotskyists, then broke up with them and work like real Bolsheviks who can be envied. One of these was Comrade Dzerzhinsky. (Voice from the seat. Who?) Comrade. Dzerzhinsky, you knew him. Therefore, when destroying the Trotskyist nests, you must look around, see around you, dear comrades, and strike with discernment, not nagging at people, not nagging at individual comrades who, I repeat, accidentally passed along the same street with the Trotskyist. This is the second question.

Third question. What does it mean to choose the right frames, what does it mean to choose the right frames? The Bolsheviks understand this matter as follows. Selecting cadres correctly means selecting an employee, firstly, according to his loyalty to the party, whether he deserves political trust and, secondly, on a business basis, that is, whether he is suitable for such work. This is an axiomatic proposition that is not worth explaining. We have violated this provision. Violations of this provision were discussed. I would like to demonstrate violations of this Bolshevik position with two examples and demonstrate with examples showing that people are sometimes selected not according to political and business principles, but from the point of view of personal acquaintance, personal devotion, friendly relations, in general, on the basis of a philistine character, on grounds that should not have a place in our practice. Take Comrade Mirzoyan. He works in Kazakhstan, he used to work in Azerbaijan for a long time, and after Azerbaijan he worked in the Urals. I warned him several times: do not drag your friends either from Azerbaijan or the Urals with you, but nominate people in Kazakhstan, do not isolate yourself from local people in Kazakhstan, because - what does it mean to drag along a whole group of friends, friends from Azerbaijan, which are not fundamentally related to Kazakhstan? What does it mean to drag along a whole group of friends from the Urals, who are also not fundamentally connected with Kazakhstan? This means that you have

gained some independence from local organizations and, if you like, some independence from the Central Committee. He has his own group, I have my own group, they are personally devoted to me. Here, look, the head of the ORPO of the South Kazakhstan regional committee is sitting with him Comrade Badabashyan, taken from Azerbaijan, Comrade Sahakyan, taken from Azerbaijan, is the secretary of the Kostanai regional committee; Comrade Sargsyan, taken from Azerbaijan, is sitting as the secretary of the Jata-Gori regional committee; taken from Georgia. I am reading the certificate of the Central Committee apparatus.

The secretary of the Karsakpay regional committee sits with him. Comrade Shirazyan, taken from Azerbaijan, the head of the ORPO of the regional committee sits with him, Asriyan, taken from Baku, the chairman of the City Council in Alma-Ata, the capital of the republic, sits with him. Comrade Saumov, also taken from Baku. Sarkisova is the secretary of the Stalin district committee of Alma-Ata, Yusupov is the secretary of the city committee of Alma-Ata - all these are people from Baku. The secretary of the Karaganda regional committee is Pinkhasik, taken from Sverdlovsk, where he used to work. A certain Sverdlov, now the secretary of the East Kazakh Regional Committee, was also taken from Baku. First, he was dragged from Baku to the Urals, and then from the Urals - here, to Kazakhstan. Kiselev is the secretary of the Alma-Ata regional committee - taken from the Urals. The chairman of the North-Kazakh regional committee is Stepanov from the Azov-Black Sea region. The secretary of the Chimkent regional committee is Kuliev, taken from Azerbaijan. Kamakidze is the deputy head of the Agricultural Department of the Kazkraykom. (Beria. A rather suspicious person.) He is suspected of active Trotskyism. In general, all these people are more or less suspected of the republics from which they were taken. (A voice from the seat. Kuliev was removed from the political department.) Deputy People's Commissariat for Agriculture Rzaev is the former chairman of the AzGPU. (Voice from the place. They removed him from the GPU for failure to work). Also taken from Azerbaijan. Deputy Prev Council of People's Commissars in Kazakhstan Aliyev Teymur was taken from Azerbaijan. Deputy Prev State Planning Committee Baranov - taken from Azerbaijan. He was

transferred by him to the Urals, and from there he took with him to Kazakhstan. (Mirzoyan. He was never with me.) We know Baranov. In general, all these people are more or less suspected of the republics from which they were taken. (A voice from the seat. Kuliev was removed from the political department.) Deputy People's Commissariat for Agriculture Rzayev is the former chairman of the AzGPU. (Voice from the place. They removed him from the GPU for failure to work). Also taken from Azerbaijan. Deputy Prev Council of People's Commissars in Kazakhstan Aliyev Teymur was taken from Azerbaijan. Deputy Prev State Planning Committee Baranov - taken from Azerbaijan. He was transferred by him to the Urals, and from there he took with him to Kazakhstan. (Mirzoyan. He was never with me.) We know Baranov. In general, all these people are more or less suspected of the republics from which they were taken. (A voice from the seat. Kuliev was removed from the political department.) Deputy People's Commissariat for Agriculture Rzayev is the former chairman of the AzGPU. (Voice from the place. They removed him from the GPU for failure to work). Also taken from Azerbaijan. Deputy Prev Council of People's Commissars in Kazakhstan Aliyev Teymur was taken from Azerbaijan. Deputy Prev State Planning Committee Baranov - taken from Azerbaijan. He was transferred by him to the Urals, and from there he took with him to Kazakhstan. (Mirzoyan. He was never with me.) We know Baranov. State Planning Committee Baranov - taken from Azerbaijan. He was transferred by him to the Urals, and from there he took with him to Kazakhstan. (Mirzoyan. He was never with me.) We know Baranov. State Planning Committee Baranov - taken from Azerbaijan. He was transferred by him to the Urals, and from there he took with him to Kazakhstan. (Mirzoyan. He was never with me.) We know Baranov.

What does it look like? How can you select people like that! What does this lead to, what good can there be - I ask you? After all, I warned comrade Mirzoyan that you cannot behave like that, that you have to select personnel from local people. And he, you see, created his own group of people who were personally loyal to him, selected people not on the basis of the Bolshevik principle, but among them there are

Trotskyists. But he hopes that since they are loyal to him, they will work with him forever. What if he doesn't get there?

Another comrade, Vainov, like Mirzoyan, he took for himself people from other regions, especially from [...] 23 people. There are many more of them, because there are still many people in the Soviet apparatus. I took 9 people from Donbass: Zhuravlev, Weisberg, Krimer, Ivanov, Katz, Ponukalov, Yurlov, Alexandrov and Isaev. They took him from Donbass, he was transferred as a secretary to Yaroslavl, he gradually brought 9 people from Donbass to him - he cannot work without them. And these people occupy the most important positions. Why did Vainov need it? What should be the attitude towards these people who came from outside, the attitude of local personnel? Of course, wary. What does it mean to take people to you, to form a group of personally loyal people from outside? This means expressing distrust of the local staff. What grounds do Mirzoyan or Vainov have to express distrust to local cadres - let them tell us. These comrades are taking on too much and letting themselves down, and therefore letting the Party down too.

It's not good to pick people like that. Here, too, Comrade Sergo - he was one of the first with us, one of the best members of the Politburo, the head of the economy of the highest type, I would say, he also suffered from such a disease: he will become attached to someone, declare people personally loyal to him and rush about, contrary to warnings from the party, from the Central Committee. How much blood he had spoiled himself in order to clatter with Lominadze. How much blood he ruined for himself, he hoped that he could straighten Lominadze, but he cheated him, let him down at every step. How much blood he spoiled in order to defend against all such, as you can see now, scoundrels like Vardanyan, Gogoberidze, Meliksetov, Okudzhava - is now revealed in the Urals. How much blood he spoiled for himself and how much blood he spoiled for us, and he made a mistake on this, because he suffered more than all of us and worried that these people, whom he most trusted and whom he considered personally loyal to himself, turned out to be the last scoundrels. The experience of a person, a leader of the highest type, shows that the method of personal selection of people is disastrous, especially the experience of people like

Mirzoyan and Vainov, whom I cannot consider as leaders of the highest type, but I bring them to show this experience that these people let them down and let the party down. This method of selection is a non-Bolshevik, I would say, anti-Party method of selecting people, and the comrades must put an end to this method before it is too late. that these people let them down and let the party down. This method of selection is a non-Bolshevik, I would say, anti-Party method of selecting people, and the comrades must put an end to this method before it is too late. that these people let them down and let the party down. This method of selection is a non-Bolshevik, I would say, anti-Party method of selecting people, and the comrades must put an end to this method before it is too late.

Fourth question. What does verification of work, verification of performance mean? How should employees be checked whether an inspection is needed at all? Undoubtedly needed. Without checking people according to the results of their work, it is impossible to recognize a single employee, to recognize what he breathes and what he is. It is impossible, on the basis of speeches, declarations, verbal statements, to draw a conclusion about the nature, so to speak, of a given worker. It's impossible, it's dangerous, it's naive. To recognize workers, they must be checked at work, according to the results of their work, day after day must be checked.

What kind of verification is there in general in our practice? There is a check from above, well, a top manager, having lower managers in his subordination, checks them, visits them, or invites them to his place, and generally checks according to the results of work. This is very good, this is great, but it is not enough. Even this rule is violated here and there. If a person is scheduled to work and put in, then they forget about him, do not ask, do not check, no help. Many of them ask for help, squeak, shout, send letters, telegrams, no answer, no greetings, they just put a person to work, which means they gave him the job at the mercy. This is a violation of an elementary rule of the Leninist principle of verifying performance.

So, this check happens from above, a check coming from above, when the boss checks his subordinates; there is a check from below, when the

leaders are checked by the party masses or the non-party masses. Party assets or non-party assets. The people are checking themselves by way of elections. Here are the elections we are organizing to the supreme bodies of our country; these elections will be a great test for many of our workers. Means for verification from below are regular assets, party and non-party, and reports of leaders, honest practical reports on their work. Many comrades left this business, being carried away by economic campaigns and imagining themselves [...] of the world. But they were mistaken, apparently, and got confused.

It is necessary to restore party assets and non-party assets under the people's commissariats, under enterprises - what we used to call a production meeting. It is difficult to assemble the entire plant, we have factories where 30-40 thousand people work, but we should select an asset from the best party and non-party people and report to them and find out how they breathe, these assets, and what mistakes are noticed.

Here is one means of checking workers from below: party assets, non-party assets, non-party assets and accountability on these assets on the part of the leaders. And another means is the restoration of democratic centralism in our internal party life. This is also a test, comrades. Restoration, on the basis of the charter, the election of party bodies. Secret elections, the right to reject candidates without exception and the right to criticize. Here's the second checker from the bottom. Both must be practiced.

Therefore, we have two ways to test workers: the way coming from above, from the boss to the subordinate, and the other way - the way coming from below, control from below. Moreover, control from below has two forms: control through assets with accountability on the part of the leaders and control through the restoration of democratic elections in our party, when party members have the right to reject any candidate, criticize as much as they like, and make the leader accountable to the party masses.

Fifth question. What does it mean to educate cadres on their own mistakes? Lenin taught us that the best way to educate cadres, to develop and develop the reserves of a party or other organization, is to

educate them on their own mistakes. What does it mean? This means helping cadres to reveal their mistakes in time; help every employee, every manager in time to reveal their mistakes, help them honestly admit these mistakes and help them correct their mistakes honestly and to the end, without fear that this can, as they say, make enemies.

There are few people or workers who are unpleasant, but you need to teach people, arm yourself with courage to listen to criticism, accustom yourself and on this give the workers the opportunity to go up and grow.

Some examples. You remember our mistakes in collective building in 1930, when we talked about the dizziness of success. The Party Central Committee has taken a firm line of ruthless criticism of our cadres. And then, after all, how the collective farms were created, there was a great competition between the regions, who will fulfill the highest percentage of collectivization. A group of propagandists came to the village, collected 500-600 houses in the village, gathered a gathering and raised the question of who is for collectivization. And they made very transparent hints: if you are against collectivization, then you are against the Soviet regime. The peasants said: what are we, organize, we are for collectivization. After that telegrams flew to the Central Committee of the Party that collectivization was growing in our country, and the economy remained on the old rails. There were no collectives, there was only a vote for collectivization.

When we checked in the Moscow region, it turned out that 85% were collectivized in 1930. How much is effective in these percentages and how much is actual? It turned out that only 8% of collectivization instead of 85. So, you shake your head, but everyone had it. This disease was common, each area was infected with this disease to a greater or lesser extent.

The Central Committee struck at these mistakes. Our cadres have managed to turn this business around, and we have raised our cadres on this. If we had not revealed these mistakes, if the Central Committee began to fear that we would lose some cadres, that we would provoke discontent, if the Central Committee began to be afraid to pet someone

the wrong way, if the Central Committee went against this trend, we would ruin the whole business and demoralize all our cadres. We would ruin the growth of agricultural personnel, the growth of collective farms. Now we have quite good leaders of the collective farm movement, by revealing their mistakes to the end, forcing them to admit these mistakes, and take a new path.

Another example is the Shakhty affair, we all would have miscalculated, what would have happened to us if we had not really undertaken, in a Bolshevik way, to give our cadres the opportunity to educate themselves on their mistakes — would have ruined the cause of industry. Many comrades were afraid that going against the current meant making enemies for themselves. The leadership of the Party's Central Committee launched self-criticism, merciless self-criticism, and we won. They revealed their mistakes and trained their economic cadres on this. Since that time, we have had real, real economic cadres. Since then - after the Shakhty affair - ten years have passed, and we have grown up excellent Bolshevik cadres in technical leadership. These cadres would not exist, they would be demoralized, disorganized, if we succumbed even for a minute to the considerations that if we go against the current,

This is what it means to educate cadres on their own mistakes. This is what it means to have the courage to honestly admit your mistakes, analyze them and find ways to correct them. Only in such a situation do cadres grow and temper, so Lenin taught us, and these words of Lenin are justified several times in our eyes.

The sixth question is, what does it mean to spare cadres? And how can they be preserved and grown in general? Spare the staff. Many comrades think that if we soften the mistakes of some comrades, if we smear them and tell the truth about the mistakes of our comrades only half, we will spare the cadres and save them. Is it right or wrong? Anyone who thinks that glossing over the mistakes of our cadres means preserving them, sparing them, he is ruining cadres, for sure, he is ruining cadres. To mitigate the mistakes of our cadres, to gloss over them — this means not to spare the cadres, but to destroy them. Ruin.

I would like to put forward again a few facts from the field, so to speak, of the practical work of some of our very responsible leaders. This was with Comrade Sergo, whom I respect not less, but more than some comrades, but I must tell about his mistakes here in order to give us and you the opportunity to learn.

Take his relationship with Lominadze. Lominadze noticed quite serious mistakes on the party and state lines. Since 1926-27-28. Comrade Sergo knew more about these mistakes than any of us. He did not tell us about them, relying on himself, believing that he would be able to correct it himself, taking on too much in this matter. He had a rich correspondence with him - Comrade Sergo with Lominadze. We subsequently only 8 or 9 years after these letters were written, we later learned in the Central Committee that they were anti-Party in nature. Comrade Out of his kindness, Sergo did not tell us about this exclusively, it goes without saying that he hoped to correct him.

Since we did not know the real insides of Lominadze, angry, the Central Committee did not know, we began to nominate him to some posts in order to see what would come of him. It is very difficult to recognize a person. There is one remedy - to take the risk of betting, give him maximum responsibility and see what comes of it. They took this risk and made him the secretary of the Transcaucasian Party Organization. If we knew about Sergo's correspondence, we would not have allowed this in any way, we would not have put on this post. But we didn't know. Put. It turned out later that the person was working not for the party, but against the party.

It was during this period that Comrade Sergo received one very bad, unpleasant and non-partisan letter from Lominadze. He came to me and said: "I want to read you Lominadze's letter." - "What is it talking about?" - "Bad." - "Let me, I'll report to the Politburo, the Central Committee should know what kind of workers there are." - "I can't." - "Why?" - "I gave him my word." - "How could you give him the floor, you are the chairman of the Central Committee, the keeper of party traditions, how could you give a person your word of honor that you will not show an anti-party letter about the Central Committee and against the Central Committee to the Central Committee? And what,

will you have with him, with Lominadze, secrets against the Central Committee? What is it like, Comrade Sergo, how could you go for this? " - "Here I cannot." He asked several times, begged to read. Well, apparently, morally he wanted to share with me the responsibility for the secrets that he had with Lominadze, without, of course, sharing his views, certainly against the Central Committee. Purely such a noble attitude to business, in my opinion, chivalrous, I would say. I tell him that I don't want to be a participant in such a secret, I am still considered a member of the Central Committee. Give the letter, I will immediately send the members of the Politburo so that they know what kind of workers there are, I will report to the Central Committee, and so he said to Sergo: "You will ruin him, Lominadze." "Why? Now, if you are on this little - the letter is anti-Party, but not such that one could be expelled from the party for it - if you are on this little, tell about the letter to the members of the Central Committee, then on the big Lominadze they will be careful. If you hide this thing from the Central Committee and defend, Lominadze will continue to hope that it is possible to continue making some mistakes against the Central Committee, since there are people who can protect him, and Lominadze can repeat these mistakes, but then he may get caught on more, and if he gets caught on a larger one, we will smash him to smithereens, there will be no dust left from him. You are ruining him; you think that you are sparing him - Lominadze. In a philistine, perhaps, it turns out that way, but in real, in a Bolshevik way, if you look at it, you are ruining him, because you do not pull him down in time. " He says he has received such letters before. So, it's bad, you probably ruined him, you put him at risk of the Central Committee, because now he will be caught on more and he will not be spared.

And so, it happened. Got caught on more. Well, of course, no one experienced this tragedy as much as Sergo, because he personally trusted a person, and he deceived his personal trust. He demanded the execution of Lominadze. Such an extreme. He passed his defense to execution. We said: "No, we will not shoot him, we will not arrest him, we will not even be expelled from the party. We will simply withdraw him from the Central Committee. " Here is an example for you, comrades, an example of a man, Comrade Sergo, through whose hands

tens of thousands of people passed, who raised thousands of wonderful business executives and party members. Here, you see, this kind of thing happens when you cover up, hide the mistakes of a comrade and do not pull him back in time, but on the contrary, you cover up - you ruin him, you probably ruin him.

So, what does it mean to spare cadres and keep them? This means, if they have mistakes, point them out in time, pull them up in time, without hiding, without glossing over. This is the only way to spare personnel, the only way to preserve them.

How should our cadres be trained and retrained in the spirit of Leninism? A short outline of this issue is set out in the draft resolution. I said something about this in my report, I could say a few words more specifically.

First of all, comrades, you must be able to strain yourself and prepare each of you two deputies first of all. Whether they are the current second secretaries or some other, more suitable, it depends, so to speak, on your sagacity and on your ability to recognize people. But deputies must be real deputies, full-fledged ones, capable of replacing you, because if the plenum of the Central Committee adopts this point in the draft resolution, and he, apparently, accepts it, then it is clear that we will begin to carry out this matter.

We have 102 thousand cells in the party, 102 thousand primary party organizations. Hence, 102 thousand secretaries of the primary party organizations. We will recall them all to the courses in 4, in 5 months, we will recall them in 3, in 4 months - this practice will show. But before they are withdrawn, they, these secretaries, must nominate two deputies for themselves. And so that they do not make mistakes in people, it is necessary that the corresponding district committees approve the lists of deputies. We must send 102,000 secretaries into training and retraining of a party-political nature. These are our party non-commissioned officers, a lot depends on them, I would say, nine-tenths of our work depends on them.

We have over 3,500 district secretaries, city and non-city. Each of them must definitely choose two full-fledged deputies, capable of replacing

them - whether they will be the current second secretaries or not, I do not know, but we no longer want to tolerate the secretaries picking up runners and runners as their deputies. It won't do. The Central Committee will demand that deputies be real, full-fledged and capable of replacing district secretaries. We have about 3,500 secretaries. We will send all of them to study, retraining, courses, so-called Leninist courses. We will work out the program of these courses, we will deal with this together with you, representatives of regions and republics. Centers will be identified where these courses will be organized. Of course, there is nothing so categorical in the draft resolution, it is possible to outline more centers,

We have several hundred city committees. After this plenum, obviously, the first secretary of the regional or regional committee, he should also be the first secretary of the city committee. It is clear that in order to raise the city's work, it is necessary to assign direct and immediate responsibility to it. Well, there will be second secretaries, maybe two. We would like the first secretaries of city committees to select two full-fledged deputies for themselves, in order to send them to courses on the history of the party.

We have over 100 regional committees, secretaries also sit there, as well as in national regions. We will also demand that each of the first secretaries try to nominate two deputies for himself, real, full-fledged. We will approve them in the Central Committee, these deputies, so that later the first secretaries of regional committees, regional committees in the Central Committee of the national communist parties will deign to come to Moscow and arrange such meetings. We can give a certain interest to these meetings.

I said in my report, I repeat here, that we old men, members of the Politburo, will soon withdraw, leave the stage. This is the law of nature. And we would like us to have several shifts, and in order to organize the matter, we must now do it, dear comrades, first secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, Central Committee of national communist parties, and get involved in international and internal affairs properly, together with us.

Here are our ways by which it is necessary to organize a real Leninist training and retraining of our cadres: 102 thousand first secretaries of primary party organizations, 3,500 district secretaries, over 200 secretaries of city committees, over 100 secretaries of regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the national communist parties. This is the leadership team that should be retrained and improved.

Next question. What does it mean not only to teach the masses, but also to learn from the masses? I, comrades, pose these questions because my impressions from the debate are such that there is a complete readiness to correct mistakes and there are opportunities, of course, if people want to, they will undoubtedly correct themselves. But there is no understanding of some specific issues in our practical policies and organizational policies. Therefore, I think it would be superfluous to talk about these issues in the final word.

What does Lenin's thesis mean — not only to teach the masses, but also to learn from the masses? Lenin obliged us not to pretend to be people who have a vessel of all wisdom in their heads. It is not true, it is for us, the leaders, that things and events are visible from one side, and those who are guided look at the same things from the other side. What we see, maybe, ordinary members of the party do not see, not what they see, for the most part we do not see. And in order for us to recognize things properly, and what does it mean to recognize is to understand things from all sides, and for this it is necessary to combine the experience of leaders who look at things from above with the experience of ordinary party members who also live and gain experience and who look at things from below. The combination of these two experiences, it gives a real full knowledge of things, deeds and facts. This means not only teaching the masses, but also learning from the masses. Some of our comrades think that if he is the People's Commissar, then he knows everything, they think that the rank in itself gives a very large, almost exhaustive knowledge, or they think: if I am a member of the Central Committee, therefore, it is no coincidence that I am a member of the Central Committee, therefore, I know everything. This is not true. Old people have to study until the day they die, not to

mention the young. We are the leaders and they, the guided, must teach each other so that the study is full-fledged, one hundred percent. And what does it mean not only to teach the masses, but also to learn from the masses? This means not for a moment weakening, not severing ties with the masses, with the party masses, with the working masses, with the peasant masses, with the people in general, not for a moment weakening or severing ties. It means listening to the voice of the masses, as they say, to the voice of the lower classes, or, as they say, to the voice of ordinary little people; learn to listen to the voice of little people,

To make this clear, I would like to share with you two examples that are relevant to our tutorial. That was three or four years ago or more, maybe five years ago. I have the case when, here in Moscow, the Central Committee and the leaders of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry jointly worked out new guidelines for the Donbass on a new organization of wages, on a new organization of work and on checking performance. It was, I think, about five years ago.

Our situation was desperate, they demanded from the Donbass - mobilize workers, there is not enough workers. We are mobilizing several hundred thousand workers, mobilizing 200 thousand. A week later, 200 thousand leave Donbass. People tell us: you are supplying us poorly, so coal mining is not going well. We answer to business executives: last year you mined so much, received such and such a supply, and now you received 20% more supply, we mobilized several hundred thousand people for you, but these people went somewhere, fell into a hole, and this is repeated from year to year. Some kind of Sisyphean work. We mobilize several hundred thousand people, 300 thousand people, and it turns out that the same number left the Donbass, we give better supplies - it also does not help.

We suggested to the People's Commissariat of Labor: let's have your project that gives a way out of this situation, because there is some kind of vicious circle - the supply is better, we give new several hundred thousand people, 300 thousand people, and 300 thousand people leave, again we will mobilize 300 thousand people - and again they leave. The case is disorganized, the Donbass is turning into a courtyard. Three projects were presented at different times. Here Sergo took part, Iosif

Kosior, leading workers of the People's Commissariat. We, members of the Politburo, have come to the conclusion that these projects are not worth a damn thing. People have completely broken away from the practical needs of Donbass and cannot offer anything sensible, and decided to call ordinary people, grassroots workers, ordinary workers from Donbass. They summoned, asked - what's the matter, how to get out of the situation? We talked with them for three days, and so they suggested to us that solution, which we accepted, and which later turned the situation in Donbass for the better. It turns out that the further the worker is from the mine, the more salary he receives, the closer to the underground, the less salary he receives. It is clear that the best workers move farther from the mine, while the worst ones move closer to the mine. But bad workers cannot do any good. Overground workers themselves receive more salaries than underground workers. Who will go there from experienced initiative workers? Nobody will go, because he gets much more from the above groundwork. Both functional and impersonality were found here. All this was sanctioned and, most importantly, a concrete way out was given. What the workers told us, we formulated, read, they approved, and then put it into practice. This is what it means to listen to the voice of little people,

The second example is the example of Nikolayenko. They talked a lot about her, and there is nothing to smear. She turned out to be right - the little man Nikolaenko, a woman. She squeaked, squeaked to all instances, no one paid attention to her, and when he did, they stuck her for it. Then the letter goes to the Central Committee. We checked. But what did she go through and what nooks she had to go through in order to get to the truth! You know that. But the fact is - a small person, not a member of the Central Committee, not a member of the Politburo, not a People's Commissar, and not even a secretary of a cell, but a simple person - and she turned out to be right. And how many such people do we have, whose voices are muffled, muffled? Why was she beaten? For the fact that she does not give up like that, it interferes, worries. People reason like this: you were expelled, well, sit, be silent, while you are whole. No, she doesn't want to calm down, she pokes at one place, at another, at a third, - well, that she had enough initiative, everyone beat her on the hands, and when, finally, she got to the point, it turned out

that she was right, she helped you expose a number of people. That is what it means to listen to the head of the lower classes, to the voice of the masses.

The ancient Greeks in the system of their mythology had one famous hero who was considered invincible - Antaeus. He was, as mythology tells us, the son of Poseidon, the god of the seas, and Gaia, the goddess of the Earth. He had a special affection for his mother, who gave birth to him and nursed him. There was no such hero whom he would not put on both shoulder blades, this Antaeus, according to the narrative of mythology. What was his strength? It consisted in the fact that when he had a hard time fighting the enemy, he touched the ground, to his mother, who gave birth to him and nursed him, and received new strength. The hero, who each time touching the ground, received new powers, he became invincible, but he was still defeated, Hercules defeated him. How? He tore him off the ground, lifted him into the air, and strangled him in the air, tore him away from his mother, who gave birth to and nurtured him.

I think that our Bolshevik leaders are like Antaeus, they should be like Antaeus. The Bolshevik leaders are Antaeus, their strength lies in the fact that they do not want to break ties, weaken ties with their mother, who gave birth to and nursed them - with the masses, with the people, with the working class, with the peasantry, with little people. All of them are Bolsheviks - the sons of the people, and they will be invincible only if they do not allow anyone to tear themselves off the ground and thereby lose the opportunity, touching the ground, to their mother - to the masses, to receive new strength.

Only people who have understood that not only must we teach the masses, but also learn from them, only people who have understood that in no case for a single minute can one tear ourselves away from our mother, from the people, from the working class, from the masses, who gave birth to, nurtured and brought us into the world, only such Bolsheviks can be invincible, and only insofar as they carry out this covenant and this thesis of Lenin. Without this - separation from the masses, without this - bureaucratic ossification, without this - death, without such a connection with our mother - with the masses, with the

working class that gave birth to us and promoted us, without such an indissoluble connection - bureaucratic - ossification, destruction. That is what Lenin's principle means, not only to teach the masses, but also to learn from the masses.

Finally, the last question is about taking care of party members and their fate. I would not say that we care very much about the party members and their fate. In general, we have divorced people on a large scale who think in thousands and tens of thousands. To expel 10,000 party members is nonsense, this is nonsense. So, they think. We have 2 million party members and candidates, what does it mean to exclude 10 thousand, ballast, passivity, as they say in our country - passive? (Voices from the field. Passive.) And what does this attitude towards an ordinary party member mean? This is help to wreckers, Trotskyists, the enemy in general. Because if we exclude people and allow them to be expelled indiscriminately, if we think in tens, and forget about the few, about individual party members, it is so clear that not all excluded will come to terms with their situation. This gives a clue to the Trotskyists, our enemies, gives them a reserve, gives them an army. The Trotskyists themselves have never represented a great force in our Party.

If you remember the last discussion, we had in 1927, the discussion was open, it was a referendum. A real referendum. 730 thousand out of 854 thousand party members took part in this referendum. This means that 123 thousand did not participate in the voting. Either because they were on shifts then, or because they were away or on vacation and so on. Of the 854,000 party members, 730,800 took part in the referendum. 724,000 spoke for the Bolsheviks against the Trotskyists. 4,000 spoke out for the Trotskyists. This is half a percent. Abstained 2600. I think that to those who voted for the Trotskyists, we must add those who abstained. It will be more than 6 thousand. I think that of those party members who, for various reasons, could not participate in this referendum, this means 121 thousand, 10 percent could be given to the Trotskyists. True, the balance of power among those who voted is such that 99.5% voted for the Bolsheviks and 0.5%, that is, half a percent, which means, for the Trotskyists. However, here among those who did not take part in the

referendum, I would like to give the Trotskyists 10 percent, not half a percent, but 10 percent. This will amount to about 11 thousand, it seems, from 120 thousand.

Here's to you: 4,000 voted for the Trotskyists, 2,600–6,600 abstained. Let's add 11,000–18,000 to them. Here are the Trotskyists. You can put 10 thousand for Zinovievites - 28 thousand. Let's put more for objectivity, more than we should - 28 thousand. And every other riffraff: right and others, let's put 30 thousand. Here are the cadres, the number is by no means exaggerated, people who stood for the anti-party trend, for the Trotskyists, for the Zinovievites. Many began to speak out for the Zinovievites, and then every little thing: the workers' opposition, the right, democratic centralism, etc. — 30,000 with 854,000 party members. Now we have 1.5 million party members, it seems, with candidates - 2 million. Of these cadres of Trotskyists and Zinovievites, 18,000 have already been arrested. If you take 30 thousand, then 12 thousand remain. Many of them went over to the party's side and went over pretty thoroughly. Part dropped out of the party, part remains, as if not very large forces. But first of all, in order to play a dirty trick and shit, it doesn't take a lot of energy. Secondly, this is not limited to the Trotskyist cadres within the USSR.

The fact that during this time we have excluded tens, hundreds of thousands of people, that we have shown a lot of inhumanity, bureaucratic heartlessness in relation to the fate of individual party members, that over the past two years there was a purge and then the exchange of party cards - 300 thousand people were excluded ... So, since 1922 we have expelled one and a half million. The fact that at some factories, for example, if you take the Kolomna plant ... How many thousands of workers are there? (Voice from the place. Thirty thousand.) There are now 1,400 party members, and there are 2,000 former members and those who left this plant or expelled from this plant, at one plant. As you can see, there is such a balance of forces: 1,400 party members - and 2,000 former members at the plant. Here, all these outrages that you allowed - all this is water for the mill of our enemies. Do not console yourself with the fact that some 12 thousand, maybe of the old cadres, and that the Trotskyists are using the last

cadres in order to do dirty tricks, whom we will soon shoot, do not console yourself. The soulless, inhuman policy towards the rank-and-file members of the Party, the lack of any interest on the part of many of our leaders in the fate of individual Party members, this readiness to kick out thousands of people who turned out to be wonderful people when we checked them out, first-class Stakhanovists, ready to make any sacrifices.

All this creates the situation in order to increase reserves for the enemies — for the Rights, for the Trotskyists, for the Zinovievites, and for anyone else. This soulless policy, comrades, must be done away with.

To demand from every member of the Party that he be a Marxist — after all, this is nonsense. We have the old, tried and tested formula for Party membership, given by Lenin, a formula that is justified by the entire history of our Party. A party member is one who recognizes the program, participates in one of the party's organizations, and pays membership fees. To accept a program does not mean necessarily to be a conscious Marxist who read Marx. It takes years, if not decades, to become a conscious Marxist. Where, then, can a worker become a class-conscious Marxist when he has no time? His position pushes him towards Marxism, he understands the program, more or less recognizes it, he is ready to fight the enemy for this program. That's all. But if he didn't understand Marxism, if he didn't study the foundations of Marxism ... (Voice from the spot. He didn't get it.), He didn't get it — this is idiocy. We allowed this idiocy at the party congress by including such comments in the party charter about who can be called active and who can be called passive. We cannot change the charter. We cannot at the plenum cancel the mistake that we made through an oversight, but we can in good conscience not apply this point, because it is against Marxism, against Leninism, against truth and against conscience.

If a person recognizes our program, well, accepts it as a basis, if he works in one of our party organizations, if he pays membership fees, since he can pay - this is a full party member. It is impossible to demand from every member of the Party that he assimilated Marxism. I do not know how many members of the Central Committee have adopted Marxism. (Cheerful animation in the hall).

How many secretaries of regional and regional committees have adopted Marxism? It takes a decade to master Marxism. How did Lenin assimilate Marxism? How did he read the works of Marx? He did not just read but worked. He compiled notes, once, twice, re-read the third time, directed the movement. And so, he finally achieved that he mastered Marxism. You cannot demand this from every member of the Party. This is stupid.

And one more oversight or our error, I don't know anymore. If a common man is guilty, our people have no other measure than exception, as at one time we had in criminal practice - either shoot or justify, as if there was no intermediate step. Let's say a party member could not attend the meeting once or twice. Well, you call him, warn him that you can't avoid party meetings. Well, if he still cannot be present, or if there was such a case that he could not pay membership fees, then you again warn him. Well, you can make an instruction, you can then put it on top of the view, you can then write down a reprimand to him and then you can give a term - here's a term for you - during this time you will somehow improve. Or if he does not know the most elementary things about our party ideology, there is some alphabet, which a party member should study, well, give him a term, help him study. If it does not help, transfer to candidates, if this does not help, transfer to sympathizers. No, we don't want that. Either you are a party member or out of the party. This is not good, comrades, it is not good.

These are the questions that I wanted to talk about today. (Prolonged applause.)

Andreev. We pass to making a decision on Comrade Stalin's report. The draft, basically approved by the Politburo, was distributed to everyone. Are there any amendments or additions to the project? (Voices from the localities. No. Khatayevich. One editorial amendment. It says: "The plenum obliges the secretaries of the regional committees to take on the duties of the secretary of the city committee." This is a little inconvenient, they must be elected. Stalin. It says that elections must be held. Take to take over the functions does not mean to become a secretary.) There is no need to accept your amendment, Comrade Khatayevich, this is clear and true.

Are there any more amendments and additions? No. I Voice. Anyone in favor of approving the submitted draft resolution, please raise your hands. Who is against? Who abstained? No. Adopted unanimously. The agenda of the Plenum is over.

Stalin. You see, comrades, here elections along the party line based on the resolution adopted on the report of Comrade Zhdanov will have to be held by May 20, no doubt. We in the Politburo discussed the issue, our opinion is that we will have to discuss in the same detailed manner the question of our soviets also being reorganized in a new way, meaning the restoration of democratic centralism in soviets. The election is bad there. Not only party organizations have forgotten about the election of party bodies, but Soviet organizations have forgotten about this and incorrectly apply the principle of election — the deputies disappear somewhere, there are no lists, there are no reports. Meanwhile, if we only restructure the party organizations - in the perspective of restructuring party organizations in a democratic way - we will help them take an active part and lead the elections to the country's supreme bodies. Moreover, you should rebuild our local councils in a general democratic way, all these RECs, executive committees, city councils, because how much democracy is there, as you think? (Voices from localities. Few. Molotov. Yes, yes). So, we have a common opinion that at the next plenum we raise the question of preparing the councils for the new conditions of elections in connection with the adoption of a new constitution ... (Voices from the localities. That's right!) ... with the invitation of the executive committee members and Soviet people in general. (Voice from the floor. About trade unions, too.) About trade unions and about the Komsomol, perhaps, we will have to discuss the issue there, not only about the trade unions, but also about the Komsomol, maybe we will have to combine these three issues. But the center will be the restructuring of the ranks of our workers in local councils, where there is very little democracy, where work has started. (Kaganovich. Right. Voices from the seats. Right.) If this is true,

Andreev. Are there any objections to this proposal of Comrade Stalin?

Voices from the field. No.

Stalin. The question of perestroika can be discussed only if the comrades in their party hold an elective beginning and share their experience with Soviet workers whom we will invite to the next plenum. Then there will be a democratic experience. (Kaganovich. You will be able to report back then.)

Andreev. Is Comrade Stalin's proposal accepted?

Voices from the field. Accepted

Andreev. I declare the meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee closed.

From the article by JV Stalin "The Year of the Great Turning Point. To the XII Anniversary of October ". November 3, 1929

Source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 1 May 1927 - November 1929. Moscow ROSSPEN 1999. Pp. 740-742.

Archive: True. 1929.7 November. No. 259; Stalin I.V. Op. T. 12. M., 1955. S. 118-135.

No. 265

The past year has been the year of a great turning point on all fronts of socialist construction. This turning point went and continues to go under the sign of the decisive offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements of town and country. A characteristic feature of this offensive is that it has already given us a number of decisive successes in the main areas of socialist restructuring (reconstruction) of our national economy.

It follows from this that the party was able to make good use of our retreat at the first stages of the New Economic Policy in order to organize a turning point and launch a successful offensive against the capitalist elements later, at its subsequent stages ...

III. In the field of agricultural construction

Finally, about the third achievement of the Party in the past year ... We are talking about a radical change in the development of our agriculture and backward individual farms to large-scale and advanced collective farming, to joint cultivation of the land, to machine-tractor stations, to artels, collective farms, relying on new technology, and finally, to gigantic state farms, armed with hundreds of tractors and combines.

The Party's achievement here lies in the fact that we have succeeded in turning the bulk of the peasantry in a number of regions away from the old, capitalist path of development, from which only a handful of wealthy capitalists benefit, and the vast majority of the peasants are forced to ruin and live in poverty, to a new, socialist a path of development that displaces the wealthy capitalists, and re-equips the

middle peasants and the poor in a new way, equips them with new tools, equips tractors and agricultural machines, in order to enable them to get out of poverty and kulak bondage on the broad path of comradesly, collective cultivation of the land.

The achievement of the party is that we have managed to organize this radical change in the depths of the peasantry itself and lead the broad masses of the poor and middle peasants, despite incredible difficulties, despite the desperate opposition of all and every dark forces, from the kulaks and priests to the philistines and the right opportunists ...

The assertions of the Right opportunists (Bukharin's group) about the following collapsed and scattered into dust:

- a) the peasants will not go to the collective farm,
- b) the accelerated rate of development of collective farms can only cause massive discontent and a split between the peasantry and the working class,
- c) the "main road" of socialist development in the countryside is not collective farms, but cooperatives,
- d) the development of collective farms and the attack on the capitalist elements of the countryside can leave the country without bread.

All this collapsed and scattered into dust, like old bourgeois-liberal rubbish.

First, the peasants went to collective farms, went to whole villages, volosts, districts.

Secondly, the mass collective-farm movement does not weaken, but strengthens the bond, giving it a new production base. Now even the blind can see that if there is any serious discontent among the bulk of the peasantry, it does not concern the collective farm policy of the Soviet government, but the fact that the Soviet government cannot keep up with the growth of the collective farm movement in supplying the peasants with machines and tractors.

Third, the controversy over the "pillar road" of the socialist development of the countryside is a scholastic controversy, worthy of young petty-bourgeois liberals like Eichenwald and Slepko. It is clear that as long as there was no mass collective farm movement, the lower forms of cooperation, supply and marketing cooperation, were the "high road", and when the highest form of cooperation, its collective farm form, appeared on the scene, the latter became the "high road" of development ...

Fourthly, now even the blind can see that without an attack on the capitalist elements in the countryside and without the development of the collective-farm and state-farm movement, we would not have now had decisive successes in the grain procurements gained in the current year, nor those tens of millions of poods of inviolable grain reserves that have already accumulated in the hands of the state.

Moreover, it can be said with confidence that thanks to the growth of the collective-farm and state-farm movement, we are finally emerging or have already emerged from the grain crisis. And if the development of collective and state farms proceeds at an accelerated pace, then there is no reason to doubt that in just three years our country will become one of the most lucrative countries, if not the most lucrative country in the world.

What is new in the present collective-farm movement? What is new and decisive in the current collective-farm movement is that peasants go to collective farms not in separate groups, as was the case before, but in whole villages, volosts, districts, even districts.

What does it mean? This means that the middle peasant went to the collective farms. This is the basis of that radical change in the development of agriculture, which constitutes the most important achievement of Soviet power over the past year ...

Stalin

Source;

Transcripts from Soviet Archives, Svitlana M, Erdogan A

Stalin to the Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR M.N.

A source: Formation of the defense-industrial complex of the USSR (1927-1932). M. 2008, p. 662.

Archive: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.D. 447.L. 4-7. Autograph.

Letter from the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I.V. Stalin to the Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR M.N. Tukhachevsky on the revision of critical comments on the latter's proposals on the main directions of reconstruction of the armed forces. *

May 7, 1932

The attached letter addressed to Comrade Voroshilov was written by me in March 1930 ² * It means 2 documents: a) your "note" on the deployment of our army, bringing the number of divisions to 246 or 248 (I don't remember exactly) ³ *; b) the "considerations" of our headquarters with the conclusion that your "note" requires, in fact, bringing the number of the army to 11 million souls, that this "note" in view of this is unreal, fantastic, beyond the strength of our country *.

In my letter addressed to Comrade Voroshilov, as you know, I joined mainly the conclusions of our headquarters and spoke sharply negatively about your "note", recognizing it as the fruit of "clerical maximalism", the result of a "game of numbers", etc. So, there was a case two years ago. Now, two years later, when some unclear questions have become clearer for me, I must admit that my assessment was too harsh, and the conclusions of my letter are not entirely correct.

First, the closest acquaintance with the case showed that the figure "11 million souls" does not follow from your "note", because what your "note" may require and what it really requires is an army of 8 million. Of course, the 8 million army is also unrealistic, unnecessary and unbearable for our country, at least in the next 3-4 years (not to mention the first five-year plan). But 8 million is still not 11 million.

Secondly, there is no doubt that the changed character of armies in recent years, the growth of military transport technology and the development of aviation, the emergence of mechanized units and the corresponding reorganization of the army create a completely new situation that deprives the old disputes about a large number of divisions of their decisive importance. There is no need to prove that not the number of divisions, but above all their quality, their saturation with equipment will henceforth play a decisive role. I think you will agree with me that an army of 6 million, well-equipped with equipment and newly organized, will be quite enough to defend the independence of our country on all fronts without exception. And we are more or less capable of such an army. It seems to me that my letter addressed to t. Voroshilov would not have been so harsh in tone and it would have been free from some wrong conclusions about you if I had then transferred the dispute to this new base. But I didn't, since obviously the problem was not clear enough for me yet.

Do not scold me for undertaking to correct the shortcomings of my letter with some delay.

With communist greetings,

I. Stalin

Notes :

1 * A copy has been sent to K. E. Voroshilov.

2 * Not published. See: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.D. 447.L. 8.

3 * See doc. on January 11, 1930 - Report of the commander of the Leningrad Military District Tukhachevsky People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR Voroshilov about the main directions of reconstruction of the armed forces.

4 * See doc. March 5, 1930 - From the conclusion of the Headquarters of the Red Army on the report of the Commander of the Leningrad Military District MN Tukhachevsky on the main directions of the reconstruction of the Red Army .

**Stalin, on the arrests of the leadership of the Nakhichevan ASSR.
September 26, 1937**

Cipher telegram I.V. Stalin in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Azerbaijan on the arrests of the leadership of the Nakhichevan ASSR. September 26, 1937

A source:

Lubyanka. Stalin and the Main Department of State Security of the NKVD. Stalin's archive. Documents of the supreme bodies of party and state power. 1937-1938. - M.: MFD, 2004, p. 380.

Archive:

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.D. 57.L. 99. Original. Typescript.

September 26, 1937

No. 1566 / sh

Baku. Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan
BAGIROV

The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) authorizes the arrest of Usein Rakhmanov and Hasan Rakhmanov. We ask you to thoroughly cleanse the Nakhichevan republic, polluted by Hasan Rakhmanov, from all evil spirits. **Keep in mind that Nakhrespublika is the most dangerous point in the entire Transcaucasia.** A real Bolshevik proven leadership must be installed there. Yusuf Kasimov will be directed to you.

Stalin - to members of the Politburo on June 5, 1932

A source: Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 Moscow: (ROSSPEN), 2001 p. 139

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11.D. 77.L. 12, 12 rev. Autograph.

Moscow. Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party.

Poskrebyshev.

For PB members .

I am protesting against the publication in Pravda of Yaroslavsky's article about the workers' unrest in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and the change in the party leadership there. The article is clearly incorrect and politically harmful from the factual point of view . With his article, Yaroslavsky gave foreign correspondents the opportunity to write about the "new Kronstadt", allegedly "dictating the latest decisions of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on collective farm trade." Who gave Yaroslavsky the right to come up with such an article, which is harmful to the party and is clearly beneficial to our enemies? Why does the editorial board of Pravda allow such irresponsible statements? Why is Yaroslavsky given the uncontrolled right to use weapons that he does not own and which he often abuses to the detriment of the party? Couldn't this end?

Stalin.

6

18 hours

5 / VI.32 y. 2

Stalin, about facilitating the plan of state farms at the expense of the collective farm-peasant sector.

Cipher telegram I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov to the first secretary of the Central Volga regional committee of the CPSU (b) M.M. Khatayevich about facilitating the plan of state farms at the expense of the collective farm-peasant sector. November 28, 1931

A source:
Famine in the USSR. 1929-1934: In 3 volumes. Vol. 1: 1929 - July 1932: Book. 1. M.: MFD, 2011. (Russia. XX century. Documents). P. 609
Archive:
AP RF. F. 3. Op. 40. D. 79. L. 150. Certified copy.

November 28, 1931

Top secret

We accept your proposal to facilitate the plan of state farms at the expense of the collective-farm and peasant sector, but only on condition that the state does not lose a single pound of grain from this operation. We warn you that if the plan is not fulfilled one hundred percent, the Central Committee will be forced to take drastic measures.

Stalin Molotov

Stalin N.I. Yezhov about the Socialist-Revolutionaries. January 17, 1938

A source: Lubyanka. Stalin and the Main Department of State Security of the NKVD. Stalin's archive. Documents of the supreme bodies of party and state power. 1937-1938. - M.: MFD, 2004, p. 463. Archive: AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 330. L. 18. Original. Typescript.

January 17, 1938

T. Yezhov.

1. The line of the SRs (left and right together) is not unwound. Fishman, Paskutsky lead the NKVD by the nose. If Belov himself had not begun to unwind along the line of the SRs, the NKVD would have sat in the dark. Belov said something, but not everything. Paskutsky, Uritsky and Fishman should supplement Belov. It must be borne in mind that we have a lot of Socialist-Revolutionaries in our army and outside the army. Does the NKVD have a record of the SRs ("former") in the army? I would like to receive it as soon as possible. The NKVD has an account of the "former." Social Revolutionaries outside the army (in civilian institutions)? I would also like to receive it in 2-3 weeks.

2. What has been done to identify the SRs on the basis of the well-known testimony of Ryskulov ?

3. What has been done to identify and arrest all Iranians in Baku and Azerbaijan?

4. I inform you that at one time the SRs were very strong in Saratov, in Tambov, in the Ukraine, in the army (command staff), in Tashkent and in general in Central Asia, at the Baku power plants , where they still sit and harm the oil industry ...

We need to act quicker and better.

5. A very important task: to strengthen the DCK regions with new security forces from outside. This is much more important than strengthening the regions of Kazakhstan, which can be done next.

Source; Transcripts from the Soviet Archives, Svitlana M, Erdogan A

Stalin, on the approval of the directive "On Anti-Soviet elements" of July 2, 1937.

A source:
"Through the corpses of the enemy for the good of the people." "Kulak operation" in the Ukrainian SSR 1937-1941. T. 1: 1937. M.: (ROSSPEN): Foundation "Presidential Center of Boris N. Yeltsin": German Historical Institute in Moscow, 2010. Pp. 60-61
Archive:

Execution by order, or how the Bolsheviks did it // Trud. 1992 June 4. P. 1. Verified with a copy of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) // RGASPI. F. 17. On. 162.D.21.L. 89.

No. P 51/94.

July 3, 1937

Top secret

ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKOV) CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Comrade Yezhov

Secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, Central Committee of national communist parties

Extract from the minutes No. 51 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

Decision of 2.VII.37

94. - About Anti-Soviet elements.

It has been noticed that most of the former kulaks and criminals, who were expelled at one time from different regions to the northern and Siberian regions, and then, after the expiration of the expulsion period, who returned to their regions 1, are the main instigators of all kinds of anti-Soviet and sabotage crimes, both in collective farms and state farms, and in transport and in some industries.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) invites all the secretaries of regional and regional organizations and all regional, regional and republican representatives of the NKVD to register all the kulaks and criminals who have returned to their homeland so that the most hostile of them are immediately arrested and shot in the administrative procedure. cases through troikas, and the rest of the less active, but still hostile elements would be rewritten and sent to the regions at the direction of the NKVD.

The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) proposes to submit to the Central Committee the composition of the troikas, as well as the number of those to be shot, as well as the number of those to be expelled, within five days.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

I. Stalin

1 We are talking about "special settlers" - peasants, who, during collectivization, were classified as kulaks, dispossessed and deported to so-called kulak settlements. See: *Zemskov V.N. Special Settlers* (According to the documents of the NKVD - Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR) // Sociological Research. 1990. No. 11. S. 3-17.

Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "Question of the USSR Prosecutor's Office". November 15, 1938

A source:

Lubyanka. Stalin and the Main Department of State Security of the NKVD. Stalin's archive. Documents of the supreme bodies of party and state power. 1937-1938. - M.: MFD, 2004, p. 606.

Archive:

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 38. L. 145-146. Copy. Typescript.

November 15, 1938

110 - Question of the USSR Prosecutor's Office. [1]

To approve the next draft directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of the Union and Autonomous Republics, the heads of the regional and regional directorates of the NKVD, the prosecutors of the territories, regions, autonomous and union republics, the prosecutors of the military districts, railway and water transport, the chairmen of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the supreme courts of the union and autonomous republics, the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, the chairmen of the tribunals of the military districts.

Secretaries of the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, regional committees, regional committees, (see appendix).

ATTACHMENT

to p. 110 ave. PB No. 65

The strictest order is:

1. To suspend, from November 16 this year, pending order, the consideration of all cases in troikas, in military tribunals and in the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, directed to their

consideration in the manner of special orders or in another, simplified procedure.

2. To oblige the prosecutors of military districts, territories, regions, autonomous and union republics to monitor accurate and immediate execution. Report to the NKVD of the USSR and the Prosecutor of the USSR about the execution.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. MOLOTOV

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. STALIN

November 15, 1938

[1] Protocol No. 65a.

Stalin to the leaders of the party organs about the unfavorable situation in the NKVD. November 25, 1938

A source: Lubyanka. Stalin and the Main Department of State Security of the NKVD. Stalin's archive. Documents of the supreme bodies of party and state power. 1937-1938. - M.: MFD, 2004, pp. 611-612.

Archive: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.D. 58. L. 61-61 rev. Script. Typescript.

November 25, 1938

No. 1316

* TO THE FIRST SECRETARIES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL COMPANIES,

KRAYKOMOV AND OBKOMOV * [1]

In mid-November of this year, the Central Committee received a statement from the Ivanovo region from Comrade Zhuravlev (head of the NKVD) about the trouble in the NKVD apparatus, about errors in the work of the NKVD, about inattentive attitude to signals from the field, warnings about the betrayal of Lytvyn, Kamensky, Radzivilovsky, Tsesarsky, Shapiro and other responsible [2] workers of the NKVD, that the People's Commissar comrade Yezhov does not respond to these warnings, etc.

At the same time, the Central Committee received information that after the defeat of Yagoda's gang, another gang of traitors appeared in the organs of the NKVD of the USSR, like Nikolayev, Zhukovsky, Lyushkov, Uspensky, Passov, Fedorov, who deliberately confuse investigative cases, shield notorious enemies of the people, and these people are not meet sufficient opposition from Comrade Yezhov.

Having raised the issue of the state of affairs in the NKVD for discussion, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks demanded an explanation from Comrade Yezhov. Comrade Yezhov filed an application where he admitted the above errors, admitted, in addition, that he was responsible for not taking measures against the flight of Lyushkov (NKVD of the Far East), the flight of Uspensky (People's Commissar of the NKVD of Ukraine),

admitted that he clearly failed with his tasks in the NKVD and asked to release him from the duties of the People's Commissar of the NKVD, to keep his posts in the NKVD and in the line of work in the organs of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) granted Comrade Yezhov's request, dismissed him from work in the NKVD and including Comrade Yezhov on the unanimous proposal of members of the Central Committee approved the current first deputy of the NKVD, Comrade. Beria L.P as People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR..

You will receive the text of Comrade Yezhov's statement by mail.

* Immediately familiarize the NKVD People's Commissars and the heads of the NKVD with this message. *

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) STALIN

[1] * - * This is what Stalin wrote in pencil.

[2] So in the source.

Source; Transcripts from the Soviet Archives, Svitlana M, Erdogan A

Stalin and VM Molotov Directive "On the fight against ticks." August 31, 1937

Archive source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession of kulaks Documents and materials Volume 5 1937 -1939 Book 1. 1937 Moscow ROSSPEN 2004. Pp. 300-302.

Archive: APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 388. L. 22-23. Script. Typewritten text edited by J.V. Stalin.

No. 179

Secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, Central Committee of the National Communist Party, chairmen of regional (regional executive committees, SNK of the republic Commissioner of Komzagh, authorized Zagotzerno Secretaries of district committees and chairmen of district executive committees, district commissioner Komzaga and Zagotzerno and heads of warehouses and mills.

As a result of sabotage in the bodies of the Procurement Committee, grain elevators, warehouses and mills were infected with a tick. In order to achieve mass disinfection of warehouses and grain stored in them with a tick, pests, the most elementary requirements for disinsection, cleaning and preparation of grain warehouses for the arrival of grain of a new harvest, mixed grain infected with a tick with spring grain, wet grain with dry grain, has been violated by not taking measures to clean and dry of grain -diluted dirt and unsanitary conditions in elevators, warehouses and mills.

The systematic care of grain, the daily care of cleanliness and sanitation in warehouses and mills, which are the most important conditions for preventing the spread of mites and their elimination, have been replaced by pests with the task of chemical cleaning of grain, which in fact should be used as a means of fighting mites in extreme cases as an additional measure. As a result, despite the presence in the Procurement Committee system of a special organization for the fight against barn pests and the expense of huge sums, tick infestation covered almost the entire network of warehouses, elevators and mills.

In order to eliminate the consequences of sabotage and to protect against tick infestation of the crop of the current year, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) oblige the regional and district commissioners of Komzag and the authorized and heads of the offices of Zagotzerno 1 *:

1. Immediately check the sanitary condition of all elevators, warehouses and mills of the Procurement Committee without exception, immediately take measures to bring them into proper sanitary condition, clean the warehouse premises, inventory and all equipment of elevators, mills and warehouses from dirt, dust and debris, avoiding further accumulation of dust, dirt and debris, especially under the floors of warehouses; when carrying out chemical cleaning, ensure the penetration of gas under the floors in order to destroy all foci of infection, perform regular whitewashing of the walls of warehouses, systematically ventilate warehouses in dry weather.

2. To oblige the Procurement Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the State Sanitary Inspectorate to establish systematic control over the sanitary condition of granaries and mills, bringing to criminal responsibility violators of sanitary rules, as pests and enemies of the people.

3. Establish that all incoming mite-infected grain must necessarily be stored in separate rooms, immediately after acceptance undergo mechanical cleaning on winnowing machines, separators and threshers, as well as drying by shoveling and passing through an elevator transport belt, avoiding in any case mite development and transition of grain infestation to the next degree.

4. Avoid mixing the wet grain arriving at the points with dry grain, stacking wet grain separately from dry, and take measures to dry the wet grain as soon as possible.

5. To oblige the managers of warehouses and directors of elevators and mills, under their personal responsibility, to establish a daily check of the state of wet, damp, infected with mites, weevils and so on 2 * grain, depending on the results of the check, to take all measures to prevent

warming of improving the quality of grain and bringing it into a conditioned state.

6) Put into operation at full capacity with operation around the clock grain dryers in mills, elevators and warehouses for drying raw and wet grain, primarily infected with mites.

7) All grain infected with mites of the second and third degrees should be immediately subjected to mechanical and chemical cleaning or fire drying and consumed for consumption during September in order to eliminate all grain residues in warehouses with second- and third-degree infections by October 1 of this year. degree.

8) Spend grain infected with a mite of the first degree first of all against healthy grain.

9) Warn all managers of procurement centers, grain warehouses, directors of elevators and mills that the unsanitary condition of warehouses, elevators and mills is for violation of the rules for caring for grain, violation or circumvention of the rules for dealing with ticks and allowing the passage of tick infestation from the first degree to subsequent , as well as for the admission of contamination of grain or flour with metal and other impurities - they will be prosecuted as pests and enemies of the people.

10) To oblige the leaders of the republican regional and district party and Soviet organizations to have systematic and strict monitoring of the exact implementation of this resolution and bringing to justice those responsible for its violation.

11) To oblige the republican and regional commissioners of Komzag to send every five days to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the measures taken to implement this resolution and the course of eliminating the consequences of sabotage in the storage of grain.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) J.V. Stalin.

Send this telegram to all secretaries of district committees and chairmen of district executive committees, district commissioners of Komzaga and Zagotzerno and heads of warehouses, mills and elevators.

1 * Hereinafter in the document, italicized inscribed by the hand of I.V. Stalin. Crossed out: "... they are offered to local party and Soviet organizations and bodies of the Committee of Procurements."

2 * Crossed out: "... and other types of substandard grain."

Directive of J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov on sabotage and demonstration processes in the field of animal husbandry. October 2, 1937

Archive source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession of kulaks Documents and materials Volume 5 1937 -1939 Book 1. 1937 Moscow ROSSPEN 2004. Pp. 486.

Archive: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 57. Typewritten text edited by I.V. Stalin. Signatures are autographs.

No. 340

Directive of J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov on sabotage and demonstration processes in the field of animal husbandry 1 * .

All secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, national communist parties, all chairmen of councils of people's commissars, regional executive committees, all prosecutors of republics, territories and regions 2 *

On the basis of the investigative materials of the NKVD of the USSR, it was established that in the territories and regions 3 * the subversive work of the enemies of the people took an especially malicious form of sabotage and sabotage in the development of animal husbandry. This subversive work expressed itself:

a) In carrying out acts of bacteriological sabotage by infecting cattle, horses, sheep and pigs with plague, foot and mouth disease, anthrax, brucellosis, anemia and other epidemic diseases;

b) in disruption of the supply of drugs and disinfectants to areas affected by epizootics and sabotage in the production of serum at biofactories;

c) in the wrecking reduction of 4 * sown areas of forage crops in order to narrow the forage base.

A significant number of veterinarians, livestock specialists, laboratory assistants of biofactories were arrested for sabotage in the field of animal husbandry, who, in fact, were the organizers of the spread of

infectious diseases leading to mass death of livestock. Over the past year, as a result of sabotage in the field of animal husbandry, collective farmers have lost hundreds of thousands of cattle and horses, not to mention the death of small livestock.

In order to protect the collective and state farms from the wrecking activities of the enemies of the people, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decided to defeat and destroy the personnel of pests in the field of animal husbandry.

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) oblige all secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, Central Committees of national communist parties, all chairmen of councils of people's commissars of republics and chairmen of executive committees of regions and territories to organize immediately demonstration trials of pests in animal husbandry, meaning both exposed veterinarians, livestock technicians, laboratory technicians of biofactories and workers of local land and state farm bodies. To this end, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) propose to organize in each republic, territory and region from 3 to 6 open demonstration trials with the involvement of the peasant masses and broad coverage of the process in the press.

Convicted of sabotage to be sentenced to death, to publish the execution of sentences in the local press.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. Stalin.

1 * On the document there is a note: "It went to the places in cipher on October 2, 1937, see the folder of the Politburo decisions" and the signatures during the voting of Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Voroshilov and Chubar. However, as a resolution, the directive was not

included in the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

2 * Here and below, the words highlighted in the text are inscribed by Stalin.

3 * Strikethrough: "most edges and areas".

4 * Crossed out: "seed planning".

Note by G.G. Karpov on the reception by JV Stalin of the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church. September 1943

Archive source: Russian patriarchs of the twentieth century. The fate of the Fatherland and the Church on the pages of archival documents. Moscow. RAGS publishing house. 1999. p. 283-291

Archive: GA RF. F. 6991. Op. 1.D. 1.L. 1 - 10. Original.

September 1943

On September 4, 1943, I was summoned to Comrade Stalin, where I was asked the following questions:

- a) what is Metropolitan Sergius (age, physical condition, his authority in the church, his attitude towards the authorities),
- b) a brief description of Metropolitans Alexy and Nicholas,
- c) when and how Tikhon was elected to the patriarch,
- d) what kind of ties does the Russian Orthodox Church have with abroad,
- e) who are the Patriarchs of Ecumenical, Jerusalem and others,
- f) what do I know about the leadership of the Orthodox Churches in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania,
- g) in what material conditions are Metropolitans Sergius, Alexy and Nicholas now,
- h) the number of parishes of the Orthodox Church in the USSR and the number of the episcopate.

After I had answered the above questions, I was asked three personal questions:

- a) am I Russian,
- b) from what year in the party,
- c) what kind of education do I have and why am I familiar with church issues.

After that, Comrade Stalin said:

- It is necessary to create a special body that would liaise with the leadership of the church. What suggestions do you have?

Having made a reservation that I was not quite ready for this issue, I made a proposal to organize a department for religious affairs under the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and proceeded from the fact that there was a permanent Commission on religious affairs under the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

Comrade Stalin, correcting me, said that it was not necessary to organize a commission or department for religious affairs under the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, that we were talking about organizing a special body under the Government of the Union and that it could be about forming either a committee or a council. Asked my opinion.

When I said that I was at a loss to answer this question, Comrade Stalin, after a little thought, said:

- 1) it is necessary to organize under the Government of the Union, that is, under the Council of People's Commissars, a Council, which we will call the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church;
- 2) the Council will be entrusted with the implementation of relations between the Government of the Union and the Patriarch;
- 3) The Council does not make independent decisions, reports and receives instructions from the Government.

After that, Comrade Stalin exchanged views with Comrades. Malenkov, Beria on the question whether he should receive Metropolitans Sergius, Alexy, Nicholas, and also asked me how I look at the fact that the Government will accept them.

All three said they considered this a positive fact.

After that, right there, at Comrade Stalin's dacha, I received an order to call Metropolitan Sergius and convey the following on behalf of the Government: "The representative of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union is speaking with you. The Government has a

desire to receive you, as well as Metropolitans Alexy and Nicholas, to listen to your needs and to any questions you have. The government can receive you either today, in an hour and a half, or if this time does not suit you, then the reception can be organized tomorrow (Sunday) or any day of the following week. "

Immediately, in the presence of Comrade Stalin, phoned Sergius and introduced myself as a representative of the Council of People's Commissars, I conveyed the above and asked to exchange views with Metropolitans Alexy and Nicholas, if they are at this time with Metropolitan Sergius.

After that I reported to Comrade Stalin that Metropolitans Sergius, Alexy and Nikolai thanked the Government for such attention and would like to be received today.

Two hours later, Metropolitans Sergius, Alexy and Nikolai arrived in the Kremlin, where they were received by Comrade Stalin in the office of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Comrade Molotov and myself were present at the reception.

Comrade Stalin's conversation with the metropolitans lasted 1 hour and 55 minutes.

Comrade Stalin said that the Union Government knew about their patriotic work in the churches from the first day of the war, that the Government had received a lot of letters from the front and from the rear, approving the position taken by the church in relation to the state.

Comrade Stalin, briefly noting the positive significance of the patriotic activity of the church during the war, asked Metropolitans Sergius, Alexy and Nicholas to speak out about the issues that the patriarchate had and they personally had, but unresolved issues.

Metropolitan Sergius told Comrade Stalin that the most important and most urgent issue is the question of the central leadership of the church, since for almost 18 years [he] has been the patriarchal locum tenens and personally thinks that it is unlikely that there are such lasting harm [difficulties], that there has been no Synod in the Soviet Union since 1935, and therefore he considers it desirable that the Government

would permit the assembly of a bishops' council, which will elect a patriarch, and also form a body consisting of 5-6 bishops.

Metropolitans Alexy and Nicholas also spoke in favor of the formation of the Synod and substantiated this proposal for education as the most desirable and acceptable form, saying also that they consider the election of the patriarch at the Bishops' Council quite canonical, since in fact the church has been led permanently for 18 years by the patriarchal locum tenens Metropolitan Sergius.

Having approved the proposals of Metropolitan Sergius, Comrade Stalin asked:

- a) what will the patriarch be called,
- b) when the Council of Bishops can be assembled,
- c) is there any need for assistance from the Government for the successful holding of the Council (is there a room, is transport needed, is money needed, etc.)

Sergius replied that they had previously discussed these issues among themselves and they would have considered it desirable and correct if the Government allowed the patriarch to accept the title of Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, although Patriarch Tikhon, elected in 1917, under the Provisional Government, was called "patriarch Moscow and All Russia".

Comrade Stalin agreed, saying that this was correct.

To the second question, Metropolitan Sergius replied that the Bishops' Council could be convened in a month, and then Comrade Stalin, smiling, said: "Is it possible to show the Bolshevik tempo?" Turning to me, asked my opinion, I said that if we helped Metropolitan Sergius with the appropriate transport for the fastest delivery of the episcopate to Moscow (by air), then the Cathedral could be assembled in 3 - 4 days.

After a short exchange of views, it was agreed that the Bishops' Council would meet in Moscow on September 8.

To the third question, Metropolitan Sergius replied that they did not ask for any subsidies from the state to hold the Council.

Metropolitan Sergius raised the second question, and Metropolitan Alexy developed the question of training clergy, and both asked Comrade Stalin to be allowed to organize theological courses in some dioceses.

Comrade Stalin, while agreeing with this, at the same time asked why they were raising the question of theological courses, while the Government could permit the organization of a theological academy and the opening of theological seminaries in all dioceses, where necessary.

Metropolitan Sergius, and then even more Metropolitan Alexy, said that they still had very little strength to open a theological academy and needed appropriate training, and with regard to seminaries, they considered it unsuitable in terms of time and past experience to admit persons at least 18 years of age. that until a person has developed a certain worldview, it is very dangerous to train them as shepherds, since there is a large dropout rate, and, perhaps, in the future, when the church has the appropriate experience of working with theological courses, this question will arise, but even then the organizational and programmatic side of the seminaries and academies must be drastically modified.

Comrade Stalin said: "Well, as you wish, this is your business, and if you want theological courses, start with them, but the Government will have no objection to the opening of seminaries and academies."

As a third question, Sergius raised the issue of organizing the publication of the journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, which would be published once a month and which would cover both the chronicle of the church and articles and speeches of a theological and patriotic nature.

Comrade Stalin replied: "The magazine can and should be published."

Then Metropolitan Sergius raised the issue of opening churches in a number of dioceses, saying that almost all diocesan bishops put

[questions] to him about this, that there are few churches and that churches have not been opened for many years.

At the same time, Metropolitan Sergius said that he considered it necessary to grant the right to the diocesan bishop to enter into negotiations with the civil authorities on the issue of opening churches.

Metropolitans Alexy and Nicholas supported Sergius, noting the uneven distribution of churches in the Soviet Union and expressing a desire, first of all, to open churches in regions and territories where there are no churches at all or where there are few of them.

Comrade Stalin replied that there would be no obstacles on the part of the Government to this issue.

Then Metropolitan Alexy raised the question before Comrade Stalin about the release of some bishops who were in exile, in camps, in prisons, etc.

Comrade Stalin told them: "Present such a list, we will consider it."

Sergius immediately raised the issue of granting the right of free residence and movement within the Union and the right to perform church services to former clergymen who had served their term of imprisonment in court, that is, the question was raised about lifting the prohibitions, or rather, restrictions related to the passport regime.

Comrade Stalin invited me to study this issue.

Metropolitan Alexy, having asked for permission from Comrade Stalin, dwelled on issues related to the church treasury, namely:

a) Metropolitan Alexy said that he considered it necessary to grant the dioceses the right to deduct some sums from the treasuries of churches and from the treasuries of dioceses to the treasury of the central church apparatus for its maintenance (Patriarchate, Synod), and in this regard, Metropolitan Alexy gave an example that the inspector according to the administrative supervision of the Lensovet, Tatarintseva did not allow such deductions to be made;

b) that in connection with the same issue, he, as well as Metropolitans Sergius and Nicholas, consider it necessary that the Statute on Church Administration be amended, namely that the clergy were given the right to be members of the executive body of the Church.

Comrade Stalin said that there was no objection to this.

Metropolitan Nicholas in the conversation raised the issue of candle factories, stating that at this time church candles are made by artisans, the selling price of candles in churches is very high and that he, Metropolitan Nikolay, considers it best to grant the right to have candle factories in dioceses.

Comrade Stalin said that the church can count on the comprehensive support of the Government in all matters related to its organizational strengthening and development within the USSR, and that, as he spoke about the organization of theological educational institutions, without objecting to the opening of seminaries in dioceses, there can be no obstacles. and for the opening of candle factories and other industries at diocesan administrations.

Then, addressing me, Comrade Stalin said: "We must ensure the right of the bishop to dispose of church funds. There is no need to make obstacles to the organization of seminaries, candle factories, etc."

Then Comrade Stalin, addressing the three metropolitans, said: "If it is necessary now or if it is needed in the future, the state can release the corresponding subsidies to the church center."

After that, Comrade Stalin, addressing Metropolitans Sergius, Alexy and Nicholas, said to them: "Comrade Karpov reported to me that you live very badly: a cramped apartment, you buy food on the market, you have no transport. know what needs you have and what you would like to receive from the Government. "

In response to Comrade Stalin's question, Metropolitan Sergius said that as premises for the patriarchate and for the patriarch, he would ask to accept the proposals made by Metropolitan Alexy to place the former abbot corps in the Novodevichy monastery at the disposal of the patriarchy, and as for the provision of food, these products are buy on

the market, but in terms of transport, I would ask for help, if possible, by allocating a car.

Comrade Stalin said to Metropolitan Sergius: "Comrade Karpov looked at the premises in the Novodevichy Convent: they are completely uncomfortable, require major repairs, and it takes a lot of time to occupy them. It's damp and cold there. The government can provide you tomorrow with quite comfortable and prepared premises, providing you with a 3-storey mansion in Chisty Pereulok, which was previously occupied by the former German ambassador Schulenburg. But this building is Soviet, not German, so you can live in it quite calmly. We provide you with this mansion with all the property, furniture, which is in this mansion, and in order to have a better idea of this building, we will now show you its plan".

A few minutes later, the plan of the mansion on Chisty Pereulok, 5, presented to Comrade Stalin by Comrade Poskrebyshv, with its courtyards and garden, was shown to the metropolitans for acquaintance, and it was agreed that on the next day, September 4, 1, Comrade Karpov would provide an opportunity for the metropolitans personally inspect the above premises.

Once again touching upon the issue of food supply, Comrade Stalin told the metropolitans: "It is inconvenient and expensive for you to buy food on the market, and now the collective farmer throws out little food on the market. Therefore, the state can provide you with food at state prices. In addition, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow we will provide at your disposal 2 - 3 cars with fuel".

Comrade Stalin asked Metropolitan Sergius and other metropolitans if they had any more questions for him, if the church had any other needs, and about this, Comrade Stalin asked several times.

All three said that they no longer have any special requests, but sometimes on the ground there is a re-taxation of the clergy with income tax, to which Comrade Stalin drew attention and suggested that I take appropriate verification and correction measures in each case.

After that, Comrade Stalin said to the metropolitans: "Well, if you have no more questions for the Government, then perhaps they will come later. The government plans to form a special state apparatus, which will be called the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, and it is proposed to appoint the chairman of the Council Comrade Karpova. How do you look at this? "

All three declared that they very favorably accept the appointment of Comrade Karpov to this post.

Comrade Stalin said that the Council would represent a place of communication between the government and the church, and its chairman should [report] to the government about the life of the church and the questions it might have.

Then, addressing me, Comrade Stalin said: "Pick for yourself 2 - 3 assistants who will be members of your Council, form an apparatus, but just remember: firstly, that you are not the chief prosecutor; secondly, your activities are more emphasize the independence of the church. "

After that, Comrade Stalin, addressing Comrade Molotov, said: "We must bring this to the attention of the population, just as later it will be necessary to inform the population about the election of the patriarch."

In this regard, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov immediately began to draw up a draft communiqué for radio and newspapers, in the preparation of which appropriate comments, amendments and additions were made both from the side of Comrade Stalin, and some from the side of Metropolitans Sergius and Alexy.

The text of the notification was adopted as follows:

"On September 4, this year, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Comrade JV Stalin, hosted a reception, during which a conversation took place with the patriarchal locum tenens Metropolitan Sergius, Metropolitan Alexy of Leningrad and the Exarch of Ukraine, Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev and Galich.

During the conversation, Metropolitan Sergius informed the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars that the ruling circles of the Orthodox Church intend to convene a Council of Bishops to elect the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and to form the Holy Synod under the Patriarch.

The head of the Government, Comrade JV Stalin, reacted with sympathy to these proposals and declared that there would be no obstacles on the part of the Government.

The conversation was attended by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Comrade VM Molotov. "

This notice was published in the Izvestia newspaper on September 5, 1943.

The communiqué was handed over to Comrade Poskrebyshev for transmission on the same day on the radio and in TASS for publication in newspapers.

After that, Comrade Molotov turned to Sergius with the question: when is it better to receive a delegation of the Anglican Church wishing to come to Moscow, headed by the Archbishop of York?

Sergius replied that since the Council of Bishops will be assembled in 4 days, it means that the elections of the patriarch will be held, the Anglican delegation can be accepted at any time.

Comrade Molotov said that, in his opinion, it would be better to receive this delegation a month later.

At the end of this reception, Metropolitan Sergius delivered a brief speech of thanks to the Government and personally to Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Molotov asked Comrade Stalin: "Maybe we should call a photographer?"

Comrade Stalin said: "No, it is already late now, 2:00 am, so we will do it another time."

Comrade Stalin, having said goodbye to the metropolitans, accompanied them to the door of his office.

This reception was a historic event for the church and left great impressions on Metropolitans Sergius, Alexy and Nicholas, which were obvious to everyone who knew and saw Sergius and others in those days.

Source; Polit Buro and The Church, Svitlana M, Erdogan A

Stalin on arrested counter revolutionaries

From the protocol No. 64 of the decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) for October 10-26, 1938 on the transfer of pending investigative cases against those arrested by "counter-revolutionary national contingents" under the authority of special troikas. September 15, 1938

A source:

The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 5. 1937-1939. Book 2. 1938 - 1939. Moscow ROSSPEN 2006. Pp. 251

Archive:

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 212. L. 195-195 ob. Script. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 24. L. 2. Original. Subscription copy

No. 111

22. A question of the NKVD.

1. Accept the proposal of the NKVD to transfer the remaining pending investigative cases against those arrested by the counter-revolutionary national contingents, in accordance with orders of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00485, 00439 and 00593 - 1937 and No. 302 and 826 - 1938, for consideration of special triplets on the ground ...

2. Special troikas are formed in the composition of: the first secretary of the regional committee, the regional committee of the CPSU (b) or the Central Committee of the national communist parties, the head of the corresponding department of the NKVD and the prosecutor of the region, territory, republic.

In the Ukrainian and Kazakh SSR and in the Far Eastern Territory, special troikas are created by region.

3. Special troikas consider cases in respect of persons arrested only before August 1, 1938, and finish work within 2 months.

4. Cases against all persons of the indicated national counter-revolutionary contingents arrested after August 1, 1938, should be sent for consideration to the appropriate judicial bodies according to the jurisdiction (military tribunals, line and regional courts, the military collegium of the Supreme Court), as well as to a special meeting at the NKVD THE USSR.

5. To grant the right to special troikas to pass sentences in accordance with the order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00485 of August 25, 1937 in the first and second categories, as well as to return cases for further investigation and to make decisions on the release of the accused from custody, if there are not sufficient materials for the conviction of the accused.

6. The decisions of special troikas in the first category shall be enforced immediately.

Secretary of the Central Committee I. Stalin

On the organization of measuring household plots. June 20, 1939

June 20, 1939

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 5. 1937-1939. Book 2. 1938 - 1939. Moscow ROSSPEN 2006. Pp. 436-437

Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3.D. 2125. L. 63-64. Certified copy.

No. 213

Circular of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the organization of measuring personal plots 1 *

To the chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the republics, regional and regional executive committees, secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, regional committees, regional committees

In view of the fact that some party and Soviet organizations incorrectly organize the measurement of household plots, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) recommend proceeding from the following:

1. All household plots that are in the personal use of collective farmers, including the lands of collective farmers located in the fields of collective farms and under buildings, as well as all lands of individual farmers and other non-members of collective farms, are subject to measurement.
2. Measurement on the spot is carried out by the commissions of the district executive committees, appointed by the district executive committees and district party committees for each village council, consisting of the chairman of the commission - a representative of the district, the chairman of the corresponding village council and the chairman of the collective farm. The chairman of the commission is selected from among the members of the district party committee, members of the district executive committee, land surveyors, agronomists of the district and MTS. To help itself, the commission

selects on the spot two measurers from among the most experienced collective farmers.

3. Instructions for the chairman and members of the commissions on measurement techniques are organized in the district prior to the start of their work. The appointed commission receives a certificate from the district executive committee, which norms for the household lands of collective farmers have been established for this collective farm. Measurement is carried out with steel tapes, tape measures, and in the absence of those with precisely measured two-meter marks. The organization of the commissions and their instructions should be carried out in 5-7 days so that, no later than July 1, work on the measurement of household lands would actually begin on the collective farms.

4. The results of the measurement of each personal plot by the commission are immediately entered into the act indicating the surname, first name, patronymic of the land user, the total area of the personal plot, including under the buildings, with an accuracy of [to] hundredths of a hectare, the length, width and separately size of the established surplus are indicated against the norm of the charter of the agricultural cartel. If the household plot of the farm is located in several places, the recording is made for each plot separately. The act on the collective farm as a whole and separately on the lands of individual farmers and those who are not members of collective farms is signed by all members of the commission and one copy is sent to the district executive committee, while the other remains on the collective farm.

5. The results of the measurement carried out by the regional executive committee commission are considered and approved by the regional executive committee presidium until August 15, 1939, after which the same commission, within the timeframe established by the regional executive committees, but no later than November 15, carries out a cut of the surplus of collective farmers' personal lands, land of individual farmers and other non-members of collective farms, in accordance with the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

dated May 27, and delimits household lands from public collective farm lands with signposts.

6. For inaccurate measurements of collective farms' household lands, land owned by individual farmers and other persons who are not on the collective farm, members of the commission should be subject to court as violators of the law.

The specified procedure for organizing the measurement of land should be immediately reported to the secretaries of the district party committees and the chairmen of the district executive committees.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. Stalin

*1 * Appendix to clause 52 of Protocol No. 4 of the decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) for June 15 - July 4, 1939.*

Stalin - to the members of the Politburo - August 5, 1934

Below is the transcript Stalin mentions on his Letter to Kaganovich

Stalin to Kaganovich

5 August

F. 81, op. 3, d. 100, ll. 43–46.

Comrade Kaganovich:

I am sending you my criticisms regarding the conduct of the editors of Bolshevik related to their commentaries (“From the Editors”) on the letter from Engels to Ioan Nedejde. I don’t think the commentaries by the Bolshevik editors are an accident.

It seems to me that they are the handiwork of Comrade Zinoviev. If the editors point out that they did not receive my previous criticisms, approved by the CC, regarding Engels’ article “On the Foreign Policy of Tsarism,” that will be a formalistic evasion of the issue, because they certainly were aware of those criticisms through Comrade Adoratsky.¹ I think this is a serious matter. We cannot leave Bolshevik in the hands of such blockheads, whom Comrade Zinoviev can always dupe. The guilty individuals must be identified and removed from the staff.

The best thing is to oust Comrade Zinoviev.²

Regards.

P.S. Send out my enclosed letter to members of the Politburo and others.

I. Stalin.

5 August 1934.

P.P.S. My criticisms of Engels’ article should be shown to Knorin and Stetsky, even though they are familiar with them.

I. St.

1. On 22 July 1934 the Politburo decided that it was inadvisable to publish Engels’ article in Bolshevik. This decision was preceded by a

letter from Stalin to Politburo members and Adoratsky, dated 19 July, which gave a critical assessment of the article (see Appendix: document 2).

2. See note 2 to document 90.

Transcript

Stalin - to the members of the Politburo, Adoratsky, Knorin, Stetsky, Zinoviev, Pospelov on August 5, 1934

A source:
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 Moscow:
(ROSSPEN), 2001 p. 716-717
Archive:

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3.D. 950. L. 87-89. Script. Typescript.

Members of the Politburo,

com. Adoratsky, Knorin, Stetsky, Zinoviev, Pospelov.

In issue 13-14 of "Bolshevik" there is a note "From the Editor" (pages 86-90), which comments on the letter of F. Engels to John Nadezhda in January 1888 and where Engels's views on the coming war are clearly falsified.

Using Engels' letter to the Romanian Ioan Nadezhda (1888), incorrectly and trickily, the Bolshevik editorial staff asserts in their note that:

- a) Engels "stands entirely on the defeatist position", on the position of defeat "and his bourgeois fatherland";
- b) "Lenin defended a similar position in the war of 1914";
- c) Lenin, therefore, did not give anything essentially new in determining the nature of the war and the policy of the Marxists in connection with the war.

In this way:

1. The editorial staff of "Bolshevik" concealed from readers that Engels did not understand the imperialist nature of the coming war, which is

evident both from Engels's letter to John Nadezhda (1888) and from his article "Foreign policy of Russian tsarism" (1890). as well as from his famous letters to Bebel (1891). It is enough to compare with these works of Engels the tables of Lenin, printed in the same issue of the Bolshevik, "The Experience of the Summary of the Main Data of World History After 1870," where Lenin notes the imperialist struggle of powers (including Germany) for colonies and spheres of influence , even at the beginning 80s of the last century, as the cause of the war, in order to understand the whole difference in the views of Lenin and Engels on the nature of the war.

2. The editorial staff of "Bolshevik" concealed from readers that Engels, 2-3 years after the letter to John Nadezhda, when the Franco-Russian alliance began to take shape in opposition to the alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy, changed his attitude to the war and began to speak not for defeat, but for the victory of Germany (see especially Engels's letters to Bebel from 1891), and Engels retained this attitude, as is known, until the end of his life.

3. The editorial staff of "Bolshevik" concealed from readers that between Engels' passive defeatism ("wish that they all be defeated"), which he later rejected in favor of defensism , and Lenin's active defeatism ("the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war ") - there is no way to draw an equal sign.

4. The editorial board of Bolshevik concealed from the readers the undoubted fact that Lenin and Lenin alone gave a fundamentally new and the only correct directive, both in the question of the nature of the war and in the question of the policy of the Marxists in connection with the war.

This is the case with the tricks of the Bolshevik editorial board.

That Engels was and remains our teacher, only idiots can doubt this. But it does not at all follow from this that we must gloss over Engels's mistakes, that we must conceal them, and even more so, pass them off as indisputable truths. Such a policy would be a policy of lies and deceit. Nothing is so contrary to the spirit of Marxism and the precepts of Marx-Engels as such a policy unworthy of Marxists. Marx and Engels

themselves said that Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action. This explains the fact that Marx and Engels themselves repeatedly changed and supplemented certain provisions of their works. This means that Marx and Engels considered the main thing in their teaching not the letter, not individual provisions, but the spirit of this teaching, its method. It cannot be otherwise, since with a different attitude, further development Marxism would be unthinkable, for Marxism would turn into a mummy. It could not be otherwise, because otherwise Lenin would not have been the person who not only restored Marxism, but also developed it further. And if Lenin developed Marxism further, then is it not clear that we should not be afraid to write down as an asset to Lenin what is new about the war that belongs to him by right and what is given to them as new in the interests of the further development of Marxism?

There can be no doubt that only disrespect for Marxism and its founders could dictate to the editorial board of Bolshevik the policy of obscuring and hiding facts, a policy of belittling Lenin's role in developing a new Marxist attitude on the nature of the war and the policy of Marxists in connection with the war.

I think that in their article the Bolshevik editors tacitly proceed from one Trotskyist-Menshevik attitude, by virtue of which Engels supposedly said everything that needed to be said about the war, its character and the policy of the Marxists in connection with the war, which all that remains is to restore what Engels said and apply it to practice that Lenin allegedly did exactly that, taking a "similar position in the 1914 war," that whoever does not agree with this revises Marxism, he is not a real Marxist.

As you know, the Trotskyist-Menshevik gentlemen proceeded from the same attitude when they denied the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, referring to the fact that Engels in his *Principles of Communism* (1846) denied the possibility that Engels had already said everything what had to be said, and whoever continues to insist on the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country is revising Marxism.

It is hardly necessary to prove that such an attitude is thoroughly rotten and anti-Marxist, for it condemns Marxism, its method to stagnation, to vegetation, sacrificing it to the letter.

I think that this incorrect attitude is the root of the mistake made by the Bolshevik editors.

It seems to me that the Bolshevik magazine is falling (or has already fallen into) unreliable hands. The very fact that the editorial board tried to place Engels' article "On the Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism" in the Bolshevik as a guiding article — this fact alone speaks not in favor of the editorial board. The Central Committee of the CPSU (b), as is known, promptly intervened in the matter and stopped such an attempt. But this circumstance, obviously, did not go to the editorial office for future use. On the contrary: the editorial board, as if in defiance of the Central Committee's instructions, published a note after the Central Committee's warning, which could not be qualified otherwise than an attempt to mislead readers about the Central Committee's real position. But the "Bolshevik" is the organ of the Central Committee.

I think the time has come to put an end to this situation.

I. Stalin.

5.VIII.34 g.

From

Transcripts from the Soviet Archives, Svitalan M, Erdgan A

From letters of Stalin to L.M. Kaganovich in connection with the development and implementation of the law of August 7, 1932

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 3. End of 1930 - 1933. Moscow ROSSPEN 2000. Pp. 418-420

Archive: RGASPI. F. 81. Op. 3.D. 99.L. 106-113, 117, 121-123, 144-145, 151; D. 100.L. 1-7.

No. 151

Kaganovich, Molotov

July 20

... Recently , theft of goods by rail has become more frequent, firstly 1 * (plundered by tens of millions of rubles); secondly, the theft of cooperative and collective farm property. Thefts are organized mainly by the kulaks (dispossessed) and other anti-Soviet elements who seek to undermine our new system. According to the law, these gentlemen are considered ordinary thieves, receive two to three years in prison (formal), but in fact, after 6 to 8 months they are amnestied. Such a regime for these gentlemen, which cannot be called socialist, only encourages them, in fact, a real counter-revolutionary "Work". To endure such a situation is unthinkable. I propose to issue a law (to remove or abolish existing laws), which would:

a) equated in its importance railway cargo, collective farm property and cooperative property to state property

b) punish for embezzlement (theft) of property of these categories at least ten years in prison, and, as a rule, with the death penalty;

c) abolish the application of amnesty to criminals of such "professions".

Without these (and similar) draconian socialist measures, it is impossible to establish a new social discipline, and without such

discipline it is impossible to defend and strengthen our new system. I think that we should not hesitate to pass such a law .

The "decree on collective farm trade" will undoubtedly revive to a certain extent the kulak elements and speculators-resellers, he wrote. The former will try to embarrass the collective farmer and incite him to leave the collective farm. The latter will get into the crowd and try to transfer trade on their own tracks. It is clear that we must eradicate this scum. I propose to instruct the OGPU and its local bodies:

a) take under strict supervision the village and all active preachers against the new collective farm system, active preachers of the idea of leaving the collective farm - to seize and send to concentration camps;

c) take under strict surveillance bazaars, markets and all speculators and resellers .., seize, confiscate and send to concentration camps. Without these (and similar) measures, it is impossible to strengthen the new system and the new, Soviet trade.

The OGPU and its organs must immediately set about preparing their forces for the study of the enemy. You can start operations in a month, not earlier ... Hello!

I. Stalin

July 26, 1932

Greetings , Comrade Kaganovich!

... I think that it would be more expedient to combine in one law the issue of protecting collective farm and cooperative property , as well as railway cargo, with the issue of protecting the collective farms themselves, that is, the fight against those elements that use violence and threats or preach the use of violence and threats against collective farmers in order to force the latter to leave the collective farm in order to violently destroy the collective farm.

The law can be divided into three sections, of which the first section will deal with the goods of railroad and water transport, with the

designation of the appropriate punishment, the second - on the collective farm and cooperative property (property) and the corresponding punishment, the third - on the protection of the collective farms themselves from violence and threats from parties of kulak and other antisocial elements, indicating that crimes in such cases will be punished in prison for 5 to 10 years, followed by imprisonment in concentration camps for 3 years and without the right to apply an amnesty.

Greetings

I. Stalin

4 August 1932

Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!

I am returning the draft decree. As you can see, I've expanded it a bit. Publish it soon ...

Outrages are happening on the railways ... The OGPU TO bodies are asleep ... Give the OGPU TO directive to have armed people on the line and shoot hooligans on the spot.

Greetings

I. Stalin

11 August 1932

Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!

... Decree on the protection of public property, of course, is good, and he will soon take on a momentum its action. The decree against speculators is also good and timely (it should be issued soon). But all this is not enough. We also need a decree from the Central Committee to the party and judicial-punitive organs on the meaning of these two decrees and the methods of their implementation. This is absolutely essential. Tell who should be prepared to draft such a letter. I'll be in Moscow soon and see ...

Greetings

I. Stalin

17 August 1932

Hello, Comrade Kaganovich!

... Pravda is behaving stupidly and bureaucratic-blindly, not launching a broad campaign on the question of enforcing the law on the protection of public property. The campaign must be started immediately. It is necessary:

- a) explain the meaning of the law point by point;
- b) criticize and expose those regional, city and district organizations (as well as rural ones) that are trying to shelter the law, without giving it a course in practice;
- c) to pin down those judges and prosecutors who show liberalism in relation to plunderers of goods, collective farm crops, collective farm stocks, cooperative property, etc., to a pillory;
- d) publish sentences in such cases in a prominent place;
- e) mobilize their correspondents, accordingly, instructing them and print their correspondence;
- f) praise and encourage those organizations that try to implement the law in good faith, etc. etc. This campaign should be systematic and long-term.

We must systematically hammer at one point in order to force our workers to turn "face to the law" on the protection of public property.

Greetings

I. Stalin

1 * Here and below, the words underlined by the author of letters are italicized.

From the speeches of S.V. Kosior, B.P.Sheboldaev, F.I. Goloshchekin, I.V. Stalin

From the speeches of S.V. Kosior, B.P.Sheboldaev, F.I. Goloshchekin, I.V. Stalin at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b). January 7-12, 1933

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 3. End of 1930 - 1933. Moscow ROSSPEN 2000. Pp. 625-631

Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. File 514. Issue I. Sheet 19 ob. - 21 ob., 43 ob. - 44. Verbatim record. Typographic text; Stalin I.V. Op. T. 13.P. 216-219, 223, 224, 229, 230, 233.

No. 254

From the speech of S. V. Kosior

... This fact alone, that the Soviet power in this five-year plan saved our working class from unemployment, that we have got rid of that scourge and horror called unemployment forever - this alone puts our achievements on an absolutely immeasurable height from the point of view of a radical improvement of the workers class. This alone covers up all the shortcomings that we still have in the sense of shortcomings in the supply of workers, etc.

The same is true of the material position of the main mass of the peasantry. Due to lack of time, I will give only one example. You all know that the Right Bank of Ukraine, the former Podolsk and Volyn provinces, have always been the sources of thousands of emigration, resettlement, due to the unprecedented poverty that existed in these places. The colossal overpopulation created unprecedented conditions of need in these areas. Everyone knows that the agricultural proletarians and semi-proletarians who worked in the landowners' estates in Podolia and Volyn were in the most downtrodden, in the most beggarly position. These people were in the most poverty-stricken position, who tried to escape from poverty and moved to the North, moved to America and wherever they wanted. It is completely different now. If at the beginning of the five-year plan we had a conversation

about resettlement from these areas, about how that we still have a large overpopulation, now this question has been completely removed by life, by a radical change in the position of the peasant masses. In a region that used to be subjected to this terrible scourge of overpopulation and poverty, we are now in a position where we can hardly recruit a certain number of workers to our enterprises. All of this population found a job, improved their financial situation, especially after a complete collectivization. We have created a solid foundation for the stable material position of the collective farm peasant and a solid foundation for further raising his material and cultural level. now we are in such a position that with great difficulty we can recruit a certain number of workers to our enterprises. All of this population found a job, improved their financial situation, especially after a complete collectivization. We have created a solid foundation for the stable material position of the collective farm peasant and a solid foundation for further raising his material and cultural level. now we are in such a position that with great difficulty we can recruit a certain number of workers to our enterprises. All of this population found a job, improved their financial situation, especially after a complete collectivization. We have created a solid foundation for the stable material position of the collective farm peasant and a solid foundation for further raising his material and cultural level.

Especially on this question, on the question of the position of the working class and the peasant-collective farm masses, it is necessary with special persistence to expose all kinds of liars, counter-revolutionaries, enemies of the Party who are trying to slander our Party.

... In his speech, Tomsy generally gives approximately the following hint: as far as industry is concerned, the issue has been resolved, the matter is so clear that, as they say, one cannot argue against facts. Here, they say, you have succeeded in industry, but as for the countryside, something is wrong, things are going very badly. It is no accident that it is precisely on this issue that the repentant, but not completely disarmed, stumble every time. It is every time when we have any difficulties with the village, conversations begin, conversations begin

that something will definitely happen, and suddenly we fail, and suddenly there will be trouble. And again, the question of agricultural degradation is being raised. And due to the fact that Ukraine, in particular, is now a topic for all kinds of conversations, I would like to dwell on this specially.

... We have strong, growing and developing collective farms in Ukraine, and this is what gave us the opportunity, despite the difficult conditions of the last year, to keep Ukrainian agriculture at a certain level, which in all respects is much higher than with individual farming. In relation to the marketability of agriculture in the Ukraine, we have an increase of one and a half to two times in comparison with what we had at the beginning of complete collectivization. This is what gave us the opportunity in past years to increase grain procurements so strongly and significantly, and all the mistakes of the past year, even the difficulties with the grain procurement campaign of this year, all this cannot shake the fact that, after all, the strength and level of agriculture now it is much larger, stronger and more durable than it was at the beginning of collectivization, at the beginning of the five-year plan.

... It has already been said about the struggle for the grain procurement plan. If earlier individual farms gave 500 - 600 million poods. bread, now we are talking about 1200-1400 million poods. Is there more or less grain in Ukraine now than it was under individual farming or at the beginning of collectivization? I must say that now we have more bread than there was then. But, if despite the large amount of bread, it is still difficult for us to take it, then there are a number of other reasons. And above all, the reason is that in a number of sectors, in a number of regions, we have to some extent missed the penetration of hostile elements into collective farms, the contamination of party organizations, missed the activation of nationalist counterrevolutionary elements that took advantage of the well-known possibilities of our national republic, penetrated our institutions, MTS, collective farms, etc. and even managed to plant their cells here and there.

To eliminate this cause, we are now conducting a most severe attack on these elements, in order to expose them, to expose them, in order to destroy and render harmless.

... Although we have more grain, the trouble is that the collective farm bread is being devoured by the parasites and idlers still on the collective farms, as well as a large number of parasites that live in the village, do not sow, do not reap, but feed on stolen collective farm grain. You can see, especially in large villages, which have 1000 - 1500 households, that there are necessarily 100-150 households of so-called individual farms that are not engaged in agriculture. How do these parasitic elements live? They live on stolen collective farm grain. Due to the fact that our collective farmers have not yet cultivated a socialist attitude towards social good, due to the fact that we have not yet been able to enforce the fruitful protection of public collective farm property, as a result, a huge amount of collective and state farm grain is plundered, reducing our resources.

From the speech of B.P. Sheboldaev

... Of tremendous importance is Comrade Stalin's instruction that the class struggle is taking place under new conditions, that the class struggle is being waged by the enemy by new methods, which are basically characterized by sabotage and sabotage. I say this because we have seen this in practice in the North Caucasus. It was to us that the Central Committee was forced to point out that the sabotage organized by the kulaks in the Kuban requires special and special measures. In what is the most vivid expression of this sabotage in our Kuban, elements of which are undoubtedly present in other regions of our region, and are probably also in a number of other regions of our Union? First of all, the fact that the collective farms do not work in the way they might require from the collective farms, from the collective farmers. Return to work, labor productivity, production rate, quality of work,

... Eismont and someone else from this group of Smirnov are interested in the North Caucasus, they go to see how things are there. In one of his conversations, essentially counter-revolutionary conversations, he

announced that there must be an uprising in the North Caucasus in the spring of 1933. This alone is enough to make it clear what the enemy is saying. We have penetrated so deeply, so thoroughly into all the pores of the village that there can be no talk of the collapse of collective farms, of any protests, uprisings. This is nonsense! We may still have some breakthroughs in the work of some of our collective farms, in certain areas, but to agree to such nonsense means not seeing anything, not seeing all the work that has been done in the countryside, not understanding that there is no turning back.

... And we have a lot of communists who, say, when we are conducting an offensive against sabotage, breaking this sortie of the class enemy, although the grain procurement plan has not been fulfilled, they say: "How can you take seeds. We will leave the farm without seeds. We must first create funds, and then fulfill our obligations to the state ". They go to deception, go to all sorts of tricks in order to deceive the state.

... There is one more breed of communists in the village. These are the communists who have lost their fighting capacity, who are unable to fight, who swear by the formulas of our general party line, but in practice they will not strike a finger for the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan, for sowing, for all sorts of measures. We consider them not only a ballast, but we also consider it a hidden form of the same sabotage of the right opportunist struggle against our party.

... I end by being deeply convinced and I think that this is the opinion of our organization, that, firstly, all the measures that we are carrying out on the instructions of the Central Committee in the matter of breaking down the resistance of the Communists and sabotaging the organized kulaks, that these these measures are supported by the main decisive cadres of our workers and the bulk of the collective farmers. This is absolutely certain. Undoubtedly, this decision raised the vigilance, fighting efficiency and political armament of our organization. With Lenin's perspicacity, our Central Committee and Comrade Stalin grasped the political essence of what was happening, or rather was just beginning to emerge, in the collective farms and villages of the Kuban, and quickly mobilized our organization into an

offensive against the class enemy. This is one of the examples of that real Leninist analysis of the conditions of the class struggle and the bold decisive and firm implementation of the necessary measures that ensured our party and the working class under the leadership of the Central Committee and the leader of the party, comrade Stalin, the greatest, world-wide historical significance, victories of the first five-year plan, the consequences of which we can hardly fully assess now. It is this leadership that will provide us with even greater victories in the future.

From a speech by F. I. Goloshchekin

When summing up the results of the first five-year plan and those colossal achievements that our party has, our country is of great importance for our party what gave the five-year plan in such backward national outskirts as Kazakhstan was and is a part of. Those results, those huge shifts that are achieved by the five-year plan in Kazakhstan, are a vivid indicator of how, on the basis of resolving the main tasks of the proletarian dictatorship in the Union, simultaneously, simultaneously solving the problem with respect to the formerly oppressed nationalities, are a vivid indicator of the correct consistent implementation of the national policy of our party. These results are a striking indicator striking at the opportunists, nationalists, against their counter-revolutionary slander, emphasizing certain negative phenomena that inevitably appear in very complex processes, taking place in Kazakhstan, obscuring the huge achievements, huge shifts that we have in Kazakhstan over these five years. This is the main method of the nationalists in the struggle against the party line, against the socialist reorganization of the Kazakh aul, which are thus the conductors of the Bai interests.

... We have achieved even more striking changes in agriculture. The sown area increased from 4 million hectares in 1928 to 5.5 million hectares in 1932 by 130%. The area of industrial crops increased by 219%. Areas of oilseed crops increased by 395%; area of forage crops by 383%. A very sharp change and socio-economic shifts have also been made towards the exclusive prevalence of socialist agriculture and animal husbandry. In 1928 we did not have a single state farm, in 1932

we have 232 state farms with 22.5 million hectares of land, against the plan of 3.5 million.

Chubar. Nobody measured them.

Goloshchekin. Nobody measured, because there was land management (movement in the hall). Does it strike you?

Kosior. It is amazing.

Goloshchekin. So much the better if it even amazes you.

... Collectivization covers in our country up to 60% of the poor and middle peasants of the Kazakh population, with fluctuations in agricultural areas up to 65% and more, and in nomadic and semi-nomadic regions up to 30%. On the basis of this collectivization, a policy of liquidating the kulaks and bays as a class was carried out.

We can confidently assert that semi-feudal relations in the Kazakh auls have been destroyed, and a severe blow has been dealt to the remnants of clan relations. Of course, in the Kazakh auls there is still a Bai influence and their sabotage work, a struggle against the socialist reorganization of auls, a struggle to preserve clan survivals, to preserve the conditions for the manifestation of their exploitative tendencies. We will still have to fight hard with all this, but we have already created conditions that ensure the victory of the working Kazakh masses over the bayism. On the basis of all the measures indicated above, with the help of the proletarian state, we carried out and are carrying out the settling of the Kazakh population.

... We are entering the second five-year plan fortified - we have found a way. The Central Committee helps us a lot, it is very attentive to the tasks of Kazakhstan.

From the speech of I. V. Stalin

... What is the main shortcoming of our work in the countryside in the last year, in 1932?

The main drawback is that grain procurements in this year were more difficult with us than in the previous year, than in 1931.

There is no way to explain this by the poor state of the harvest, because our harvest this year was not worse, but better than in the previous year. No one can deny that the gross grain harvest in 1932 was greater than in 1931, when a drought in the five main regions of the northeast of the USSR significantly reduced the country's grain balance. Of course, in 1932 we also had some yield losses due to unfavorable climatic conditions in the Kuban and Terek, as well as in some regions of Ukraine. But there can be no doubt that these losses do not even account for half of the losses that took place in 1931 due to the drought in the north-eastern regions of the USSR. Consequently, in 1932 we had more grain in our country than in 1931. And yet, despite this circumstance, grain procurements in our country in 1932 took place with greater difficulties than in the previous year.

What's the matter here? Where are the reasons for this lack of our work? How can the discrepancy be explained?

1) This is explained primarily by the fact that our local comrades, our village workers have failed to take into account the new situation in the countryside created by the announcement of collective farm trade in grain.

... In order not to disrupt the assignments of the Soviet power, the communists had to under this new situation from the very first days of harvesting, in July 1932, they had to intensify and accelerate grain procurement in every possible way. This was required by the situation. What did they do in practice? Instead of speeding up grain procurements, they began to speed up the formation of all kinds of funds in the collective farms, thereby increasing the restraint of grain suppliers in fulfilling their obligations to the state.

... Did the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee take into account this new situation, which had developed in connection with the collective farm trade in grain, in their well-known resolution on the development of collective farm trade? Yes, we did. This resolution explicitly states that collective farm trade in grain can be opened only after the grain procurement plan has been fully and completely fulfilled and the seeds have been collected. It is said so

bluntly that only after the end of grain procurements and the filling of seeds, by about January 15, 1933, only after these conditions are fulfilled will it be possible to open collective farm trade in grain. With this resolution, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee seemed to be telling our village workers: do not obscure your attention with concern for funds and supplies of all kinds, do not be distracted from the main task, expand grain procurements from the very first days of harvesting and force them,

... The Party can no longer confine itself to individual acts of interference in the process of agricultural development. It must now take the leadership of the collective farms into its own hands, assume responsibility for the work and help the collective farmers lead their economy forward on the basis of the data of science and technology.

... Without systematic intervention on the part of the Soviet government in the work of collective farm development, without its systematic assistance, it is impossible to establish such an economy.

... The face of the class enemy has changed in recent years, the tactics of the class enemy in the countryside have changed, and that accordingly it is necessary to change their tactics in order to achieve success. The enemy understood the changed situation, understood the strength and might of the new system in the countryside and, realizing this, reorganized himself, changed his tactics, switched from a direct attack against the collective farms to working on a sly. But we didn't understand this, we didn't see the new situation and we continue to look for the class enemy where he no longer exists, we continue to carry out the old tactics of a simplified struggle against the kulaks, while this very tactic has long been outdated.

They are looking for a class enemy outside the collective farms, looking for him in the form of people with a brutal physiognomy, with huge teeth, with a thick neck, with an image in their hands. Looking for the fist as we know it from the posters. But such fists have long since disappeared from the surface. The current kulaks and podkulachniki, the current anti-Soviet elements in the countryside are for the most part "quiet", "sweet" people, almost "saints." They do not need to be looked

for far from the collective farm, they sit in the collective farm itself and occupy the positions of storekeepers, bookkeepers, secretaries, etc. They will never say "down with the collective farms." She is in favor of collective farms. But they are doing such sabotage work on the collective farms that the collective farms will not be happy with them.

... In order to discern such a clever enemy and not succumb to demagoguery, one must possess revolutionary vigilance, one must possess the ability to tear the mask off the enemy and show the collective farmers his real, counter-revolutionary face. But how many Communists in our village do we have with these qualities? Communists often not only fail to expose such class enemies, but, on the contrary, succumb to their fraudulent demagogy and lag behind them.

... I think that the political departments of the MTS and state farms are one of the decisive means by which it will be possible to eliminate these shortcomings in the shortest possible time. (Stormy, long-lasting applause .)

Stalin's note to L.M. Kaganovich and V.M. Molotov on the prohibition of travel by foreign correspondents in the USSR. 19 February 1933

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 3. End of 1930 - 1933. Moscow ROSSPEN 2000. Pp. 644-645
Archive: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.D. 741. L. 3. Copy.

No. 267

I.V. Stalin's note to L.M. Kaganovich and V.M. Molotov on the prohibition of travel by foreign correspondents in the USSR 1 *

February 19, 1933 at the earliest 2 *

Molotov, Kaganovich!

Do you know who allowed American correspondents in Moscow to travel to the Kuban?

They concocted vileness about the situation in the Kuban (see their correspondence). We must put an end to this and forbid these gentlemen to travel around the USSR. There are so many spies in the USSR.

I. Stalin

1 * In the upper right corner there is a resolution: "This is an ugly business. It should be discussed in the Central Committee. Molotov. Kaganovich".

2 * The document is a copy made by the staff of the Politburo archive. Under the text there is a note: "Messages from American correspondents - Bulletin not for the press No. 49 of February 19, 1933 - see the case of foreign correspondents and the diplomatic corps, group No. 46". On the back of the document there is an inscription: "For the original, see [Stalin's] personal archive, section correspondence with Molotov."

From the speech of JV Stalin at the first congress of collective farmers-shock workers. 19 February 1933

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 3. End of 1930 - 1933. Moscow ROSSPEN 2000. Pp. 705-706

Archive: Stalin I.V. Op. T. 13.S. 243, 245-247, 251-252.

No. 308

... They say that the path of the collective farms is the correct path, but it is difficult. This is only partly true. Of course, there are difficulties along the way. A good life doesn't come for free. But the fact is that the main difficulties have already been overcome, and the difficulties that are facing you are not even worth talking about seriously. In any case, in comparison with the difficulties experienced by the workers 10-15 years ago, your present difficulties, collective farmer comrades, seem like a child's play.

... What have we achieved on the new path, on our collective farm path, and what do we think to achieve in the next 2 - 3 years? ..

... We have achieved that we have helped the millions of poor people to enter the collective farms. We have achieved that by entering the collective farms and using there the best land and the best implements of production, the millions of the poor have risen to the level of the middle peasants. We have achieved that the millions of the poor, who used to live from hand to mouth, have now become middle peasants on collective farms, become well-to-do people. We succeeded in undermining the stratification of the peasants into poor peasants and kulaks, defeated the kulaks and could the poor peasants become masters of their labor within the collective farms, become middle peasants ...

... By deploying collective farm construction, we achieved that we destroyed this mess and injustice, broke the kulak bondage, all this mass of the poor was drawn into collective farms, gave them a secure existence there and raised them to the level of middle peasants who

could use collective farmland, benefits collective farms, tractors, agricultural machines.

What does it mean? This means that at least 20 million of the peasant population, at least 20 million of the poor, were saved from poverty and ruin, saved from kulak bondage and, thanks to the collective farms, turned into wealthy people.

This is a great achievement, comrades. This is such an achievement, which the world has not yet known and which has not yet been achieved by any state in the world ...

Here are the practical, obligatory results of collective-farm development, the results of the peasantry taking the path of collective farms.

But this is only the first step, our first achievement on the path of collective farm development.

It would be wrong to think that we should stop at this first step, at this first achievement. No, comrades; we cannot stop at this achievement. In order to move further and finally strengthen the collective farms, we must take the second step, we must achieve a new achievement. What is this second step? It consists in raising the collective farmers even higher. It consists in making all collective farmers prosperous. Yes, comrades, well-to-do. (Prolonged applause.)

... Now a few words about women, about collective farmers. The women's question on collective farms is a big question, comrades. I know that many of you underestimate women and even laugh at them. But this is a mistake, comrades, a serious mistake. It's not just that women make up half of the population. The point is, first of all, that the collective farm movement has promoted a number of remarkable and capable women to leading positions. Look at the Congress, at its composition, and you will see that women have long since advanced from the backward to the advanced. Women on collective farms are a great force. To keep this power under wraps is to allow crime. Our responsibility is to push women forward on the collective farms and to use this force in action.

Of course, in the recent past, the Soviet government had a small misunderstanding with the collective farmers. It was about a cow. But now the cow deal is settled, and the misunderstanding has disappeared. (Prolonged applause.) We have achieved that the majority of collective farmers already have a cow per yard. Another year or two will pass, and you will not find a single collective farmer who does not have his own cow. We Bolsheviks will try to ensure that all collective farmers have a cow each. (Prolonged applause.)

**From the correspondence between M.A.Sholokhov and I.V. Stalin.
April 4 - May 6, 1933**

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 3. End of 1930 - 1933. Moscow ROSSPEN 2000. Pp. 717-720

Archive: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.D. 827. L. 1-22. Script; Questions of history, 1994, No. 3. P. 14-16, 22.

No. 317

M.A.Sholokhov - I.V. Stalin

April 4, 1933

Stanitsa Veshenskaya

... Now about the methods that were used in all collective farms of the region according to the instructions of Ovchinnikov and under the direct supervision of Sharapov. The eviction from the house and the sale of property was carried out in the simplest way: the collective farmer received a control figure for the delivery of bread, say, 10 centners. For failure to deliver, he was expelled from the collective farm, all his debts were taken into account, including the arbitrarily established loss ratio incurred by the collective farm in previous years, and all payments were presented as to an individual farmer. Moreover, according to the amount of payments, the property of the collective farmer was assessed; was regarded in such a way that it was exactly enough to pay off the debt. For example, a house could be bought for 60 - 80 rubles, and such a trifle as a fur coat or felt boots was bought literally for a pittance ...

It was officially and strictly forbidden to the rest of the collective farmers to let the evicted people into their homes to spend the night or warm up. They were supposed to live in sheds, in cellars, in the streets, in gardens. The population was warned: whoever lets the evicted family in will be evicted with the family. And they were evicted only because some collective farmer, touched by the roar of freezing children, let his evicted neighbor warm up. 1090 families in 20-degree

frost lived on the street day in and day out. During the day, like shadows, they wandered around their closed houses, and at night they sought refuge from the cold in sheds, in chaffs. But according to the law established by the regional committee, they were not allowed to spend the night there either! The chairmen of the village councils and the secretaries of the cells sent patrols through the streets, which rummaged through the sheds and drove the families of the collective farmers thrown out of their homes into the streets.

I saw something that cannot be forgotten to death: the hut, Volokhovskoe of the Lebyazhensky collective farm at night, in a fierce wind, in the cold, when even the dogs are hiding from the cold, families thrown out of their houses burned bonfires on the alleys and sat near the fire. Children were wrapped in rags and placed on the ground thawed from the fire. A continuous childish cry stood over the alleys. Is it really possible to mock people like that?

It seemed to me that this was one of Ovchinnikov's excesses, but in late January or early February, the secretary of the regional committee Zimin came to Veshenskaya. On the way to Veshenskaya, he spent two hours at the Chukarinsky collective farm and spoke at the bureau of the RK about the progress of grain procurements in this collective farm. The first question he asked the secretary of the Chukarinskaya cell who was present at the bureau: "How many people have been evicted from your houses?" "Forty-eight households". "Where do they sleep?" The secretary of the cell laughed, then replied that they would spend the night, they say, wherever they had to. Zimin said to him: "But they should not spend the night with relatives, not indoors, but on the street!"

After that, we took an even steeper line across the area. And the evicted began to freeze. A woman with a baby was evicted from the Bazkovsky collective farm. All night she walked around the farm and asked to be allowed in with the child to warm up. They were not allowed in, fearing that they themselves would be evicted. In the morning the child froze to death in his mother's arms. The mother herself was frostbitten. This woman was evicted by a party candidate - an employee of the Bazkovsky collective farm. After the child froze to death, he was quietly

sent to prison. I was planted for the "bend". For what was they imprisoned? And, if they planted it correctly, then why does Comrade Zimin remain free?

The number of frozen people has not been established, since no one was interested in this statistics and is not interested in the same way that no one is interested in the number of people who died of hunger. One thing is indisputable: a huge number of adults and "flowers of life" after two months of wintering on the street, after spending the night in the snow will leave this life along with the last snow. And those who survive will be half-skinned.

But eviction is not the most important thing. Here is a list of the ways in which 593 tons of bread were obtained:

1. Mass beatings of collective farmers and individual farmers.
2. Planting "in the cold". "Is there a pit?" - "No". - "Go, sit in the barn!" The collective farmer is stripped to his underwear and put barefoot in a barn or shed. The time of action is January, February, often whole brigades were planted in barns.
3. In the Vaschaev collective farm, collective farmers were doused with kerosene on the legs and hem of their skirts, lit, and then extinguished: "Tell me where the pit is! I'll set it on fire again!" On the same collective farm, the person being interrogated was put in a pit, buried halfway and the interrogation continued.
4. In the Napolovo collective farm, the authorized RK, a candidate member of the RK Bureau, Plotkin, during interrogation, forced him to sit on a red-hot couch. The planted man shouted that he could not sit, it was hot, then water was poured from a mug under him, and then he was taken out into the frost and locked up in a barn. From the barn back to the stove and interrogated again. He (Plotkin) forced one individual peasant to shoot himself. He gave a revolver in his hands and ordered: "Shoot, but no - I'll shoot you!" He began to pull the trigger (not knowing that the revolver was discharged), and when the firing pin clicked, he fainted.

5. At the Varvara collective farm, cell secretary Anikeev at a brigade meeting forced the entire brigade (men and women, smokers and nonsmokers) to smoke makhorka, and then threw a pod of red pepper (mustard) on the hot stove and did not order to leave the premises. The same Anikeev and a number of workers of the propaganda column, whose commander was a candidate for membership in the Bureau of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nashinsky, during interrogations at the headquarters of the column, forced the collective farmers to drink huge quantities of water mixed with bacon, wheat and kerosene.

6. In the Lebyazhensky collective farm they were put against the wall and fired past the head of the interrogated from shotguns.

7. In the same place: rolled up in a row and trampled underfoot.

8. In the Arkhipov collective farm, two collective farmers, Fomin and Krasnov, after a night interrogation were taken out three kilometers to the steppe, stripped naked in the snow and let go, ordered to run to the farm at a trot.

9. In the Chukarinsky collective farm, the secretary of the cell, Bogomolov, picked up 8 people, demobilized Red Army men, with whom he came to the collective farmer - suspected of theft - in the yard (at night), after a short interrogation, took them to the threshing floor or to the levada, built his brigade and commanded "fire" at the tied collective farmer. If the one who was terrified by the staging of the execution did not admit, then, beating him, they threw him into a sleigh, took him out to the steppe, beat him along the way with rifle butts, and, after taking him out to the steppe, set him up and repeated the procedure preceding the execution.

9. 1 * In the Kruzhilinsky collective farm, the authorized RK Kovtun at a meeting of the 6th brigade asks the collective farmer: "Where did you bury the bread?" - "I didn't bury it, comrade!" - "Didn't you bury it? Oh, well, stick out your tongue! Stop like that!" "Sixty adult people, Soviet citizens, by order of the commissioner, take turns sticking out their tongues and stand like this, drooling, while the commissioner delivers an incriminating speech for an hour. The same thing was done by Kovtun in the 7th and 8th brigades; with the only difference that in

those brigades he, in addition to sticking out his tongues, forced him to kneel down.

10. In the Zatonsk collective farm, an agitation column worker beat the interrogated with a saber. On the same collective farm, they mocked the families of the Red Army soldiers, opening the roofs of houses, destroying the stoves, forcing women to cohabit.

11. In the Solontsovsky collective farm, a human corpse was brought into the room of the Komsode, put it on the table, and in the same room the collective farmers were interrogated, threatening to be shot.

12. In the Verkhne-Chirsky collective farm, the shop assistants put the interrogated barefoot on a hot stove, and then beat and took them out, barefoot, into the cold.

13. In the Kolundaevskoye collective farm, the farmers were forced to run in the snow for three hours. The frostbitten ones were brought to the Bazkovsky hospital.

14. In the same place: the interrogated collective farmer was put on a stool on his head, covered with a fur coat from above, beaten and interrogated.

15. In the Bazkovsky collective farm, during interrogation, they undressed, the half-naked were released home, half-way back, and so several times.

16. Authorized RO of the OGPU Yakovlev with the operational group held a meeting in the Verkhne-Chirsky collective farm. The school was stupefied. They were not ordered to undress. Nearby had a "cool" room, where they were taken out of the meeting for "individual treatment." Those who held the meeting took turns, there were 5 of them, but the collective farmers were the same ... The meeting lasted more than a day without interruption.

These examples can be endlessly multiplied. These are not isolated cases of bends, this is a "method" of grain procurement legalized on a regional scale. I either heard about these facts from the communists, or from the collective farmers themselves, who experienced all these

"methods" on themselves and then came to me with requests "to write about it in the newspaper."

Do you remember, Iosif Vissarionovich, Korolenko's essay "In a calm village?" So, this kind of "disappearance" was done not over three peasants suspected of stealing from the kulak, but over tens of thousands of collective farmers. And, as you can see, with a richer use of technical means and with greater sophistication.

A similar story took place in the Verkhne-Don region, where the same Ovchinnikov, who was the ideological inspirer of these terrible bullying that took place in our country in 1933, was a special representative.

... It is impossible to pass over in silence what was happening in the Veshensky and Verkhne-Don districts for three months. Only hope for you. Sorry for the verbosity of the letter. I decided that it would be better to write to you than to create the last book of Virgin Soil Upturned on such material.

With regards Sholokhov

I. V. Stalin - M. A. Sholokhov

May 6, 1933

Dear Comrade Sholokhov!

Both of your letters have been received as you know. The help that was requested has already been provided.

To investigate the case, Comrade Shkiryatov will come to you, in the Veshensky district, to whom - I beg you - to help.

This is true. But that's not all, Comrade Sholokhov. The point is that your letters make a somewhat one-sided impression. I would like to write you a few words about this.

I thanked you for the letters, as they expose the sore of our party-Soviet work, reveal how sometimes our workers, wishing to bridle the enemy, accidentally hit friends and sink to sadism. But this does not mean that

I agree with you in everything. You see one side; you see not bad. But this is only one side of the matter. In order not to be mistaken in politics (your letters are not fiction, but solid politics), you need to review, you must be able to see the other side. And the other side is that the respected grain growers of your region (and not only your region) carried out "Italian" (sabotage!) And were not averse to leaving the workers, the Red Army - without bread. The fact that the sabotage was quiet and outwardly harmless (no blood) does not change the fact that the respected grain growers, in fact, waged a "quiet" war against the Soviet regime. War to attrition, dear comrade.

Of course, this circumstance in no way can justify the outrages that were committed, as you assure us, by our workers. And those responsible for these outrages must be duly punished. But it is still clear as daylight that respected farmers are not such harmless people as it might seem from afar.

Well, all the best and shake your hand.

Yours I. Stalin

1 * Numbering was broken by Sholokhov. - (Approx.ed.)

Stalin - On the cessation of mass evictions of peasants - May 8, 1933

Directive-instruction of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the cessation of mass evictions of peasants, streamlining the process of arrests and unloading places of detention."
May 8, 1933

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 3. End of 1930 - 1933. Moscow ROSSPEN 2000. Pp. 746-750

Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 981. L. 229-238. Script. Typewritten text edited by I.V. Stalin.

No. 333

Secret. Not for print.

To all party and Soviet workers and all organs of the OGPU, the court and the prosecutor's office

The desperate resistance of the kulaks to the collective farm movement of working peasants, which unfolded at the end of 1929 and took the form of arsons and terrorist acts against collective farm leaders, created the need for the Soviet government to use mass arrests and acute forms of repression in the form of a massive eviction of kulaks and podkulaks in northern and distant lands.

Further resistance of the kulak elements, sabotage on collective and state farms, uncovered in 1932, widespread massive theft of collective and state farm property demanded further strengthening of repressive measures against kulak elements, thieves and all kinds of saboteurs.

Thus, the last three years of our work in the countryside were years of struggle for the elimination of the kulaks and the victory of the collective farms.

And these three years of struggle led to the defeat of the forces of our class enemies in the countryside, to the final strengthening of our Soviet socialist positions in the countryside.

Summing up, we can now say that the position of individual farming has already been overcome in all the main regions of the USSR, collective farms have become a ubiquitous and dominant form of farming in the countryside, the collective farm movement has become firmly consolidated, and the complete victory of the collective farm system in the countryside is assured.

Now the task is no longer to defend the collective farm form of management in its struggle against the private form of management, for this task has already been successfully solved. The task now is to meet the growing urge of individual working peasants to join the collective farms and to help them enter the collective farm, where only they can save themselves from the danger of impoverishment and hunger.

The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR believe that all these circumstances create a new favorable environment in the countryside, which makes it possible, as a rule, to stop the use of mass evictions and acute forms of repression in the countryside.

The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars believe that as a result of our successes in the countryside, the moment has come when we no longer need mass repressions, which, as we know, offend not only the kulaks, but also individual farmers and some of the collective farmers.

True, demands are still coming from a number of regions for mass evictions from the countryside and the use of acute forms of repression. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have applications for the immediate eviction of about a hundred thousand families from the regions and territories. There is information in the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, from which it is clear that mass indiscriminate arrests in the countryside still continue to exist in the practice of our workers. Collective farm chairmen and members of collective farm board are arrested. Chairmen of village councils and secretaries of cells are arrested. District and regional commissioners are arrested. All who are not lazy and who, in

fact, have no right to arrest, are arrested. It is not surprising that with such a rampant practice of arrests, the bodies that have the right to arrest, including the organs of the OGPU, and especially the police, lose their sense of proportion and often make arrests without any reason.

But what does all this say?

All this suggests that there are still quite a few comrades in the regions and territories who have not understood the new situation and still continue to live in the past.

All this suggests that, despite the existence of a new situation requiring a shift in the center of gravity to mass political and organizational work, these comrades cling to obsolete forms of work that no longer correspond to the new situation and pose a threat of weakening the authority of Soviet power in the countryside.

It seems that these comrades are ready to substitute and are already substituting political work among the masses in order to isolate the kulak and anti-collective farm elements with the administrative-KGB operations of the GPU and the militia, not realizing that such a substitution, if it assumes any mass character, can reduce to zero the influence of our party in the countryside.

These comrades, apparently, do not understand that the method of mass eviction of peasants outside the region in the new situation has already outlived its usefulness, that eviction can be applied only in a partial and individual manner and only to the leaders and organizers of the struggle against collective farms.

These comrades do not understand that the method of mass and indiscriminate arrests, if only it can be considered a method, in the new situation gives only disadvantages that undermine the authority of the Soviet government, that arrests should be limited and strictly controlled by the relevant authorities, that arrests should be applied only to active enemies of Soviet power.

The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have no doubts that all these and similar errors and deviations from the party line will be eliminated in the shortest possible time.

It would be wrong to think that the presence of a new situation and the need for a transition to new methods of work mean the elimination or at least a weakening of the class struggle in the countryside. On the contrary, the class struggle in the countryside will inevitably intensify, since the class enemy sees that the collective farms have won, he sees that the last days of his existence have come, and he cannot help but grab onto the most acute forms of struggle against Soviet power in despair. Therefore, there can be no question of weakening our struggle against the class enemy. On the contrary, our struggle must be intensified in every way, our vigilance must be sharpened in every way. It is, therefore, about intensifying our struggle against the class enemy. But the fact is that it is impossible to intensify the struggle against the class enemy and eliminate it with the help of the old methods of work in the current new situation, because these methods have outlived their usefulness.² * more accurate and organized. Finally, the point is that each of our blows should be politically prepared in advance, so that each of our blows is backed up by the actions of the broad masses of the peasantry. For only with such methods of improving the methods of our work can we achieve the final elimination of the class enemy in the countryside.

The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have no doubts that all our party-Soviet and KGB-judicial organizations will take into account the new situation created as a result of our victories, and accordingly reorganize their work in relation to the new conditions of the struggle.

The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decide:

I. On the cessation of mass evictions of peasants

Immediately stop all mass evictions of peasants. Eviction should be allowed only on an individual and private basis and in relation to only those farms whose heads are actively fighting against collective farms and organize the refusal of sowing and harvesting.

Eviction will only be allowed from the following areas and in the following limits:

| | |
|-----------------|-------------------|
| Ukraine | 2 thousand farms |
| North Caucasus | 1 thousand farms |
| Lower Volga | 1 thousand farms |
| Middle Volga | 1 thousand farms |
| CChO | 1 thousand farms |
| Ural | 1 thousand farms |
| Gorky Territory | 500 farms |
| Western Siberia | 1 thousand farms |
| Eastern Siberia | 1 thousand farms |
| Byelorussia | 500 farms |
| Western Region | 500 farms |
| Bashkiria | 500 farms |
| Transcaucasia | 500 farms |
| middle Asia | 500 farms |
| Total | 12 thousand farms |

II. On streamlining the execution of arrests.

1) Prohibit the process of arrests by persons who are not authorized by law, chairmen of RECs, district and regional commissioners, chairmen of village councils, chairmen of collective farms and collective farm associations, cell secretaries, etc.

Arrests can only be carried out by the prosecutor's office, the OGPU or the chiefs of the police.

Investigators can only make arrests with the prior approval of the prosecutor.

Arrests made by police chiefs must be confirmed or canceled by district OGPU officials or by the prosecutor's office of their affiliation no later than 48 hours after the arrest.

2) To prohibit the prosecutor's office, the OGPU and the police from using detention pending trial for minor crimes as a preventive measure.

As a measure of restraint, only persons accused in cases of: counter-revolution, terrorist acts, sabotage, banditry and robbery, espionage, border crossing and smuggling, murder and severe injuries, large embezzlement and embezzlement can be imprisoned pending trial., about professional speculation, about currency dealers, about counterfeiters, malicious hooliganism and professional repeat offenders.

3) Establish the preliminary consent of the prosecutor's supervision in all cases when making arrests by the OGPU bodies, except for cases of terrorist acts, explosions, arson, espionage and defectors, political banditry and counter-revolutionary anti-party groups.

The procedure established in this clause is put into practice for the DCK, Central Asia and Kazakhstan only after 6 months.

4) To oblige the prosecutor of the USSR and the OGPU to ensure the unswerving execution of the 1922 instruction on the procedure for prosecutorial control over the arrest and detention of persons arrested by the OGPU.

III. Unloading places of detention.

1) Establish that the maximum number of persons who can be held in custody in places of detention of the NKYu, OGPU and the Main Directorate of Militia, except for camps and colonies, should not exceed 400 thousand 3 * people for the entire USSR.

To oblige the prosecutor of the USSR and the OGPU, within a two-decade period, to determine the maximum number of prisoners for individual republics and regions (territories), based on the above total figure.

To oblige the OGPU, the People's Commissariat of Justice of the Union republics and the USSR Prosecutor's Office to immediately start unloading places of detention and to bring the total number of those

deprived of liberty from 800 thousand, actually imprisoned today, to 400 thousand within two months.

The responsibility for the exact implementation of this resolution shall be assigned to the USSR Prosecutor's Office.

2) Establish for each place of detention the maximum number of persons who can be held in a given place of detention, based on the above figure of 400 thousand.

Prohibit the heads of places of detention to accept those arrested in excess of the established limit.

3) Determine the deadline for keeping arrested persons in police custody for no more than three days. It is imperative to provide those arrested with bread rations.

4) Suggest that the OGPU, the People's Commissariat of Justice of the Union republics and the USSR Prosecutor's Office immediately organize a review of the personnel of investigating prisoners so that everyone, except for especially dangerous elements, can replace detention with another measure of restraint (surety, bail, recognizance not to leave).

5) In relation to convicts, carry out the following measures:

a) replace imprisonment with compulsory labor for up to 1 year for all those convicted by the court up to 3 years, and consider the rest of the term conditional;

6) send convicts for a term of 3 to 5 years inclusive to the labor settlements of the OGPU;

c) send convicts for a term of over 5 years to the OGPU camps.

6) Kulaks sentenced to a term of 3 to 5 years inclusive are subject to being sent to labor settlements together with their dependents.

7) For unloading the places of confinement and holding specified in paragraphs. 5 and 6 events to organize in each republic, region (region) special regional commissions consisting of: the regional (regional)

prosecutor, the chairman of the regional (regional) court, the OGPU PP and the head of the regional (regional) police department chaired by the regional (regional) prosecutor.

8) In the republics, territories, regions, where the total number of prisoners currently exceeds 30 thousand people, allow the regional commissions to form inter-district exit sub commissions as their subsidiary bodies, so that the decisions of the inter-district commissions are approved by the regional commissions.

9) Provide the right to regional commissions to exempt from being sent to camps and villages, regardless of the term of conviction, the disabled, disabled, old people, mothers with small children, pregnant women, replacing them with imprisonment with forced labor.

In some cases, regional commissions have the right to send especially dangerous elements to the camps, even if they are sentenced for up to 5 years.

10) To carry out unloading in the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, Kara-Kalpakia, propose to the USSR Prosecutor's Office, the OGPU and the Supreme Court of the USSR to send special commissions from Moscow for general management of the work of the republican commissions of these republics.

To oblige the People's Commissariat of Justice of the Union Republics and the People's Commissariat of Health of the Union Republics to completely eliminate typhus diseases in prisons within a month.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov (Scriabin)

Secretary of the PC of the CPSU (b) I. Stalin

1 * Crossed out against. The words inscribed by I.V. Stalin are highlighted in bold.

2 * Crossed out "From indiscriminate and ill-considered."

3 * Crossed out "300".

**From the report of JV Stalin to the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b).
January 26, 1934**

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 3. End of 1930 - 1933. Moscow ROSSPEN 2000. Pp. 839-841

Archive: Stalin I.V. Op. T. 13. S. 317-318, 320-323, 325-328. No. 386

2. The rise of agriculture

The development in the field of agriculture went somewhat differently. Many times, more slowly than in industry, but nevertheless faster than during the period of predominance of individual farming, the growth of the main branches of agriculture grew in the period under review. And in the livestock industry, we even had a reverse process - a drop in the livestock population, and only in 1933, and then in the pig industry alone, there were signs of an upswing.

It is obvious that the enormous difficulties of uniting separate small peasant farms into collective farms, the difficult task of creating a large number of large grain and livestock farms almost from scratch, and, in general, the reorganization period of restructuring and transferring individual agriculture to new collective farm rails, requiring a lot of time and costs - all these factors inevitably predetermined both the slow pace of growth in agriculture and the relatively long period of decline in the development of livestock.

As a matter of fact, the reporting period for agriculture was not so much a period of rapid recovery and a powerful run-up, but a period of creating the prerequisites for such a rise and such a run-up in the near future.

... The years of the greatest height of the reorganization of agriculture - 1931 and 1932. - were the years of the greatest decline in cereal production.

... The most painful reorganization period was the livestock sector of agriculture.

Here is the corresponding table.

Livestock in the USSR:

| | In million heads | | | | | |
|--------------------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | 1916 g. | 1929 g. | 1930 g. | 1931 g. | 1932 g. | 1933 g. |
| a) Horses | 35, 1 | 34, 0 | 30, 2 | 26, 2 | 19, 0 | 16, 0 |
| b) Cattle | 58.9 | 68.1 | 52, 5 | 47.9 | 40.7 | 38.6 |
| c) Sheep and goats | 115.2 | 147.2 | 108.8 | 77.7 | 52.1 | 50.6 |
| d) Pigs | 20.3 | 20.9 | 13.6 | 14.4 | 11.6 | 12.2 |

It can be seen from this table that in terms of the number of livestock we have for the reporting period not an increase, but a still continuing decline in comparison with the pre-war level. Obviously, the greatest saturation of livestock farming branches with large-scale elements, on the one hand, and intensified kulak agitation for the slaughter of livestock, which had fertile ground during the years of reorganization, on the other hand, were reflected in one table.

It follows from this table, further, that the decline in the livestock began from the first year of the reorganization (1930) and continues until 1933, and the decline reached its greatest extent in the first three years, and in 1933, in the first year after the end the reorganization period, when grain crops began to rise, the size of the decline in livestock reached a minimum.

From this table it follows, finally, that a reverse process has already begun in pig breeding, and in 1933 there were already signs of a direct rise.

Collectivization:

| | 1929 г. | 1930 г. | 1931 г. | 1932 г. | 1933 г. |
|---|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| The number of collective farms (in thousands) | 57.0 | 85.9 | 211.1 | 211.05 | 224.5 |
| The number of farms in collective farms (in millions) | 1.0 | 6.0 | 13.0 | 14.9 | 15.2 |
| Percentage of collectivization of peasant farms | 3.9 | 23.6 | 52.7 | 61.5 | 65.0 |

... What are these tables talking about? They say that the reorganization period of agriculture, when the number of collective farms and the number of their members grew at a rapid pace, has already ended, ended in 1932.

Consequently, the further process of collectivization is a process of gradual absorption and re-education of the remnants of individual peasant farms by collective farms.

This means that the collective farms have won finally and irrevocably.

... The strength of collective farms and state farms is not, however, exhausted by the growth of their sown area and production. It is also reflected in the growth of their tractor fleet, in the growth of their mechanization. There is no doubt that in this respect our collective and state farms have made great strides.

Here is the corresponding table.

Tractor fleet in agriculture in the USSR (including depreciation)

| | In thousands of pieces | | | | | Power in thousands of horsepower | | | | |
|----------------|------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | 1929 г. | 1930 г. | 1931 г. | 1932 г. | 1933 г. | 1929 г. | 1930 г. | 1931 г. | 1932 г. | 1933 г. |
| Total tractors | 34.9 | 72.1 | 125.3 | 148.5 | 204.1 | 391.4 | 1003.5 | 1850.0 | 2225.0 | 3100.0 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| including: | | | | | | | | | | |
| a) tractors in MTS | 2.4 | 31.1 | 63.3 | 74.8 | 122.3 | 23.9 | 372.5 | 848.9 | 1077.0 | 1782.0 |
| b) tractors in state farms of all systems | 9.7 | 27.7 | 51.5 | 64.0 | 81.8 | 123.4 | 483.1 | 892.1 | 1043.0 | 1318.0 |

Consequently, 204,000 tractors and 3,100,000 horsepower for collective and state farms. The force, as you see, is not small, capable of rooting out all the petty roots of capitalism in the countryside. Power, twice the number of tractors, which Lenin spoke of in his time as a distant prospect ...

Tractor drivers, combine operators, steering wheels, drivers were trained during the reporting period and sent over 1 million 900 thousand people through the Narkomzem system alone.

More than 1 million 600 thousand people were trained and retrained during the same period of chairmen and members of collective farms' boards, field crop foremen, livestock foremen, accountants.

This, of course, is not enough for our agriculture. But it's still something ...

Can we say that these opportunities have been properly used?

Unfortunately, this cannot be said ...

The presence of a huge park of tractors and machines, it would seem, obliges the land authorities to keep these valuable machines in order, to repair them on time, and to use them at work more or less tolerably. What are they doing in this area? Unfortunately, very few. The storage of tractors and machines is unsatisfactory. The repairs are also unsatisfactory, because they still do not want to understand that the basis of repairs is current and average repairs, and not major ones. As for the use of tractors and machines, the unsatisfactory state of this matter is so clear and well known that it does not need proof.

Stalin's speech. July 2, 1934

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 4. 1934 - 1936. Moscow ROSSPEN p. 186-192

Archive: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1.D. 5324. L. 1-23. **uncorrected transcript.**

No. 66

First of all, the first reason why this question has been raised is the question of the state of collective farms, the growth or stabilization of collectivization, the profitability of collective farms, individual farmers and collective farmers, and the estates of collective farmers and the estates of individual farmers. Why did we raise this question?

Listening to some speakers, one might think that we are almost ready to overestimate all values. For example, Kabakov said 1 * so that it is worth, say, all talk about it when the individual peasant where life is better than the farmer, and in general the sole work gives more benefits than the farm. At least he did it. And the speeches of other comrades revolved around this question. If an outsider, who does not know the history of this issue, listened to us, he would say: things are bad with the collective farms, if the individual peasant cheats us, the village council saddles, he has a horse, and the collective farmer does not have a horse, the individual peasant has more income, and if the personal income of an individual farmer gives more than collective farm labor, then what is a collective farm then?

We know that not because of abstract ideals the Bolshevik party in power, so to speak, operates, mobilizes people, but because of economic interests. That which does not go along the lines of the economy of the working people is denied by us, no matter how beautiful it is, no matter how exciting it is. So, the comrades got carried away in their criticism when they thought that the question was whether the collective farms were profitable or not. The question of whether collective farms are profitable or not profitable has already been decided. People on collective farms sit, work, people do not want to leave. What makes them sit there? Obviously, there are some material benefits, the basis,

the root that enables the collective farm to develop. After all, our collective farms are developing, they are arming themselves technically, their experience is accumulating. This is a new farm. We had no personnel at all. That, what we have created in 2 - 3 years is a very big deal. What does kolkhoz mean? This is a large economy, this is what used to be called economy, landlord estate in terms of its volume. Indeed, for this, the old ruling classes had people. These classes were rich, their sons learned the art of management and learned this art not only in school, but also in practice. We have other classes in power - the working class and the peasantry. These are poor people who did not have the opportunity to learn this art on their own, because it was not they who managed the economy, but they were managed by other owners. Their sons also did not have this opportunity. And if, despite this specificity of the basic character of those classes and their strata that are in power, despite the fact that these are the poor strata, which could not study, if, despite this, people were able to select the necessary cadres, who are leading a large economy forward, it is clear that this very big deal has been done. This, comrades, must not be forgotten. We do not have the question of whether collective farms are profitable or not. Not worth it and will not stand. The question is not and will not be whether it is expedient for individual collective farmers to be on the collective farm or not, because this issue has also been resolved.

And the question is like this. Apparently, the new reality on the collective farms — not only on the collective farms, but in the countryside — has raised a whole series of new questions that our comrades have not yet figured out. That is why they were not talking about what should be said. As if, now we are talking about the rates, as if the rates are weak. This is not what we are talking about, but why our local activists have ceased to pay enough attention to collectivization. They calmed down, they say, everything is done, the victory is complete - this is true, and there is nothing to worry about further, we will go as we are looking for. It is for this purpose, in order to dispel this wrong approach to the matter and against the practice of our attitudes, attitudes that the stability of the collective farm movement is not bad, in order to dispel these vague views ,

So, it is not a question of whether the collective farm system is profitable, whether it is progressive and advanced. This question is not raised, it has been resolved.

There is also no question of whether it is profitable for the collective farmer, as an individual, to be on the collective farm, having a certain part of his personal economy, or whether it is profitable for him to leave and become an individual; this is not an issue, this has also been resolved. There is no question that the rates of collectivization are weak. Nobody demands to speed up the rate of collectivization. We, already a year ago, in 1933, said that there is no need for a forced rate of collectivization 2 *, but we need that collectivization grow by 2, 3, 4% every year, but that collectivization grows. We are not satisfied with stability in collective farms. That's what it is about.

How could it happen that our comrades did not have enough attention for the further growth of collectivization? They calmed down with the latest successes - this is, firstly, secondly, they did not notice some new issues that have now arisen in connection with the new situation - after the victory of the collective farms. The individual re-armed, did not notice it. There should be a certain democracy on the collective farms, but it is often completely destroyed. Does the board of a collective farm or the chairman of a collective farm have the right, for example, to exclude from the collective farm? It does not, in my opinion. And what does the charter say?

Voices from the field. General meetings only.

Stalin. Is this point being fulfilled with us? Not executed. I now know the materials and of the inquiries comrades, that in some areas directly hundreds beating 3 * and are not considered the fact that the means to expel a person from the farm. And this means - doom him to a hungry existence or push him to steal, he must become a bandit. This is not an easy matter, to be expelled from the collective farm, it is not something to be expelled from the Party, it is much worse. This is not to exclude the old Bolsheviks from the Society 62, it is much worse, because your source of livelihood is taken away from you, you are disgraced, firstly, and secondly, you are doomed to a hungry existence.

Then, about the two cows, there is also a lack of clarity. Many in the commission, and we had a commission before the plenum; in the commission, everyone, except Vareikis, spoke for the second cow. Do you know what it smells like? This is a serious matter. I would not say that this is a matter of principle, it can be admitted in certain areas where livestock farming plays a very significant role, it can be admitted here, but this is not the point. After all, we are working out a directive for the entire USSR, and if a slogan is given within the entire USSR - the second cow, what does that mean? It is impossible to understand: on the one hand, they want to reduce to a minimum the individual farming that collective farmers have, to reduce the estates from 2 hectares to tenths, and on the other hand, they want to give a second cow. We must have logic after all. Ambiguity of views. This needs to be clarified. And we tried to clarify by the decision of the plenum, excluding this issue. It is placed incorrectly. It is not a question of a second cow, or of increasing the factors of individual farming on a collective farm. We must not move along this plane, but, on the contrary, we must increase the social share of the economy, not the individual. This does not mean that the individual share should be excluded, I am against it when they say that tenths of shares should be given to the collective farmer for the estate and that's enough. This is not true. In some places you can limit yourself to half a hectare, and in some places hectares, or maybe two hectares, it depends on the situation that the individual share should be excluded, I am against it when they say that tenths of shares should be given to the collective farmer for the estate and that's enough.

It did not go so far as to abstract completely from individual interests. Of course, we are still far from this. When the farms grow up, become real farms, when there is an abundance of food and everything necessary, then the peasant himself will raise the question of this, why should he bother with two cows, isn't it better to get everything he needs at a known minimum price? Have you gotten to this? Didn't get it. You cannot rush from one extreme to another ... 4 * But nevertheless, this meeting consisted of poles and extremes, for example, the second cow. This business will not go from pole to pole.

The third question is about the subsidiary enterprises of the collective farm. Do you know what it smells like? Why do we need collective farms? For field cultivation and animal husbandry. If we raise the question of subsidiary enterprises, then they will forget about animal husbandry. If you want to open factories, factories, then this is nonsense, in my opinion. Where do you get the workers from in the cities? There is no other source here to take workers to the city; where do you get them, if things go better for the collective farms, and they go better, then you can't pull him out of the collective farm with a stick. You know that? After all, we have a country where there is no unemployment, there are no surplus workers. We have a collective farm country. If a collective farmer is given sufficient security, then he will not go anywhere to the plant, but you cannot drag them to underground work even on a lasso. And you are saying that factories and factories should be opened on the collective farm. There is no raw material for this. When collective farms switch from agriculture to the rails of factory reality, they will have to choose one thing: either agriculture or a factory: you cannot not choose. It should be borne in mind that factories have a lot³ *, there are not enough workers, and the further, the more there will be a shortage. When you talk about subsidiary enterprises, you must bear in mind the branches of the same agriculture: fishing, beekeeping. There are industrial centers for industry, and collective farms for agriculture. Mix this, i.e., it is impossible to compare one with the other.

I don't know what Comrade K is about ... 5* said, in general one cannot appeal with such things, one cannot say that Ilyich spoke about it. Ilyich never said that collective farms should be turned into factories and plants. This is what Ilyich said. Such facts cannot be appealed. Collective farms for agriculture, and first of all, the main and most important branches of field cultivation and animal husbandry. Keep in mind that the most profitable type for a collective farm is animal husbandry, the second is gardening and then field cultivation. Field cultivation will give a very big effect when our mechanization goes well, when we improve the cultivation of the land, the fields will be better, then the yield will increase. Productivity will increase when fertilizers are distributed properly, agricultural technology is applied

properly, but collective farms are a new business, one cannot demand that they give much.

That is why we raised this question in order to improve the leadership, while the whole point, if we bear in mind the question of agriculture, is in the formulation of the leadership. This is a weak point in our localities.

If we read all your speeches and notes, then I must say where the main reason is that things are not going so well with collective farms, although they are not going badly, but not the way we would like, although they are going pretty well - our leadership is the reason ...

Who told you to allow an individual peasant to rent land? Who! Why are you allowing this? Who told you to allow an individual to have more farmsteads than a collective farmer? Who! On what grounds?

We ourselves are to blame. Our leadership looked the other way and overlooked here. It's all about leadership.

Why do we still have collective farms with large debts to the state, some old debts that deserve to be forgotten? When individuals moved to a collective farm, some property was there, something helped, and then they put everything together, and even with interest, you, Comrade Grinko, probably collect it?

Grinko. No interest.

Stalin. Can't this case be liquidated altogether? All the same, there is little benefit.

Kalinin. Not really only.

Stalin. Some old debts from the times of agricultural cooperation.

I repeat, comrades, once again that the question is not about a reassessment of values, not about collective farms or individual farming, because one cannot get carried away with such criticism and forget all perspectives, but about how best to conduct business on collective farms. We do not need to force the rate of collectivization at all. It is not necessary because we have already passed the period of

forcing, we finished it in 1932. We need a gradual, but systematic move forward in terms of collectivization, not by means of administration to drive people into the barn, but in the order of economic and agitation measures so that there is no chance not in a single region where the number of households on collective farms fell in total. And it falls here and there. You take comfort in the percentage of all households. This should be taken into account, but it does not solve the problem. If your population has become smaller in the region, they have gone somewhere, therefore, there are fewer households, then you may be able to achieve that the percentage of collectivization is growing. But this is not a real increase in collectivization if the number of households in the collective farm sector has decreased. This is not the growth we need. Move forward, gradually, but move forward, and not stabilize at the same level, because we are far from over with this business, keep in mind. It is during this period, when the matter of collectivization is not finished, that 2-3-4% of individual farms that exist and are dodging are of importance. For the fluctuation of collective farms, this matters. In two or three years, the presence of 2-3-4%, even 10% of individual peasants will not matter that much, because the collective farms will grow, any comparison of the income of the collective farmer with the individual will be removed by history, because the income of the collective farmer will be large. Then maybe this question is irrelevant. But now this income of the collective farms is not so great, we are still building, completing the building of the collective farms, the construction period has not yet passed, there are areas where there are not even public buildings, as Comrade Razumov told us today.⁶ *

Until this construction period is over, for us every percentage of the availability of individual farms - when the income of collective farmers is not so great - matters. You do not console yourself with the fact that few percent of individuals remain. This percentage is scattered across all districts, this is a very active percentage, he is offended, he dodges this way and that, we do not have enough attention and ability to keep up with him. And he does the work of his existence and therefore dodges. And if the case goes to an individual, he, of course, scoffs at the collective farm. And in order for a certain number of farms to fluctuate on collective farms, this is of great importance ... at this stage, in these 2

- 3 years, it cannot be neglected that 1 - 2% of individuals remain. This is also important for the strength of the collective farms, in order to save the collective farmers from hesitation.

You cannot operate with an average figure. They understood that the average figure is nothing. This is not true. But it is impossible to be guided in all work by the average figure, because you also lost sight of those areas and those collective farms that still live poorly, sometimes degrade. This happens in the history of the development of new economic relations. It happened that some enterprises degraded, and capitalism developed. You cannot get carried away by a separate collective farm or region. Why is the average figure bad? Because it smears out concreteness.

In this area, say, 1,000 collective farms, of which 200 collective farms live well. I believe that for these conditions it is good if, for example, 1,000 poods. bread remained from workdays, and 5 thousand more in money, as the Ukrainians reported (voices: right, right). It's good. Out of a thousand 200 collective farms, there are, say, 700 medium-sized collective farms, which are moving forward with hesitation, need to be raised, 100 collective farms literally die (maybe the leaders are bad, they came at the wrong time, or forgot about them), if you bring out the average figure, the situation will be successful, it will turn out, say, an average of 6 - 7 kg, which is not bad, but there are 100 collective farms that do not receive one kilogram. How to deal with them? The average number gets in the way, but it is important for us that the rest catch up. Therefore, all your speeches and all criticism (if we are talking about criticism, whether we are conducting it, whether the enemies are conducting it) revolve around these collective farms. They are carried away by the fact that 700 collective farms live tolerably more or less and do not focus on the fact that 100 collective farms are degrading. This is a live demonstration of all our work. Therefore, they must be raised, and in order to raise them, you cannot be distracted from the average figure. This average figure is indicative for statistics, but if you take it as a symptom, as an indicator of your work, then it will be death. This is what we are talking about.

How to be now? I believe that it would be inappropriate now for us to come forward with the aim of reducing the land of the collective farmers. This is not the time now. You can't do it now. I'm not even talking about the fact that it is impossible to establish the same standards. Different norms are absolutely necessary. I also consider it inappropriate if we would suggest anything else that could narrow the individual economy. In general, this will be a blow to the collective farm, keep in mind. We must find the right time; if you start to attack, then you have to on the individual farmer. Do you think it is possible to admit that the same rate should be kept in the estate for both the collective farmer and the individual farmer? It is necessary to make a difference between the individual and the collective farmer, so that the individual can see what is better on the collective farm.

We now quite often have more farmland for individuals, in fact, and not on paper, more land than a collective farmer. Because the collective farmer is all here, under control, and they know how much of the estate land he has but catch an individual: part of the land is leased, part is seized, part is taken for a while, and business starts. It is necessary to create such a situation in which the individual, in the sense of the individual farm household, would have a worse life, so that he would have fewer opportunities than the collective farmer as an individual farm. Until now, all the time we have been practicing one directive - in everything to maintain a more favorable position for the collective farmer as a social activist in comparison with an individual. And now somehow, they rolled off these rails here and there. How can this be explained? This attitude, this line must be restored in all areas — in the area of taxes, and in the area of trade, and in all others.

It is necessary that in all our work and activity, legislative and administrative, one idea runs like a red thread, that in all this the collective farmer has more rights and privileges than the individual. This does not mean that I am in favor of destroying individuals, arresting, punishing, disrupting and so on. It won't work either. This is not a cost-effective approach.

To take him straight and strangle him is stupid. Individual farming gives us some bread. How much bread did Comrade Kleiner get?

Kleiner. 130 million

Stalin. We cannot put an end to this. But the individual must know that our starting point of view, given by Ilyich, is that we give the collective farm and the collective farmer advantages over the individual.

This advantage must be preserved, but I am opposed to strangling individuals, They must be educated, re-educated and made clear in the manner of economic and financial measures, they will understand this that it is more profitable for them to be on a collective farm than to be in individuals, it is more profitable to give up individual farming and to go to a collective farm or it is more profitable to completely go to the city for work than to engage in individual farming, speculate, rob, steal, engage in horse-stealing, and so on. This is what concerns the estate economy.

As for the farming of individuals, you say that most of them have given up on farming, but some are engaged.

Kosior. Two thirds are engaged.

Stalin. Obviously, it is necessary to strengthen the tax press, but I am against strengthening this press so that the individual has nothing left of it. Here, too, one must have a measure.

Everything in our country should revolve around one line, that the collective farmer as a social worker has more advantages in all branches of labor and work than the individual farmer. If we do this, we will surely get the best individuals on the collective farm. And those who are not able to go to the collective farm will go to the state farms, some will go to the cities to work. Those who are incorrigible, declassified, they will become bandits or hooligans.

These are my considerations, which follow from your speeches and on which, obviously, we will have to make a well-known decision. I think that today we are not in a position to make a decision, because it is not enough to limit ourselves to one general decision, since we have raised

very specific questions. It is possible to make such a decision today: taking into account the exchange of views, instruct our secretaries of regional committees and chairmen of regional executive committees, so that each of them in their area presents their views and their specific proposals in relation to the specific conditions of their area, and not only the area, but also individual areas within the region itself, so that they present their specific proposals, perhaps justified by the attached notes 7*. And the Politburo can use this material and give something suitable, maybe give something general and something concrete in the context of the regional one.

Kalinin. And the village council?

Stalin. You see, the village councils ... I didn't blame them at all. We do not have a legal commission to accuse anyone and put an end to it. But one must bear in mind, Comrade Kalinin, that in some places the village councils have turned into agents of individuals. Who is to blame for this? We are all to blame here, and the village councils are to blame. But the main thing here will ask more of us. After all, the mood that the village councils are nonsense has not yet been overcome. This is our mood is wrong. And not only village councils. Among our party members there are "Marxists" who think that Soviet forms are generally nonsense, there are people like that, I assure you. As a rule, more solid and more experienced people are not sent to the village councils themselves. We send people to collective farms, to MTS, to political departments, but I don't remember that the best people are sent to the village councils. There are people sitting there who are out of work.

Voice. They are already starting to send good workers.

Stalin . It is necessary, in my opinion, to break our assets, so that they pay attention, follow, help the village council, put the best people, shoot the worst.

I think this will have to happen exchange of views, let each region undertake to send its specific proposals, and we will process this matter.

Molotov. There is a proposal to end the debate. No objections? No. There is a proposal to accept Comrade Stalin's proposal. No objections? No. The meeting is closed.

1 * See doc. No. 65.

2 * See: Report of JV Stalin at the January (1933) plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) "Results of the First Five-Year Plan" // Stalin I.V. Op. T. 13.P. 195.

3 * So in the text.

4 * Hereinafter, outlines of the document.

5 * So in the text. Name not set.

6 * See doc. No. 64.

7 * See doc. No. 93-97.

62 The Society of Old Bolsheviks was created in 1922. It was under Istpart, then the Lenin Institute under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). According to the charter, adopted in 1931, the purpose of the Society was to use the experience of the old Bolsheviks in educating young people, to collect historical and party materials. The Society consisted of members of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with continuous party experience of at least 18 years. At the beginning of 1934, the Society consisted of over 2 thousand people. Since 1931 the chairman of the Society - Em. Yaroslavsky. The society of old Bolsheviks was liquidated in accordance with the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of August 2, 1935 (SEI. T. 10. S. 413).

Source:

"Transcripts from the Soviet Archives", 14 Volume, Svitlana M, Erdogan A

Stalin's letter about Bukharin's article "The Economy of the Soviet Country."

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 4. 1934 - 1936. Moscow ROSSPEN p. 200-201

Archive: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.D. 1118.L. 37-39. Copy.

No. 74

JV Stalin's letter to the members and candidates of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) about NI Bukharin's article "The Economy of the Soviet Country" 66.

Members and candidates of the Politburo of the Central Committee: vols. Andreev, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Kirov, Kosior St., Kuibyshev, Mikoyan, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze, Petrovsky, Postyshev, Rudzutak, Stalin, Chubar Tov. Zhdanov Tov. Bukharin and Stetsky

Izvestia, dated May 12, 1934, published Comrade Bukharin's article "The Economy of the Soviet Country." The article caused criticisms tons. Stetsky, circulated to members of the Politburo of 16 May 67 . In view of my proposal to Comrade Bukharin, the latter sent at the end of June to my name "Reply to Comrade Stetsky," to which Comrade Stetsky's counter-reply "On Comrade Bukharin's New Critical Exercises" followed.

I think these latest documents deserve to be sent to the members of the Politburo.

Sending them to the members of the Politburo, I consider it necessary to note that in the dispute between Comrades. Bukharin and Stetsky, Comrade Stetsky is right, not Bukharin.

1. Industrialization cannot be reduced to the creation of "funds" in general, as Comrade Bukharin does 68 , since such a reduction obscures the difference between the "funds" of heavy industry, which are leading and reorganizing the entire national economy, and the "funds" of other branches of the national economy. that are neither leading nor reorganizing. For our policy, the whole point is in this difference.

2. It is impossible to make even a remote hint that our heavy industry has developed ostensibly through some or partial devouring of light industry and agriculture. It is impossible, since it does not correspond to reality, gives slander and discredits the policy of the party. And such, it is true, a distant hint is certainly found in Comrade Bukharin's article 69 .

In this regard, it should be noted that the former right-wingers sometimes try to reduce the difference in the attitudes of the party and the right to the fact that the party was going to the goal, ostensibly with a frontal blow, and the right-wingers went to the same goal in a roundabout, but less painful way, as if they had given the right opportunity, they would arrive at the goal with fewer sacrifices. There is no need to prove that such a "theory" has nothing to do with Marxism. In fact, the right-wingers did not go "towards the same goal", but into a trap set by the class enemy, and if the workers obeyed the right-wingers, they would sit in a trap ... 1 * It seems to me that the vestiges of precisely this counter-revolutionary "theory" from which, apparently, Comrade Bukharin has not yet freed himself, played a role in his article "The Economy of the Soviet Country."

3. It is impossible to reduce the policy of collectivization to the concept of "agrarian revolution", as Comrade Bukharin does 70 . It is impossible, since such an "operation" obscures the main thing that distinguishes the collectivization policy favorably from any other "agrarian" policy towards the peasantry. For our party, the whole point is in this difference. This is, of course, not an argument about "words." This is a question of clarity and certainty in the wording. The strength of the Bolsheviks is that they do not neglect the demands of clarity and certainty.

4. You cannot talk about "classical" and non-classical NEP 71 . You can't, as it confuses the issue and can confuse people. "New" words are needed if they are caused by necessity, create clarity, and give clear advantages. They are harmful if they are not caused by necessity and give off artificiality. The Bolsheviks do not need to play with "new words".

I. Stalin.

1 * Outline of the document.

66 N.I. Bukharin's article "The Economy of the Soviet Country", published on May 12, 1934 in the newspaper "Izvestia", sums up the results of the country's economic development, defines the characteristic features of the economy in that period. Bukharin believed that the most characteristic feature of the economy was the elimination of economic diversity. The socialist structure, according to the author, is "not only a leading principle," "commanding height," "dynamically decisive value," etc. He is "the overwhelming colossus of the entire national economy. He is everything, minus the individual peasant and an insignificant number of artisans." Bukharin considered the problem of new fixed assets and the creation of heavy industry to be one of the most important difficulties in building a socialist economy.

Noting the imbalances in the development of the national economy (a shift towards heavy industry), Bukharin wrote about the difficulties of building socialism in agriculture, about the very significant "costs" in the reorganization of agriculture. At the same time, he emphasized that "it would be extremely wrong to regard both " halves "of the economic whole as separate and isolated forces," the rise of heavy industry led to an acceleration in the rate of development of the entire socialist economy as a whole. The ratio between production and consumption in the second five-year plan, according to Bukharin, is changing towards consumption, which meant "establishing a real connection between both industries", "the interests of production and the interests of consumption, separated in capitalist society, merge under socialism."

Thus, the internal tendencies in the development of socialist society lead to an "unusually efficient society", "a tremendous increase in the productivity of social labor."

67 In a letter dated May 13, 1934, addressed to I.V. Stalin, L.M. Kaganovich, A.A. Zhdanov, Stetsky accused N.I. Bukharin that the article "The Economy of the Soviet Country" "abounds in theoretically incorrect formulations, some provisions represent a relapse of right-wing opportunistic confusion on major issues. "

Stetsky believed that the mention of NI Bukharin in the article of Lenin's definition of the economy of pre-revolutionary Russia as a multi-structured one is an absurd formulation leading to confusion. Further Stetsky noted that the problem of industrialization has been replaced by the "problem of new fixed assets", which in Bukharin include the funds of industry and transport, and agriculture, and this, according to the author of the letter, smears the clear policy of industrialization "and allows you to invest whatever content you want" into it.

According to Stetsky, "Comrade Bukharin's exposition of the sources of accumulation gives off a bad spirit." In particular, Bukharin's indication that "the percentage of the accumulated part turned out to be extremely high" (due to a decrease in the percentage of consumption), which also meant "the export of consumer goods for the import of means of production."

Stetsky also believed that Bukharin absolutely wrongly replaced the policy of collectivization and liquidation of the kulaks as a class with the term "agrarian revolution", an extremely general term and which, as Stetsky wrote, "does not directly express the work done by the party for the socialist remaking of the countryside." And, finally, Stetsky criticized that part of Bukharin's article that spoke of the NEP period. Here the author of the letter did not particularly like Bukharin's phrase: "The turn towards NEP was a retreat." Stetsky wrote that in this and other provisions of the article, "the assertion of Comrade Bukharin's former views on NEP" is manifested.

Summing up his criticism, the head of the department of culture and propaganda of Leninism of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) wrote in conclusion: "Apparently, Comrade Bukharin decided to again act as the theorist setting the tone. Op is original and tries to say, "new words". However, these words sound in the old way, in Bukharin's way. Comrade Bukharin should draw serious conclusions from this clearly unsuccessful and confusing article "(RGASPI. F. 329. Op. 2. D. 2. L. 115 - 117).

68 Apparently, JV Stalin had in mind the following provision of NI Bukharin's article: "One of the most important and central difficulties

in building a socialist economy was, of course, the problem of new fixed assets (new means of production), or still in capitalist language, the problem of fixed capital. "Technical reconstruction", "socialist accumulation", "new fixed capital", "re-equipment of the entire economy", etc. - all these are different formulas to designate, in essence, one question, one task, which boiled down to the movement of productive forces on a new, socialist basis. "

69 NI Bukharin's article contains the following remark about the development of heavy industry, which, apparently, is criticized by JV Stalin: "... the percentage of the accumulated part of the national economy turned out to be extremely high (and because "), The redistribution of productive forces was partially due to other sectors (including agriculture), the ratio between production and consumption developed towards a decisive preponderance of the former ..."

70 NI Bukharin wrote about collectivization: "It was a gigantic agrarian revolution carried out by the proletarian dictatorship with the expropriation of the means of production of the kulaks, a revolution in economic forms, a radical regrouping of class forces. from the industry, i.e., revolution in the technical basis of agriculture".

71 Bukharin mentions the era of "classical" NEP in connection with the consideration of market problems: "The market of the era of" classical "NEP had as its deepest basis a small individual peasant economy, fragmented labor, a peasant household."

Source;

"Transcripts from the Soviet Archives", 14 Volume, Svitlana M, Erdogan A

JV Stalin's speech on the report of VM Molotov. November 26, 1934

A source: The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 4. 1934 - 1936. Moscow ROSSPEN p. 320-326

Archive: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.D. 1118. L. 42-61. **Uncorrected transcript.** No. 117

Stalin . Comrades, it is not customary to applaud in our Central Committee. This is not a meeting or conference.

I took the floor in order to clarify several questions, as I understand them, due to the fact that the speakers, apparently, do not quite understand, did not quite understand the meaning and significance of the introduction of this reform.

What is the meaning of the whole policy of canceling the card system? First of all, we want to strengthen the monetary economy. I will give the roughest formulations so that the comrades do not think that something is being hushed up here. Strengthen the monetary system in the Soviet conditions and does expand trade, replacing the system of turnover or policies of the current or the current policy of the mechanical distribution of products when deemed no longer a need for the region and not with human beings, but with an abstract person, is not considered a consumer 1*. I distributed so many goods, so many breads, take it while it is whole, you will not take it, it will still be lost. This principle needs to be changed. We stood on the basis of trade turnover. We have already stood on the basis of commodity circulation, but we must firmly stand with both feet on the basis of accounting for living people, on the basis of moving towards the consumer. Our consumer is not considered a person now. They gave you rations - live as you know, good or bad. This principle, in my opinion, is stupid, which had its justification, while we did not have enough bread, now it should be banned.

We need to develop in full swing trade in all our economic activity, in our entire sphere through the money economy. Trade turnover is not just trade, not exchange. We need to strengthen the monetary economy.

The money economy is one of the few bourgeois economic apparatus that we socialists must use to the bottom. It is still far from being used, this apparatus. He is very flexible, we need him, we will turn him in our own way so that he pours water into our mill, and not the mill of capitalism. To expand trade, to expand Soviet trade, to strengthen the monetary economy — this is the main meaning of the reform we are undertaking.

We, so to speak, have a fairly well-organized industry, we can produce food, goods, we also have a fairly well-organized agriculture, we can have agricultural products. But all this is not enough. It is necessary to establish a meeting of these products, an exchange between town and country. And it is unthinkable to establish exchange between town and country without commodity circulation under our conditions, without buying and selling. We have separate "leftist" and left-wing radical bourgeois elements in the party who think that it is possible to go from place to career straight to product exchange. It is nonsense. How many times have individual comrades tried to do this and each time they smashed their foreheads? We are now at the stage when the link between industry and agriculture, the exchange of goods and products between town and country, can be produced only through commodity circulation. We are at this stage, and we have not yet used this stage. Only after we use this stage to the bottom, then the question of product exchange can be raised. We did not even use a third of the opportunities for commodity circulation through the money economy, which it provides so that what is produced by industry and produced by agriculture does not go to waste in vain but reaches the consumer. Trade turnover is a necessary link between industrial products and agricultural products. This is the stage at which we are standing, which we must develop if we want to really move our economy forward — I mean the entire national economy. how we use this stage to the bottom, after that the question of product exchange can be raised.

The abolition of the rationing system means that in the field of grain products and cereals, obviously, we will do the same for potatoes, and for sugar we will do the same for manufactory. This means that with regard to the bond, the commodity bond between town and country,

mechanical, blind, clerical distribution, and the distribution of food rations, an end is being put. Tastes, needs, wishes of individual regions, individual consumers should be taken into account by our trading organizations, tastes, both in terms of obtaining a certain amount of goods, and especially the quality of these goods, all various conditions are taken into account. Until this was done, until the third part of this turnover was not used, to talk about the destruction of the money economy, about the replacement of commodity turnover with product exchange, means talking nonsense, absolutely anti-Leninist, anti-Marxist, having nothing to do with Marxism.

So, precisely for the purpose of turning the turnover of goods, for strengthening the money economy in our Soviet conditions, with trade without capitalists and without speculators, it is for this, first and foremost, that the abolition of the rationing system is introduced. The card system, it undermines the foundations of commodity circulation, it replaces trade with simple distribution, it does not take into account the prices in the market, it does not take into account at all. It turns all the possibilities of commodity circulation upside down and, thus, it prevents us from establishing a normal, living, organic connection between town and country, between industry and agriculture, between urban and agricultural products. Here is the first meaning.

It may seem strange that the socialists who have come to power, who have already organized a socialist industry, organized a socialist economy, having such production capabilities, are grasping at the old instrument of the bourgeoisie - trade. But there is nothing strange about that. We used not one or two instruments of the bourgeoisie, of the bourgeois economy. And this tool, the most tenacious in the monetary economy, we use with might and main, if we do not have any card systems. This is now the crux of the question.

So, I repeat, in order to further turn the trade turnover, which provides a link between town and country, trade links, and in order to strengthen the monetary economy in our conditions, since trade turnover is unthinkable without money, we first of all destroy the rationing system for bread, according to these basic goods, because bread pulls everything else along with it. It is with this link that you need to start.

This is the first and main meaning.

The second meaning of the reform that we are introducing is to put on a real basis, on a real living real basis, the policy of reducing prices for all goods and for all products. How are we now? Every trading organization tries to make a cape everywhere. If it's a difficult matter, they want to solve everything in order to raise prices. This chaos, rather, this whole orgy in the price policy must be ended. The meaning of the reform is that we are beginning to put on a real basis the policy of reducing prices for all goods and for all products. This reform itself, it lowers the price of bread. Here Comrade Razumov spoke and spoke about the prices of rations. Is this the price, Comrade Razumov, the ration price? Our ration for black bread a year and a half ago cost 12 kopecks. in Moscow.

Molotov. Even 8 kopecks. 3 years ago.

Stalin. And the price on the market was two hundred times higher. Market prices do not in any way take into account the prices of rations, because, in fact, this is not a price, but a gift from the state to the working class. This is a social class ration for the working class. The ration price is an add-on, but in the strictly economic sense it is not the price of bread, so the market does not consider this. Subsequently, we raised it to 50 kopecks, to 25 kopecks. first, then up to 50 kopecks. ration price per kilo of black bread. For commercial sales they sold for 2 rubles. And what did the market take into account (all these peasants who export grain), with the ration price? Of course not. They focused on the market, on a commercial price, a little higher than a commercial one, a little lower, but it revolved around a commercial price. If, Comrade Razumov, you want to know what the price of bread is, inquire at the market and in commercial stores. Here's the price. As for the ration price, this is not a price, and no one considers it. Nobody. And if the commercial price of bread is 2 rubles. and 1.5 rubles, and now we, this price, are reducing it to 90 kopecks, to 1 ruble, 10 kopecks and so on, and only in the Far East, where there is no own grain, transport conditions are imported, there is only 1 ruble. 30 kopecks - 1 rub. 40 kopecks, this means that we are starting a real real policy of lowering prices for bread, we are starting this reform of lowering prices with

bread, because prices for bread are added up in the market, and the market does not take into account the ration price that was not the actual price, it represented our class policy of giving towards the working class at the expense of the peasant. They took cheap bread, sold it cheaply, did not sell it, but gave it away. So, you have to understand.

This means that the second meaning of the reform is that we are starting a real, real policy of grain prices. In the future, we will continue to reduce prices for bread and all other goods. You will see, in January the month. trade in bread without rations will begin in our country - the price of bread on the market will drop by half. Just remember how the peasant sells bread now, and how he will sell it then - compare. There will certainly be a decline in the prices of bread on the market, the man will first of all reduce it. Consequently, we are organizing a genuine, real policy of lowering prices, starting with grain, and further along the entire line, this policy must go with us. We shouldn't have the old orgy of jumping along the price line anymore. The reform is the setting of a base for the price policy, starting with bread, and for all other products. This is the meaning of this policy.

This is very important for us both from the point of view of animal husbandry and from the point of view of resolving the meat problem. The peasants will only begin to engage in livestock raising when the prices of grain fall, when they realize that it is better to carry grain through livestock and sell their meat than to sell grain. Only after a drop in prices, only after a drop in prices for bread, only after that does the very production of bread develop properly, and the transition from selling bread to selling meat begins, i.e., the consumption of bread will begin for feeding livestock, real feeding for livestock. So, from this point of view, the policy of lowering the prices of bread, it also ricochets the good result that we are laying a real basis for the development of animal husbandry in view of the fact that grain will also be used for the development of animal husbandry. Here is the second result of the price reduction policy.² * (inaudible).

What is the third meaning? The third meaning is that the possibilities of bread speculation are undercut. When there are two or three prices

for bread in life, speculation is obligatory, it is absolutely inevitable. Pricing policy is a very interesting thing, we do not do this very much. When we sold kerosene to MTS for 10 kopecks. a kilo, and a peasant through cooperation for 70 kopecks, of course, all MTS speculated, bought kerosene from us for 10 kopecks, sold for 70 kopecks. After we set one price for kerosene, the kerosene speculation was undermined. It's the same here. There is a commercial price for bread 1 rub. 50 kopecks, and the worker pays 50 kopecks per kilo, then, of course, he sells part of the grain. Even if he sells for a ruble, then 50 kopecks. wins. And the workers do it. I don't blame them, because the system itself is like this, the system of two or three prices is like this, that the most honest person should sell bread and that turns out to be the most honest person. That's how rotten the rationing system has become. Take Leningrad, the best workers, you know this from experience, commercial grain is sold there ten times less than it was before. Bread is sold less than in Kharkov, although the population is twice as large. What's the matter? The workers compete with the state: rationed bread is sold much cheaper than the state, and there is no longer such a need for commercial bread. And this is everywhere, both in Moscow and everywhere in large cities. Petty speculation is enlivened by this system, petty speculation creates rich soil for petty and theft in general, creates the basis for all speculation, both for large and for small: since I buy bread here for cheaper, I sell it at a higher price there, and I profit from it. Cancellation of cards means setting one price for bread within such and such a zone. Two or three prices for the same type of bread will not be within this zone. Are we 6 - 7?

Voice. Eight (92).

Stalin. Within each zone, the price for bread of such and such kind is the same, the same price. Here speculation is difficult. This is the third meaning of this reform - to make it difficult to speculate. And then, do not push honest people from the workers into speculation, because there are a lot of prices - that means pushing the most honest people into speculation in order to turn around and make money. Here are the three main meanings of the economic order, which I wanted to point

out because, apparently, comrades, not everyone clearly understands why we are destroying the rationing system.

How will this affect the health of our trading organizations? It is clear that our trade organizations will have to clean up. You can't do business as dirty as it was up to now: they brought you rations - you want to take it, you don't want it, but if you don't take it, you will lose it.

Kosior. In Chekhov's way - burp what they give.

Stalin. Pop what they give, otherwise they won't give it.

It will have to be a new way, and the quality of the bread will have to be posed the question, so that it is fresh, so that it can be brought in in the morning, there will be many protests and anything, and we will scratch all trade organizations if they do not abandon operations with an abstract consumer, if they will not reckon with a living person who will buy bread for money at the real price.

Kosior. For your own money.

Stalin. So, money will be used, the fashion for money will go, which we have not had for a long time, and the monetary economy will be strengthened. The exchange rate of the ruble will undoubtedly become more stable, and to strengthen the ruble means to strengthen all our planning and cost accounting. No cost accounting is inconceivable without a somewhat stable ruble exchange rate, there is nothing absolute in the world, I am not talking about absolute stability, but there must be some more or less minimal stable ruble exchange rate if you want us to have economic accounting, if you like, so that our planning is not clerical, but real. This will give a huge plus, and this is the fourth thing we get from this reform. This is a huge plus.

Voice. Right.

Stalin. A huge economic plus for our entire economy, for our entire planning, for the organization of industry and agriculture, for everything.

And the fifth plus - the fact that our organizations will clean up, begin to work more carefully and begin, finally, to respect the consumer, to

recognize him as a person, not an animal - this is also a big plus. Until trade organizations learn to respect a person in our consumer, that worker and peasant about whom they talk a lot, we will not have any basis for product exchange.

Some employees from the State Bank are talking about how we will benefit in money from such a reform. In my opinion, it is not correct, this is nonsense. It is not true, as if two or even three billion. Now Comrade Maryasin refuses - "I don't say, they say," but he did. The People's Commissariat of Finance calculates that people think that the workers will buy the same amount of bread as they bought ration, is wrong. The rationed bread did what the workers and employees recruited relatives, assigned them to cards and sold half of the bread. Now there will be no two prices. There is no need for them to recruit relatives. Now you have to buy with money. They will spend more economically, and they will buy less.

If we take industrial workers' centers - Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Kiev, etc., Baku, say, where there are really more or less skilled workers, people with taste who want to live, know how to live, earn as they should, they will buy less grain because now they need to count the money, not what they used to buy for nothing, they will buy less. Therefore, on this we are losing. You raise prices for bread from the point of view of the ration. Firstly, we will compensate for this, although it is not fully compensated on 3 / 4 minimum, and secondly, they buy less bread, then we have minus. And our bankers believe that our worker will buy the same amount. This is not true. He will buy less.

Who will buy more? Those workers and employees who live in the provinces, who did not live according to a special list, not according to the first list, who did not receive 800 g, but less. They bought commercial bread, and they win. They paid one and a half rubles, now they will pay one ruble, 90 kopecks. They will buy more, but at a price less than commercial bread. Again, we get a minus. These people lived on commercial bread. Now, perhaps, they will take twice as much grain, but at a low price, at a ruble or 90 kopecks. Again, a minus.

I'm not even talking about the fact that we have to compensate producers of industrial crops 1 *. What are we winning here, how much are we losing? In general, nothing can be calculated in advance, so guessing, in my opinion, is to write with a pitchfork on the water.

Voice. Right.

Stalin. We also discussed this with Molotov. He was surrounded by all sorts of materials about the fact that we are winning, but when we examined the materials, it turns out nonsense.

Molotov. We do not have such a goal and cannot be.

Stalin. What changes will take place in the market, what will happen to buyers, how will they buy, how much will they buy? One thing is clear that the provincial consumer who turned around in the commercial market will buy more.

Postyshev . He will also save money.

Stalin. No, I'm talking about the benefits of the state from the reform. There may be benefits, but most likely there will be no benefits. You can't guess here.

And now about those areas that have lagged behind in terms of baking. Here is Comrade Kabakov, then Comrade Nosov - he did not sign up, Ivanovo-Voznesensk Region. In some places we have lagged behind. This is very bad, comrades. We must make up for this business. Comrade Here Kabakov read a report 3 * that he is not given one, another, a third. We do not give anything at all, comrade Kabakov, but it is taken, one must be able to take it. And even more so you are in the Urals, with your capabilities, after all, it is nonsense to build a middle type of bakery, bakery, this is nonsense, although the bakery is also not God knows. Uralmashzavod was built, you see, but they cannot organize bakery. This means very little concern for the worker in the Urals.

Voroshilov. Right.

Stalin. In general, I must say, I am one of the few members of the Central Committee who respect Comrade Kabakov as a good organizer, but I

must say that whatever you take up in the Urals, everything says that there is no concern for the worker's life, Well, you just wonder how people live there? How much dirt! What a terrible life, medieval. Comrade Kabakov, you can't live like that. If you wanted, given the opportunities offered by the Urals industry, you would have many more bakeries and bakeries than in Moscow, which had fewer opportunities (applause).

1 * So in the text.

2 * Sharpen the document.

3 * Speech by I.D. Kabakov at the plenum see: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2.D. 536.L. 12-13.

92 The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars "On the abolition of the rationing system for baked bread, flour and cereals and the system for the supply of industrial crops with bread" dated December 7, 1934 (see note No. 100) established 8 price zones for bread: 1) Central Asian republics, a number of regions of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; 2) most of Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Volga region, Western Siberia, with the exception of 2 regions of the Narym okr, referred to the 7th belt, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; 3) central and western regions, Crimea, Dnepropetrovsk and Odessa regions, Chelyabinsk region, ZSFSR, BSSR, most of the Obsko-Irtysh region; 4) Leningrad, Sverdlovsk region, East Siberian region, except for BM ASSR, Chita region. and national districts; 5) Karelian ASSR, Murmansk environs, part of the Northern Territory; 6) Buryat-Mongolian ASSR; 7) most of the DVK, areas of the Northern Territory and the islands of the Arctic Ocean and the White Sea, a number of areas of the Narym, Yamalo-Nenets environs; 8) a number of national regions and districts of the DCK.

"On the procedure for making arrests.

Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "On the procedure for making arrests." June 17, 1935

A source:

The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and dispossession. Documents and materials Volume 4. 1934 - 1936. Moscow ROSSPEN p. 537-538

Archive:

GARF. F. 5446. Op. 1.D. 481.L. 478-479. Copy.

No. 213

Secret.

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) decide:

1. In the amendment of the instruction of May 8, 1933, arrests in all cases, without exception, by the NKVD bodies can henceforth be carried out only with the consent of the relevant prosecutor.
2. If it is necessary to make an arrest at the scene of a crime, officials from the NKVD authorized to do so by law are obliged to immediately report the arrest to the appropriate prosecutor for confirmation.
3. Permits for arrests of members of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Central Executive Committees of the Union republics are given only upon receipt by the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office and the NKVD with the consent of the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR or the chairmen of the Central Executive Committees of the Union republics by affiliation.

Permits for arrests of leading employees of the People's Commissariats of the Union and the Union republics and central institutions equated to them (heads of departments and heads of departments, managers of trusts and their deputies, directors and deputy directors of industrial

enterprises, state farms, etc.), as well as those in service in various institutions of engineers, agronomists, professors, doctors, heads of educational and research institutions are given in agreement with the relevant people's commissars.

4. Permits to arrest members and candidates of the CPSU (b) are given in agreement with the secretaries of the district, regional, regional committees of the CP (b), the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, by affiliation, and in relation to communists holding leading positions in the People's Commissariats of the Union and equated to them central institutions, upon receipt of the consent of the chairman of the Party Control Commission.

5. Permits for arrests of servicemen of the highest and middle command personnel of the Red Army are given in agreement with the People's Commissar of Defense.

6. Permits for arrests are issued in the district by the district prosecutor, in the autonomous republics by the prosecutors of these republics, in the krais (oblasts) - by the krai (oblast) prosecutors.

In cases of crimes on railway and water transport, permits for arrests are issued by district prosecutors, road prosecutors of the basins by affiliation, in cases falling within the jurisdiction of military tribunals - by prosecutors of military districts.

Permits for arrests, issued directly by the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs of the Union republics, are issued by the prosecutors of those republics.

Permits for arrests, issued directly by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, are issued by the Union Prosecutor.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. Stalin.

On assistance to cowless collective farmers in acquiring cows

Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) "On assistance to cowless collective farmers in acquiring cows." August 14, 1933

A source:

Famine in the USSR 1929-1934. Volume 3. Summer 1933 - 1934 M. : MFD, 2011. Pp. 234-236

Archive:

NW USSR. 1933. No. 52. Art. 303.

No. 174

In order to quickly implement the task, set by the party and the government of providing cows to collective farmers who do not have cows for their personal use, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decide to take the following measures:

1. To organize, during 1933, state aid to unhealthy collective farmers of the Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, North Caucasian Territory, Lower Volga Territory, Middle Volga Territory, Central Black Earth Region, Moscow Region, Western Region, Ural Region, , The Kazakh ASSR, Central Asia and the Far Eastern Territory in the acquisition of heifers on preferential terms in the amount of 1,000,000 (one million) heads.
2. For these purposes: a) purchase from dairy collective farms and collective farms with a socialized herd, in the republics, territories and regions listed in paragraph 1, 228 thousand heifers under the age of 8 months; b) purchase 772 thousand heifers under the age of 8 months from collective farmers and individual farmers who have cows for their personal use, by way of purchase with preliminary contract.
3. To approve the following plan for the purchase of heifers in the republics, territories and regions:

In a thousand heads

| | Total | Including | |
|--------------------------------|---------|--|----------|
| | | Due to the offspring of commercial dairy farms and the socialized herd of collective farms | |
| 1. Ukrainian SSR | 275 | 40 | 235 |
| 2. North Caucasian region | 100 | 35 | 65 |
| 3. Central Black Earth Region. | 110 | fourteen | 96 |
| 4. Middle Volga region | 85 | eighteen | 67 |
| 5. Lower Volga region | 70 | sixteen | 54 |
| 6. Ural region. | 80 | 27 | 53 |
| 7. Moscow region. | 70 | ten | 60 |
| 8. Kazakh ASSR | 65 | 45 | 20 |
| 9. Western region. | 50 | 8 | 42 |
| 10. Far-Eastern Territory | fifteen | 2 | thirteen |
| 11. Belarusian SSR | 40 | ten | thirty |
| 12. Central Asia | 40 | 3 | 37 |

4. Do not transfer purchased heifers from one region to another.

5. To oblige the councils of people's commissars of the union and autonomous republics, regional and regional executive committees, the Central Committees of the national communist parties, the regional committees and regional committees of the republics, territories and regions listed in paragraph 1 indicating which part of the heifers should be transferred from one area to another, and follow these plans.

6. Organized on the basis of this decree, state assistance to uncorn collective farmers in the acquisition of heifers should be provided primarily to the best collective farmers-shock workers.

7. Allocated from the offspring of dairy farms and the socialized collective farm herd of heifers to hand over to the members of the collective farm for cash or with installments of up to one year at the expense of worked days.

8. In order to facilitate the acquisition of heifers, provide collective farmers who are unable to pay in cash for their full cost, a monetary loan at the expense of the state, on average, within 50% of the cost of a heifer with repayment in installments up to one year.

9. To provide credit assistance to low power, cowless collective farmers in the acquisition of heifers, allocate 35 million rubles at the expense of the state, including 5 million rubles. to assist in the acquisition of heifers from offspring of dairy farms.

10. State credit assistance should be provided through the regional branches of the agricultural bank, and credit should be provided to each collective farmer separately on the basis of an individual agreement with him. Republican, regional and regional organizations are given the right to differentiate the size of the loan by district.

11. Purchase and contracting of heifers from collective farmers and individual farmers at conventional prices.

12. Collective farmers and individual farmers selling and drinking heifers by contract for sale to cowless collective farmers shall be granted a discount on the delivery of milk to the state in the form of a 25% discount from the annual plan and a privilege on the delivery of meat to the state in the form of a 20% discount from the annual plan.

13. Agreements on the contracting of heifers for this purpose shall be registered with the village councils.

14. The organization of the purchase and contracting of heifers shall be entrusted to the boards of collective farms and oblige the chairmen of the village councils and district executive committees to provide them

with all possible assistance in this matter, and when buying heifers on their collective farm or in a nearby area, it is imperative to attract buyers of heifers - collective farmers and collective farmers to the selection and purchase of heifers ...

15. Suggest the Council of People's Commissars of the Union and Autonomous Republics, regional and regional executive committees, the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, the regional committees and regional committees of all other republics, territories and regions not specified in this resolution, to develop measures within a month to organize the purchase of heifers for collective farmers who do not have cows in their personal use, and submit them for consideration by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). 146

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov (Scriabin)

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. Stalin

146 Immediately after the publication of this decree, active work on its implementation began in the regions. The newspapers quoted Stalin: "Well, we Bolsheviks will try to ensure that all collective farmers have a cow with us" (Pravda. 1933, August 20). "The issue of the heifer is on the agenda," the headlines of the newspapers flashed (Ibid.). How the decision of the Center to provide assistance to cowless collective farmers was implemented can be judged by the resolution of the bureau of the Lebedyanskiy district committee of the Central Chernobyl Organization "On assistance to cowless collective farmers in acquiring cows" dated August 25, 1933 (Central House of National Research, Lipetsk Region, F. 48. Op. 1. D 146. L. 82), the resolution of the Presidium of the Nizhne-Volzhsky regional executive committee and the regional committee's bureau "On assistance to cowless collective farmers in acquiring cows" dated September 3, 1933 (GA of the Volgograd Region F. R-313. Op. 1. D. 259 . L. 159-161).

The specific mechanism for the implementation of the Center's decision to provide assistance to uncorn collective farmers is given an idea and resolution of the bureau of the Ust-Labinsk district committee, the presidium of the district executive committee and the political departments of the MTS SKK

dated August 26, 1933. It approved the figures for the purchase and contracting of cows (heifers) by collective farmers and individual farmers (1070 pieces in the district) from dairy farms. In excess of this amount, the purchase of young animals directly by the collective farmers themselves from individual farmers and collective farmers was allowed. The boards of collective farms and village councils were to provide all possible assistance in this. Credit plans approved. It was allowed to dispense grain waste outside the distribution plan (Central Household Research Institute of the Krasnodar Territory. F. 1471. Op. 1. D. 128. L. 12-13).

Telegram V.M. Molotov and I.V. Stalin to the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR on measures to combat drought.

May 14, 1934

A source: Famine in the USSR 1929-1934. Volume 3. Summer 1933 - 1934 M.: MFD, 2011. Pp. 329

Archive: AP RF. F. 3. Op. 40. D. 92. L. 143. Copy. No. 248

In view of the threat of drought in some regions of the USSR, 206 of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars oblige you:

1. Ensure complete reseeded of dead winter crops.
2. Organize careful monitoring of the state of spring crops, timely informing the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars about the areas subject to reseeded.
3. In addition to the obligatory re-sowing of dead crops, sow an additional 900 thousand hectares of grain crops in excess of the current plan for your republic.

Use for additional sowing areas intended for non-cereal spring crops, but remaining unseeded due to lack of seeds, as well as other free land and partially fallow. Pay special attention to the use of low-lying lands for this purpose.

To ensure an additional sowing plan, we release to you in the order of a seed loan of millet 11,500 tons, buckwheat 1000 tons, sunflower 5000 tons, lentils 5000 tons.

The above-mentioned additional sowing areas are subject to only half of the mandatory grain deliveries.

Inform the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars 3* about the measures you have taken and the breakdown of the additional sowing plan by regions .

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. Molotov

Secretary of the Central Committee I. Stalin

1 * *In the Central Committee of the CP (b) U - S.V. Kosioru, P.P. Postyshev and SNK Ukrainian SSR - P.P. Lyubchenko. Copy - M.M. Khataevich, E.I. Weger, N.N. Demchenko.*

2 * *Appendix to paragraph 120/104 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) No. 7 of May 26, 1934. Adopted by a poll of the PB members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on May 14, 1934.*

3 * *Telegrams of similar content were sent to other regions of the country (see ibid., Fol. 137-144).*

206 *The problem of drought was relevant in the Soviet countryside during all the years of collectivization. Stalin also paid attention to it. For example, on March 23, 1932, in the wake of the arid 1931, he spoke at a PB meeting with a report on the fight against drought, in particular on the irrigation of the arid regions of the Volga, N. Dnieper and Manych (Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) -VKP (b). Agenda of meetings. 1919-1952. Vol. II. 1930-1939. P. 285). The drought problem persisted in 1934. For example, in the summaries of the reports of the deputy chiefs of the political department of the MTS on the work of the OGPU for June 5 and 9, 1934, it was reported about prayers in the Soviet village in connection with the drought (CA FSB of Russia. F. 3. Op. 1 D. 779.L. 355-356, 385-387).*

"On the question of the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class."

Article by I.V. Stalin "On the question of the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class." January 21, 1930

A source:

Politburo and the peasantry: Expulsion, special settlement. 1930-1940 Book I. Moscow. ROSSPEN 2005 p. 38-41

Archive:

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 30.D. 193. L. 12-12 rev. In the case is a copy of the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" No. 18 dated January 21, 1930.

193-10

In No. 16 of Krasnaya Zvezda, in the article "The Elimination of the Kulaks as a Class," which on the whole is indisputably correct, there are two inaccuracies in the wording. It seems to me that it is necessary to correct these inaccuracies.

1) The article says:

"During the restoration period, we pursued a policy of restricting the capitalist elements in town and country. With the beginning of the reconstruction period, we moved from a policy of restriction to a policy of ousting them. "

This position is incorrect. The policy of restricting the capitalist elements and the policy of ousting them are not two different policies. They are one and the same policy. The ousting of the capitalist elements in the countryside is an inevitable result and an integral part of the policy of limiting the capitalist elements, the policy of limiting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks. The ousting of the capitalist elements in the countryside is not yet the ousting of the kulaks **as a class**. The displacement of the capitalist elements in the countryside is the displacement and overcoming of **individual detachments**. the kulaks, who could not withstand the tax pressure, could not stand the system of restrictive measures of the Soviet government. It is clear that the policy of limiting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks, the policy

of limiting the capitalist elements in the countryside, cannot but lead to the ousting of individual detachments of the kulaks. Therefore, the ousting of individual detachments of the kulaks cannot be viewed otherwise than as an inevitable result and an integral part of the policy of limiting the capitalist elements in the countryside.

This policy was pursued in our country not only during the period of restoration, but also during the period of reconstruction, but also in the period after the XV Congress (December 1927), but also during the XVI Conference of our Party (April 1929), as well as after these conferences up to the summer of 1929, when a period of continuous collectivization began in our country, when a **turning point began** in the direction of the policy of **liquidating the kulaks** as a class.

If we consider the most important documents of the Party, starting at least from the XIV Congress in December 1925 (see the resolution on the Central Committee's report) and ending with the XVI Conference in April 1929 (see the resolution "On the Ways of Boosting Agriculture"), then one cannot but note that the thesis about "limiting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks" or "limiting the growth of capitalism in the countryside" always goes alongside the thesis about "ousting the capitalist elements of the countryside", about "overcoming the capitalist elements of the countryside."

What does it mean?

This means that the party does not separate the ousting of the capitalist elements in the countryside from the policy of limiting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks, from the policy of limiting the capitalist elements in the countryside.

The 15th Party Congress, like the 16th Conference, stand entirely on the basis of the policy of "limiting the exploiting aspirations of the agricultural bourgeoisie" (resolution of the 15th Congress "On Work in the Countryside"), on the basis of the policy [""] of adopting new measures to restrict the development of capitalism in the countryside" (see *ibid.*), on the basis of the policy of "decisively limiting the exploiting tendencies of the kulak" (see the resolution of the 15th Congress on the five-year plan), on the basis of the policy of "attacking

the kulak" in the sense of "transition to a further, more systematic and persistent restriction of the kulak and the private trader" (see *ibid.*), on the basis of the policy of "even more decisive economic displacement" of "elements of private capitalist economy" in the city and countryside (see the resolution of the 15th Congress on the report of the Central Committee).

So, a) wrong and the author of the said article, depicting the policy of restricting the capitalist elements and the policy of repression as two different policies. The facts show that we are dealing here with one general policy of restricting capitalism, an integral part and the result of which is the ousting of individual sections of the kulaks.

Consequently, b) the author of the above article is wrong in asserting that the ousting of the capitalist elements of the countryside began only during the period of reconstruction, during the 15th Congress. In fact, the displacement took place both before the 15th Congress, during the restoration period, and after the 15th Congress, during the reconstruction period. During the 15th Congress, the policy of limiting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks by new additional measures was only intensified, in connection with which the ousting of individual detachments of the kulaks was to be intensified.

2) The article says:

"The policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class follows entirely from the policy of ousting the capitalist elements, being a continuation of this policy at a new stage."

This position is inaccurate and therefore incorrect. It is clear that the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class could not fall from the sky. It was prepared by the entire previous period of restriction, and hence the ousting of the capitalist elements in the countryside. But this does not mean that it does not differ **radically** from the policy of restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements of the countryside, that it is, as it were, a **continuation of the** policy of restriction. To say this [,] as our author says, is to deny that there has been a **turning point** in the development of the village since the summer of 1929. To say so is to deny the fact that we have made a **turn** during this period. in the policy of our party in the

countryside. To say so means to create some kind of ideological shelter for the right-wing elements of our Party, who are now clinging to the decisions of the 15th Congress against the **new** policy of the party, just as Comrade Frumkin once clung to the decisions of the 14th Congress against the policy of imposing collective and state farms.

What was the starting point of the Fifteenth Congress, proclaiming an intensification of the policy of restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside? From the fact that, in spite of this limitation of the kulaks, the kulaks **as a class** must nevertheless remain for the time being. **On this basis, the** 15th Congress upheld the law on land lease, knowing full well that the tenants, in their mass, are kulaks. On this basis, the Fifteenth Congress upheld the law on the hiring of labor in the countryside, demanding its precise implementation. On this basis, the inadmissibility of dispossession was once again proclaimed. Do these laws and these regulations contradict the policy of **restricting** (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside? Of course not. Are these laws and regulations contrary to policy of the **liquidation of the** kulaks as a class? Definitely yes. Therefore, these laws and these decrees will now have to be put aside in areas of complete collectivization, the scope of which is growing by leaps and bounds. However, they have already been set aside by the very course of the collective farm movement in areas of continuous collectivization.

Can it then be asserted that the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class is a continuation of the policy of restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside? It is clear that it is impossible.

The author of the aforementioned article forgets that it is impossible to oust the class of the kulaks, as a class, by means of tax and any other restrictions, **leaving** in the hands of this class the instruments of production with the right to free use of land and **keeping** in our practice the law on hiring labor in the countryside, the law on rent, the prohibition dispossession. The author forgets that with the policy of limiting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks, one can count on ousting only individual groups of the kulaks, which does not contradict, but, on the contrary, presupposes the **preservation** for the

time being, until the time of the kulaks as a class. To oust the kulaks as a class, the policy of restricting and ousting its individual units is not enough. To oust the kulaks as a class, it is necessary to **break** in open battle the resistance of this class and deprive it of the productive sources of its existence and development (free use of land, tools of production, rent, the right to hire labor, etc.). This is a **turn** towards the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class. Without this, talk about ousting the kulaks as a class is empty chatter, pleasing and beneficial only to the Right deviators. Without this, no serious, let alone complete, collectivization of the countryside is inconceivable. This is well understood by the poor and middle peasants of our village, who are crushing the kulaks and carrying out complete collectivization. It is not yet understood, apparently used some of our comrades.

Consequently, the present policy of the Party in the countryside **is not a continuation of the** old policy, but a **turn** from the old policy of **restricting** (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the countryside to a new policy of **eliminating the** kulaks as a class.

I. Stalin

- *Published: Stalin I. Questions of Leninism. 11th ed. M., 1939.S. 295-298.*

and Here and so on in the document, it should be wrong.

b So in the document.

Telegram I.V. Stalin to the party organizations on collectivization and "dispossession". January 30, 1930

A source: Politburo and the peasantry: Expulsion, special settlement. 1930-1940 Book I. Moscow. ROSSPEN 2005 pp. 48-49

Archive: AP RF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 193. L. 22. Certified typewritten copy of that time. 193-19

Top secret.

Not for print.

To all Party organizations .

Local reports are being received indicating that organizations in a number of regions have abandoned the cause of collectivization and have concentrated their efforts on dispossession of kulaks. The Central Committee explains that such a policy is fundamentally wrong. The Central Committee points out that the policy of the party consists not in naked dispossession, but in the development of the collective farm movement, the result and part of which is dispossession. The Central Committee demands that dispossession should not be carried out without connection with the growth of the collective-farm movement, that the center of gravity be shifted to the construction of new collective farms, based on a truly mass movement of the poor and middle peasants. The Central Committee reminds that only such an attitude ensures the correct implementation of the party's policy.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) Stalin .

30.1.30 g.

- At the top left of the typewritten outgoing document number and date: "30.1.30 ."

- RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 38. L. 15. Typewritten original, signature - autograph.

- Published according to a copy of RGASPI: The Tragedy of the Soviet Village. T. 2.P. 131.

The case contains a cover letter on the letterhead of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), sent on January 30, 1930 by the assistant to the secretary of the Central Committee I.V. Comrade to members and candidate members of the Politburo, members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and members of the Central Committee, on the sending of the latter, on behalf of I.V. Stalin " to provide a copy of the Central Committee directive to all party organizations on the question of collectivization." Tovstukha's signature is a facsimile (fol. 21).

Telegram I.V. Stalin about preparation "for the reception and resettlement of kulak farms." February 16, 1930

A source: Politburo and the peasantry: Expulsion, special settlement. 1930-1940 Book I. Moscow. ROSSPEN 2005 p. 100

Archive: AP RF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 193. L. 85. Typewritten copy of that time, certified by S. Parshin, an employee of the Politburo Secretariat. 193-64

Telegram I.V. Stalin to the secretary of the Ural regional committee of the CPSU (b) I.D. Kabakov on the preparation "for the reception and resettlement of kulaks" 43 February 16, 1930

By cipher

Top secret

Sverdlovsk To the Secretary of the Uralobkom Kabakov

The Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary that the Uralobkom take all the necessary preparatory measures for the reception and resettlement of at least 20 thousand kulak farms by mid-April, relocated according to the Central Committee's plan. Please report on the measures taken. No. 13 / s.

Stalin.

February 16, 1930

- At the top left it is written by hand: "Comrade. Tovstukhe".

43 Telegram from the leadership of the Ural regional committee of the CPSU (b) I.V. Stalin - doc. No. 193-68.

In total, by May 1930 in the Ural region. 17,835 families, 85,134 people were moved from other regions and territories of the country, incl. from the North Caucasus - 10 595 families (51 577 people), from Belarus - 4468 families (21 273 people), Crimea - 2772 families (12 284 people). Head of the OGPU task force S.V. Puzitsky noted in his report of May 6, 1930 that "despite the short period for preparation for admission, for a large number of infused kulaks and for the winter, nevertheless, the

workers of the PP of the OGPU of the Northern Territory and the Urals were generally satisfactorily placed with the assigned task "(The tragedy of the Soviet village ... T. 2. P. 424).

On the fight against "distortions of the party line in the collective farm movement."

Cipher telegram I.V. Stalin to the secretary of the Ural regional committee of the CPSU (b) I.D. Kabakov on the fight against "distortions of the party line in the collective farm movement." March 22, 1930

A source: Politburo and the peasantry: Expulsion, special settlement. 1930-1940 Book I. Moscow. ROSSPEN 2005 p. 167 Archive: L. 176. A typewritten copy of that time, certified by S. Parshin, an employee of the Politburo Secretariat, on April 3, 1930. 193-107

Top secret.

Copy.

Sverdlovsk Uralobkom Kabakov.

According to information in the Urals, the distortion of the party line in the collective farm movement is still continuing, the instructions of the Central Committee are ignored, and the approximate charter of the artel is not being implemented. According to the same information, there is a massive collapse of collective farms, seeds and cattle are being taken apart, sowing is disrupted. Please inform us briefly about the state of affairs in connection with this information, inform about the state of collective farms, about the prospects for sowing and expanding the spring wedge. No. 26 / s 66

Stalin.

22.III.30 g.

- Top left printed: " Archive of the II sector "

66 Telegram from I.D. I.V. Kabakova Stalin - doc. No. 193-109.

"On the legal status of labor settlers"

Edition of the draft SNK USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "On the legal status of labor settlers", prepared by the UD SNK USSR. October 15, 1939

Archive source:
Politburo and the peasantry: Expulsion, special settlement. 1930-1940
Book II. Moscow. ROSSPEN 2006 p. 625-627
Archive:

GA RF. F. R-5446. Op. 25.D. 32.L. 91-89. A typewritten copy made by the staff of the USSR Council of People's Commissars Administration.

P-315

Top secret

RESOLUTION

OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR and the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the CPSU (b)

"" October 1939

Moscow Kremlin

On the legal status of labor settlers

In order to clarify the legal status of the labor settlers, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the AUCP (b) DECIDE:

1. Suggest to the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs:

a) to release from labor settlements persons evicted in accordance with the Order of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 775-146 from April 20, 1933 - convicted by the courts, b. bodies of the OGPU and the bodies of the NKVD of the USSR, by which the established term of punishment has expired, having issued the released passports with restrictions on the right of residence in the areas specified in the appendix to this Resolution.

b) persons moved into labor settlements on the basis of the said Decree, whose terms of stay in labor settlements have not been established, leave to live in labor settlements, transferring them to the position of administrative exiles, setting a 5-year period of stay from the moment of eviction.

All who have been in labor settlements for at least 5 years shall be released from labor settlements by issuing passports to them with the restriction specified in paragraph "a" of Art. 1 of this Resolution.

NOTE: To establish that any resettlement of labor settlers outside the areas within the krajs (oblasts) may be carried out with the permission of the police.

2. Children of labor settlers living in areas of labor settlements falling under the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1143-280 from October 22, 1938 [,] enjoy the unhindered right to leave the areas of labor settlements.

3. In accordance with the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 986-236 of September 9, 1938, labor settlers and their families, as well as persons living in labor settlements, transferred to the position of administrative nobles, may be members of non-statutory agricultural and fishing artels.

4. The economic and labor activity of these artels is regulated by the charter of the artel, the board of the artel and the Resolutions of the general meetings of the members of the artel, as well as by national decrees and orders.

Labor activity of labor settlers working in construction, timber rafting and production is regulated by labor agreements concluded between economic agencies and labor settlers.

For malicious failure to fulfill their obligations under labor agreements with economic agencies, labor settlers are prosecuted under Art. 131 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding articles of the UCC of other Union Republics.

5. Propose to the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of labor settlers working in construction, timber rafting and other sectors of the national economy under labor agreements concluded between them and economic agencies, to issue passports with a note in column 10: "Suitable for living in such and such an area."

Allow the families of labor settlers to live with the head of the family who works as a permanent worker in production.

6. To oblige the People's Commissariat of the USSR to complete in 1939 the issuance of acts for the perpetual use of land to the statutory agricultural cooperatives of labor settlers.

7. Labor settlers who have not been personally discredited by anything, who have served a 5-year period of stay in labor settlements and who have married citizens from among non-labor settlers, are allowed to live in all points of the USSR, except for the items listed in the Appendix to this Resolution.

To propose to the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs not to interfere with the departure of these persons to the places of residence of their choice, indicated in the Appendix to this Resolution, and the issuance of the corresponding passports to them.

8. To abolish the commandant's office of the NKVD of the USSR in labor settlements from November 15, 1939.

Observation of order in labor settlements, as well as measures to prevent escapes from labor settlements, shall be entrusted to the precinct and regional offices of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Police of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

9. Permit the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to increase the size of the police in the areas of labor settlements accordingly by reducing the staff of the NKVD commandant's offices of the USSR.

10. Propose to the NKF of the USSR to increase the corresponding allocations in the state budget for the maintenance of additional contingents of the precinct and district apparatus of the RK Police.

11. To consider as invalid:

a) Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 130 s of 1 / VII-1931,

b) Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 775-146 from 20 / VI-1933.

c) Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 174 ss of 16.III.1931 and

d) Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) No. 91 of January 17, 1936.

in parts that contradict this Resolution.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (V. MOLOTOV)

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) (I. STALIN)

On l. 91 handwritten notes (autographs): 1) "<SNK USSR> + in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) A. Vyshinsky", 2) "For - item 7 is not clearly formulated. It is not specified whether this clause applies to all, or to those [who] have expired. Bulganin ", 3) " for N. Voz [nesensky] ". On l. 89 at the bottom left of the typewritten clerical note with the date "15.X.39." (dated from this litter), under it signatures - autographs: "P. Ivanov. 15 / X-39 ", the second is illegible, date " 16 / X 39 ".

The draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on the legal status of labor settlers, proposed by the NKVD. At the earliest June 1, 1939

A source: Politburo and the peasantry: Expulsion, special settlement. 1930-1940 Book II. Moscow. ROSSPEN 2006 p. 618-620

Archive: GA RF. F. R-5446. Op. 32.D. 25.L. 56-54. Typewritten copy of that time.P-309

Top secret

RESOLUTION

OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR and the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the CPSU (b).

" _ " _ 1939. Moscow. Kremlin.

On the legal status of labor settlers.

In order to clarify the legal status of the labor settlers, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the AUCP (b) DECIDE:

1. Labor settlers (formerly kulaks expelled from areas of complete collectivization) and their families, in accordance with the decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of 25 / I-1935, are assigned to live in the areas of their settlement without the right to leave these areas, with the exception of children labor settlers falling under the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1143-280 from 22 / X-1938 and who have married non-labor settlers.

Any resettlement outside the districts within the krais (oblasts) may be carried out only with the permission of the RK Police.

2. To propose to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR:

a) to release from labor settlements the persons evicted by the order of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 775-146 from April 20, 1933 - convicted for a period of time by the courts, former organs of

the OGPU and organs of the NKVD of the USSR, to whom the established term of punishment has expired passports with restriction of the right of residence in the areas specified in the annex to this resolution.

b) the persons moved into labor settlements on the basis of the said decree, whose terms of stay in labor settlements have not been established, should be left to live in labor settlements, transferring to the position of administrative exiles, having established a 5-year period of stay from the moment of eviction. After the expiration of a 5-year term, release from labor settlers, issuing passports to them with the restriction specified in paragraph "a" of Art. 2 of this resolution.

3. Children of labor settlers living in labor settlements falling under the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1143-280 from 22 / X-1938 [,] enjoy the unhindered right to leave the areas of labor settlements.

4. In accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 986-236 dated 9/IX-1938, labor settlers and their families, as well as persons [,] living in labor settlements, transferred to the position of admiral [,] may be members of statutory agricultural and fishing artels.

5. The economic and labor activities of these artels are regulated by the charter of the artel, the board of the artel and the resolution of the general meetings of the members of the artel, as well as by national decrees and orders.

Labor activity of labor settlers working in construction, timber rafting and production is regulated by labor agreements concluded between economic agencies and labor settlers.

For malicious failure to fulfill their obligations under labor agreements with economic agencies, labor settlers are prosecuted under Art. 131 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the corresponding articles of the Criminal Code of other Union Republics.

6. Propose to the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to issue to labor settlers working in construction, timber rafting and other

sectors of the national economy, under labor agreements concluded between them and economic agencies, passports with a note in column 10: "Suitable for living in such and such an area."

Allow the families of labor settlers to live with the head of the family who works as a permanent worker in production.

7. To oblige the USSR People's Commissariat of Agriculture to complete in 1939 the issuance of acts for the perpetual use of land to statutory agricultural cooperatives of labor settlers.

8. Labor settlers who are not personally defamed by anything, who have married citizens from among the non-labor settlers, are allowed to live in all points of the USSR, with the exception of those listed in the appendix to this resolution.

To propose to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs not to interfere with the departure of these persons to their chosen places of residence and the issuance of appropriate passports to them.

9. To abolish the commandant's offices of the NKVD of the USSR in labor settlements from 1 / X1-39.

Observation of order in labor settlements, as well as measures to prevent escapes from settlements, shall be entrusted to the precinct and district offices of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Militia of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

10. To allow the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to increase the size of the police in the areas of labor settlements by reducing the staff of the NKVD commandant's offices.

11. Propose to the NKF of the USSR to increase the corresponding allocations in the state budget for the maintenance of additional contingents of the precinct and district apparatus of the RK Police.

12. To consider as invalid:

a) Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 130 s of 1 / VII-1931.

b) Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 775-146 from April 20, 1933;

c) Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 174 ss of August 16, 1931 and the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) No. 91 of January 17, 1936 in parts that contradict this resolution.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (V. Molotov)

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) (I. STALIN)

On l. 56 at the top right is a stamp of the Secret Department of the USSR Council of People's Commissars Administration with the handwritten date "11 / X-1939" and the incoming number. Dated from document P-308.

About the uprising in Georgia. JV Stalin

From the encryption programs about the uprising in Georgia. JV Stalin
- in the Transcaucasian Regional Party. September 2, 1924

Archive source: Soviet village through the eyes of the Cheka-OGPU-
NKVD. 1918-1939. Documents and materials. In 4 volumes / T. 2. p. 239
Archive:CA FSB RF. F. 2. Op. 2. D. 86. L. 40. Certified copy.

No. 171

24 hours

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The decree of the Politburo of September 2 is passed on: "The Central Committee accidentally learned from the GPU that it was not doing well in Georgia. Khomeriks, Chkhikvishvili were sentenced [to] execution, which is a sentence on the execution of 25 Mensheviks, Endeks. I accidentally learned about the execution of 182 people. Quite by chance we learned from the NKVD - GPU and RVSR that we lost a number of points in Georgia and captured Makharadze, Sturua, Dolidze, Ruben and others. Despite a number of requests and demands of the Central Committee, Zakkraikom is silent, does not inform. The Central Committee considers this situation intolerable. The events [in] Georgia are of great general political significance. The Central Committee, demanding decisive action to suppress the uprising, categorically rejects the policy of mass executions of those arrested. The Central Committee demands an immediate suspension of executions based on the decisions of Zakchek.

The Central Committee demands from the Zakkraikom complete, objective, systematic information and presentation of a plan of his work for the coming days in connection with the uprising. An independent solution of the most important issues of the all-Soviet policy of Zakchek and the Zakkraikom is unacceptable "1 *.

*1 * The document contains the following label: "This document was reported by Comrade Kuznetsov on July 30, 1953, by the Deputy Minister to Comrade IA Serov. An instruction was received to store it in a special archive. "*

Transcript of JV Stalin's speech "on the study of the history of the CPSU (b)."

Transcript of JV Stalin's speech at a meeting of propagandists and leading workers in the propaganda of Moscow and Leningrad "on the study of the history of the CPSU (b)." September 27, 1938

Archive source: I. V. Stalin. Historical ideology in the USSR in the 1920s-1950s: Correspondence with historians, articles and notes on history, transcripts of the speech Collection of documents and materials Part 1.

Archive: RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.D. 1122.L. 1-18. Typescript

Stalin: Comrades, this is not a meeting here. That you are only wasting time with applause? I did not expect qualified people to applaud. It won't do.

In order for the debate to go on the right track, and not to be scattered in various unnecessary streams, I consider it necessary to say a few words.

Why was the meeting called? Comrade Zhdanov has already spoken. You all praised that the book is this, the book is that gives everything, and so on. We do not need praise here, but help, help in the form of amendments, in the form of comments, in the form of instructions originating from your propaganda experience. This is what is needed, not praise or applause.

Be so kind as you are conducting propaganda, you have experience, you are dealing with living material, with people. Tell us how you process their heads, what came of it. Tell me how to make the propaganda go better, but it goes badly, goes badly. These questions need an answer, and this will be help for the Central Committee. The Party Central Committee cannot know, cannot embrace everything. He needs your help. You must provide this assistance to the Central Committee.

Praise is not needed here.

Here's the first point.

Second. How does the Central Committee view this book? It does not give everything and cannot give everything, which is why it is called a short course. This means that there must be a complete course.

Recently I looked again at the history of the German Social Democracy of Mehring. A wonderful man Mehring is a Marxist, well educated, but he must be pitied. The history of the Germans is very poor. What, strictly speaking, has been written about in the history of German Social-Democracy? They have several pretentious moments, they fought there with ... (inaudible)..., but then they got rid of him and calmed down. Compare this material from the history of German Social-Democracy with the material of our Party: after all, we have such wealth, comrades, that one can drown. This means that the material is terribly rich, our party has gone through a very serious history, one might say, turned upside down the whole life of the people and thinking, turned it upside down. To think that such material, at least in the main part, can be embraced, at least in a short course, would be a mistake, comrades.

It's impossible.

The book that is being published is just a short course. The bias of this book is towards theoretical questions. This was a special assignment of the Central Committee. Until now, our party history has been written from a different angle - no offense will be told to the authors of history textbooks, I do not want to hate them, these are people who have worked conscientiously and have done a lot of good, who have given great benefit to our party - but still that way, to which our textbooks were - not good. This was the way of educating people on faces, praising these faces. Not all, but almost all of them. Here, too, Comrade Shlensky makes a remark that the role of individuals is not sufficiently noted in the book. As if this is the case. After all, we were presented with a well-known draft of the textbook, we have completely revised it. The draft of the textbook was built on faces, mainly who behaved heroically, who fled from exile how many times, who suffered how much for the cause, etc. etc.

Is it possible to build a textbook on this? Is it possible to educate personnel on this?

Personnel must be educated on ideas, on theory. What is theory? Theory is knowledge of the laws of historical development. If this knowledge is there, then there are cadres, and if people do not have this knowledge, it is not cadres, it is an empty space.

And what will the faces give us? I do not want to oppose ideas to faces, although, of course, we will have to talk about faces, but to speak to the extent necessary. But salt is not in faces, but in ideas, in a theoretical bias. There should be a theoretical bias. The Central Committee thinks that the party will gain from this, it will only gain.

Here's a second note.

Third remark. I would like to say about our ideological economy.

It is believed that we have IMEL. IMEL is a treasure house of sources, works of Marx, Engels, Lenin. Very well. The people who worked on this textbook had to delve rather seriously into all the existing works of different periods. You cannot imagine what kind of mismanagement in this ideological economy! Take this fact. It seems that the eighth volume of Lenin's works, or the thirteenth, I forgot, is where Lenin's work "Materialism and Empirio-criticism" is placed ...

VOICE : Thirteenth volume.

STALIN : Yes, the thirteenth volume. The book is polemical, remarkable in its content, you yourself know that and there is nothing to say about it, a book that played a decisive role in the ideological development of our party. And as appendices there are reviews of this book, reviews of a hostile nature. There are four or five reviews as an appendix to the book. Here we are, the Marxists of the IMEL, are publishing Lenin's book and this book contains an appendix - reviews that cover Lenin, and there is no answer. And how to block them from these reviewers? And this is called a careful attitude to our ideological economy! Why was it necessary - to add an application? Who needs it for the review of the Orthodox to show off there, where she, this Orthodox, covers Lenin

in both tail and mane, and no one answers her? Or some Ilyin. There are 4-5 reviews there.

VOICE : Nevsky is there.

STALIN : I don't touch the Nevsky. His article can hardly pass for a review. And I meant reviews that were published in the press, reviews of people not ours, hostile to what Lenin defends.

What can the comrades answer to this? How could this happen? What did we want to publish - a book by Lenin or a discussion collection? The result was a discussion collection, and with the provision of the last word to the reviewers - opponents of Lenin.

Take translations. There is a collection of works by Marx and Engels, I think 25-24 volumes. Cope, wrong translation. In the most interesting place there is a distortion, a gross and conscious distortion. What he did not say is attributed to Engels. You take other translations, you take Lenin, and if he has doubts about the translation of a word, he inserts a French or German word from the text that is completely different. Who should think about this?

And our people, our cadres, they cannot be satisfied with a short course in the history of the party, in any way, they must master the primary sources. The original sources, which have been translated long ago, are useless, the translation is incorrect, we have to use old translations to restore the face of the author of the book, the same Engels and Marx. Well, Comrade Adoratsky? Doesn't work like that! Our ideological economy is very neglected, comrades, very neglected. We need to take a critical approach; we need to liquidate this case in IMEL. There was sabotage on the ideological front, which was allowed by the translators. It is necessary to liquidate this case and, if possible, if not so difficult, to withdraw these reviews of Lenin's book. How did they get there and who instructed you to publish these reviews of Lenin's book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism? Who instructed you to publish this collection of articles with the last word, I repeat, to Lenin's opponents?

Here is the third remark - about mismanagement in our ideological economy.

And the fourth remark. To whom is this book addressed, to what audience? So, I read on the pages of Pravda, Izvestia and other newspapers, Komsomolskaya Pravda - they all drag a book to the factory, organize circles there and do not see that there are other strata of the population besides the workers and do not ask themselves the question - to whom is this book addressed, to what audience?

The book, comrades, is serious in the sense that it has a great bias towards theoretical problems. This is done on purpose because it is in the field of theory that our people are lagging behind. We have a backlog of our staff. They are loaded with practical questions, tens of thousands of practical questions, they are unable to raise their heads from practical questions, they are not able to. Where should they study theory? They lagged behind theory. And we must begin to eliminate this backwardness and start actively. This is the initiative taken by the book, and hence the bias towards theoretical problems. If we are talking about saboteurs, about Trotskyists, then you should bear in mind that not all these saboteurs are Trotskyist-Bukharin, not all of them were spies.

The leading people of them were spies, they called it cooperation with fascist states. But they had their own, so to speak, mass. I won't say that they were spies, they were our people, they went crazy afterwards. Why? They did not turn out to be real Marxists, they were weak in theory.

What is theory? This knowledge of the laws of the development of society, this knowledge makes it possible to orientate in the situation, but they did not have this orientation, they turned out to be bad Marxists, bad, we educated them badly. That is why, among other things, it is necessary to focus on the theoretical training of our cadres, on the theoretical Marxist training of our cadres. If any fascist appears, so that our cadres know how to fight him, and not be afraid of him, and not retreat and bow before him, as happened with a significant part of the Trotskyists and Bukharinites, who were our people, and then went over to their side. And don't think that all these cadres who helped the Trotskyists and Bukharinites were their cadres. Among them were our people, who then went crazy and will continue to go crazy,

So, who is this book addressed to? To cadres, not to rank-and-file workers in factories, not to rank-and-file employees in institutions, but to those cadres about whom Lenin said they were professional revolutionaries. The book is addressed to the leading personnel. First of all, they need to be turned properly, theoretically shod, then the rest will go.

Therefore, when going to plants and factories, we must not forget that we have student youth, and student youth are the future command staff of our entire state.

What is a learner? Many of you still have a rather strong vestige of Makhaevism. Makhaevshchina is a "theory" that believed that in general the intelligentsia should be beaten in the party, we need, they say, calloused hands, etc. And now things have turned out in such a way that you don't need to have corns in order to work at the plant. Our factory is something like a laboratory, something like a pharmacy, where it is clean and there are no corns. Good or bad? In my opinion, good, very good. Corns are a thing of the past.

So, there are still survivals of this Makhaevism, and the expulsion of the intelligentsia reigns in the minds of some comrades. The exile case is no longer coming out. But there is disregard for the intelligentsia that runs the country. The intelligentsia is all people who are in the leading cadres. This is the intelligentsia. A person who yesterday was a worker or a peasant, and as soon as a person left the field or factory and began to work with his head, he is an intellectual.

I would like to say such a theoretical idea that we want to turn the entire working class and all the peasantry into the intelligentsia, to raise their level. Then miracles will really start in all branches of construction. Disdainful attitude towards the intelligentsia, towards yesterday's worker will not come out. As long as he was a worker and stood at the machine, he was respected. But he was nominated later, as a capable man, he went to study, they spit on him - "the intelligentsia". On what grounds? What wildness? This is not our theory; this is not Marxism or Leninism. This is bourgeois old stuff. When we were not in power and did not rule the country, we were in opposition, and the intelligentsia

was alien, bourgeois, we could bully it, because it did not serve the people. That time has passed. And now, when we have been in power for 20 years and we ourselves insist that no class can hold on to power, if he fails to create his own intelligentsia. With the help of God and with your help, we will create this intelligentsia. Almost created. Yesterday's worker, yesterday's peasant is torn away from direct work, from production and sent to school, but he is accompanied by a curse. There are people who, if a person has moved away from the workers, does not work at the machine, has moved away from the peasants, does not work in the field, they believe that this is a stranger.

I repeat, this is savagery, this is dangerous savagery.

Not a single state without employees, without commanding personnel in terms of economy, politics, culture, not a single state can govern the country like that. After all, our state, how does it differ from any bourgeois state? The fact that it has absorbed all the main lines of economy and culture.

If we consider the economy of a bourgeois state, and its budget, this, so to speak, is not even a drop in the ocean in comparison with what the state and its economy represent in our country. The state has absorbed all industry, almost all of it; the state has absorbed quite significant channels in agriculture; the state took into its own hands the direct management of the peasant economy, collective farm economy. This is a huge organism of the country's governing.

How can one do without the intelligentsia here?

Let's assume. Either we create our own intelligentsia and respect it, or we take a course towards respecting the intelligentsia that stands out, or we will surround this student youth - these our future commanders of all branches of management, we will surround them with attention and respect, - or we will do it, or we will be lost. Here are the calloused hands. A bourgeois will come, he will hit in the face, but he will not be able to build, - here you have to work with your head. There are schools for this.

Employees, management apparatus. As you wish, we have about 8 million employees. Just imagine. This is the apparatus with which the working class runs the country and conducts domestic and foreign policy. How can this apparatus not be processed in the spirit of Marxism? If we despise him, the person who works there - an employee, since he is not a worker, he does not stand at the machine, he is not a peasant, he does not work in the field, but here he works in the management, if we do not surround him with respect and attention, in order to make him a real Marxist, and if we treat him with disdain, then we will destroy the state and will benefit only our enemies.

The book is addressed to these people - to cadres and cadres studying in schools. This is the first and main audience to whom the book is addressed - to the personnel. In other words, specifically to employees who work intellectually. I mean employees in the army; the commanding staff are employees. I mean our business executives, the leaders of our industry, our agriculture — they are employees, public education, teachers. Take 500 thousand teachers alone. This book is addressed to them.

This is the commanding staff, the employee, in relation to whom, in general, disdain is sometimes manifested in people of the Makhaevian persuasion. It is with these people that we must begin the turn of our cadres towards their Bolshevization, and especially the student youth - tomorrow's commanders of our national economy, our industry, our agriculture, our education, educational affairs, our health care, all branches of administration. Students are tomorrow's commanders.

They just dropped out of sight. When you read the notes of individual propagandists, you see that the commanding people of management - employees and students - have completely dropped out of sight. They say that you cannot deal with them, there is nothing to Bolshevize them, so to speak.

But we will go to the worker from the machine and will Bolshevize him. He will not understand everything in this book.

One has to deal with a worker who works 8 hours, is a family man, busy and cannot devote many hours to this business - one must teach this

book with him one at a time, in a simple way, so as not to intimidate him with the theoretical complexity of individual problems. With the commander, you need to teach this business in a different way. Moreover, people who work intellectually, those people I just spoke about, employees, that is, our command cadres, leading people in all sectors of the national economy and industry, they will not be satisfied with just this book. The book will be a guiding thread for them, a kind of regulatory idea, they will demand more, and here they will have to turn to the primary sources - to Marx, Engels, Lenin. This means that this book will have to be taught in different ways.

Little trained people - whether he is a worker or a peasant, must not be forgotten, and no one said a single word about the peasants.

Propagandists in separate notes and comments write - how I will prepare for propaganda, how I will teach the history of the CPSU (b), etc., they write in Pravda, Izvestia. Recently, apart from the workers, they began to talk about employees, about students, but not a word about the peasants. This is wrong.

Out of 500 thousand teachers, $2/3$ must be in the villages. After all, this is already the command staff for the development of people's consciousness.

In the collective farms themselves, employees are also command personnel. Keep in mind. Then the collective farm peasantry very quickly, and I would say, is great at providing people who want to learn, eagerly pounce on knowledge. They run the economy as you wish, over 200,000 collective farms. I take on average 5 people per collective farm, all the employees who manage the farm, make plans, give advice, help. Multiply 200 thousand by five. Here's a million.

You want to leave these people to their fate. On what grounds? These are our team people in agriculture. This is wealth. Now, if you count, we will have about 8 million in all branches of the national economy and state administration - these are cadres for managing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is with them that we must begin the U-turn of Bolshevization. The book addresses them first of all.

Well, that's all for now, but in essence we'll talk later.

* Orthodox - pseudonym Lyubov Isaakovna Axelrod (1868-1946).

A transcript of JV Stalin's speech "In connection with the question of the film" The Law of Life "

A transcript of JV Stalin's speech at a meeting in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) "In connection with the question of the film" The Law of Life "AO Avdeenko." September 9, 1940.

Source: I. V. Stalin. Historical ideology in the USSR in the 1920s-1950s: Correspondence with historians, articles and notes on history, transcripts of the speech Collection of documents and materials Part 1.

Archive: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11.D. 1124.L. 67-145. 1940 typescript.

From the editors of the site. Here is a transcript of a meeting in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the film "The Law of Life" and an article from the newspaper "Pravda" dated August 16, 1940, criticizing the film.

Processed into text by Alexander Timakov.

List of meeting participants in connection with the issue of the film "Law of Life" Avdeenko A.O.

09.09.1940 at 18.30

1. Stalin I.V.
2. Zhdanov A.A.
3. Malenkov G.M.
4. Andreev A.A.
5. Poskrebyshev A.N.
6. Pospelov P.N.
7. Alexandrov G.F.
8. Fadeev A.A.
9. Lozovsky S.A.

10. Polikarpov D.A.
11. Avdeenko A.O.
12. Stolper A.B.
13. Ivanov B.G.
14. Bolshakov I.G.
15. V.P. Kataev
16. Lebedev-Kumach V.I.
17. Fedin K.A.
18. Trenev K.A.
19. Sobolev L.S.
20. Pogodin N.F.
21. Bakhmetyev V.M.
22. Aseev N.N.

List

who spoke at the meeting on 9.09.1940 at 18:30?

1. T. Zhdanov.
2. T. Avdeenko.
3. T. Stalin.
4. T. Lozovsky.
5. T. Fadeev.
6. T. Lebedev-Kumach.
7. T. Kataev.
8. T. Aseev.
9. T. Sobolev.

10. T. Fedin.
11. T. Ivanov.
12. T. Stolper.
13. T. Pogodin.
14. T. Stalin.

Meeting dated September 9, 1940.

Comrade Zhdanov presides.

Zhdanov. (The beginning was not stenographed)

Now, the Central Committee has learned that two years ago, around 1938, Avdeenko wrote another work that did not see the light of day - "The State is Me".

And, it turns out, we learned about this later than the review appeared in Pravda, that Lozovsky criticized this novel and that this novel did not see the light of day.

It is interesting to note that the conclusions reached by Lozovsky, they coincided mainly with those conclusions reached by the review of Pravda.

I will permit myself to read out Lozovsky's letter to Avdeenko, dated October 1938. It's a little long, but interesting, (reads).

As you can see, this review, which the Central Committee learned about only a few days ago, surprisingly coincides with what is written in the review about the Law of Life.

Why has the Central Committee called this conference? That's why. We believed that the review published in the central organ Pravda, which presents a very serious and just accusation to the author of the script, should have caused some kind of reaction. Almost a month has passed since the publication of the review, and Comrade Avdeenko is silent. Why is comrade silent Avdeenko? If he thinks this review is unfair, let him prove it. This review is placed in the central organ of the

Central Committee of the Party and its silence seems incomprehensible to us. And if you take his silence in the light of the fact that he kept silent about the criticism of the novel "The State is Me" ...

AVDEENKO. This is Comrade. Lozovsky said that I was silent.

ANDREEV. Essentially nothing is said there.

Zhdanov. How does the film "The Law of Life" differ from the novel "The State is Me"? This is a political falsehood. The review says more than convincingly about this. And artistically, in relation to the penetration of Artsybashevism. Who gave the right to Comrade Avdeenko write like this and try to smuggle this kind of work? This is the question that we wanted to ask comrade. Avdeenko.

AVDEENKO. Why are the reviews the same? Obviously, because I do not agree with Comrade Lozovsky on this. I wrote the novel "The State is Me". I live in Donbass and I know people, I know miners. The novel "The State is Me" shows more miners than Trotskyists. And all these statements seem scary to people who have not read the novel. I put the novel aside to work on. These statements seem scary, but these are not my statements, these are statements by negative characters and therefore these statements do not seem scary to me. It seems to me that these statements make it possible to know the essence of these people, what guided them when they took action against the people, against the party. This is how I can explain this novel. If you are interested in a novel marked by comrade. Lozovsky and editorial notes, I can give.

Why are the reviews the same? Again, because I wrote "The Law of Life" and was convinced that this was the way to write, like the novel "The State is Me", so that the enemies were not as straightforward as they were shown up to now. I wrote the script and handed it over to the studio. There Ognierubov is much more disgusting than in the picture, he was a notorious enemy, he gave instructions to corrupt young people. I was told that it is not interesting - there are ten - fifteen such films that from the first frame it is clear that it is an enemy. It is not interesting. We must show how the enemy seduces. We must show the enemy of the people in such a way that we do not know him, that is, show him well outwardly, but inwardly he is a scoundrel.

This opinion prevailed not only in the studio, but it was also in the committee, it was among the screenwriters, directors, that the enemy should be shown more subtly, not so black, and from here I veiled him so that later I could expose him. The directors also had this point of view. Many, obviously, read the review of Pravda and Comrade Lozovsky that in essence two years had passed, and I continued to look at the enemy in such a way as not to give it to such blacks.

Zhdanov. You did not agree with Comrade Lozovsky's review and therefore continued to write as it is.

AVDEENKO. Even now I disagree with Comrade Lozovsky's opinion.

ANDREEV. You do not tell comrade Lozovsky about this directly.

AVDEENKO. I remember what I wrote about.

Zhdanov. You can read it out.

AVDEENKO. I remember this letter very well. Of course, this letter offended me very much, offended because all these sins are attributed to me, as if I were to blame. Comrade Lozovsky writes that I consider a woman disgusting and that for me, as a writer, a woman is just as disgusting as for Ivan Petrovich.

Zhdanov. It turns out this way. Here is your ideological disorder. You put it in your mouth and then pretend that you are exposing the enemy. The exposure turned out in the review. There the ideology of Ognerubov is based on Marx and Lenin.

The fact is that the needs of love are depicted as follows: love as much as you want, love who you want, love whenever you want.

On the contrary, all this is veiled by jealousy, which was played by the feeling of jealousy. Your main fault is that there are no goodies. Unfortunately, I could not read all your works, I didn't have time to do it properly, but I did read something, for example, "Destiny". If you take Storozhilov or Nikolai, they are active agents in relation to love, i.e. You endow your goodies entirely with the qualities of Ognerubov. And this is in "Destiny" and in "The State is me". Here's the coincidence. It so happened that you continue to impose on our

youth, our literature and our public the cult of this Artsybashevism. But that's not the point. The main thing is that you portray your enemies as strong, and your people as weak. You yourself say that enemies should be shown strong and your people weak.

I read the script, read "The State is Me", why is the same thing repeated in these works, the enemies are shown as strong, authoritative, they are endowed with all the qualities of strong people, and our people are shown as puny, pale. Why is this?

AVDEENKO: I said that I do not agree with Comrade. Lozovsky not at all ...

Zhdanov: On the cult of licentiousness. Where you speak about love, everything happens spontaneously: he looked, she looked, and they met. After all, this thing is familiar to us, that he looked, she looked and agreed.

AVDEENKO: It is very difficult for me to speak after all that has befallen me. I tried to speak; I was interrupted. I repeat that I do not agree with Comrade. Lozovsky only in one, the most important thing, that my opinion is that women are so disgusting, that women are so disgusting as it seems to Ivan Petrovich, that, allegedly, I share this point of view. I do not agree with this that Ivan Petrovich's view is my view.

I did not impose this novel. You spoke to give to the Writers' Union. I said I won't. I would have to work a lot on this novel, I would work as much as necessary. I did not impose this novel on anyone. For you personally, comrade. Lozovsky, I did not give this novel and did not personally offer it to your publishing house, I gave it to the magazine.

LOZOVSKY: This is our publishing house.

AVDEENKO: But personally, I did not give it to you. For me, this novel is still important. The heroes of the Stakhanov generation are shown there. If it turned out unsuccessfully, an error turned out, I take it, it is correct, and I take any harsh words of yours.

I also disagree with the Pravda review that I did it deliberately.

That I was a coward in front of public opinion. Here an error occurred of the following order, that I had, where I wrote about the black enemy, I find it funny, and ashamed, and painful that I wrote about the enemy like that. It's much more complicated. You yourself said, Comrade Petukhov, that the enemy spoke French, that he was much more cultured, that it was not necessary to kill a child for this to appear disgusting, the enemies were much more difficult. It seemed to me that the black enemy is a bad person, and it is not worth writing about him like that.

Then, when I undertook to write this script "The Law of Life", Chernyavsky is not here, but I was asked to write a script about the moral character of a young man. I must say that this was discussed several times in the Committee.

Zhdanov. A young Soviet man, or in general?

AVDEENKO. On the moral character of Soviet youth. The script was praised, the script was directed along the way so that the enemy was disguised, so that it would be clear why Nina and Natasha loved him, why he is kept as the secretary of the Komsomol, why he is not so quickly exposed. If he were black in the script, he would be quickly exposed, so you need to make the enemy as hidden as possible, i.e., hide the being and moral essence of this person.

I made it this way, it was taken apart, I was guided along this path in order to carefully veil its negative features and show what it hides behind each phrase. That was the task.

Zhdanov. But you haven't answered my question. I asked you why you say that Ognerubov had a rotten essence at a time when all the heroes that you deduced as positive heroes developed the same views on the attitude towards women. I have given you several names.

AVDEENKO. First, I want to say about the "Law of Life", because I was mistaken in the "Law of Life" ...

Zhdanov. What began to be endowed with those traits that are inherent in positive types?

AVDEENKO. It was outwardly so that he hid the essence with a beautiful phrase, which influenced the bourgeois women, showed the outside, and this seduced the opinion, it seduced the directors and people who liked this script. And this mistake is not only mine, although this mistake is gross, because since I was sent in the Committee, in the studio, directed by comrades, directed by consultants, it means it is not accidental and it is not only my mistake. I loved it. I liked to write this way, to show people what this inferior personal life in a love relationship can bring to.

Now, if you remember, "Fate", "The State is me", "I love", there it also seemed to me that this is the law to love boldly. I'm not afraid, I understand the importance of this. They say to me "I love", "Fate" - there are simple relationships, trust in each other - this is my creative slogan, I was guided by this, perhaps unconsciously when I wrote the novel "I love" and "Fate". I don't see anything wrong with Storozhilov, who has earned this trust for several years of work in Magnitogorsk, when he talks with a girl, they have a simple relationship.

Zhdanov. In *Novy Mir* in 1936, shortly after the publication of *Fate*, there was a review in *Novy Mir*, where you were reproached in the same way for interpreting the relationship between a man and a woman as these (*inaudible*) Nedoli and daughter of Nedoli.

So, apparently, you considered yourself not obliged to respond to criticism in 1936, to criticism in 1940. You thought I liked it; I don't give a damn about the organ of the Central Committee. I am silent. I am my own master.

AVDEENKO. I have not yet said why I was silent.

Zhdanov. You said you disagree.

AVDEENKO. Comrade Zhdanov, it's hard for me to speak. I did not say this at all, which you attribute to me. I disagree with what was attributed to me. Why am I silent about this review in *Pravda*? I have not seen the film until today, they have not shown it to me, they did not ask me for my opinion, when the director put a question to the film studio about showing the film to the author, he was asked who would

pay the author for the visit. I myself went to Bolshakov and asked to be shown the film. I was on a business trip in Lviv, in Bukovina.

I was not asked for my opinion. I was sitting in Kiev, writing a script. I finished the script and just arrived at your call. I went to Chernyavsky and Bolshakov, watched the film, and said that the criticism is indeed correct. I could not perform ahead of time. The criticism is absolutely correct, the criticism is harsh and fair. She did me a tremendous benefit, because I saw that it really did not coincide with my plans. There was lies and falsity in my designs. This is not how you need to live, not how you need to build your life. It seemed to me that when Sergei Paromov appeared on the screen, the viewer would be on his side, and not on the side of Ognerubov. Here is obviously my mistake here. I repeat that I was led down this path. And it would be easier for me to get lost on this path, because I had data for this,

Zhdanov. Did the directors shoot down? Did they push, apparently?

AVDEENKO. I never thought that the Central Committee would talk to me like that.

Zhdanov. Do you think that creativity is not under the control of the party?

AVDEENKO. No, I don't.

Zhdanov. Probably so you think that everyone is his own boss, as I want and do, none of your business, do not meddle in this area?

AVDEENKO. In the studio, they told me that you can't give an enemy in black, you need to give it covertly, you need the viewer to love him. I liked it. I've seen dozens of film standard. It was necessary to veil it. It seemed to me correct to show the enemy like that. It turns out that this enemy led us into the jungle of the enemy.

Zhdanov. Why such indifference to the film? You say you didn't see the movie until you were summoned to the Central Committee.

AVDEENKO. This is not indifference.

Zhdanov. What's the matter? As if you should have raised a noise, what's the matter, why are they scolding?

AVDEENKO. I only knew what was shown in the studio.

ANDREEV. They could go to Moscow. You have no anxiety. Such a review has been posted about you and there is no alarm.

AVDEENKO. I was very anxious.

ANDREEV. Your behavior is strange in this sense. Don't you find? You were criticized, and you remained silent.

AVDEENKO. I knew right away that I was wrong when the review came out. But I didn't know how the director would do it. I liked the pieces; the pieces were very good. I have not seen the party.

Zhdanov. She walked on the screen. This picture was not rejected in the studio, but on the screen. Not only the author of the script could see this picture, having gone to Moscow, but it was possible to see it on the screen. Maybe she walked in Kiev.

AVDEENKO. No, I didn't go to Kiev, only in Moscow and Leningrad. Is it indifference or not? No, this is not indifference. I thought that when I finished the script, I would go to Moscow. But they presented me with a demand - you will work for a day, and then you will go.

I said that I would go to Moscow, and they told me when you hand over the script, then you will go. I realized my mistake at the same time as I read the article.

Zhdanov. It was necessary to let the public know about this, otherwise it turns out that you do not share this opinion. And you are standing in a position of silence.

AVDEENKO. For me it was quite clear that it was necessary to respond but does this solve the issue for a day or two.

Zhdanov. Almost a month has passed since August 16 - the film was released on screens, everyone watched it.

AVDEENKO. I'm asking myself now, why don't I find my fault? I immediately, after reading the article, realized that I was mistaken - I, the director, were all mistaken together. I made up my mind that day and I knew that I would go to Moscow, write a letter, I knew that I would admit that there were mistakes. Therefore, it was okay that it would be one day later, although I was eager to go to Moscow, but they told me - you can't leave the script, you need to finalize it.

That's just what I want to explain. Now I am so confused that I don't know what words I can say. For example, take "The State is Me" or "Billionaire" there are no enemies. In Billionaire, the woman is the hero. In the State, the cutter driver is a hero who works in a mine. There is no system of accusing me. In "Destiny" and in other works - this is not. I cannot say that this is my system, that this is my law, that I live this way, I don't want to say this, I don't teach young people this.

Zhdanov. You were in Bessarabia, in Bukovina, you wrote in the newspaper "Battle (inaudible)", you wrote an article about Chernivtsi.

I will now credit it to you (reads the article). You see, you describe that there are beautiful buildings, beautiful streets. And then some worker moralist appears who says: yes, all this is fine, but not for workers and not for workers. Or take all your other works. Indeed, I will read a few words from the basement. You write what Chernivtsi is like, magnificent streets ... (reads)

You talk about this on a whole page. Then you describe the Chernivtsi theater, where you say that this theater is not inferior to the best theaters in the USSR, if only in size. Where did you get this from? Why did you decide that the Chernivtsi theater is not inferior to the theaters of the USSR and if inferior, then only in size?

Then you write further that in Chernivtsi there are about 20 films that are created for a joyful human life. You have been there for several days and you have such an impression. You got the impression that this theater is not inferior to our theaters.

STALIN. And the city is only two inches.

Zhdanov: Just think, some kind of world center!

STALIN: We know, narrow streets, they want to create a contrast, but it turns out badly.

Zhdanov: What's the matter?

STALIN: I am drawn to the old Chernivtsi.

Zhdanov: Is that so?

STALIN: There is enough paint for old Chernivtsi, but for ours - his paint is running out.

Strange affair. He has little culture, an illiterate person, does not speak Russian, and how much he has literary impudence! You are amazed when you read.

The poet conveys the transfusion of the soul. Love is a powerful thing, but how does it convey? Is that how they write. A person has little culture, an illiterate person, not a poet, and as an axis, there is one main note: everything that concerns people who have become our enemies, he has enough colors to describe such people, there is logic, initiative. When you portray these people, you have an argument and whatever you like, but when you portray our people, the colors dry out, our people turn out to be some kind of crap. After all, pests can be portrayed in different ways. Take "Great Citizen" especially the second series. There are enemies and friends there. Some have their own arguments; others have their own. The person understands that it is no coincidence that ours won, defeated, because we have more arguments. And read his works - everything tends to be in the black light, in the light of backwardness,

Chernivtsi is a scrawny city, but there was enough paint for that, but for ours - there is not enough paint. Cleverly hiding is not our man. How did you get into the party, on whose recommendation?

Gvahariya recommended it, Kabakov. What is it holding on to? On the fact that he has a working origin. Just think, you will not surprise us with this. The working class as a whole is a revolutionary, advanced class, but there are individuals in the working class. And your friend

Kabakov is also a worker, and he wanted to sell Russia, a good fifth of Russia, to the Japanese, Poles, and Germans.

Don't you know that?

Tomsky is also a former worker, and they supported Trotsky. So much for the former workers. Do you think every worker is worth its weight in gold? You are mistaken, and if you take all the imperialists of Sitrin and others, they are former workers. Among the advanced workers there is one stratum that uses their working origin and chooses everything appropriate in order to arrange their affairs and then sell the interests of the working class to their advantage. This is the law of life. Nine-tenths of the working class - gold, one-tenth or one-twentieth, or even one-thousandth - bastards who betrayed the interests of their class. They are everywhere, in all countries, and we like Tomsky, Kabakov, Zhukov, Evdokimov and others, they are not random people. This is the law of life. You love to write about the laws of life, and if you looked at this matter, it would have turned out differently.

The writer is not important, he has little culture and does not work on himself. Semi-literate, does not speak Russian properly. What his language is - it's scary. How sloppy he is in style. After all, a writer is recognizable by style. The writer loves style, it is scary to look at his style and read his works.

He is not a party member and has never been a party member. This is our gullibility and our simplicity, this is what he went on, look at what Don Juan he draws for a socialist country, preaches tavern love, ultra-natural love - "I love you, go to bed." This is called poetry. Literature would then perish if people wrote that way.

LOZOVSKY. I want to make some posts.

This manuscript entered Krasnaya Nov '. There she raised great doubts. Then Yermilov and three of his closest employees were the editor or deputy editor. This manuscript was read by Ermilov, Makarenko and Lebedinsky. They decided to call Avdeenko and explain to him. So, this thing has gone through some serious brainstorming.

STALIN. The party member was supposed to appear the very next day and talk to the Central Committee, but he was hiding. After all, it is not for nothing that he is called a hoarder in Donbass, when they talk about Avdeyenko, they call him - "this hoarder." This person does not work. After all, he found time to buy himself all sorts of junk, but in order to come and say that this and that is the case, he could not. He's a coward. This is the greatest coward.

Take his "Law of Life" or "The State is Me" - this is a rather strange name as well as "Law of Life". Here the law of life was given - he makes a hint for his own and echoes with them.

And he thought that people are busy, I'll make my way through another day, maybe they will forget and pass. And it was terrible.

But people were busy with collective farms, industry, now, fortunately, a little time is left for this book.

LOZOVSKY. Thus, a commission specially created by the editorial board of Krasnaya Nov 'rejected his novel and the editorial board sent me his work; indeed, Avdeenko himself did not give it to me. I read it carefully myself. When I read this work, I thought it was an unconscious mistake, I criticized it very sharply.

STALIN. Which book?

LOZOVSKY. "The state is me."

STALIN. You spoke to him, the masked man.

LOZOVSKY. I thought that it could be corrected, but after the film "The Law of Life" appeared, I see that this is not an unconscious mistake, it is a deliberate, not ours, someone else's line, not a Soviet line, I am not talking about the fact that this is a non-partisan line.

The following is interesting. 2-3 months after I sharply criticized his work, he sent me a letter that characterizes him as a person, as a writer, and as a party member.

STALIN. Should there be any diplomacy?

LOZOVSKY. You will see for yourself.

He writes the following: it took 3 months for me to come to my senses after your remark on my novel "The State is Me". Now he is healthy, cold-blooded, generous, happy. I thought about it for 3 months, the criticism was of great benefit. Of course, the novel will not be altered, not completed, it will be rewritten. Let the state be the goal of my life, anyway I will not refuse to work. That's all that I could answer to your attention to me.

Zhdanov. After he said disagree?

AVDEENKO. I said I agree.

LOZOVSKY. When I received an answer, I decided that the correspondence on this issue was over, because in essence I criticized him from the point of view of the party, literary, artistic and political, and he sends a reply, in which everything can then be turned anywhere. That's why it seems to me that it has consistency. This is not an accident with him. He has the same heroes, the same approach, the same assessment, pornography, a frivolous, non-Soviet, non-partisan attitude towards our Soviet life, towards our Soviet reality.

Zhdanov. Two years ago, in the summer of 1938, it was "The State is Me", and now the "Law of Life".

ANDREEV. Under a different name.

LOZOVSKY. This is the same line, the same assessment.

Zhdanov. In 1936, there was criticism of "Destiny". There he portrayed pests as strong people, and our people, as weak-willed people, with rags.

LOZOVSKY. I talked with him for several hours, talked for a long time. I told him why I criticize him. And so, after 3 months, he sent this answer.

I think that Avdeenko does not have our worldview, not our line. The most characteristic is the attitude to what was published in Pravda. He

pays no attention to the Central Organ, to the party. Your party is just like ours.

ANDREEV. This is not his party.

LOZOVSKY. When you do not pay attention to this, then you are not associated with the party. It doesn't bother you. This proves your weak connection, and most likely the absence of any connection with the party. Hence, both political mistakes and all sorts of others.

FADEEV. Of course, there should be no two opinions on the assessment of the essence of Avdeenko's literary activity. I think everyone can see that there is some kind of consistency here. But I would like to dwell on how he could come to such a life. Indeed, in the work of our Union of Writers and not only the Union of Writers, but there are also shortcomings that contribute to the fact that some elements can sink, like Comrade Avdeenko, to such a position and can take a path that may make it easier to get there.

With Avdeenko, the following thing happened: he came as an illiterate person, came from the homeless.

STALIN. He is not working on himself.

FADEEV. With the help of an experienced writer, he could make a book about himself. Everyone knows the book "I Love". Alexey Maksimovich drew attention to it and edited it. I personally don't think it is correct to work with young writers to this day. Ultimately, you need to make them work.

STALIN. Right.

FADEEV. Editing means making corrections, but the author himself has to work. Then, almost from the very first steps, he has a lot of conceit - do not approach. All writers know about this. It is difficult to criticize him, he does not understand anything.

And I must say the following, that after the young writer published his first book, this is not only him, but also many others, he allows himself conceit and does not work, his life is easy.

LOZOVSKY, I wrote one book and quit working.

FADEEV. We pressed on with the ruble, in particular, I must say that money is bad in the Writers' Union, the literary fund replaces both the mutual assistance fund and social insurance. We are considered a democratic organization, we have a government, people are different, there is a lot of demagoguery around young people, and a person, getting - especially before - a member of the Writers' Union, in fact, believed that he had the right to mutual assistance. Money is not highly valued, receiving an allowance of 300 rubles is not considered money. And we have a category that exists for 300 rubles, and a smaller category - for 500 rubles.

Our Office for Determination of Copyright, a loud name, is engaged in a number of superfluous functions, which actually receives, and sometimes collects, and the writers themselves collect royalties that come from performances in theaters. A lot of money is being concentrated, which makes it possible to advance sometimes even an incompetent person, i.e., the person becomes impatient, but shouts: "I am a talent."

We, the Writers' Union, the Presidium of the Writers' Union, are composed entirely of writers. We love literature and work of an ideological nature is much more pleasant for us. But the experience of two years shows that we cannot cope with this. The most important job is still limping and limping badly. We have now groped for something, but this does not justify us. We are missing a lot, because we are immersed in the work of the material, every day, administrative order. I must say that we have very little organizational experience, none of the writers, especially the master's experience. Now every writer considers himself the salt of the earth. The writer needs to be accepted; you need to talk to him. This whole system, i.e., rest homes, it crushes us, discourages literary men. As a result of a number of such small questions, the taste for work is lost. It turns out to be a very bad situation.

STALIN. It is necessary that administrative functions be transferred not to literary men, but to people who know literature.

FADEEV. My personal point of view is this.

Zhdanov. Still, the direction of literature needed to be given more attention.

FADEEV. You cannot imagine how much this weighs on us. My opinion in this respect coincides with the opinion of the members of the Presidium. I think that we have a number of functions that should not lie with the Writers' Union. Take a question such as the distribution of vacation packages. Who distributes vouchers to holiday homes for himself? Themselves give each other mutual assistance. It seems to me that these issues need to be resolved. As a result of this situation, we missed a lot. We must confess to this. Our system must be adapted to work with young people. We have clubs, we have a club for art workers where you can get worn out, and some people are happy to do it. We have stages where people perform with pleasure.

Recently, the question of a party member B was discussed At the meeting it turned out that he wrote only one hack all the time, although he was not a member of the Writers' Union. We have a lot of those who love where you can get worn out.

I do not understand such a communist, I would consider, for example, it is simply shameful for myself. He could work and be useful. It turns out that he is a member of the party organization, he has weight, he speaks, he criticizes and studies literature. Now our attention to this has become especially sharpened, and especially when the question is raised in this way in the whole state in connection with the new law. It is clear that the parasites are crushing us, who strive for an easy life.

We will be happy to study in the same club, get together, discuss works, we all love this, but we often do not.

LOZOVSKY. Why don't you?

FADEEV. Until now, this has not been given due attention. Absolutely correct.

STALIN. There are many parasites.

FADEEV. We need to create an atmosphere so that we can work with the people.

We did not discuss the issue at the presidium, but I talked with some comrades, they supported me in the idea that a number of functions should be taken away from us. Where, I can't say yet. Take this fact: I was in a writing holiday home and I must say that 80% of people I don't know by sight. It's no good, it's rubbish. This needs to be translated somewhere, it is necessary to make it so that it is transferred to the state, and we - the organization - would engage in ideological and educational work.

LOZOVSKY. Have you read this work?

FADEEV. I have not read this work, I asked Avdeenko, he did not give it.

LOZOVSKY: I told Avdeenko: "You do not agree with me, no? Let's take it apart on the podium".

FADEEV. He did not give this piece; I did not see it. "The law of life" - passed by the union, but Pavlenko read it and gave a negative review.

LEBEDEV-KUMACH. I am a young party member, and I got into the union in a somewhat unusual way, but I was received with a grain of salt and came to the presidium a little later than others. Alexander Alexandrovich spoke about the need to remove economic and administrative functions from us. This question is long overdue, I personally spoke about it in the party organization, comrade. Pospelov said, I said that something like a Committee on Literary Affairs is needed. In fact, it turned out ashamed that the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Writers is an all-Union organization, which should lead the writers of not only Moscow, Leningrad and the RSFSR, but it turns out that, in essence, no one was in charge ideologically, there was no line in the union; often the big questions of life raised by the party and the whole country somehow passed us by. This must be said. Alexander Alexandrovich laughed at something, but apart from laughter, there are also many tears, I must say that we took this a little lightly. After all, there were such facts when the Central Committee of the Party, or

higher party organizations indicate that we start conversations - we all knew, made a slight mistake and will recover.

I did not like Alexander Aleksandrovich's speech a little because he took people indiscriminately, but I must say that there are a number of such people who work very honestly and loyally and do a lot of work that is necessary for the homeland and the party. You cannot take only the aristocratic elite and talk about it, and people who are engaged in literature, but do not write big things, like this aristocratic elite, should be considered indiscriminately rubbish. I must say that these people sometimes have the right sense of smell and they have the right approach to business, so you need to listen to them.

There was a resolution of the Central Committee concerning thick magazines. A year has passed. What is done? Have we done anything about this? Here is a place where you have to speak in spirit.

The question of patriotism. When there was an editorial in the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* about this, it was felt that the attitude in the union and in the presidium was such that a man spoke up and everything, there was even a little snobbish attitude.

Conversations about quality were conducted on the aesthetic plane and people completely forgot that there are two sides to quality. Take at least the same Avdeenko, he could, perhaps, write a wonderful thing, take at least the same Artsybashev, he wrote not badly, but we do not need such a quality. There were many mistakes because we were loaded with other things. I must say that being on duty at the presidium turned into an unnecessary waste of time. There was no feeling that I helped literature and a living person.

The meeting of the presidium is the same, they were faced with such questions - whether to give a dacha, or not to give it, instead of raising big questions of principle. Never once was a big question of principle raised at the presidium.

The presidium did not say that there is a lack of collective farm plays in literature and drama. Or take these decrees now. After all, the People's Commissariat of Justice works a lot, but we must also work to somehow

help this cause, and we will not swing in any way. When there was a discussion at the party organization of these decrees, this discussion took place in such a way - how much a writer should work and even such jokes were heard that a writer had to sit for 8 hours. This question could be posed much more seriously. Such a phenomenon as Comrade. Avdeenko, I think this is our fault. We are entirely to blame for this, and now we need to revise, restructure the entire work of the union, so that all literary funds, dachas and other issues are taken away from us and so that we are engaged in an ideological issue, we would learn ourselves. In particular, I will say to myself that I do not have enough time, and here all sorts of loads of the anniversary order give. True, this is a necessary thing, it is of great importance, but you cannot emasculate and force a person into some anniversary committees if he cannot bring real benefit, and at best will be just a sign.

I believe that there is a lot of our fault in this matter. We need to look more at literature, read more, and for this we need time to have, we need to speak more boldly, signal more often, because because of this, as you pull the spine, you will pull out a big and interesting thing.

WAIT. Who else wants a word?

KATAEV. It seems to me that the story with Avdeenko brings us back to the question that I raised 2 years ago, i.e., the issue of quality, Vasily Ivanovich in vain wanted to present this most serious issue in such a way that in the union we do not pay enough attention to the small form.

VOICE FROM THE PLACE. Quality is also needed there.

KATAEV. I realized that the point is that they do not engage in small form, that Fadeev repels a large number of talented people. Fadeev understated a little. The amount of ballast is monstrous, the amount of ballast we have is such that it's scary to think. I can cite a case when two young men came to us a year ago, they write some verses, and they did not want to be accepted into the union. And the question is, why should they be admitted to the union, because this is the Union of Soviet Writers - this is not a joke.

When we raise the question of form, style, when, as Comrade Stalin said, we want to mint a phrase, we are told that you are snobs and aesthetes. But this is wrong. This is where it leads. Avdeenko came to us, strangers minted him, and then he himself, with childish ease, took up such topics as enemies of the people. After all, everyone wants to write such a novel, but you need to open these people. This can be revealed even by being an intelligent person, but in addition, you need to have wonderful skill, you need to be a master to write such things.

Why do we have pest plays fail? We believe that it is necessary to immediately show the worthlessness of this person. If you take Gogol's "Inspector", Khlestakov enters in Act 2 and it is immediately clear that this is not an inspector. As if the curtain should come down on that. But on the contrary, after this begins the discovery of this Khlestakov in all facets, in all his character traits. After all, you cannot make a person be good all the time, and then turn out to be bad. People open up in relationships with other people, and Avdeenko did not think about it, did not think about these forms, did not do the proper analysis. And when we get together and think deeply about all this, we argue about the last phrase, about the minting of all this, we are told that these are snobs sitting.

Comrade Zhdanov asked if cleaning was needed. What can be slowly cleaned. I don't know for sure, but there are about 3 thousand people throughout the Union.

ANDREEV. You want to either campaign or not get rid of anyone.

KATAEV. We want, but difficult. Maybe I'm exaggerating, fewer people.

STALIN. You need help. There are valuable people, and there are crumbs, but those who raise their head or tail high, I don't know, but we can draw a conclusion from this. It is necessary for the Presidium to more often take themes of a literary and artistic nature, of an ideological nature, and to involve people in the discussion of literary issues with specific examples. Here is a writer of such and such to make out, or a direction to develop such and such. To attract people to forge thought, forge tastes. It's bad to be called a snob.

KATAEV. If we talk about how Flaubert builds the stage, we are already snobs.

STALIN. It would be better if we dealt with literary issues more often, looked out of necessity, attracted people and not only members of the Presidium, but others as well.

I think that from this ballast, but I do not agree that this ballast could be squeezed out of a large number of pretty good people, literary workers. Camel people gather in our party, raw, you look, you come to despair, then from these people you develop workers, the dullards during the strike turned into heroes. It's the same with your ballast. Maybe they will be useful to you. They will come up and help you.

In my opinion so. You just have to work. We must give free rein to art. We need to let people speak. It is necessary to convince people who are wrong, if people are correctable. And there are people who are incorrigible, comrade Fadeev, in my opinion he is incorrigible. There are people who can be corrected, such people can be brought up, you just need to work on them and not look from high above. In my opinion, this comrade is right, a professional writer shows a kind of aristocracy - to look at the roach from above. But we, too, were once roach.

FADEEV. It is characteristic that all do not grow from members of the union.

STALIN. Incorrigible, hopeless - exclude.

FADEEV. Tvardovsky, Virta, Krymov, this year we are publishing Egorov in Krasnaya Novi. In my opinion, wonderful people. All these people outside the Writers' Union grew up from living life.

STALIN. This means nothing. Look at the roach from a high altitude, and no fish can live without roach, the fish uses the juices of the roach. About the fact that we do not have time to mark some and do not notice. For some reason, you do not celebrate an author like Wanda Vasilevskaya. She is not celebrated; however, she writes sparingly.

FALEEV. This is a real artist.

STALIN. I don't know if the artist is real or not, but I know that she writes truthfully, honestly. I read her three works "The Image of the Day" - there the life of a worker is depicted truthfully, honestly, then "Motherland", it depicts the life of a farm laborer working in bondage for a landowner, wonderful, good, simply conveyed. "Land in a yoke" - it depicts the life of a peasant - the owner - a poor man, a middle peasant and a farm laborer. Remarkably well rendered. For some reason they are silent about her. She is not a foreigner, she is a member of the Supreme Soviet, a deputy, a citizen of the Soviet Union, and she is still published in foreign literature. Why is our citizen not being celebrated?

FADEEV. As for the Literaturnaya Gazeta, it was readily published there.

STALIN. I say that this is not an ordinary talent, in my opinion she writes very well.

KATAEV. So, it seems to me that Comrade Stalin has exhaustively finished my speech. I just want to say that in the Writers' Union we must pursue a policy of liberation from unusual functions.

Zhdanov. Even with these functions, they could engage in literature.

FADEEV. It is very difficult.

LOZOVSKY. I was in a meeting, 9/10 of the time is spent on these functions.

STALIN. Is that why the writers don't come?

LOZOVSKY. And the manuscripts are not.

FADEEV. Manuscripts are carried only when they were not accepted or badly criticized, scolded. And bad production starts to tire.

KATAEV. I would like to end like this. On the basis of clearing our time, we could discuss more specific works in the club, now we discuss it 3-4 times a year, but we could discuss and convene conferences 10-15 times a year.

STALIN. Right. In addition, it is very good and instructive to put individual novels for discussion, to acquaint people with different directions, to pose general questions.

KATAEV. And then we are crushed by such a moment when the writers' community gets a little disorganized, when they stop working with us, when they do not accurately inform us about the situation, and we begin to feel a little loose. It is necessary to publish, maybe in the general press, some articles, maybe of a directive nature, because sometimes you have to swim.

It seems to me that everything will go well and we, armed with technology, will be able to better arm our ideas and aspirations.

Zhdanov (presiding). I give the floor to Comrade Aseev.

ASEEV. Comrades, this is my first time in the Central Committee of the party and for the first time I am so a little worried, because this is my first time in the Central Committee, I want to say what is essential in my opinion in this matter.

The case with Comrade Avdeenko, it seems to me, is a very typical case both in the sense that he is so severely beaten and in the sense of where it came from. I'm not afraid to say, although I don't know how this will be done, but I will still say that it leads to the hostile reputation that we sometimes have. Comrade Avdeenko will forgive me, but I'll tell you. We rested in Yalta two years ago. He told me that he wrote a wonderful piece. He said that the editor has not yet ruled, but the work is wonderful. Comrade Avdeenko hoped that after editing the editor, all responsibility would be removed from him. Relying on the fact that someone else will correct, that someone will support you - this is the pursuit of fame. If a person once wrote something well, he was praised, then everywhere and everywhere they begin to praise him. There is no such position.

I will speak frankly. Comrade Stalin said that he liked the works of Wanda Vasilevskaya. I must say that it is very good that you liked the works of Wanda Vasilevskaya. Personally, I read and they did not affect me very much. Why am I talking? Because tomorrow, the day

after tomorrow, Wanda Vasilevskaya will suddenly become the only standard literary achievement. It is one thing what Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin likes; another thing is the directive on how to write.

And this is often combined and there is a haircut for this writer. I rarely meet, but I must speak the truth. For a very long time Demyan Bedny sat and equated us with Demyan Bedny.

I'm not afraid of anything, I believe that everything here will be taken into account and weighed, but sometimes it turns out the way, how did Stalin say! Of course, this must be taken into account, but another matter, Iosif Vissarionovich likes such and such a work, such and such a picture, but this does not mean that doing a repetition, repeating this work, or a picture three hundred thousand times.

STALIN: Doesn't mean.

ASEEV. This is what I wanted to say.

STALIN. I'm talking about the fact that she is being hushed up, Wanda Vasilevskaya, and she is a talented writer. I don't think she's the best, but I think she's very talented. Maybe we will talk about her creative work, but she is hushed up.

ASEEV. For some reason, this story with Avdeenko is sad for me. To tell the truth, I feel sorry for him, and I would like to stand up for him, but here we will talk about rotten liberalism. Maybe he should be beaten like that, but he was given a review of the whole Union. What should he work on further? They said that from this roach, siblings, roach grew, sometimes rudd swam, but he was already called a whale from the very beginning. Where should he go on a long voyage? This is not good.

Comrade A. Fadeev, that they are overwhelmed with various side matters and this interferes with work, so the work is going wrong inside.

I'll let you quote:

"Stalin talks about my poems at the Politburo."

This is what Mayakovsky dreamed of. We talk about literature for real, and the trouble with Avdeenko is that they talk about him now when there is nowhere to go. I would think that Avdeenko, for all his rudeness of the letter, and the hope that such and such an uncle will support him, correct, straighten his manuscript, is a lordly, white-handed in writing, and after all, the first manuscript was corrected and released to him. And further, there is no way to write a story from which he himself would be happy, and he is already writing a script, an opera, I do not know if he wrote an opera, but they had to write an opera based on "I Love", i.e., it was necessary to serve different aspects of art. And he was already arrogant. Lozovsky? What he writes there, he is not a writer, but I am a writer, Gorky recognized me, but he did not, and Lozovsky has a greater culture than a recognized writer. Why does it work? Because at first a person was given all the possibilities: in the Donbass, he is the first person, he will come to any cinema, they open the doors to him, please, and they also say: why are you, comrade. Avdeenko, don't you write? And he still needs to write stories for a long time, and he was snapped up, he went to the market. He is not yet ripe, but he is already snapped up.

It seems to me that if Comrade Stalin says that they can get out of the roach, then Avdeenko had some fins.

STALIN. He's not a roach, he's taller. I said in connection with the fact that the ballast is called aspiring writers. But beginners, at least most of them, cannot be called roach either. I must say that you are looking at them from top to bottom, but you have to work on them.

ASEEV: You may still not see everything here, Comrade Stalin, but we have a lot of this roach, which will never grow up, which has realized that it is possible to wash ashore anyway if they give up complementary foods. And this roach swims near the shore and swarms, and this makes it difficult to work in a union and due to this, disputes and petty squabbles begin.

SOBOLEV: I, Nikolai Nikolaevich, do not agree with you. The tragic story of Avdeenko, I must say frankly, is not that this man was overwhelmed, then they started to write an opera, but the fact is that in

Avdeenko himself there are personal human qualities, on which everything bad and rotten fell like on good soil, which is associated with hasty literary activity,

I am not as old a writer as Fadeev, Aseev, but over the years I was amazed at how tragically the fate of people who suddenly find themselves in literature can turn out, I looked at Avdeenko for a long time, I was wondering how this plot could end, And I spoke correctly Aseev, that we are beginning to quickly give birth to names. Usually it turns out like this - the person about whom they wrote on the pages of Pravda becomes, as it were, the center of attention. People come to him from provincial newspapers, from theaters, operas, and he starts to feel dizzy. I can cite a Kazakh proverb here, when one painter was praised, and he dyed his entire beard. We get such a picture that a person produces himself into classics. And this is where personal qualities are needed, firstly, he must resist this harmful influence, and secondly, we, our people's attention,

Take Wirth, for example. He worked for a provincial newspaper, wrote a good book and got a name on it. He, in my opinion, is not yet dizzy. He makes mistakes. I see that a person works, in my opinion, assiduously, and even a little funny. He reads things that we all have known for a long time. Our business, since we are in some way educators, are responsible for the state of literature, to remember this.

I had a case the other day. Last year I met a kid, unenviable looking: skinned, hungry.

He brought me several stories. 9 of his stories were very bad, 2 were excellent. I and my other comrades had to work with him. His career ended with the fact that he ended up in Butyrka prison, received 4 years for hooliganism.

As a writer, he began to grow, but as a person, he failed to educate himself. I warned him about this. There may be our mistake. It might need to be transplanted into a different environment.

Here, here Mikhail Nikolayevich made a remark: he died in the caviar itself. Also, Avdeenko - he died in the caviar itself, and we are to blame for this.

Here, this is the main thing I wanted to say about the case with Avdeenko. You can't leave people.

Here, the writer Krymov appeared. He wrote a very good thing, but it's good that he won't write another, it's good that he continues to work as an engineer, because the same story can be repeated with him.

Second, I recorded one of Avdeenko's lines. It comes out somehow caricatured. He kept saying that he didn't want to show the enemy in black but wanted to show the enemy as if he were good.

The fact is that Avdeenko got confused in two schemes, and a scheme for literature is a destructive poison. He got confused in the scheme. One scheme: the enemy comes out and says I'm the enemy, I'm a son of a bitch. I will blow up the plant, I will do this, I will do something else. There is a second scheme: the enemy comes, and everyone prays to him, he is good, and at the end of the fifth act it turns out that he is a villain.

Avdeenko has neither talent, nor life experience, nor observation to understand that this is not the scheme.

The second remark: I was supported, they told me that it was good.

(AVDEENKO. That's right.)

It is wrong that you are a person who calls himself a writer who undertakes to write things so that the people can read, and the people do not have much time to read wastepaper.

You say that you were kept in Kiev, that you could not come and say how you feel about the review in Pravda. I am not a party member, you are a party member, you have your party card in your pocket, the central body writes that you made a mistake, and you do not react in any way. I don't know how you can sleep at night, why you can't come here and figure out what is the matter. I absolutely don't understand this. You have a name. The people know you, they know your books,

and suddenly, the newspaper says that you made a mistake, how it was done, I do not understand?

I don't know what Avdeenko is, but in terms of literature, this is absolute coldness towards his profession. A real writer cannot have this.

But such a thing cannot be done. So, the concept - a writer in relation to me in this case is also removed. We need to remember how to deal with such things.

About the scheme. The last conclusion for us, for the entire Union. It is difficult for me to speak now, because I have not thought of various things, but my comrades will help me. Sometimes they announce a high road, some method, some kind of trick, and suddenly they think that everything should be done like this. This is not true. Comrade Stalin said that a discussion should be held. Comrade Stalin said that there are different currents, let's collide these currents, find out what they want to do and we will talk.

STALIN. The artistic attitude is one, but it can be reflected in different ways, different method, approach and manner of writing, why not argue about it. There will never be a standard on these issues.

FADEEV. I spoke several times, struggling with this or that current, because they understand some ideal essence.

STALIN. Direction.

FADEEV. Let's talk about direction.

SOBOLEV: I will not talk about the work of the union; this is a complex issue. From my personal feeling, I just want to say that there are times when you say - let me pee a little. Then when it goes away, you start to decide how many thousand to give, etc. It seems to me that we need to do so in order to do our literary work and then there will be no such cases as with Avdeenko, we will understand what is driving what.

FEDIN. I want to say three points. The first question is how it happened that Avdeenko occupied such, I would say, an honorable place in literature. Here are the quotes that were given in Comrade Lozovsky's

review, they alone say that he simply could not occupy an honorable place, there was an oversight. It was impossible to raise a writer with such data so high. He was just a bad, worthless writer, he had to learn.

It was necessary to raise him to such a "height" that he would not have the opportunity to be in art. The comrades here correctly said that we place low demands on the quality of literature. We think too little about it. It should also be noted that every second book is more difficult for a writer than the first, the third or fourth is more difficult than the previous one, the more a writer writes, the more difficult it is to write. We must drum this into our youth, this must be our motto.

Here Comrade Fadeev spoke correctly, it was only necessary to add that we pay a lot of attention to the so-called graphomania. Let me draw your attention to the following. Each person on duty of the presidium writes down what he did during his duty so that everyone is aware of what he has done. If I could process this diary, which has accumulated over two years, then I assure you that the main questions from the diary would be the fight against graphomania. I assure you that it is. Graphomania cannot be immediately distinguished, there is a completely illiterate one, it is easier to fight it, but sometimes you will not immediately understand it.

Next question. When Comrade Avdeenko spoke, he said that when he was working on the screenplay, the cinema advised him to make the enemy more difficult so that he could not be solved. We really do have some kind of scheme regarding the villains. I also wrote a script for a movie; the topic was such that it was necessary to touch the enemy. I wrote about Kirov, and when I wrote the script, cinema also made a demand for me, they told me that my enemy was not smart enough, not complicated enough, it was necessary to give it more difficult.

It must be said that I am not such a young writer.

I know the complexity and the responsibility. It seems to me that there should not be a diagram here. This question will have to be resolved.

Zhdanov (presiding). I give the floor to Comrade Ivanov.

IVANOV. It is very insulting and sorry that one has to act here not as the author of a good and necessary one, but as one of the authors of a properly criticized and harmful film.

I made a huge mistake with the second director Stolper. The mistake of the scriptwriter Avdeenko could not be fully understood and corrected by us. True, the film was processed for a year.

We altered it several times and it is true that we felt that the scales were tilting in the wrong direction. Our desire was directed towards giving the right film, but apparently, we weren't hitting the main point. It is now quite clear.

We clearly see all the mistakes that we made. We wanted to show the enemy with all our might and turned it into an end in itself. I am deeply shocked. Seeing such people, hearing such people, I fully understand that we made a gross mistake. Only ignorance of life, inability to possess life can lead to such things. But, besides all this, our work was hampered by the fact that, as if they had nothing to do with cinema, they talk about literature. We had such a situation that they did not tell people the truth in the face, but, on the contrary, praised, hid the mistakes of a person.

LOZOVSKY. It is right.

Zhdanov. Mutual agreement. Don't criticize me, I won't criticize you.

IVANOV. This is my first work on this film. It seems to me that I received a huge benefit, a huge lesson, I received a lesson that will teach me a lot. I believe that the story of this sad film will give us the opportunity to eliminate all our shortcomings in art.

What have I come to? I came to the conclusion that somehow it became easier for me; it became easier not because I am less guilty than Avdeenko, that's not the point, but easier because I understood how I need to work, how to understand my role in general in art, in life. As a party member, first of all as a party member, I am doubly responsible for the mistakes that were made.

The last thing I want to finish, which is, of course, subjective, I wanted this film to be good. I myself am an old Komsomol member and on my first work I made such a mistake. I'm just offended. I want to roll up my sleeves to prove what it means to work. I will make every effort to show our young man with the colors that are really in nature, which are inherent in him.

Zhdanov (presiding). Comrade Stolper has the floor.

STOLPER. I wanted to write down what to say to me, but I could not. When I found out about the article, I was not in Moscow at that time. But it is quite understandable that after I learned about the article, I felt the seriousness of this matter. Naturally, this mistake was a disaster.

I must honestly say that I did not understand everything right away, if I understood immediately, I would become a bastard. It so happened that I was not in Moscow, I had to leave for 6 days and there was no time to think it over. I have to say that I was left alone with my conscience. I was looking, what's the matter?

And every day, and every hour, I collected facts that I had to realize, and I realized them. How did it all work out?

I must say that Comrade Ivanov and I - we do not work very much in this area, we recently graduated from the academy. I must say that life is very difficult for young directors. I must honestly admit that sometimes it happens that you are told put this thing, and you put it, otherwise you will not put it for a year or two. We have many young people who are eager to fight and cannot escape. We read Avdeenko's script and there was a question of working on it at all costs. Together with Avdeenko, we began to rework the script. Then there was a second alteration in the director's style, the script was drastically revised. It lasted 2-3 months.

It seemed to us that we had corrected the mistakes that we had discovered, but we did not correct them, but swallowed, we sniffed at them. When we started shooting the picture, and I must say that we started shooting at a fire-fighting pace, we still had doubts and we

personally, on our own initiative, sent the script to the Central Committee of the Komsomol. After that, we received a letter from the Central Committee of the Komsomol, for which we were very grateful, and we again began to redo the script in every possible way.

It seemed to us that we fixed, in fact it turned out that we did not fix it. In the process of work it was very difficult to fix it, because the work is physically difficult, in the process of shooting you do not have the opportunity to think, because you have to shoot all the time and if you are a young director, it is even more difficult for you to shoot, and not only because bad leaders, but such system.

But we had to think about this scenario in the process of work, but we still sniffed and did not see everything.

When the article came out, some of my comrades told me that you took the exam for the director, there you can see the creative skill of yours and Ivanov, that you know how to build a mise-en-scene, but that did not console us. And the question before us was that as long as we do not creatively and completely confess our huge mistake, we have no right to work further. We talked a lot with Ivanov about this, we accept many mistakes, but not all, and they must be accepted absolutely and completely.

But what worries me now, I am worried about a thing that can happen by chance, or maybe not by chance, as a result of this vicious story. I know many people who today are afraid of things of the Soviet theme - about youth, about students. Now a lot of people are just starting to scrupulously approach each shot, there is talk about what to do when the script comes across a shot that a person is drinking a glass of vodka.

I think that this is not what the article in Pravda taught us.

I personally would like to pose another question here.

In spite of our big mistake, we want to shoot things about youth again, because we are young directors, and we want to do things about youth again. And it will come out or not?

I think it should come out if we fully understand the gross mistakes we made and make the tape good.

I would like to pose the following question. I was jealous now when you criticized the Union of Soviet Writers, I was jealous of our writers, because you have a creative organization, it works, but we have no creative organization. It turned out by the will of fate that we, having made a picture, or a script, are stewing in our own juice. We cannot go to the podium and exchange views. We have a bad atmosphere in our factories. Over the years there has been such a law that if you say bad about me, then I will say bad and, therefore, it is better not to speak. And the worst thing is that we need to tell young directors. We often get it like this - they shot a picture, and then it turns out that the masters knew about it but didn't want to talk so as not to upset. I believe that it is necessary to sharply raise the question of how we can cobble together an asset,

Zhdanov. I give the floor to Comrade Pogodin.

WEATHER. I didn't want to perform. But after a friend from the cinema, I want to say that this is not a particular example of Avdeenko, but it is about being responsible for what you do. And we have such phenomena and tendencies when it is not evaluated. When they talked about Avdeenko like that, we never talked about it like that at our presidium.

This is very important, because in cinema, and in general in related fields of art, things can come out so liberally, calmly, easily and irresponsibly.

What happened? I drew attention to one important thing that Avdeenko said, He said that Chernyavsky had summoned him, they discussed the peaceful appearance of a Soviet person. Think what happens? The topic is solved in the office. Write to us such and such an enemy, show us this way. Speaking seriously with responsibility is a caricature. They came and talked merrily. Avdeenko went to write, he says that he has some kind of concept. What concept I wanted to ask a question? That you lived in a student hostel, you are thinking of solving

the question of the figure, the image that millions will look at. I know how to do it. This is hack.

Here they said that no one helped. Has anyone checked? No, we didn't want to check. What Avdeenko wrote was accepted. What is a relationship for cinema? I'm just saying, I painted two pictures and I can't work in films anymore.

We see that the director's team, not all of it, of course, but mostly - these are people cut off from life, people who work in factories, shoot pictures. When you come to them, the question is solved from the formal side, how to show the hero, and to what extent he is connected with reality, how he truly reflects it - this is a secondary question.

To understand this, I'll give my own example. I painted a picture, is it bad, well, I don't know "The Man with the Gun". It was banned for a year. A conversation with a consultant who is still working, probably he is not an enemy of the people, but with great conceit, I was just ridiculous. How did he advise showing Comrade Stalin? This is not just a mockery, this is a stupid person, a fool. He says - you wrote a caricature of the October Revolution, why? He says so because he has a certain scheme. I wrote the script for about a year. I spent a lot of time studying the material, but they approached me with armchair fictions, with these concepts that exist when you read a thematic plan of cinematography. He makes a miserable impression, he is poor. Here, a certain number of solved topics is taken, and not what reality gives.

And from here it turns out this - you need to make a picture not for the people, not for millions of people, but for those officials who will accept the picture in the Committee for Arts. And naturally, since the production itself from script to picture is not verified by reality, then such a thing turns out. But it is strange, a mistake can be made, a young director can shoot a bad picture, but to shoot a picture that radically distorts reality - this is just a false picture. It's all invented.

And the last thing that I want to say and solve is a very important matter, everyone was talking about it - in our literature it is easy to enter and live easily, it is very easy to earn daily bread. If you have your head on your shoulders, you can take it. These laudatory reviews, all this

pomp make people unrecognizable, awarded, wealthy, and they conceive a novel of 70-100 printed pages, write 3-4 plays, send them to theaters and everything tends to the fact that they are not responsible for their work and then they have to pay off.

STALIN. - There are various issues here, these issues are of great importance for the development of literature. I want to say on a question that has nothing to do with Avdeenko's book - about the approach to literature. There is a truthful, objective approach to literature. Does this truthful and objective approach mean that it can and should be impartial, just draw, photograph? Is it possible to equate a living person, a writer who wants to be truthful and objective, can he be equated with a photographic apparatus? No way.

This means that truthfulness, objectivity should not be dispassionate, but alive. This is a living person, he sympathizes with someone, dislikes someone from his heroes. Hence, truthfulness and objectivity are truthfulness and objectivity, which serves some class. Plekhanov said that literature cannot come out tendentious, and when he deciphered this, it appears that literature must serve some conditions, some class, some society. Therefore, literature cannot be some kind of photographic apparatus. This is not how truthfulness should be understood. There can be no literature without passion, it sympathizes with someone, hates someone. I believe that from this point of view, we must approach the assessment of literature - from the point of view of truthfulness and objectivity. It is required that the works give us the enemy in all its most important form. Is this right or wrong? Wrong. There are different ways of writing - the style of Gogol or Shakespeare. They have outstanding heroes - negative and positive. When you read Shakespeare or Gogol, or Griboyedov, you find one hero with negative traits. All negative traits are concentrated in one person. I would prefer another style of writing - the style of Chekhov, who has no heroes, but gray people, but reflects the mainstream of life. This is a different way of writing. but reflecting the mainstream of life.

I would prefer that we were given enemies not as monsters, but as people hostile to our society, but not devoid of some human traits. The

very last scoundrel has human traits, he loves someone, respects someone, wants to sacrifice for someone. He has some human traits. I would suggest that you give enemies in this form, strong enemies. What would be a plus when we were making noise, there was a class struggle, between capitalism and socialism, and suddenly the little one was smashed. And the enemies made a lot of noise, they were not so weak. Weren't there strong people. Why not portray Bukharin, no matter how monster he is, but he has some human features? Trotsky is an enemy, but he is a capable man, no doubt, to portray him as an enemy with negative traits, but also having good qualities, because he had them, no doubt.

The point is not at all that Avdeenko portrays enemies decently, but the point is that he leaves our brother in the shadows. We need truthfulness that depicts the enemy fully not only with negative traits, but also positive traits, which were, for example, persistence, consistency, courage to go against society. These features are attractive, why not portray them. The point is not that Comrade. Avdeenko gives enemies in a decent light, but the fact that the winners, who defeated the enemies, led the country behind them, he leaves aside, he lacks colors. That's the problem. Here is the main bias and untruthfulness.

There has been a lot of talk here about not indulging young novice writers, not pushing them forward early, because this makes people dizzy and deteriorate. This, of course, is true, but one should not advise any kind of guild in professional literature.

So, they looked: a student may be capable, but a deadline is set here. The apprentice may be three heads taller than the master, but once the deadline is set, he must work it out. Then he will be given a slap in the face and initiated into the master. Well, dear comrades, you are preaching such a philosophy. And if among the young there were people who, in talent and gift, are not worse than some old writers, why would you marinate them. So, you cripple capable people who are gifted by God, who want to grow. You have to grow them, you need to look after them, look after them, like a gardener looks after plants. We need to help them; we need to break this guild. We must put an end to these guild traditions, otherwise it will never be possible to nominate

people. Take the best commander of our country, Suvorov, he is a monarchist, there was a feudal lord, a nobleman, a count himself, but practice prompted him, that some foundations need to be broken and he promoted people who distinguished themselves in battles. And only as a result of this, he created a group around himself that broke everything. He was disliked because he violated the traditions of the guild. Here he is not a very capable commander, but excuse me, he has such a surname, such connections in the courtyard, so sweet, how can you not love him. And he moved little-known people, broke the foundations of the guild. They did not like him for this, however, he created around himself a group of capable people, good generals. The same if you take Lenin. How did Lenin forge cadres? If he saw only those who spent 10-15 years in the party environment in leadership work and so on. and did not notice those young people who grow like mushrooms, but they are capable people, if he did not notice this and did not break the traditions of experience, he would have disappeared. Literature, the party, the army - everything is an organism, in which some cells need to be renewed, without waiting for the old ones to die off. If we wait until the old ones die and only then will we update, we will be lost, I assure you. I agree with these amendments regarding the promotion of young people, but people cannot be limited, kept in a pen. This remark is about the roach that has been spoken of here in the thousands. After all, there are few old ones. Of course, it is good to have old writers, this is a find, a treasure, but there are few of them. And in our party, we also have old people who never grow old in soul, who are able to perceive everything young, there are few such old people. If only on them you build a literary front, only on old people who never grow old, there are old people who do not grow old, then our army will be very small, and it will not live long, because the old cadres, they will still die ... Hence the question of aspiring writers. Here they talked about roach, about several thousand, we also have middle peasants in the party who are unknown to anyone, the Central Committee is more or less known, so far, they have not stood out at all, but capable. There are such people, you have to deal with them, work with them, and they usually make good workers. We were all average people, we were corrected one, another time, where

necessary, and good workers grew out of the roach. We have a lot of roach, so we should not forget it, we must work with this roach, and not say that they are for color. You can't do that, it's very offensive. There must be patient work to educate these people, to select them. If out of 20 people there is one, that's good, then you will have a whole army of writers. Our country is large, and you need to have quite a lot of writers. If a person is a talented, capable person, he must be lifted, helped to go up, maybe even in violation of the charter. Sometimes nothing comes out without violations.

About Wanda Vasilevskaya. Why does she like the letter?

She has in her works gray, simple people, inconspicuous figures, but they are well displayed in everyday life, they are cleverly and well chosen. I don't think she's the most outstanding writer, but she's quite talented and writes very well, in my opinion, but for some reason she is hushed up. She herself does not climb anywhere. You read her works; you will see that this is a talented person. We have many talented people who are famous. Take Panferov, for example. He has good places, but in general a person can write when he is working on himself, this Panferov is famous, and I assure you that Wanda Vasilevskaya, she could become taller than Panferov, and no one deals with her, she is considered a foreigner, and she is a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Union.

Now about Comrade Avdeenko. You see, I have already said that the point is not that he has (*made*) mistakes, not that he conveys the types of enemies or friends of our enemies in the most decent form, not as monsters, but as people who have some good features. and without them there is not a single person. The very last scoundrel, if you look closely at him, has good features. He can lay his head for a good friend, which means not that he portrays our enemies well, but the fact that the people who exposed these enemies are shown not by Soviet people. It is not so easy to do it. In our country, for example, 25-30 million people were starving, there was not enough bread, but now they began to live well. Here the enemies within the party figured this way - we will give it to the Germans, this to the Japanese, there will be enough land for our century, but we have turned the other way around, we are not giving

anything to anyone, but on the contrary, expanding the front of socialism. Is it bad? Is it bad from the point of view of the balance of power struggle in the world? We are expanding the front of socialist construction, this is favorable for humanity, because Lithuanians, Western Belarusians, Bessarabians consider themselves happy, whom we have delivered from the oppression of landowners, capitalists, policemen and all other bastards. This is from the point of view of the peoples. And from the point of view of the struggle of forces on a world scale between socialism and capitalism, this is a big plus, because we are expanding the front of socialism and reducing the front of capitalism. policemen and all sorts of other bastards. This is from the point of view of the peoples. And from the point of view of the struggle of forces on a world scale between socialism and capitalism, this is a big plus, because we are expanding the front of socialism and reducing the front of capitalism. policemen and all sorts of other bastards. This is from the point of view of the peoples. And from the point of view of the struggle of forces on a world scale between socialism and capitalism, this is a big plus, because we are expanding the front of socialism and reducing the front of capitalism.

Avdeenko has people who have to fight, they are shown as some kind of creepy, simple, grayish, how these people could defeat enemies. The whole sin of Avdeenko is that he leaves our brother - a Bolshevik - in the shadows and for him Avdeenko lacks color.

He looked so closely at the enemies, got to know them so well that he can portray even from the point of view of negative and positive. I haven't looked closely at our reality, it's hard to believe. I didn't understand, didn't notice.

Here is about the same picture "The Law of Life". Why Zakon didn't explain. What do you want? Here, you, gentlemen, Bolsheviks, whatever you interpret, but there is a law of life, love is the way I understand it, and it will take its toll, because there is a law of life. To say this to the end, he did not have the spirit, but love, who knows how to think, understands what it is. Ognerubov - well done, an eagle, fell victim to stupidity, the crowd. Took voted. Does it happen like that? The heroes fall. Brilliant people find themselves in a limited

environment. The environment of our creepers and heroes who fell victim to. Directly some Chatsky who was strangled by Wednesday. There is not enough color to portray our people. And here he sins against serving some cause. One feels that he is so sympathetic, so he does not sympathize. I would like to know which of his heroes he sympathizes with. In any case, not to the Bolsheviks. Why does he have otherwise, there was not enough color to show real people, where did the Chkalovs and Gromovs come from? Where did they come from, because they do not fall from the sky? After all, there is an environment that gives heroes. Why is there not enough paint to show good people? Why are there no paints to show bad features? There are not enough colors to arrange a new life, why are there no colors for the image of life? Because he doesn't sympathize with it. You will say that I am exaggerating. I would like to be wrong, but in my opinion, he hardly sympathizes with the Bolsheviks. to arrange a new life, why are there no colors for the image of life? Because he doesn't sympathize with it.

Take 1934. After all, he was being corrected. Everything is the same.

Then in 1938. Corrected, indicated. He does his own thing anyway. This camp lives with him, our camp is somewhere in the shadows.

I, he says, of proletarian origin. Don Juan does not come out of the golden youth. Don Juan was Where is this persistence.

There is a painting "The Law of Life". The same goes for a lot of colors. Where is it from? Is this a mistake? No, not a mistake.

A self-confident person, he writes the laws of life for people, - almost a monopoly education of young people. The laws. This is the mistake since 1934. If he had not been warned, not corrected, that would have been a different matter, but there were warnings from the Central Committee and a review in Pravda, and he continues his work. To get into the soul is not my business, but I don't want to be naive either. I think that he is a man of enemy outrage - Sarkisov, Kabakov, - and he echoes with the enemies: - I live among fools, they will still miss my works, they will not notice, I will get money, but whoever needs it, he

will understand, and fools - the devil is with them, let them be fools and remain.

Zhdanov. Let's finish, maybe on this?

VOICE. Yes, let's finish ...

Zhdanov. Let me end it then.

Fake film (About the motion picture "The Law of Life" by "Mosfilm" studio)

"True". August 16, 1940

Recently, a new motion picture "The Law of Life", released by the "Mosfilm" studio, has appeared on the screens. A film with such a promising title was directed by A. Avdeenko, directed by A. Stolper and B. Ivanov.

The picture "The Law of Life" could be considered just one of the bad pictures released recently, if not for some of the features of this film. The author of the painting, A. Avdeenko, undertook to interpret the laws of life, to teach young people, to assert those moral canons, which, in his opinion, should be followed by the country's youth. But the moral of the film is false, and the film itself is fake through and through. To be precise, the film "The Law of Life" is a slander against our student youth.

The film's slanderous nature is particularly evident in the scenes of a party for medical graduates. The filmmakers portrayed the graduates' evening at the institute as a drunken orgy; students and female students get drunk to hallucinations. The filmmakers relish these details, over and over again in dozens of frames they show scenes of reckless drunken binge. And according to the film, neither the administration of the institute, nor public organizations, nor the students themselves, tomorrow's doctors, not only do not stop, do not stop this outrage, but they themselves take an active part in it. Where did the authors see such scenes? Where did the authors see that our student youth resembled the scum of bourgeois morality they portrayed? These scenes are a slander against Soviet student youth.

The leading Komsomol worker Ognerubov, a cynic, an internally rotten person, an enemy who corrupts the youth, through everyday life, tries to instill in them enemy ideas, incites the student youth into drunkenness and decomposition. The authors of the film give full scope to their hero Ognerubov, who preaches disorderly love and debauchery. According to the film, it turns out that this enemy sermon by Ognerubov reliably finds access to the hearts and minds of students, tomorrow's doctors, and Ognerubov's "principles" are implemented right there, in the audience, in a drunken orgy. In these, and in the subsequent scenes of the film, one can see a kind of revival of Artsybashevism, which at one time they tried to poison young people, to turn them away from politics, from the revolutionary movement by preaching sexual promiscuity.

Among the Soviet student youth, the authors of *The Law of Life* were unable to find real, positive, bright people whom our country is rightfully proud of. Except for Sergei Paromov (about whom below), only such a character as Cheryomushkin is singled out in the film. The filmmakers endowed him with all kinds of comedic tricks. Cheryomushkin, one of Ognerubov's drinking companions, is called upon to play the role of "the soul of the tavern society." Everything that is funny in the picture comes from Cheryomushkin. The lot of all the other characters is gloomy meditation. Cheryomushkin's lot is to amuse the audience. But this supposedly positive character burdens the picture with silly and pathetic witticisms. In such an environment, Ognerubov could live and prosper. But the fact of the matter is that this environment is invented, false, that it does not exist in nature.

In contrast to Ognerubov, the authors brought out in the film the Komsomol organizer Sergei Paromov, who is supposed to serve as the personification of our new morality, to represent a fighting Komsomol, a man of big heart and noble feelings. But it's strange, while the enemy of Ognerubov is portrayed as such an enticing Pechorin, Komsomol organizer Sergei Paromov, like his comrades, is shown in the film as a weak-willed person and often a dim-witted simpleton. Before his eyes, under the guise of supposedly Marxist ideology, they preach the moral

decay of youth. Before his eyes, an ugly general student drunkenness is taking place, and he, Paromov, does not find the strength to actively resist Ognerubov, to stop the drunkenness. His moralizing in the film is helpless and colorless.

How could this have happened? And this happened because the real sympathies of the author of the film are on the side of Ognerubov, no matter how hard he tried to hide it with obscure maxims. Yes, the author made Ognerubov, who is morally and politically alien to Soviet youth, as the hero of his picture, called "The Law of Life". He, Ognerubov, according to the author of the film, is the "ruler of thoughts" of the youth, very easily captures the sympathies of the audience, conquering the youth without any difficulty with his charm, generously given to him by the author of the film.

The scriptwriter and directors endowed the devastated and vile enemy with the qualities of a "strong man", ennobling him in every possible way even by the end of the film, when, after watching a good three-quarters of the picture, the viewer finally sees (much to his surprise) that Ognerubov is being exposed. Of course, there is a Komsomol meeting. Of course, heated speeches are made. Of course, evil is punished, but virtue triumphs. But even then Ognerubov's assistants remain unrevealed and unpunished. And Ognerubov himself, remaining alone, retains, according to the authors of the film, pride, dignity, and even nobility. This pose is false through and through, it was invented by the "creators" of the film. For people like Ognerubov, for all their harmfulness, are petty. When they are exposed, they crawl on their knees, flowing down and crying out to pity, for they are afraid to be alone with themselves.

At the end of the film, the authors, paying tribute to the spirit of the times, reluctantly expose Ognerubov, thereby trying to adapt to our Soviet reality, to obscure the true deeply harmful essence of the picture. However, the exposure of Ognerubov in the film is not motivated by anything - neither the logic of the dramatic action, nor the situations of the film, nor the truth of life, which is a companion of true art. The authors, apparently, hoped that they would be able to deceive the viewer with a "happy ending". But here, too, the authors

miscalculated. Our viewer has grown up and is able to appreciate such a fake film.

It is all the more painful that some newspapers regarded the film "The Law of Life" as an "event" in Soviet cinematography. So, for example, the newspaper "Kino" found in the picture "sincerity", "temperament", "genuine truthfulness", "deep knowledge of the material." If the editorial staff of the Kino newspaper (as well as the Committee on Cinematography Affairs, which governs it) thoughtfully and conscientiously treated the films released on the screen, would it have allowed the praise of a contrived and harmful film that distorts our reality, slandering our student youth!

After all, why is the film called The Law of Life? What is the essence of the so-called "law of life"? As you can see, the content of the "law of life" is formulated by Ognerubov: he has the right to love disorderly, he has the right to change girls, he has the right to leave them after he uses them, since the "law of life" consists in pleasure, turning into licentiousness ... In fact, the filmmakers had to end the film with the triumph of the "law of life", the triumph of Ognerubov's philosophy. But since the authors of the film are cowardly before our public opinion, they paid tribute to him and ended the matter with the failure of Ognerubov and his "law of life." This is the basis of the film's falsity. Why, we repeat, is the film called "the law of life"? After all, the law of life must be highly vital and irresistible. Isn't it strange that the "law of life" of the filmmakers turned out to be a dummy, having no power? Is it not clear that the "law of life" of the filmmakers does not in the least resemble the actual law of life? This is not a law of life, but a rotten philosophy of licentiousness.

**An uncorrected transcript of I.V. Stalin at a meeting of the Politburo.
March 18, 1926**

A source: Transcripts of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) -VKP (b) 1923-1938. Moscow. ROSSPEN. 2007. Volume 1 1923-1926. P. 712-713

Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163. D. 681. L. 87-91. Script. Typescript.

Stalin. I will begin with where Comrade Kamenev ended. If any of the members of the Central Committee had the confidence that Comrade Zinoviev wanted to lay down arms against the Central Committee, we would not have spoken about this. But until now we do not see this, on the contrary, we see that you are doubly preparing, everyone can see it. Precisely because you hold a stone in your bosom and accumulate war shells in order to then shoot at the party, one of you says that in two months everything will change, the other says that "we will see."

Voroshilov. 14 1 / 2nd exit.

Stalin. That is why the question arose about Comrade Zinoviev. With this mood of yours, there is an attempt to return to the double center again.

About the uprising. Kamenev remembered this, remembered that Lenin ... (inaudible) and scolded me as a traitor. Yes, why not say that, it's a strange thing.

Kamenev. Why didn't they talk about it for 8 years?

Stalin. Since you remembered, I think we can talk about it.

Kamenev. At the Third Congress you remembered this.

Stalin. Now not the third congress. I take facts. Why is it possible to talk about Bukharin's mistake anywhere and everywhere, while the mistakes of Kamenev and Zinoviev cannot be talked about in the Party? Since when? Why is this? We must talk about this; we must write about it and teach the Party. We must say that there were mistakes. How we legalized the mistakes of Comrade Bukharin, why can Bukharin's mistakes be carried around and criticized, while Zinoviev's and

Kamenev's mistakes cannot be spoken about? You can and should speak.

They remembered the will here. It's like we're hiding it. What does it say? That one should not poke Comrade Trotsky in the nose of his mistakes, mistakes that ...

Voroshilov. Which were no coincidence.

Stalin. Much has been said about the mistakes of Bukharin and Pyatakov, but not a single word has been said about fundamental mistakes ... (inaudible) that I am not fit and could abuse my power. After that, I twice demanded resignation, please let go ... what was said then, we repeated it at the congress. What did I say? I have passed my will for sure. They talked about mistakes, but not a word was said about my fundamental mistakes. They only said that I am a person ... (inaudible) and said that to find an equal person ... Find and put. I do not mind.

On the theory of compromise. Comrade Trotsky spoke about this, said that this was my theory. I did not say a word about this theory. It turns out that I am a supporter of the theory of compromise. This is not true. I believe that since disagreements begin in the party, since there is a struggle, then the defeated one will certainly be compromised. It is impossible without it. Show me at least one stage of the internal party struggle, so that one part of the leaders would not be compromised. You can't do without it. Whoever lost is compromised. And to portray it so that I am the author of this theory is wrong. The very law of the struggle within the party is such that the one who is defeated is compromised. What is this theory of the rebirth of leaders? Who spoke about this?

Trotsky. You read it, Comrade Stalin, you distorted me so much that you yourself have already believed it.

Stalin. How can I distort when I myself read that our leaders can be reborn, and an analogy with the German leaders was given?

Trotsky. This was printed on purpose to be used as a pretext to attack me. After all, this was sent to the editorial board of Pravda, why did no

one ask me if it was possible to understand my words this way? Why wasn't I called and asked?

Stalin. I do not accuse you; I only note the fact that the first serious step in our party after Ilyich on the question of compromising was taken by Comrade Trotsky.

Trotsky. This is not so, because at that time there was already a theory of Trotsky's depopulation in the country. Comrade Rykov told all his friends and acquaintances about this, told that now it was necessary to depopulate Trotsky. Am I telling the truth, Comrade Rykov?

Rykov. I do not remember.

Stalin. I ask you not to get excited, I am only talking about the facts of the past. We have read this article. You say that you sent her to Pravda, but at the same time you sent her to the districts. The workers knew about this, and the Central Committee could not put itself in the stupidest position, so that later they would say that the Central Committee was holding its mouth and preventing Trotsky's appeal from being published, which had already been read out in three districts. We had no protests from Trotsky, on the contrary, Trotsky sent this article for publication. What was it? Trotsky fought, and this was one of the ways of waging this struggle, one of the ways was this article. I do not blame Comrade Trotsky. This is the law of struggle, but let him not blame us, because we could have done it too. Do not pretend, comrades, people who are clean. We all did this, we all had to do this, because we had an internal party struggle. Any struggle leads to exposure, exposure inevitably leads to compromise. Comrade Zinoviev spoke here about the appeal of the plenum on internal party democracy. If the plenum of the Central Committee on all organizations before the congress makes a demand that internal party democracy be carried out, that is quite ... (inaudible). Strange affair.

You think there will be a full guarantee when we are in power. I say, write it down, there is no full guarantee. And when will it not be? While our economy is developing, while we are right. Because the party that rules, it has to rely on that mass of institutions ... (inaudible). About 500 thousand active workers tried to simplify our state apparatus, to create

democracy, sometimes they became bureaucratic, we must not forget the bureaucracy that hangs over our party. These are the reasons that make us not to cling on to full democracy, not to complete democracy. If you think for a complete democracy, be open about it. Complete democracy is nothing.

Voice. Democracy is transitional, there are several stages.

Stalin. As for the current regime, what Comrade Trotsky demands for speakers to speak, this is what you want. No?. To give everyone the right to speak and defend their point of view at any time, you demand this. No?.

To Comrade Demyan Bedny

J. V. Stalin

Excerpts from a Letter

December 12, 1930

Works, Vol. 13, 1930 - January 1934

Your letter of December 8 received. You evidently want my answer. Well, here it is.

First of all, about some of your small and trifling phrases and insinuations. If these ugly "trifles" were an accidental element, one could ignore them. But they are so numerous and "pour forth" in such a lively spate that they set the tone of your entire letter. And as everyone knows, it is the tone that makes the music.

In your estimation the decision of the C.C. is a "noose," a sign that "the hour of my (that is, your) doom has struck." Why, on what grounds? What shall one call a Communist who, instead of reflecting on the essence of a C.C. decision and rectifying his mistakes, treats it as a "noose"?...

Dozens of times the C.C. praised you when praise was due. And dozens of times the C.C. shielded you (not without stretching things somewhat!) from the attacks of particular groups or members of our Party.

Dozens of poets and writers have been rebuked by the C.C. when they made mistakes. All this you considered normal and understandable. But when the C.C. found itself compelled to criticise your mistakes you suddenly started to fume and shout about a "noose." On what grounds? Has the C.C. perhaps no right to criticise your mistakes? Is the C.C. decision perhaps not binding on you? Is your poetry perhaps above all criticism? Do you not find that you have caught a certain unpleasant disease called "conceit"? A little more modesty, Comrade Demyan. . . .

What is the essence of your mistakes? The fact that your criticism of shortcomings in the manner and conditions of life in the U.S.S.R.—an

essential, imperative subject of criticism— which at first you carried out with considerable accuracy and skill, carried you away so that it began to turn in your works into slander of the U.S.S.R., of its past and present. Such are your "Get Down from the Oven" and "Without Mercy." Such is your "Pererva," which I read today at Comrade Molotov's suggestion.

You say that Comrade Molotov praised your skit "Get Down from the Oven." It is very possible. I praised it perhaps no less than Comrade Molotov did, for it (as well as other skits) contains a number of splendid passages that hit the nail on the head. But there is a fly in the ointment which spoils the whole picture and turns it into a veritable "Pererva." That's the point, and that's what sets the tone in these skits.

Judge for yourself.

The whole world now admits that the centre of the revolutionary movement has shifted from Western Europe to Russia. The revolutionaries of all countries look with hope to the U.S.S.R. as the centre of the liberation struggle of the working people throughout the world and recognise it as their only Motherland. In all countries the revolutionary workers unanimously applaud the Soviet working class, and first and foremost the Russian working class, the vanguard of the Soviet workers, as their recognised leader that is carrying out the most revolutionary and active policy ever dreamed of by the proletarians of other countries. The leaders of the revolutionary workers in all countries are eagerly studying the highly instructive history of Russia's working class, its past and the past of Russia, knowing that besides reactionary Russia there existed also revolutionary Russia, the Russia of the Radishchevs and Chernyshevskys, the Zhelyabovs and Ulyanovs, the Khalturins and Alexeyevs.

All this fills (cannot but fill!) the hearts of the Russian workers with a feeling of revolutionary national pride that can move mountains and perform miracles.

And you? Instead of grasping the meaning of this process, one of the greatest in the history of the revolution, and of being equal to the lofty tasks of a bard of the advanced proletariat—you retired to a quiet spot in the country and, after getting into a muddle between most tedious

quotations from the works of Karamzin and no less tedious maxims from the *Domostroi*,* began to shout from the house-tops that in the past Russia was an abomination of desolation, that present-day Russia is one solid "Pererva," that "laziness" and a desire "to lie on the oven-couch" are well-nigh national traits of the Russians in general and hence also of the Russian workers, who after achieving the October Revolution did not, of course, cease to be Russians. And this you call Bolshevik criticism! No, highly esteemed Comrade Demyan, this is not Bolshevik criticism but slander of our people, a discrediting of the U.S.S.R., a discrediting of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., a discrediting of the Russian proletariat.

And after that you want the C.C. to keep silent!

What do you take our C.C. for?

And you want me to keep silent on the ground that you, it appears, cherish a "biographical tenderness" for me! How naïve you are and how little you know the Bolsheviks. . . .

Perhaps, being a "literate person," you will not refuse to listen to the following words of Lenin's:

"Is the sense of national pride alien to us, Great-Russian class-conscious proletarians? Of course not! We love our language and our country, we are working most of all to raise her labouring masses (i.e., nine-tenths of her population) to the level of the politically conscious life of democrats and Socialists.

It pains us more than anything else to see and feel the outrage, oppression and humiliation inflicted on our splendid country by the tsarist hangmen, the nobility and the capitalists. We are proud of the fact that these outrages have roused resistance in our midst, the midst of the Great Russians; that from this midst came Radishchev, the Decembrists and the revolutionary commoners of the seventies; that the Great-Russian working class in 1905 created a mighty, revolutionary party of the masses; that at the same time the Great-Russian muzhik was becoming a democrat, began to overthrow the priest and the landlord.

We remember that half a century ago the Great-Russian democrat Chernyshevsky, who devoted his life to the cause of the revolution, said: 'A miserable nation, a nation of slaves, from top to bottom—all slaves.' The avowed and unavowed Great-Russian slaves (slaves of the tsarist monarchy) do not like to recall these words. Yet, in our opinion, these were words of genuine love of country, love saddened owing to the absence of a revolutionary spirit among the masses of the Great-Russian people. That spirit was absent at that time. There is little of it now; but it already exists. We are filled with a sense of national pride because the Great-Russian nation, too, has created a revolutionary class, it too has proved that it is capable of giving mankind splendid examples of struggle for freedom and for socialism, and not only great pogroms, rows of gallows, dungeons, great famines and great servility towards priests, tsars, landlords and capitalists" (see Lenin, *The National Pride of the Great Russians*). 1

That is how Lenin, the greatest internationalist in the world, could speak of the national pride of the Great Russians.

And he spoke thus because he knew that :

"The interests (not in the servile sense) of the national pride of the Great Russians coincide with the socialist interests of the Great-Russian (and all other) proletarians" (ibid.). 2

There you have it, Lenin's clear and bold "programme." This "programme" is fully comprehensible and natural to revolutionaries intimately linked with their working class, their people.

It is not comprehensible and not natural to political degenerates of the Lelevich type, who are not and cannot be linked with their working class, their people.

Can this revolutionary "programme" of Lenin be reconciled with that unhealthy tendency displayed in your latest skits?

Unfortunately, it cannot, and that is because they have nothing in common.

That is the point at issue and that is what you refuse to understand.

Therefore, you must at all costs turn back to the old, Leninist road.

That is the crux of the matter, and not the inane lamentations of a frightened intellectual who goes around in a blue funk talking about how they want to "isolate" Demyan, that Demyan "won't be printed anymore," and so on.

J. Stalin

December 12, 1930

* Domostroi, a memorial of Russian literature of the 16th century — a code of social, religious, and particularly family conduct. It has come to be a synonym for a conservative and uncultured mode of life. — Tr.

Notes

1. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 85
2. 2 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 87.

**An uncorrected transcript of I.V. Stalin at a meeting of the Politburo.
March 18, 1926**

Archive source: Transcripts of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) -VKP (b) 1923-1938. Moscow. ROSSPEN. 2007. Volume 1 1923-1926. P. 710-711

Archive: RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163.D. 681.L. 50-55. Script. Typescript.

Rykov. Comrade Stalin has the floor.

Stalin. Maybe allow me to continue to adhere to the regulations?

Stalin. I took the floor because with the statement of Comrade. Zinoviev, I cannot agree. Comrade Kamenev says that formally the question stands in such a way that the Politburo must either cancel the decision ... (inaudible), but how expedient is the removal of Comrade. Zinoviev. I say that it is impossible to formally direct the decision of the plenum of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee, it would be inappropriate. What is the inexpediency, error of this proposal in order to correct the decision? The fact that if Comrade. Zinoviev will remain at the head of the Soviet; he can once again turn the entire Leningrad organization into a battering ram for a strike against the Central Committee. Why am I talking about two centers? There were two centers, two press organs, two organizations: the Leningrad and the Central Committee, and the sharpest clash between these two centers was formally expressed at the congress. The Leningrad organization found itself in the rear of the majority. I affirm that this situation in our party, which is in power, cannot continue for any length of time. A party which, by the mercy of the leaders of the Leningrad organization, has in its rear such an organization, a quarrelsome organization as the Leningrad organization, cannot govern the country and the proletariat. From this point of view, I am considering the question of the advisability of removing Comrade. Zinoviev. I suppose...

Kamenev. Then you will have to change the argument.

Stalin. Why this question is actually a foregone conclusion, leave Comrade. Zinoviev at the head of the Leningrad organization - this means either splitting the Leningrad organization and rebuilding a part

against the Central Committee or throwing the entire organization into confusion. You led it against the party, against the congress — that is a fact. What is a co-report, what is your special resolution, which you passed, if not the usual ones, which were put forward when they were in the same party with the Mensheviks? You went for a split. Or did you not understand this? You are not always aware of what you are doing. That this double center has become more acute and it has become clear to everyone.

Voroshilov. When did it start?

Stalin. It began a year and a half ago, there is nothing to say about it. That such a situation cannot be tolerated, that the Leningrad workers understand this - it is also clear that they have turned sharply against the leaders, this is also not an accidental fact. That is why my opinion on the advisability of removing Comrade. Zinoviev. By this we will protect the Party from any attempts in the future.

About Lenin's methods. Lenin never proposed drastic measures. No, comrades, I must say everything. In the October days, at the time of the mistakes of Kamenev and Zinoviev, Lenin proposed seven times to expel one or the other from the Party who opposed this? In the Central Committee, I remember the mood of the Central Committee when we sent our decision to Lenin so that he would not insist on it, that he would not turn to the Party, because he wanted to turn to the Party. There is a letter about this to the Bolshevik Party about their expulsion. Comrades Trotsky and Dzerzhinsky and I insisted against this, and the majority of the Central Committee did not allow this to be carried out. Here is the opinion of Comrade. Lenin, when he took mistakes seriously, when he walked more decisively than we are doing now.

Voice. And the exclusion of Shlyapnikov, and the question of Tomsk?

Stalin. Democracy comrade Kamenev and Zinoviev. Our quarrels began when Zinoviev struck on the question of Trotsky. It is clear. We have a resolution of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee to exclude Comrade Trotsky from the Party, isn't that a fact? We argued with him. We have this resolution; I can deliver it now if you like. And another resolution to have this item turned off, and it turned off. Clause on the

application of the 7th clause of the resolution of the X Congress on exclusion. And it turns out that the majority of the Central Committee, those people who retained the majority, spoke on the contrary, did not allow the suppression to be carried out to the end.

About the discussion. I have never seen such a discussion that took place before the congress and at the congress in the history of the party. Perhaps it will be possible, although there was no discussion in such a detailed form, it was about the Brest-Litovsk peace with Bukharin, but then the party faced a split. I don't know a big discussion, take a larger discussion * (* So in the document.) . Take the minutes, a thousand pages, half of it, more than half devoted to discussion. You read, you know well, but after the congress, of course, there was no such case that the members of the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission after the decision of the congress opposed it, they must carry out the decision of the congress, if this does not happen, then it will not be a party, but a mess. You can always speak out, defend the decisions of the congress, always, no one closed his mouth. You must put the party in order, you must support it.

About the fact that the bureau of the collective was dispersed, this is the most interesting and, I would say, the most dangerous in the view of comrade. Zinoviev and Kamenev. They do not understand what happened, do not understand the separation that has taken place, do not understand why it was easy to raise the Leningrad organization against the old elite. Do you think thanks to the speeches of Kalinin and Molotov only? Nothing of the kind ... * (* There is a note from the stenographer: "Zinoviev's remarks are not heard.")

Stalin. I ask for hints to refrain, and both have done a great job. But because our congress campaign coincided with the onslaught of democracy, sudden democracy that manifested itself there. It has been refracted so that, thank God, we can speak, we can re-elect. How was it before? They held themselves like a near-sub * (* So in the document. Correctly " near-sub ."), did not allow to gather, dispersed already assembled meetings. It is a fact. Only because our congress campaign on the decisions of the congress coincided with this understanding of the minimum of democracy that was hidden there, led to this. This you

did not understand, and therefore everything goes like this. And the fact that after this impulse people dared to remove those who oppressed, this is called work. Nothing like this. This is the first exercise of the rights of democracy. And as for the Comintern and other things and the third congress, I was not here.

I told from the words of Ilyich. I was on vacation.

... and however, the question regarding Comrade. did not put it, because one is not always necessarily connected with the other. As for the fact that not a single party is raising this question, I said that. When they insisted on a discussion, we told them what you want? Do you want a change? No, they say. As for the work ... then you did the work, acted somewhat gently, maybe you went too far, had every right to do it ...

They were going to lead an illegal party in sections against our party and against our party ... You can get whatever work you want, and the people around you and the Central Committee of the party will carry out the decisions of the congress.



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Selected Transcripts 1903 - 1951 from
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